In re M.B. CA2/7 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/13/23 In re M.B. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re M.B., et al., Persons Coming B318130
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
________________________________ (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 21CCJP01737)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MAURICE B., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Dismissed in part and affirmed
in part.
Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Maurice B.
Serobian Law and Liana Serobian, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brandon W.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
INTRODUCTION
Maurice B., the father of 15-year-old Malaysia B., and
Brandon W., the father of nine-year-old Zion W., appeal from
findings and orders the juvenile court made on January 18, 2022.
Maurice argues the court erred in sustaining a supplemental
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3871
removing Malaysia from his custody, ordering him to attend
parenting and anger management classes, and requiring his
visits with Malaysia to be monitored. Brandon argues the court
erred in denying his request at the six-month review hearing for
custody of Zion and requiring his visits with Zion to be
monitored.
In July 2022, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile
court terminated its jurisdiction over Malaysia and Zion and
issued custody and visitation orders granting their mother,
Michelle (who is not a party to this appeal), sole custody of both
children, with monitored visitation for Maurice and Brandon.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
Maurice timely appealed from the July 2022 orders, but Brandon
did not.
Because the July 2022 custody and visitation orders
regarding Zion are final, we cannot provide Brandon any effective
relief in this appeal. Therefore, we dismiss his appeal from the
January 18, 2022 orders regarding Zion. In Maurice’s appeal,
which is not moot because he appealed from the July 2022 orders,
we affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition
orders regarding Malaysia.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Department Files a Petition Under Section 300,
and the Juvenile Court Detains Malaysia and Zion
In February 2021 Malaysia called law enforcement because
she became scared after a fight between her mother and
Brandon. Michelle told sheriff’s deputies that Brandon became
angry with her, pushed her into her bedroom, and grabbed her by
the neck and that Zion witnessed the incident. Brandon
admitted to the social worker that he had choked and “body-
slammed” Michelle, but said that he later “calmed down and
walked out.” He described the incident as a “misunderstanding.”
Malaysia told the social worker that her mother and
Brandon fought often, that Brandon was violent, and that she
and Zion feared Brandon. Zion said that Brandon was “mean” to
his mother and yelled at her and that it scared him when
Brandon banged on their door loudly at night. Zion said Brandon
once threatened Michelle with one of his two guns.
On April 15, 2021 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), on behalf of Malaysia and
3
Zion, alleging Michelle and Brandon had “a history of engaging in
violent altercations in the children’s presence” and that their
violent conduct “endangers the children’s physical health and
safety and places the children at risk of serious physical harm,
damage, and danger.”
The juvenile court detained Malaysia from Michelle and
Maurice, detained Zion from Michelle and Brandon, and placed
both children with a maternal aunt. The court ordered monitored
visitation for all three parents. The court granted Michelle’s
request for a temporary restraining order against Brandon and
ordered him not to have any contact with Malaysia.
B. The Juvenile Court Sustains an Amended Petition
and Places Malaysia with Maurice
In May 2021 the Department filed a first amended petition
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), adding allegations
Michelle and Brandon physically abused Malaysia and Zion by
hitting them with a belt. The Department soon filed a second
amended petition adding allegations that Michelle and Maurice
had a history of domestic violence and that Michelle obtained a
temporary restraining order against Maurice in 2015.
At a jurisdiction hearing in June 2021 the juvenile court
found Malaysia and Zion were persons described by section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b). The court sustained counts a-1 and b-1
(domestic violence between Michelle and Brandon) and a-3 and b-
3 (physical abuse by Brandon). The court also sustained counts
a-2 and b-2 (physical abuse by Michelle), but struck the
allegation Michelle hit Malaysia with a belt because the court
found Michelle no longer did that. The court dismissed counts a-
4 and b-4 (domestic violence between Michelle and Maurice). The
4
court granted a three-year restraining order protecting Michelle,
Malaysia, and Zion from Brandon.
