Scaccia v. Scaccia CA3 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/20/23 Scaccia v. Scaccia CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
BRIAN SCACCIA, C094344
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CV-2014-
1820)
v.
JOHN SCACCIA, JR.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Brian Scaccia representing himself, appeals following summary judgment granted
in favor of his brother, John Scaccia, Jr.,1 who is also representing himself. The brothers
sued each other in Ohio and California for various claims arising from the care,
treatment, and estate of their deceased mother, Anne Ringkamp. John sued in Ohio, and
then Brian sued in California. Years after John obtained a judgment against Brian in the
1 Because the brothers share the same surname, we intend no disrespect and refer to each
by their first name in order to avoid confusion.
1
Ohio action, the trial court in Yolo County entered judgment for him in the California
action. On appeal, Brian claims the trial court erred. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
We start by noting a fundamental tenet of appellate practice. An appellant’s
opening brief must contain “a summary of the significant facts” relevant to the issues
raised in the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Where the judgment and
all underlying rulings are purportedly being challenged on appeal, a factual summary is
critically important, particularly in a case such as this where the record spans 28 volumes
and more than 20,000 pages. In light of the absence of a coherent factual summary in
appellant’s opening brief, the following is our attempt to briefly summarize what appear
to be the relevant facts as asserted by appellant, with additional facts highlighted in
pertinent discussions below.
Anne Ringkamp (Ringkamp), the mother of Brian and John, died at Sutter Davis
Hospital (Sutter) in November 2013. In the next year, John sued Brian in Ohio, and then
Brian sued John in Yolo County. Each claimed, among other things, that the other
brother breached a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff brother or to Ringkamp,
committed fraud, and converted large sums of Ringkamp’s money, thereby harming her
heirs. Brian’s suit included a cause of action for wrongful death against John, Sutter, and
a Sutter medical doctor, claiming there was a conspiracy to “euthanize” Ringkamp.
Ultimately, John obtained a default judgment in the Ohio action against Brian in
2014 (Ohio judgment). And in 2021, John obtained a judgment in his favor in Brian’s
Yolo County action, after the trial court granted summary adjudication on all of Brian’s
claims that were not later voluntarily dismissed. The trial court’s judgment for John is
the subject of this appeal.
As Brian characterizes the facts, Ringkamp lived in Ohio from 1997 to 2013,
where she rented a house from John, who lived next door. In August 2013, she moved to
California and began living with Brian. In September 2013, Brian took her to the Sutter
2
emergency room because she was having difficulty breathing and appeared to have
suffered a stroke.
Brian’s second amended complaint states that a scan of Ringkamp’s lungs
revealed a liver tumor. Dr. Daniel Kennedy (Dr. Kennedy), one of her treating
physicians at Sutter and a codefendant in the underlying action, stated the tumor was
probably caused by metastatic cancer elsewhere in the body and that she was dying of
cancer. Dr. Kennedy refused tests to determine if Ringkamp had cancer, and
recommended a course of action finding that Ringkamp’s quality of life had deteriorated
so much that it should not be prolonged. Brian disagreed and stated it was premature to
treat Ringkamp as if she had terminal cancer, insisting that her poor health was likely the
result of bad living conditions in Ohio. After Ringkamp was discharged from the
hospital, she told Brian she wanted aggressive treatment.
On November 10, 2013, Ringkamp returned to Sutter with severe respiratory
distress. Within days, she contracted an antibiotic-resistant infection and was placed on a
ventilator. Dr. Kennedy claimed she was in pain, and he sought Brian’s permission to
remove her from the ventilator. When Brian refused, Dr. Kennedy contacted John and let
him make decisions about Ringkamp’s care and treatment, despite Brian’s warnings to
Dr. Kennedy that John had committed “financial and physical elder abuse and neglect” of
Ringkamp. Dr. Kennedy did not attempt to obtain a copy of Ringkamp’s advanced health
care directive (AHCD), which Brian had previously told Dr. Kennedy about, and which
named Brian as Ringkamp’s agent in healthcare decisions.
John told Dr. Kennedy that Brian had kidnapped Ringkamp for financial reasons,
that she was in decent health when in Ohio, and that Brian was starving and abusing her
financially and physically. Dr. Kennedy never gave Brian an opportunity to rebut John’s
claims. Believing that Ringkamp’s death would “silence the sole witness to his unpaid
loans [from] her . . . and keep anyone from learning that he used fraud or extortion to take
money from her since 2003,” Brian claimed that John decided to “euthanize” Ringkamp
3
and that Dr. Kennedy agreed. With the approval of John, who had traveled to California,
and without Brian’s knowledge, Ringkamp’s ventilator was removed on November 23,
2013, and she died that day.
