People v. Villalpando CA4/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/7/23 P. v. Villalpando CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E079902
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF2201458)
ERICK ANGEL VILLALPANDO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Wohl Law and David E. Wohl for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Erick Angel Villalpando was charged by amended felony
complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a),
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count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (b), count 2). As to both counts, it was alleged that defendant personally
inflicted great bodily injury (GBI). (Pen. Code,1 § 12022.7, subd. (a).) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, he pled guilty to both counts and admitted the GBI allegations. A trial court
placed him on probation for a period of three years, on specified terms and conditions,
including that he spend 120 days in county jail. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to
withdraw his plea (§ 1018), after learning that his teaching credential was revoked based
on his conviction for a strike offense. The court denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to withdraw his plea. He also contends the denial of relief violated his equal
protection rights. The People concede, and we agree, that the court erred in denying his
motion. We therefore reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 24, 2022, the Riverside County District Attorney (the district attorney)
filed a felony complaint, charging defendant with driving under the influence of alcohol
(Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a), count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08
percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 2).
On May 17, 2022, the district attorney amended the complaint to add the
allegation, as to both counts 1 and 2, that defendant personally inflicted GBI during the
commission of the felony. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
The court held a hearing that same day. At the outset of the hearing, the court
stated that it had a chambers conference with the parties that morning. The court noted
there was an issue as to whether, if defendant pled guilty, the People would be adamant
that he needed to serve the time “straight in custody.” Defense counsel informed the
court about defendant’s employment as a schoolteacher and the potential loss of his job if
he remained in custody, given that they were at the end of the school year.
The court stated that if defendant entered a plea, it would impose 120 days of
custody and order him to wear a SCRAM device2 while released on probation. The court
added that it would postpone the surrender date for that custody time until June 23, 2022,
at which time it would determine whether the time needed to be served straight or if
defendant could serve the time on the work release program. The court then informed
defendant that the People had submitted an amended complaint, which added allegations
under section 12022.7. The prosecutor confirmed that the allegation would add three
years to the sentence, and defense counsel informed the court that defendant had been
advised that the allegation was under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and would add an
additional three years and make the offense a strike offense, and his maximum exposure
was now six years.3 The court reviewed the plea form with defendant and confirmed that
he understood he was pleading guilty to a strike offense and that he understood the
2 A SCRAM device appears to be an alcohol detection device.
3 We observe that defense counsel only referred to a single allegation and strike
offense, whereas the amended complaint added the section 12022.7 allegation to both
counts 1 and 2.
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constitutional rights he was waiving by signing the form. The court also informed
defendant that because he was pleading to a felony, he would no longer be able to own or
possess a weapon or ammunition. It then gave him the following example: “Say you’re
back at school teaching and some student dropped a bullet and you think you’re doing the
world a favor by collecting that and you picked it up, some police officer could say
you’re in violation of the law by having that bullet, and you could go to state prison up to
three years. Because you have a strike in this case, that would get doubled to six.”
Defendant acknowledged his understanding and pled guilty to counts 1 and 2 and
admitted as true the GBI allegations.
The court proceeded to place defendant on formal probation for a period of three
years. It informed him that he would be released that day, he had two days to have the
SCRAM device affixed, and he needed to complete a first offender impaired driver
program. The court also stated that he would be brought back to court on June 23, 2022,
and that if he was complying with all the specified conditions, it would likely allow him
to serve the remainder of his time on the work release program instead of in county jail.
The court concluded by addressing defendant directly and stating: “You have a lot
of things going for yourself. You have an impressive education. You have a good job, a
lot of people that obviously care about you and watch you today, but you also obviously
have some kind of issue with alcohol which you’re struggling with; . . . The problem
becomes when you drive a motor vehicle, and in this case you injured somebody. . . . As
I advised you, if you do it again and you were to kill somebody this conviction would be
evidence that the district attorney will use in your homicide trial to show that you’ve been
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advised and lectured.” The court added, “there’s a lot of people in here that really don’t
have a lot going for themselves, and in some ways not a lot to lose. You have quite a bit
on the table and so you have a major incentive.”
Defendant returned to court on June 23, 2022, and requested to serve the rest of
his sentence on work release. The court granted his request.