At the disposition hearing in July 2021 counsel for
Malaysia expressed concerns about Maurice’s unresolved “anger
management issues” and said Maurice called the maternal aunt a
“bitch” in front of Malaysia. Counsel stated Malaysia wanted to
visit Maurice, but she was “not entirely comfortable with the idea
of living with him yet.” The juvenile court declared Malaysia a
dependent child of the court. The court removed Malaysia from
Michelle and placed her with Maurice on the following conditions:
(1) that Maurice “comply with parenting and anger management
in therapy”; (2) that no one discuss the case or make negative
remarks around Malaysia about her parents; and (3) that the
Department initiate a plan for Malaysia to transition to
Maurice’s home. The court ordered family maintenance services
for Malaysia and Maurice. The court also ordered Maurice to
participate in individual counseling to address anger
management, domestic violence, and parenting issues and to
participate in conjoint counseling with Malaysia if her therapist
recommended it. The court ordered Michelle to participate in a
support group for victims of domestic violence, parenting classes,
and individual counseling. The court ordered monitored
visitation for Michelle.
The juvenile court also declared Zion a dependent child of
the court, removed him from Michelle and Brandon, and ordered
reunification services and separate monitored visitation for both
parents. The court also ordered custody exchanges of Zion to
occur at a police station without either parent present.
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C. The Juvenile Court Sustains a Supplemental Petition,
Removes Malaysia from Maurice, and Returns
Malaysia and Zion to Michelle
Michelle complied with her case plan by completing a
parenting class. Maurice did not comply with his case plan.
Among other things, he did not provide the Department with
proof he had enrolled in counseling, and he violated the court’s
order to refrain from making negative comments to Malaysia. In
July 2021 the maternal aunt told the social worker that Maurice
called Malaysia, read aloud from the case reports about the
allegations of abuse committed by Brandon, and told Malaysia,
“You disgust me,” which caused Malaysia to cry. When the social
worker spoke with Maurice the next day about his comments to
Malaysia, Maurice denied making them and complained that, as
a man and a father, he was not being treated fairly by the
Department. The social worker invited him to attend the
Department’s support group for fathers, and he agreed to speak
with the social worker who led the group.
The following day Malaysia told the social worker that
Maurice complained about the maternal relatives during his
visits and that Malaysia wanted him to stop. In September 2021
the social worker told Maurice that speaking about the case or
saying negative things about the maternal relatives made
Malaysia cry or feel angry. Maurice denied saying those things
and said the maternal relatives were lying. A few weeks later
Malaysia again told the social worker that she wanted Maurice to
stop talking about Michelle and the maternal aunts. Malaysia
said that Maurice needed “counseling” and “anger management,”
that she was no longer comfortable having overnight visits with
Maurice, and that, when Maurice talked about the case or spoke
6
negatively about the maternal relatives, Malaysia thought about
“hurting others.”
In October 2021 the Department reported to the juvenile
court that Maurice’s “negative berating comments” endangered
Malaysia’s physical and emotional well-being. The Department
requested, and the juvenile court issued, an order removing
Malaysia from Maurice. When the social worker informed
Maurice of the court’s order, he accused the social worker and the
maternal relatives of lying and told the social worker, “You are
going to lose your job. You are a dumb racist bitch.”
On October 20, 2021 the Department filed a subsequent
petition under section 342 alleging Maurice emotionally abused
Malaysia by frequently making disparaging comments about
Malaysia, Michelle, and Michelle’s family. The Department also
filed a supplemental petition under section 387 seeking to remove
Malaysia from Maurice. The Department alleged that Maurice
did not comply with the court’s orders to participate in parenting
and anger management classes, that he violated the court’s order
not to discuss the case or make negative remarks about Michelle
in Malaysia’s presence, and that Maurice’s conduct endangered
Malaysia’s physical health and safety and put her at risk of
serious physical harm. When the social worker read the
allegations to Maurice, he said that they were not true and that it
was Malaysia who initiated discussion about the case and the
maternal relatives. Maurice stated, “What was I supposed to do,
tell her to shut up?”
At the October 25, 2021 detention hearing on the
subsequent and supplemental petitions, the court removed
Malaysia from Maurice and ordered monitored visitation and
7
phone calls. The court ordered the Department to assess whether
Michelle could have unmonitored and overnight visits.
At the January 18, 2022 combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing regarding Malaysia the court dismissed
without prejudice the subsequent petition under section 342 for
emotional abuse. The court sustained the supplemental petition
under section 387. The court found Maurice’s derogatory
statements about Malaysia, Michelle, and Michelle’s relatives
violated the court’s conditions for releasing Malaysia to Maurice.
