People v. Parra CA2/6 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/25/23 P. v. Parra CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B309749
(Super. Ct. No. NA003695)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
FROM SUPREME COURT
JOEL QUINTANA PARRA,
Defendant and Appellant.
In August 2021, we filed our opinion affirming the
postjudgment order denying Joel Quintana Parra’s1 motion to
vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7.
(People v. Parra (Aug. 6, 2021, B309749 [nonpub. opn.].)
Quintana contends his guilty plea to felony forgery is invalid due
to prejudicial error impairing his ability to understand the
immigration consequences of his plea. In October 2021, the
1 The record contains several variations of appellant’s
name, including Joel Parra Quintana, Joel Para Quintana, Joel
Parra, and Joel Quintana-Parra.
California Supreme Court granted review and in May 2023
transferred the matter back to us “with directions to vacate [our]
decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Espinoza
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 311.” We do so, and upon reconsideration,
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Guilty plea and sentence
In 1990, Quintana was charged with felony counts of
receiving stolen property (count 1, Pen. Code, § 496, former subd.
1) and forgery of a vehicle certificate of title (count 2, Pen. Code,
§ 470). Quintana pleaded guilty to forgery in exchange for felony
probation and one year in county jail. The trial court advised
him: “If by some chance you are not a citizen of this country, this
conviction could result in your being deported, your being denied
naturalization, your being denied the right to come back into the
country at a later time.” Quintana said he understood. The
minute order states, “Defendant advised of possible effects of plea
on any alien/citizenship/probation/parole status.”
The court placed Quintana on probation with terms
including 365 days in the county jail, with credit for 101 actual
days served and 50 days conduct credit. On motion of the People,
the court dismissed count 1.
In 1995, the court found Quintana in violation of probation
and sentenced him to 16 months in state prison, with credit for
335 actual days served and 165 days conduct credit. He received
a concurrent prison sentence of 16 months for a 1995 felony
conviction of petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666). In 2016,
the section 666 conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor. (Pen.
Code, § 1170.18, subd. (g).)
2
Immigration proceedings, motion to vacate, and the trial
court’s ruling
In 2012, Quintana was detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE sought his removal from the
country based on a 2010 conviction of possession of a firearm by a
felon. The basis for removal was then amended to substitute
conviction of forgery with a loss to the victim of $10,000 or more.
ICE again substituted its basis for seeking removal to a 2002
conviction for causing corporal injury to a spouse. Quintana
states that this is the offense for which he is facing removal.
Quintana sought discretionary relief of cancellation of
removal. (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) § 240A(a).) The immigration judge determined that
Quintana was not eligible for relief because his conviction for “an
offense relating to . . . forgery. . . for which the term of
imprisonment is at least one year” was an “aggravated felony.”
In 2020, Quintana filed a motion to vacate the forgery
conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. He stated that
a 1988 theft conviction and the forgery conviction were crimes of
moral turpitude that subjected him to deportation. Because the
forgery sentence was a year or more, it was an aggravated felony
that subjected Quintana to mandatory deportation and
permanent exclusion from the United States. It also made him
ineligible to apply for discretionary cancellation of removal to
remain in the country. The former public defender who
represented Quintana during the guilty plea did not remember
the case.
At the hearing on the motion to vacate his conviction,
Quintana testified he had been arrested several times as a
juvenile and adult, but had no contact with ICE until 2012.
3
When he pleaded guilty, his attorney told him “[o]f the
deportation or something. Something like that.” His attorney
told him the immigration consequences “would be deportation
and all that. But it didn’t apply to me because I was legal. I was
not illegal.” When asked if he drew that conclusion or his
attorney told him that, Quintana responded, “I guess we both
came to the conclusion.”
His attorney never told him forgery was a moral turpitude
crime that would result in deportation. When asked if receiving
that advice would have affected his decision to plead guilty,
Quintana said he would still think not because he was “legal.”
Quintana pleaded guilty because “they would have found
me guilty anyways” and “they already had the evidence of stuff
against me.” He “took the deal” because with his custody credits,
he was “basically going to get out of custody.”
The trial court denied the motion to vacate. The court
found that Quintana’s attorney told him he “could be deported.
That this was a deportable offense.” The court found that counsel
and the trial judge “did what [they were] supposed to do” by
advising that deportation was possible. But Quintana “just didn’t
think it applied” to him. The court did not “think [Quintana]
would have done anything differently.” He made a “rational
decision” to plead guilty to one of the two counts for time served.
Prior appellate proceedings
We previously affirmed the trial court’s postjudgment order
denying Quintana’s motion to vacate his guilty plea to felony
forgery pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7. According
substantial weight to the trial court’s credibility findings and
exercising our independent judgment to determine whether the
facts satisfy the rule of law (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th
4
510, 524-527), we concluded Quintana established that the
forgery conviction “is currently causing or has the potential to
cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration
benefit.” (Pen. Code, § 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) However, we
concluded that Quintana was adequately advised that his guilty
plea would result in deportation. We also concluded that
Quintana had not shown prejudicial error because he did not
corroborate his claim that he would have gone to trial if he
understood his plea would adversely impact his legal permanent
resident status.
DISCUSSION
In People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 (Espinoza), a
noncitizen defendant sought to vacate his no contest plea because
his lawyer did not advise him that pleading to the charges would
put him in danger of losing his permanent resident status, being
deported, and being barred from reentry into the United States.
Had he known that his plea would have adverse immigration
consequences notwithstanding his legal permanent resident
status, defendant claimed he “would instead have taken the case
to trial or agreed to a longer sentence in exchange for an
immigration-safe plea.” (Id. at p. 318.) The issue was whether
the defendant had established prejudicial error to vacate his plea
by sufficiently corroborating his claim that “immigration
consequences were a paramount concern.” (Id. at p. 317.)