On August 3, 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. He argued that
he had good cause for withdrawing his plea since it was the product of mistake and
ignorance. He said that at the time he entered his plea, he was unaware that his
admission of the GBI enhancement would result in the automatic loss of his teaching
credential. Defendant attached a copy of a letter he had received from the Commission
on Teacher Credentialing (the Commission), informing him that pursuant to Education
Code section 44424, his teaching credential was revoked due to his felony convictions
and admitted GBI enhancements.4 He also submitted a declaration stating that he
graduated from the University of California, Riverside, with a master’s degree in
education, and received his teaching credential in June 2013. In August 2013, he got a
job teaching Spanish at a middle school and loved it. When he was subsequently charged
with two counts of driving under the influence and causing GBI, he opted to take the plea
bargain. He said no one advised him that by admitting the GBI allegation he would
4 Education Code section 44424 provides, in relevant part: “Upon the conviction
of the holder of any credential issued by the State Board of Education or the Commission
on Teacher Credentialing of a violation, or attempted violation, of a violent or serious
felony as described in Section 44346.1 . . . the commission shall revoke the credential.”
A “serious felony” includes any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts GBI on
any person. (Ed. Code, § 44346.1, subd. (c), Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
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automatically lose his ability to teach, and he found out only when he received the letter
from the Commission. Defendant said he was devastated when he found out, and that, if
he had known, he unequivocally would have rejected the court’s offer and asked for more
time or tried other ways to get the prosecutor to drop the GBI allegation so that he
“would not lose what [he] worked for so long to achieve.”
The court held a hearing on the motion on September 13, 2022. Defense counsel
argued there was good cause to withdraw the plea because defendant was unaware that
his plea would result in automatic revocation of his teaching credential. He asserted that
advisement as to the loss of the credential needed to be part of advisement given to
someone “who’s entering into this type of plea.” Counsel argued, “[T]he reality is there
should have been an advisement of that, and the fact that there wasn’t led to prejudice
that literally took away [defendant’s] entire career.” Defense counsel compared the
situation to that of a defendant who pleaded guilty without being advised as to the
immigration consequences of the plea. He said he could not find a case directly on point
but that defendant had demonstrated good cause for withdrawing his plea by showing that
he entered the plea without knowing it would cause him to lose his career. Defense
counsel contended such loss was not a collateral consequence of the plea, but a direct
consequence since the Education Code stated that if someone is convicted of a strike
offense, they lose their credential and are not entitled to a hearing.
The prosecutor argued that defendant’s motion should be denied because the only
evidence provided was defendant’s self-serving declaration. The prosecutor also argued
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that collateral consequences “do not need to be advised to the defendant” and that
defendant losing his teaching credential was a collateral consequence.
The court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, stating that “a
defendant does need to be advised of all of the direct consequences that would flow from
a conviction. He needs to be advised of what he’s pleading guilty to, the maximum
consequences, the length of probation, the time he’s going to serve, [and] terms of
probation.” The court said it looked up the Education Code statute cited in the
Commission’s letter and noted that losing his credential was “essentially an immediate
consequence of the fact of the type of conviction he suffered.” The court then focused on
whether defendant was legally entitled to “have that information provided to him.” It
stated that it found Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, which concerned a similar
situation with immigration consequences, to be instructive. The court then concluded
that there was no requirement for defendant to be advised of the consequence of losing
his teaching credential and that it was a collateral consequence of the plea. The court
added, “. . . here under the circumstances, I don’t feel that anything occurred that
[defendant] wasn’t advised of that he didn’t take into consideration and that he needed to
be advised of.” The court was empathetic, but said defendant was not foreclosed from
being a teacher permanently since he could be successful on probation and possibly have
his credential reinstated. The court then found that good cause had not been shown and
denied the motion.
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DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Withdraw
Defendant argues the court abused its discretion in denying his motion by applying
the wrong standard and finding there was no good cause under section 1018. He asks this
court to reverse the order denying the motion and give him relief that we consider “just,
proper, and equitable.” The People concede that the court applied the wrong standard
when it concluded there was no requirement that defendant had to be advised of the
consequence of losing his teaching credential and thereby erred in denying the motion.
The People state that defendant is entitled to a new hearing at which the court applies the
correct law. We agree with the People.
A. Standard of Review
“A defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea may do so before judgment
has been entered upon a showing of good cause.” (People v. Weaver (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 131, 145 (Weaver); see § 1018.) “To establish good cause, it must be shown
that defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming
the exercise of his free judgment. [Citations.] Other factors overcoming defendant’s free
judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress.” (People v. Huricks (1995) 32
Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) “ ‘The burden is on the defendant to present clear and
convincing evidence [that] the ends of justice would be subserved by permitting a change
of plea to not guilty.’ ” (Weaver, at p. 146.) “ ‘Withdrawal of a guilty plea is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court. A denial of the motion will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a showing the court has abused its discretion.’ ” (Huricks, at p. 1208.) “A trial
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court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable to the
issue at hand.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 85.)