The court also found Maurice was “not complying with the case
plan in that it does not appear he is addressing parenting and
anger management in his individual counseling.” And, the court
stated, “the persistent nature and extent of his negative
comments shows he is not working on the issues at all.” In
contrast, the court found Michelle had made substantial progress
in her case plan. The court removed Malaysia from Maurice and
placed her with Michelle on the condition Michelle comply with
family preservation services.
The court ordered Maurice to participate in parenting and
anger management classes and individual counseling to address
age-appropriate discipline for children and anger management
and domestic violence issues. The court ordered monitored
visitation for Maurice. Maurice timely appealed from the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings on the sustained
supplemental petition under section 387 and the court’s
disposition orders.
The juvenile court also conducted on January 18, 2022 a
six-month review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e),
regarding Zion. The court denied Brandon’s request that the
court place Zion with him or alternatively that Brandon have
8
unmonitored visitation. The court stated that Brandon had not
completed even half of the 52-week domestic violence program
and that Brandon had committed “really serious domestic
violence . . . that included him strangling the mother until she
fell to her knees and threatening mother with a gun.” The court
stated Brandon “may be making progress, but he has to make a
lot more for the court to consider return or even unmonitored
visits.” The court released Zion to Michelle. Brandon timely
appealed from the juvenile court’s orders under section 366.21,
subdivision (e).
D. The Juvenile Court Terminates Jurisdiction, Grants
Michelle Sole Custody of Both Children, and Orders
Monitored Visitation for Maurice and Brandon
At the July 22, 2022 review hearing under section 364, the
juvenile court awarded Michelle sole legal and physical custody of
Malaysia and Zion and ordered monitored visitation for Maurice
and Brandon. On July 26, 2022, after receiving custody and
visitation orders, the court terminated its jurisdiction over
Malaysia and Zion.2 Maurice timely appealed from the court’s
July 2022 orders; Brandon did not.
2 We granted the Department’s motion to take judicial notice
of the juvenile court’s July 22, 2022 and July 26, 2022 orders.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
9
DISCUSSION
A. Brandon’s Appeal Is Moot; Maurice’s Appeal Is Not
1. Applicable Law
“Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness
concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to
appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court
proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) “‘[T]he
critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is
moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective
relief if it finds reversible error.’” (In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163; see In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
275.) An “appeal may become moot where subsequent events,
including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the
reviewing court to grant effective relief.” (Rashad D., at p. 163.)
“A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether
subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case
moot and whether [its] decision would affect the outcome in a
subsequent proceeding.’’’” (D.P., at p. 276.) “‘When no effective
relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.’”
(In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1050-1051.)
Even when a case is moot, a court may exercise its
“inherent discretion” to reach the merits of the dispute. (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Discretionary review generally
is appropriate only when a case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur, when the controversy between the
parties may recur, or when a material question remains for the
court’s determination. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court in D.P.
identified several non-exhaustive additional factors for
10
evaluating whether discretionary review of a moot case may be
warranted. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First, the court may consider
whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current
or future dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing the
child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency
petition or the juvenile court’s determination about further
reunification services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the court may
consider the nature of the allegations against the parent: “The
more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the
parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Third, the court may consider whether the case became moot due
to prompt compliance by parents with their case plan: “It would
perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine
resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings
only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has
issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)
2. We Cannot Grant Brandon Any Effective Relief
in His Appeal from the Order at the Six-month
Review Hearing Denying His Request for
Custody or Unmonitored Visitation
We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on
whether we should dismiss the appeals as moot in light of the
juvenile court’s July 2022 orders awarding Michelle custody of
the children, ordering monitored visitation, and terminating
jurisdiction. In a supplemental letter brief Brandon argues his
appeal is not moot because the juvenile court’s errors “are not
isolated, but set the stage and resulted in the later orders.” But
that is not the standard for mootness. Brandon’s appeal is moot
because we cannot provide him any effective relief. Even if we
11
were to reverse the juvenile court’s January 18, 2022 order
denying his request for custody or unmonitored visitation, the
court’s now-final July 2022 custody and visitation order would
preclude placing Zion with him or allowing unmonitored
visitation. Because we cannot provide Brandon any effective
relief, his appeal from the January 18, 2022 orders under section
366.21, subdivision (e), is moot. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 276 [case becomes moot when events “‘“render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of
plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief”’”].)
Nor is it appropriate to exercise our discretion to hear
Brandon’s moot appeal under In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266.