Brian sued John, Dr. Kennedy, and Sutter, both on his own behalf and on behalf of
Ringkamp. The operative complaint contains 22 causes of action, 20 of which are
asserted against John.2
In 2020, John moved for summary adjudication on most of Brian’s claims in the
second amended complaint, arguing many of the claims implicated the 2014 Ohio
judgment John obtained against Brian, and therefore were barred by California’s
“litigation privilege” and/or principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and “full faith
and credit.”3
In September 2020, the trial court overruled Brian’s objections to John’s evidence,
and granted summary adjudication in favor of John on 14 of Brian’s claims. Citing the
parties’ separate statements of material facts, the trial court explained that John met his
burden of showing that one or more elements of each cause of action could not be
established, or that there was a complete defense to the cause of action, and Brian had
failed to show that a triable issue of material facts existed as to any of those causes of
action or complete defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
2 A different panel of this court recently affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in
favor of Dr. Kennedy and Sutter in Scaccia v. Kennedy et al. (Mar. 30, 2023, C093627)
[nonpub. opn.] (Kennedy et al.).
3 Article IV, section 1, of the United States Constitution provides that “Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State.”
Similarly, California law provides that “the effect of a judicial record of a sister state is
the same in this state as in the state where it was made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1913, subd.
(a).)
4
After Brian voluntarily dismissed the six remaining claims against John, the trial
court entered judgment for John in June 2021. Brian timely appealed. This case was
fully briefed in April 2023.4
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant’s Burden on Appeal
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609
(Jameson).)
To demonstrate the trial court’s summary adjudication for John was incorrect,
Brian must “support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority.
[Citations.] When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a
particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration.
[Citations.] In addition, citing cases without any discussion of their application to the
present case results in forfeiture. [Citations.] We are not required to examine
undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen); see Woods v. Horton (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 658, 677 [“A court need not consider an issue where reasoned, substantial
argument and citation to supporting authorities are lacking”]; Wright v. City of Los
Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“asserted grounds for appeal . . . that merely
4 In March 2023, Brian requested we take judicial notice of multiple categories of
documents, including court filings in Ohio, court filings in connection with the probate of
Ringkamp’s estate, and portions of the record in Kennedy et al. John opposed. The
request for judicial notice is denied, because consideration of the documents is
unnecessary for resolution of this appeal.
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complain of error without presenting a coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned
and unworthy of discussion”].)
In addition to providing reasoned, coherent argument and supporting legal
authority, an appellant must provide adequate citations to the record on appeal. (Mansell
v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 (Mansell).) “Rather than
scour the record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged
on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.” (WFG National
Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 (WFG).)
Simply put, “it is not this court’s function to serve as . . . backup appellate counsel.”
(Mansell, at p. 546.) These rules apply here, even though Brian, like John, is
representing himself, and “self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient
treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)
II
Claims of Error
A. “Refused Continuances and Recusal”
Brian argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying continuances he
sought without considering his homelessness, automobile breakdowns, and “heavily
litigated related cases burdening him.” He also asserts the trial court “refus[ed] to
recuse” itself. Brian does not support these contentions with reasoned argument. He says
the trial court “refus[ed] to recuse,” but provides neither a pertinent citation to the record
nor argument. And although he cites one case, the case has no discussion of pertinent
law. Accordingly, this claim is forfeited on appeal. (See Woods v. Horton, supra, 167
Cal.App.4th at p. 677.)
B. “Defense Rests on Void Judgment”
Under this claim, and interspersed throughout the opening brief, Brian appears to
argue that the Ohio judgment is void because the Ohio courts lacked personal jurisdiction
over him, and never fairly decided the issue of jurisdiction. Specifically, Brian appears to
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contend John never mailed necessary paperwork to Brian’s address in California, and an
Ohio appellate court ruling rejecting a version of this contention was “contrary to
jurisdictional law and facts,” thereby “creat[ing] extrinsic fraud” by depriving Brian of
the opportunity to present his defense to John’s action. Citing sections of the Probate
Code, Brian also appears to argue Ohio courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all
of John’s claims because they concerned Ringkamp’s estate, which was probated in Yolo
County.
To the extent this claim is an effort to assert that the Ohio judgment does not
preclude any of Brian’s causes of action against John, we are not persuaded. Brian has
not demonstrated the Ohio judgment is void. And the provisions of the Probate Code that
Brian cites, but does not discuss, do not stand for the proposition that John could not
bring his Ohio claims against Brian.