B. The Court Abused its Discretion
In People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 (Giron), the California
Supreme Court held that a defendant could establish good cause to withdraw a guilty plea
under section 1018 by showing that he or she was unaware that the plea would result in
deportation. (Id. at p. 798.) In that case, the defendant claimed that when he pled guilty
to possessing marijuana, he, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the court were all unaware
that deportation would be a collateral consequence of his plea. (Id. at pp. 796-797.) The
Supreme Court stated that a trial court “in the exercise of its discretion directed to the
promotion of justice may take into consideration such material matters with which an
accused was confronted and as to which he made erroneous assumptions when he entered
a guilty plea. The court might consider that justice would not be promoted if an accused,
willing to accept a misdemeanor conviction and probationary status, cannot by timely
action revoke his election when he thereafter discovers that much more serious sanctions,
whether criminal or civil, direct or consequential, may be imposed.” (Id. at p. 797.) The
Court specifically stated: “We do not deem the thrust of the argument to be that [the
defendant] was entitled as a matter of right to be advised of such collateral consequences
prior to the acceptance of his plea nor do we so hold.” (Ibid.) The Court held that “the
test of abuse in such circumstances is whether after consideration of all relevant factors
there was good cause shown for granting the motion and whether justice would be
promoted thereby.” (Id. at p. 798.)
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In People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885 (Patterson), the defendant similarly
sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that at the time of the plea, he was
unaware the conviction would render him subject him to deportation. (Id. at p. 895.) In
that case, the defendant was advised that his plea may have immigration consequences,
and he alleged he was unaware that his plea would make him subject to deportation and
that he would not have entered the plea if he had known. (Id. at p. 898.) The Supreme
Court stated that, “[i]f those allegations are true, he did not appreciate the risk he was
taking by entering a guilty plea. Nothing in our cases bars a trial court from exercising its
discretion in these circumstances to grant or deny a motion under section 1018 to
withdraw the plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance.” (Ibid.) In other words, even
when a defendant receives a proper advisement under section 1016.5, the advisement did
not appear to be “a categorical bar to the withdrawal of a guilty plea on grounds of
mistake or ignorance.” (Id. at p. 896.)
The Court in Patterson noted that the trial court “did not rule on whether [the
defendant] had credibly demonstrated that he would not have entered a guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance had he known the plea’s immigration
consequences.” (Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 899.) Rather, the trial court concluded
that even if he was unaware of the actual immigration consequences of his guilty plea,
“he could not, as a matter of law, show good cause to withdraw that plea because he had
been advised that his plea ‘may’ have adverse immigration consequences.” (Ibid.) The
Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion on that basis and
reversed the order and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine
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whether defendant had shown good cause to withdraw his plea on the grounds of mistake
or ignorance. (Ibid.)
Here, it appears that the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw based
on its conclusions that the loss of his teaching credential was a collateral consequence,
and he was not required to be advised of that consequence. The court stated, “I don’t feel
that anything occurred that [defendant] wasn’t advised of that he didn’t take into
consideration and that he needed to be advised of.” The court was apparently saying it
did not think anything happened that defendant needed to be advised of and thereby made
the standard that he was not required to be advised that he would have his teaching
credential revoked. However, whether or not defendant was advised of the consequence
of losing his teaching credential was not determinative of whether he established good
cause to withdraw his plea. In other words, the trial court did not rule on whether he had
established good cause on the grounds of mistake or ignorance under section 1018. (See
Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 899.)
We further note, as defendant points out, that the court’s representations made it
seem as if he would be able to keep teaching. At the outset of the plea hearing, defense
counsel informed the court that defendant was a teacher and could lose his job if he
remained in custody, given that they were at the end of the school year. The court agreed
to postpone the surrender date until June 23, 2022, at which time it would determine if he
could serve his custody time on the work release program. Furthermore, the court
informed defendant that because he was pleading to a felony, he would no longer be able
to own or possess a weapon or ammunition. It gave him the example that he would be in
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violation if he was “back at school teaching” and a student dropped a bullet, and he
picked it up. The court later acknowledged defendant had a “good job” and warned him
of what would happen if he were to drink and drive again and kill someone, stating that
he had “quite a bit on the table.”
In view of the circumstances, we will remand the matter to the trial court to
consider the relevant factors and rule on whether defendant has credibly demonstrated
that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known of the consequence of losing
his teaching credential. (See Giron, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 798 & Patterson, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 899.) In light of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to address
defendant’s additional argument that the court’s denial of his motion violated his right to
equal protection.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court to determine if defendant has established good cause
to withdraw his plea on the grounds of mistake or ignorance under section 1018. We
express no view as to whether defendant has established good cause.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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