Brandon does not argue the challenged orders could impact
future dependency proceedings; the findings involving Brandon,
though very concerning, were not especially egregious for
allegations of physical domestic violence; and the case became
moot because the juvenile court returned Zion to Michelle and
terminated jurisdiction, not because Brandon promptly complied
with his case plan. No other factor justifies reaching the merits
of his moot appeal. (See id. at p. 286 [“no single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal”].)3
3. Maurice’s Appeal Is Not Moot
Unlike Brandon, Maurice appealed from the juvenile
court’s July 2022 orders. Therefore, his appeal from the January
18, 2022 jurisdiction findings and disposition orders is not moot
3 In re Samuel A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67, cited by
Brandon, did not involve mootness.
12
because we can provide him effective relief if we rule in his favor
in this appeal and in his appeal from the July 2022 orders. (See
In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [“in addition to
the appeal from the jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the
orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is
necessary for this court to be able to provide effective relief”];
In re J.S. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295 [juvenile court’s
order terminating jurisdiction did not moot the appeal from prior
orders where the “exit orders [were] also pending appeal”].)4
The Department argues Maurice’s appeal is moot because
in his opening brief in his appeal from the July 2022 orders (the
only brief filed so far in that appeal), Maurice, according to the
Department, challenges the “custody orders but not the
termination of jurisdiction.” Maurice’s notice of appeal in that
case, however, states he is appealing from “[o]rders from the
Section 364 hearing on 07/22/2022” and lists as hearing dates
“7/26/2022, 7/22/2022, and 7/18/2022.” Those are the correct
orders, and they include the order terminating jurisdiction. And
a timely challenge to a custody and visitation order includes an
implicit challenge to the accompanying order terminating
jurisdiction and a request to vacate the latter order for the
limited purpose of reversing the former. In any event, putting
aside whether an appellant’s opening brief in one appeal can
moot a prior appeal, the jurisdiction rule in dependency cases
under Rashad D. requires that the appellant file a timely notice
of appeal from the order terminating jurisdiction, not that the
appellant make good or even the right arguments in his or her
opening brief.
4 A custody and visitation order is commonly referred to as
an “exit order.” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513)
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B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the
Supplemental Petition, Removing Malaysia from
Maurice, Ordering Maurice To Attend Parenting and
Anger Management Classes, and Requiring His Visits
To Be Monitored
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When a child protective agency seeks to change the
placement of a dependent child from placement with a parent to a
more restrictive placement, the agency must file a supplemental
petition under section 387. (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
1154, 1161; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.560(c).) “In the
jurisdictional phase of a section 387 proceeding, the court
determines whether the factual allegations of the supplemental
petition are true and whether the previous disposition has been
ineffective in protecting the child. [Citations.] If the court finds
the allegations are true, it conducts a dispositional hearing to
determine whether removing custody is appropriate. [Citations.]
A section 387 petition need not allege any new jurisdictional
facts, or urge different or additional grounds for dependency
because a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction already exists.
[Citations.] The only fact necessary to modify a previous
placement is that the previous disposition has not been effective
in protecting the child.” (T.W., at p. 1161; see In re D.D. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 985, 989-990.) We review the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction and disposition findings for substantial evidence.
(T.W., at p. 1161; D.D., at p. 990.)
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2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Finding the Previous Disposition Had
Not Been Effective in Protecting Malaysia
Maurice argues the juvenile court erred in sustaining the
section 387 petition because substantial evidence did not support
the court’s finding his failure to comply with the court’s orders
put Malaysia “at a substantial risk of harm.” As an initial
matter, Maurice appears to confuse the standard for jurisdiction
under section 300, subdivision (b), with the standard for moving a
child from placement with a parent to a more restrictive
placement under section 387. When a child protective agency
files a supplemental petition under section 387, the juvenile court
already has jurisdiction, and the “law does not require that a fact
necessary to establish jurisdiction under section 300 be
established to warrant a change in placement.” (In re A.O. (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 103, 110.) To sustain the supplemental petition,
the juvenile court only had to find the previous disposition was
not effective in protecting Malaysia. (See T.W., supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.)
Which is what the juvenile court found. The court found
that Maurice made “really negative comments about [Michelle]
and the maternal relatives” and “very negative comments about
Malaysia herself” and that these comments violated the court’s
conditions for releasing Malaysia to Maurice. The court further
found Maurice’s behavior was very damaging to Malaysia.