1. Preclusion
“Preclusion comes in two main forms: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
[Citation.] . . . Like many courts, [our Supreme Court] previously used the terms ‘res
judicata’ and ‘collateral estoppel’ when discussing claim and issue preclusion,
respectively.” (Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 323.)
Claim preclusion “ ‘prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit
between the same parties or parties in privity with them.’ [Citation.] Claim preclusion
arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties
(3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is
established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” Issue preclusion
“prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the
second suit raises different causes of action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015)
61 Cal.4th 813, 824.)
“The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar relitigation of a factual
dispute even when the factual dispute was erroneously decided in favor of a party who
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did not testify. . . . [¶] Courts often speak of applying full faith and credit to a sister
state’s judgment in order to implement res judicata principles. [Citation.] ‘With respect
to judgments, “the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.” [Citation.] . . . A State
may not disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees with the reasoning
underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the merits.’ ” (Hawkins v. SunTrust
Bank (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393-1394.)
Citing Milliken v. Meyer (1940) 311 U.S. 457 (Milliken), Brian contends that
“[v]oid judgments are rendered by courts lacking jurisdiction either of the subject matter
or the parties.” He further contends that because his appeal of the Ohio judgment
resulted in a decision “contrary to jurisdictional law and facts,” the Ohio judgment is
“void under [Ohio] law.” We are not persuaded.
Milliken stands for the proposition that “[w]here a judgment rendered in one state
is challenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter
is . . . open to inquiry,” “[b]ut if the judgment on its face appears to be a ‘record of a
court of general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction over the cause and the parties is to be
presumed unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by the record itself.’ ” (Milliken,
supra, 311 U.S. at p. 462.) If jurisdiction is not disproved, “the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the
logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the
judgment is based. [Citations.] Whatever mistakes of law may underlie the judgment
[citation] it is ‘conclusive.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Ohio judgment on its face appears to be a record of a common pleas court,
which is a court of general jurisdiction. (Ohio High Sch. Ath. Ass’n v. Ruehlman (2019)
157 Ohio St. 3d 296, 298.) Brian offers no reasoned argument regarding what extrinsic
evidence or parts of the record of the Ohio judgment disprove jurisdiction. His
contention that an Ohio appellate ruling was “contrary to jurisdictional law” is unavailing
as it depends on an impermissible “inquiry into . . . the validity of the legal principles” on
8
which the Ohio judgment was based. (Milliken, supra, 311 U.S. at p. 462; see Medical
Legal Consulting Servs. v. Covarrubias (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 80, 87 [citing Milliken for
the proposition that in cases “involving full faith and credit issues, it is presumed that the
first state to impose a judgment had jurisdiction over the parties”].)
2. Probate Code Section 7050-7052
Brian invokes sections 7050-7052 of the Probate Code, which relate to trial court
jurisdiction over proceedings concerning the administration of a decedent’s estate and the
proper venue for these proceedings. He asserts these statutes support the proposition that
“[o]nly Yolo County’s court had jurisdiction over claims by purported beneficiaries” of
Ringkamp’s will “or those making claims against the estate or its beneficiaries.” Even if
Brian’s understanding of those statutes is accurate, there is no reasoned argument in his
brief discussing the nature of each of John’s claims from the Ohio judgment, and how
they might fall within the categories of claims Brian contends could have been brought
only in Yolo County. All Brian tells us in his opening brief is that had John been truthful
John’s kidnapping claim would have rendered an Ohio court a potential venue for the
claim. Such an assertion without support by pertinent or cognizable legal argument and
factual analysis is forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
C. “Conversion and Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship”
It appears Brian’s claim under this heading is that he should be permitted to amend
his complaint regarding causes of action for conversion and tortious interference with a
business relationship. This claim is forfeited on appeal, because a trial court’s decision
denying leave to amend is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and it is a plaintiff’s
burden to demonstrate abuse. (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 603, 612.) Although it is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the trial court
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend, Brian does not explain in his brief which
trial court order he is challenging or rebut the presumption that the trial court’s order is
9
correct. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609; Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p.
52.)