Our Supreme Court in Espinoza concluded the noncitizen
defendant was prejudiced by his failure to understand the
immigration consequences of his no contest plea on his legal
permanent resident status. “ ‘Factors particularly relevant to
this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the
importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
5
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible.’ [Citations.] Also relevant
are the defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable
outcome if he had rejected the plea, as well as the difference
between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were
convicted at trial. [Citation.] These factors are not exhaustive,
and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 320-321.)
This case is similar to Espinoza in several respects. Both
defendants came to the United States from Mexico as children.
Both had strong family ties in the United States and lengthy
work histories here. Both were advised of the immigration
consequences but believed they did not apply to them because
they were lawful permanent residents. Both claimed their
attorneys said or implied they would not be deported. Both
claimed they would not have pleaded guilty or no contest if they
had known the immigration consequences but would have gone to
trial or sought an immigration-safe plea. (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 317-319.)
While “a defendant’s deep and long-standing ties to the
United States are among the totality of circumstances that can
support an inference that immigration consequences were of
paramount concern” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323), here
there are other circumstances that weigh against a finding of
prejudicial error. “Another consideration is whether alternative,
immigration-safe dispositions were available at the time of the
defendant’s plea. Factors relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution’s
case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes
6
involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging policies
with respect to immigration consequences, and the existence of
comparable offenses without immigration consequences.” (Ibid.)
Lack of criminal record is relevant to whether “the
prosecutor might have been willing to offer an alternative plea
without immigration consequences.” (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 324.) Espinoza had no prior criminal record. (Ibid.)
He also “presented evidence from an immigration attorney that
there were alternatives the prosecution could have offered that
would not have resulted in mandatory deportation.” (Ibid.)
Thus, “Espinoza’s lack of a criminal record, combined with the
declaration of the immigration attorney, support his assertion
that he had reason to expect or hope for a plea bargain without
immigration consequences. This enhances the ‘credibility of [the]
defendant’s claim’ that he ‘would have rejected the plea bargain’
had he been properly advised.” (Ibid.)
On the other hand, Quintana had a significant prior record
at the time of his guilty plea. Quintana presented no evidence
regarding the availability of an immigration-safe alternative
bargain. (Cf. People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1179-
1180 [defendant detailed alternative pleas without same adverse
immigration consequences].) Quintana’s counsel stated in a
declaration that Quintana could have served the same amount of
custody time if he were sentenced to 364 days with a waiver of
accrued and future custody credits. But he has not shown how
that would have been a more favorable disposition for
immigration purposes because forgery resulting in a year or more
of custody was not an aggravated felony at that time.
Forgery with a possible term of imprisonment of five years
or more became an aggravated felony on April 24, 1996.
7
(8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), INA § 101(a)(43)(R), as amended by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) § 440(e)(8).) Effective September 30, 1996, the
definition of aggravated felony was amended to include forgery
for which a sentence of one year or more was imposed. (8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(R), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA)
§ 321(a)(10).) Quintana concedes the “365 [day] rule” was not in
effect at the time of the 1990 guilty plea. Nor was it in effect
when the court revoked Quintana’s probation and sentenced him
to 16 months in prison. The amendment is retroactive—it applies
“regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or
after [September 30, 1996].” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), final par., as
amended by IIRAIRA § 321(b) & (c); Aragon-Ayon v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3d 847[amendment is retroactive]; see Vartelas v. Holder (2012) 566
U.S. 257, 267 [recognizing retroactive effect].)
Nor did Quintana offer any evidence regarding the district
attorney’s charging policies in 1990 with respect to immigration
consequences.
Quintana also testified that he pleaded guilty during jury
selection because “they would have found me guilty anyways”
and “they already had the evidence of stuff against me.” He “took
the deal” because with his custody credits, he was “basically
going to get out of custody.” Thus, unlike Espinoza, there is
insufficient objective evidence to corroborate Quintana’s assertion
that he would have rejected the plea bargain, continued with his
trial, or sought an immigration-safe plea. (Espinoza, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 318.)
Quintana has deep and long-lasting ties to the United
8
States. He is not only a financial provider for his family, but a
caregiver to his daughter and spouse. The potential immigration
consequences of Quintana’s conviction to him and his family are
significant. “The immigration consequences of criminal
convictions have a particularly strong impact in California. One
out of every four persons living in the state is foreign-born. One
out of every two children lives in a household headed by at least
one foreign-born person.” (Pen. Code, § 1016.2, subd. (g).)
“Whether they become citizens or not, these immigrants’ ties to
our country are evident not only in their work and schooling, but
in how they’ve formed attachments and families of their own. In
contrast, what ties they once had to their country of birth—from
which they may lack even memories—often slip away. So when
long-standing noncitizen residents of this country are accused of
committing a crime, the most devastating consequence may not
be a prison sentence, but their removal and exclusion from the
United States.” (People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 516.)
But based on “the totality of the circumstances” here,
Quintana has not “shown a reasonable probability that he would
have rejected the plea and either gone to trial or sought a
different, immigration-safe bargain if he had understood the
consequences of the plea.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
325.) Nor has he presented “ ‘evidence that would have caused
the defendant to expect or hope a different bargain would or
could have been negotiated.’ ” (People v. Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 529, italics omitted.) The trial court properly denied
Quintana’s motion to vacate his guilty plea after reviewing the
evidence and weighing the credibility of his testimony.
(Espinoza, at p. 320 [appellate courts engaging in independent
review must give deference to trial court’s factual determinations
9
based on witness credibility].)
DISPOSITION
Our original decision filed August 6, 2021, is vacated. The
order denying Quintana’s Penal Code section 1473.7 motion to
vacate his conviction is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
10
Laura L. Laesecke, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Andres Bustamante for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.