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
findings. Despite the court’s order, Maurice continued to
disparage Michelle and her family and discuss the case
allegations with Malaysia. In July 2021 Maurice read Malaysia
the report of Brandon’s abuse and told Malaysia that she
15
“disgusted” him. Between June and September 2021 the social
worker warned Maurice five times not to criticize the maternal
relatives when he was around Malaysia. In September 2021
Malaysia told the social worker that she wanted Maurice to stop
talking about Michelle and the maternal family, that she did not
want to have overnight visits with Maurice, and that she felt she
was doing better since she left Maurice’s home. Malaysia also
said Maurice’s negative talk made her think of hurting other
people. In November 2021 the social worker read Malaysia the
allegations in the supplemental petition, and Malaysia said they
were true. Malaysia said, “I love my dad, but he really needs
help. My dad would always talk bad to me about my mom and
aunts and it made me really mad. I have felt like wanting to hurt
people because of the stuff he would say. I would get so mad at
him and it would just make me sad.”
Maurice attempts to deflect or minimize his responsibility
for his conduct by asserting that he “only spoke of the mother and
the maternal relatives when [Malaysia] brought them up” and
that “it was understandable [he] might discuss the mother and
the maternal relatives with” Malaysia because there were
“frequent custody exchanges” and “continuous conflict over
visits.” But claiming “the child started it” did not excuse
Maurice’s violations of the court’s order, which required Maurice
to refrain from speaking negatively about the maternal relatives,
even if Malaysia raised the topic. By continuing to criticize
Michelle and her family in front of Malaysia in violation of the
court’s order, Maurice brought Malaysia into the conflict,
allowing his anger to take priority over Malaysia’s well-being.
Maurice also argues that, even if he violated the juvenile
court’s order by speaking negatively about the maternal relatives,
16
it was “unlikely to recur” because he “had enrolled in
e-counseling and was refraining from discussing case issues or
[Michelle] in [Malaysia’s] presence.” The record does not support
Maurice’s suggestion his problematic behavior was unlikely to
recur. At the January 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing
Maurice produced a receipt showing he had participated in six
phone sessions with an online therapist, but he submitted no
evidence he was addressing anger management, domestic
violence, or parenting issues during those sessions, as the court
had ordered. Maurice never gave the Department an enrollment
or progress letter indicating he was addressing the case issues,
and he refused to provide verification his therapist was approved
by the Department.
Finally, Maurice’s behavior around Malaysia undermined
his assertion he was learning to control his anger. As late as
November 8, 2021, after Maurice had completed three of his six
therapy sessions, Malaysia told the social worker, “I got tired of
[Maurice] always talking bad about my mom. I love my dad, but
he really needs help and to get into parenting and anger
management classes. Once he does that and is doing better, then
I will want to talk to him.”
3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Order Removing Malaysia from
Maurice
When a section 387 petition seeks to remove a child from
parental custody, the Department must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned
17
home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor
from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1); see In re D.D., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 996
[“‘When a section 387 petition seeks to remove a minor from
parental custody, the court applies the procedures and
protections of section 361.’”]; In re T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1163 [same].) “‘The parent need not be dangerous and the
minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is
appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the
child.’ [Citation.] The court may consider a parent’s past conduct
as well as present circumstances.” (In re N.M. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169-170.)
“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011; see In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
147, 149.) “In conducting its review, the court must view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below
and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(O.B., at pp. 1011-1012.)
Maurice contends the juvenile court erred in removing
Malaysia from his custody because there were reasonable means
to protect her without removal, such as ordering the Department
“to make unannounced home visits” and providing “family
preservation services” and “conjoint counseling.” Maurice does
18
not explain how those alternatives would have prevented him
from continuing to make harmful negative remarks to Malaysia.
The juvenile court reasonably concluded Maurice was unlikely to
change his behavior because he failed to accept responsibility for
the harm he caused Malaysia. The court found Maurice “is just
in complete denial, so I think he will continue to violate this
court’s orders and continue to say really damaging things to and
in front of Malaysia. So those findings further support my
jurisdiction findings and now support my removal order.” (See
In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 156 [“The inference from
[the father’s] denial is that he is less likely to change his behavior
in the future.”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“In light
of mother’s failure to recognize the risks to which she was
exposing the minor, there was no reason to believe the conditions
would not persist should the minor remain in her home.”].)
