In re M.F. CA2/4 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/10/23 In re M.F. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re M.F., et al., Persons B320148
Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP01024A-B)
Department of Children and
Family Services,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Philp L. Soto, Judge. Dismissed as moot.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for respondent minors Matthew F. and
Lynette F.
______________________________________________
Mother, C.R., appeals from an order denying her
request to return her children to her custody at a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.221 status review hearing.
Mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding that placing
the children in her custody created a substantial risk of
detriment to the children. The juvenile court has since
terminated its jurisdiction and entered a final custody order
granting Father, M.F., sole physical custody of the children
and Mother unmonitored visitation rights. Because Mother
did not appeal this order, there is no effective relief she can
be granted. Further, we decline to exercise our inherent
discretion to reach the merits. Therefore, the appeal is
dismissed as moot.
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and Father are the parents of Matthew F. and
Lynette F. (the children). In February 2019, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) filed a petition under section 300 alleging that
the children were at substantial risk of harm.
On April 3, 2019, at the adjudication and disposition
hearing, the court declared the children dependents and
sustained the petition, as amended by interlineation, under
section 300 subdivision (b)(1). The sustained allegations
stated that the children were at risk of harm because of
Mother’s and Father’s history of engaging in violent
altercations, Father’s substance abuse, and Mother’s and
Father’s failure to protect the children. The court removed
the children from Mother and released them to Father.
The Department then filed a section 387 petition
alleging Father failed to comply with court orders by abusing
alcohol and allowing Mother to have access to the children,
and the court authorized the Department to detain the
children from Father’s custody. At the hearing on June 5,
2019, the court sustained the section 387 petition and
removed the children from Father’s custody. The court
ordered family reunification services for the parents with
monitored visits. The children were placed with their
maternal grandmother.
At the six-month status review hearing on December 4,
2019, the children were returned to Mother’s custody, and
the Department was ordered to provide family maintenance
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services to the children and parents and enhancement
services to Father. Over the next year, the Department
continued its investigation and provided services to the
family. On March 30, 2021, the juvenile court authorized
detaining the children from Mother and continuing to detain
them from Father. The children remained in their maternal
grandmother’s care.
On April 1, 2021, the Department filed another section
387 petition alleging that Mother failed to comply with the
juvenile court’s orders and to protect the children. The
Department concurrently filed a section 342 petition alleging
that Mother and Father engaged in domestic violence
incidents in November 2020, February 2021, and March
2021. On June 4, 2021, the court sustained the petitions,
removed the children from Mother’s and Father’s custody,
and ordered family reunification services for the children
and parents.
On April 26, 2022, the court held a section 366.22
review hearing. Mother requested that the court return the
children to the parents with shared custody. After hearing
argument and reviewing evidence, the court returned the
children to Father’s custody and ordered monitored visits for
Mother. The court stated that it did not appear that Mother
was internalizing the lessons from the court-ordered
programs in which she participated based on an incident
that occurred in January 2022 when Mother and Father
were together, in violation of a court order, at the home were
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the children were staying. Mother timely appealed the
order.
After Mother filed this appeal, on January 24, 2023,
the juvenile court found the conditions that justified the
initial assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 no longer
existed and were not likely to exist if supervision was
withdrawn. The court terminated its jurisdiction and stayed
the order pending receipt of a juvenile custody order giving
Father sole physical custody, giving the parents joint legal
custody, and giving Mother unmonitored visitation rights.
On January 27, 2023, the court entered the final juvenile
custody order, lifted its stay, and terminated its jurisdiction
(the exit order). The children’s counsel filed a request for
judicial notice of these post-appeal orders, which was
granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c) & (d).)
Pursuant to Government Code section 68081, we sent a
letter to the parties soliciting their views on whether
Mother’s appeal was moot in light of the January 2023
orders. The children filed a letter brief contending the
appeal is not moot because the challenged findings “could
affect future proceedings as to Lynette,” as Matthew F. turns
18 in July 2023, and asking that we affirm the April 26,
2022, order. They did not specify how the affirmance of the
order would affect future proceedings. The Department
argues in a letter brief that the January 2023 orders, which
Mother has not challenged, have rendered Mother’s appeal
moot. Mother did not file a brief addressing this issue.
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DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect,
and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In
re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276, quoting Consolidated etc.
Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863.)
“A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff,
to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to
be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the
plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the
harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the
outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In a dependency case, “relief is
effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 277.)
Depending on the circumstances, an order terminating
juvenile court jurisdiction can render an appeal from a
previous order in a dependency proceeding moot. (In re
Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163.) “However,
dismissal of a dependency appeal for mootness following
termination of jurisdiction ‘is not automatic, but “must be
decided on a case-by-case basis.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also
In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 663–664 [“The
termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not
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categorically prevent a reviewing court from granting
effective relief in all cases”].)
“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.
[Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) “As a
rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion to review
a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when
a material question remains for the court’s determination.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
B. Mother’s Appeal is Moot and Does Not Warrant
Discretionary Review
Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s April 26,
2022, order at the section 366.22 hearing, ordering the
children returned to Father and monitored visits for Mother.
Mother argues that insufficient evidence supported the
court’s refusal to return the children to her custody.
However, more recently, the juvenile court entered the exit
order awarding sole physical custody to Father, joint legal
custody to parents, and unmonitored visits for Mother as
arranged by the parents. There is no indication that Mother,
or any other party, appealed from the exit order, and her
time to do so has expired. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.406.) The Department asserts that this renders this
appeal moot, and Mother has not argued otherwise though
invited to do so. We agree that the appeal is now moot.
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Reversing the April 26, 2022, order regarding custody
and visitation “could not deliver the desired relief—namely,
a change in custody and/or visitation. Even after such
reversal, the more recent custody and visitation terms
contained in the exit order would govern. To effect an actual
change in custody and visitation rights, the appellate court
would need to reverse the juvenile court’s last word on
custody and/or visitation—the exit order terminating
jurisdiction on those terms—which . . . the appellate court
does not have the power to do if that order has not been
appealed.” (In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 666–
667.) Consequently, there is no effective relief that can be
granted for Mother.2 (See In re Rashad D., supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [juvenile court had no jurisdiction to
conduct further hearings, including modification of its
custody order, unless reviewing court also reversed or
vacated order terminating dependency].)
Further, exercise of our discretionary authority to
consider the merits of Mother’s appeal is not warranted. No
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur has been
identified. Mother has not offered any reason we should
consider the appeal on the merits now that the exit order has
become final. While the children ask the court to affirm the
2 Mother is not left without a remedy. Under section 302,
subdivision (d), she may seek modification of the final custody order in
a proceeding under Family Code section 3021 if she can demonstrate
“there has been a significant change of circumstances since the
juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order is in the
best interests of the child.” (§ 302, subd. (d).)
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juvenile court’s April 26, 2022, order, they do not specify the
way in which affirmance, as opposed to leaving the order
undisturbed, would affect future proceedings. Any impact
that the challenged findings may have in future proceedings
is far too speculative for us to exercise our inherent
discretion to consider the challenged order. (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Therefore, we decline to
address the merits of Mother’s appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Mori, J.
We concur:
CURREY, Acting P. J.
COLLINS, J.
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