D. “Abused Process and/or Maliciously Prosecuted”
Brian also now “seeks amendment to clarify” his abuse of process cause of action
“and add a [cause of action] for malicious prosecution.” But he again does not explain in
his brief which trial court order he is challenging or rebut the presumption that the trial
court’s order is correct. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.) Accordingly, this
contention is forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
E. “Defamation and False Light Rulings Abused Discretion and Erroneous”
This claim appears to be that the trial court’s summary adjudication of causes of
action for false light and defamation was error because John “created an evidentiary
void” on those issues by refusing to provide discovery and that Brian therefore was
entitled to “favorable inferences.” Brian does not cite to the record to support the
assertion John created an evidentiary void. Because this claim is not supported by
adequate citations to the record and fails to present a coherent argument, this claim is
forfeited on appeal. (See Mansell, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 545-546; Allen, supra,
234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
F. “Unjustifiable Denials of Plaintiff’s Motions”
Here, Brian’s argument is that the trial court erred in February 2020 when it
denied his motion for partial default judgment against John. Brian contends the trial
court claimed his motion was based on John’s failure to answer the operative complaint.
That was error, Brian contends, because the title of his motion clearly stated the basis for
sanctions was fraud, contempt, and discovery abuse.
The relevant order denied Brian’s motion without prejudice, in part because Brian
had “not established that lesser sanctions, such as an order striking pleadings or parts of
pleadings or an order staying further proceedings until discovery orders are obeyed, have
been inadequate to curb abuses of the discovery act.” (Italics added.) Brian offers no
10
discernible, reasoned argument how this component of the ruling, which clearly
references the notion of discovery abuses, was error. Accordingly, the argument is
forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
Further, Brian also appears to challenge the trial court’s denial of his own motion
for summary adjudication. But, again, he provides no reasoned argument how that ruling
was error. So this argument is forfeited on appeal too. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at
p. 52.)
G. “Conspiracy: Wrongful Death, Probate Codes, and Elder Abuse”
Brian argues the trial court erred by granting summary adjudication in favor of
John on his wrongful death, “decisions law,” and elder abuse causes of action. For
example, Brian argues that John “ignored records stating” Brian was Ringkamp’s “agent
with her AHCD.” But Brian provides no citation to these records. Accordingly, this
claim is forfeited on appeal. (See Mansell, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 545-546.)
To the extent we can find relevant portions of the record on our own, we reject
Brian’s claim on the merits. For instance, Brian contends John’s motion for summary
adjudication was supported with “inadmissible evidence.” But the trial court overruled
all of Brian’s evidentiary objections to John’s evidence in support of his motion for
summary adjudication, and Brian does not explain how that evidentiary ruling was error.
Brian also appears to contend that because John “feigned ignorance” that Brian
was Ringkamp’s “designated surrogate and AHCD agent,” there is a triable issue of fact
as to whether there was a conspiracy between John, Dr. Kennedy, and Sutter to hasten
Ringkamp’s death. Though Brian provides no citation to the record in support of this
contention, Brian argued in the trial court it was “inconceivable” John did not know
Ringkamp had an AHCD. For support of that contention in the trial court Brian cited to a
portion of his declaration, wherein he states that in July 2013, John’s son entered a room
in Ohio as the AHCD was explained to Ringkamp by a “healthcare social worker and
nurse,” and Brian explained to John’s son “what was occurring.”
11
That John’s son might have known about the AHCD does not create a triable issue
of fact that John knew about the AHCD. (See Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1524 [“A party cannot avoid summary judgment based on
mere speculation and conjecture”].)
H. “Fraud”
Brian seeks to amend his cause of action for fraud, arguing he was “unjustly
denied” the opportunity to amend the second amended complaint. But again, he provides
no reasoned argument in support of the contention. Accordingly, the contention is
forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
Brian also argues John “knowingly represented fraudulent medical records to the
Ohio court.” But having found above that Brian failed to demonstrate the Ohio judgment
is “void,” and therefore that the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in California,
we must reject any effort by John to collaterally attack the Ohio judgment.
I. “Appellant Denied Discovery”
Brian’s argument for this claim discusses ostensible discovery abuses by John’s
codefendants in the trial court, and explains that “records relevant to this appeal . . . await
the related appeal,” Kennedy et al. Such argument, without factual or legal support, does
not demonstrate trial court error in granting summary judgment to John and we need not
discuss it.
Brian also argues that “[j]ustifying the merits and necessity of [his] discovery to
his case and in opposition to [John] would make” his 122-page opening brief
“excessively large.” Accordingly, Brian refers us to the justifications in his trial court
motions and cites nearly 500 pages of the record. As it is not our job to “scour the record
unguided” and since he simply directed us to underlying papers, Brian has forfeited this
argument on appeal. (WFG, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.)