Maurice also contends he was enrolled in counseling and
“learning to refrain from discussing the case issues or the
mother” in Malaysia’s presence. But as discussed, there was no
evidence that Maurice was addressing parenting and anger
management issues in counseling or that his behavior with
Malaysia was improving. Substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
placing Malaysia with Maurice posed a substantial risk of harm
to her and that there were no reasonable means to protect her
except by removing her from his custody. (See In re Cole C.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 918 [removing the child was
necessary where the father did not accept voluntary service
referrals and did not acknowledge the inappropriate nature of his
parenting techniques].)
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4. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion in Ordering Maurice To Attend
Parenting and Anger Management Classes
Maurice argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering him to attend parenting and anger management classes.
Section 362, subdivision (a), provides “the court may make any
and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody,
conduct, maintenance, and support” of a child described by
section 300. Such orders may include “a direction to participate
in a counseling or education program,” so long as “[t]he program
in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be
designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s
finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.”
(§ 362, subd. (d); see In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663,
673.) “‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what
would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a
dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination
cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’” (In re
D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071; see In re I.R. (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 510, 522 [“We review the juvenile court’s
disposition case plan for an abuse of discretion.”].)
Maurice argues that he did not need parenting or anger
management classes and that Malaysia “was often drawn into
the conflict” with Michelle’s family about scheduling visits.
Maurice admits that the conflict was “upsetting” to him “and
sometimes caused him to vent,” but he contends that the court
should have ordered him to address parenting and anger
management in individual counseling. But that’s what the
juvenile court ordered at the disposition hearing six months
earlier, and it did not stop Maurice from complaining and venting
20
to Malaysia. In ordering Maurice to attend classes, the court
stated that “it appears he really does need to do parenting
[classes] because he doesn’t acknowledge how his own behavior is
very damaging to his child and what his responsibility is towards
her and how to handle his frustration with her. . . . Parenting
classes teach an adult how to deal with that frustration. I hoped
he would address it in individual counseling, but there is no
evidence that he has done that.” Given Maurice’s lack of progress
in controlling his anger, the juvenile court acted well within its
discretion in ordering him to attend parenting and anger
management classes. (See In re Carmen M. (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 478, 486 [juvenile court has “broad discretion to
determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest
and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this
discretion”].)
5. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion in Ordering Monitored Visits
Visitation between a parent and child must be as frequent
as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(A); see In re D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)
However, “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the
child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B); see In re T.M. (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1218.) “The power to regulate visits between
dependent children and their parents rests with the juvenile
court and its visitation orders will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion.” (D.P., at p. 1070; see In re
Brittany C. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356 [“[w]e review an
order setting visitation terms for abuse of discretion”].) The
juvenile court ordered Maurice’s visits with Malaysia to be
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monitored, “given the extraordinary nature” of Maurice’s
negative statements to Malaysia. The same evidence that
supported the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding under
section 387, the removal order under section 361,
subdivision (c)(1), and the order to attend classes supported the
court’s order for monitored visitation.
Maurice argues the court should have allowed unmonitored
visitation because he and Malaysia “had a close and bonded
relationship,” Malaysia loved Maurice and “initially requested to
live with him,” and Maurice was participating in online
counseling. Malaysia expressed interest in living with Maurice
(as well as with her maternal aunt) in June 2021, after the court
removed her from Michelle and placed her with her maternal
aunt, and before Malaysia had ever lived with Maurice. But in
November 2021, after living with Maurice, Malaysia said that his
criticism of her mother and aunts made her angry and sad and
that she did not want to have contact with Maurice until he got
help and was “doing better.” The juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in requiring a monitor to be present during Maurice’s
visits to ensure Maurice refrained from making harmful negative
remarks. (See § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B); In re D.P., supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 [“juvenile court reasonably exercised
its discretion to limit mother to monitored visits”].)
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DISPOSITION
Brandon’s appeal from the juvenile court’s orders under
section 366.21, subdivision (e), regarding Zion is dismissed. The
court’s jurisdiction findings on the section 387 petition regarding
Malaysia are affirmed. The court’s disposition orders removing
Malaysia from Maurice, requiring him to complete parenting and
anger management classes, and requiring monitored visitation
are affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
FEUER, J.
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