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J. “Unrepresented One-Person Estate-Heirs Can Pursue . . . Claims”
Brian invokes case law for the proposition that, even though non-attorneys cannot
represent “multiple-heir estates,” it may be possible that a sole beneficiary can represent
an estate. But Brian does not tether this proposition to a specific ruling of the trial court
that he is challenging. Accordingly, this claim is forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234
Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
K. “Denied Right to Amend”
Arguing the trial court improperly denied him leave to amend his complaint on
multiple occasions, Brian cites approximately 400 pages of the record without clearly
identifying which rulings or orders he challenges on appeal, and as noted numerous
times, it is not our job to cull through the record to find support for undeveloped
arguments. Accordingly, this claim is forfeited on appeal. (WFG, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th
at p. 894; see also Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574,
600.)
Within the pages Brian cites, is a July 15, 2020, order by the trial court denying
with prejudice Brian’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The trial court
reasoned that motion “completely fail[ed] to comply with California Rule of Court
3.1324(b),” because Brian did not state in his supporting declaration the effect of the
amendment, why the amendment was necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to
the amended allegations were discovered, and the reasons why the request was not made
earlier. Although it is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the trial court abused its
discretion in denying leave to amend (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc.,
supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 612), Brian does not explain in his brief why that order was
erroneous or rebut the presumption that the trial court’s order is correct (Jameson, supra,5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609). Accordingly, this contention is forfeited on appeal. (Allen,
supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
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L. “MSJ Gave Insufficient Notice and Incompetent Evidence Justifying
Denial”
Citing section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure, Brian appears to contend that
modified courthouse operations in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a
violation of his statutory right to a minimum number of days between the filing of John’s
motion for summary adjudication and the trial court’s hearing on that motion on
September 2, 2020. Specifically, Brian appears to argue that he had only “21 court days”
to prepare for a hearing on John’s motion for summary adjudication.
Section 437c, subdivision (a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires notice of
the motion for summary judgment and supporting papers be served on all other parties to
the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing, and increases the notice
period by specific numbers of days depending on the location of the intended recipient.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(2).)
As far as we can tell, there were over 200 calendar days between when John filed
his motion and when the trial court conducted its hearing on the motion. We are unable
to discern from Brian’s argument how this amounted to a violation of the statute. In any
event, Brian has not satisfied his burden to rebut the presumption that the trial court’s
order is correct. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
Brian also argues the trial court erroneously “refused to continue the MSJ
hearing,” and that John’s motion for summary adjudication relied on inadmissible
evidence and an “incompetent declaration.” The trial court overruled all of Brian’s
evidentiary objections to John’s evidence in support of his motion for summary
adjudication, and Brian’s conclusory assertions of trial court error without pertinent cites
to the record are insufficient. (See Wright v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th
at p. 689 [“asserted grounds for appeal . . . that merely complain of error without
presenting a coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of
discussion”]; WFG, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.)
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M. “Defendants’ MSJs are Based on Inadmissible Hearsay and Incompetent
Expert Testimony”
Brian’s argument for this claim appears to be directed at the judgment for John’s
codefendants, which is not the subject of this appeal. For example, Brian argues Dr.
Kennedy’s motion for summary judgment relied “solely” on “fraudulent notes.” We
discern no coherent argument in this claim explaining why the judgment for John was
improper. Accordingly, this claim is forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th
at p. 52.)
N. “Spoliation Prevented Shifting Burden”
Spoliation refers to the intentional destruction or suppression of evidence.
(Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 4.) “[T]here are a
number of . . . remedies that seek to punish and deter the intentional spoliation of
evidence,” including “the evidentiary inference that evidence which one party has
destroyed or rendered unavailable was unfavorable to that party.” (Id. at p. 11.) This
inference is codified in Evidence Code section 413, which provides, “In determining
what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case against a party, the trier of
fact may consider, among other things, the party’s failure to explain or to deny by his
testimony such evidence or facts in the case against him, or his willful suppression of
evidence relating thereto, if such be the case.” (Evid. Code, § 413.) Brian cites Cedars-
Sinai Medical Center and Evidence Code section 413, but does not discuss them,
resulting in forfeiture of the argument. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
Brian contends “[d]efendants” (plural) “effectively spoliated” 10 categories of
medical records. But Brian fails to explain how these records were either destroyed or
suppressed, resulting in forfeiture of the argument. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p.
52.)
15
O. “Failed to Disprove Plaintiff’s Case”
Brian argues “[j]udges cannot abdicate their roles to scrutinize facts by sleepily
d[ef]erring to expert summaries.” He also argues medical “[m]alpractice is provable . . .
by showing obviously inappropriate treatment,” and that evidence here “shows
[d]efendants[] denied treatment, tortured, and killed” Ringkamp. We discern no reasoned
argument challenging the trial court’s judgment for John. Accordingly, this claim is
forfeited on appeal. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. John is entitled to his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (a)(2).)
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
KRAUSE, Acting P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
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