People v. Ruben E. CA4/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/26/23 P. v. Ruben E. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080870
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. J244351)
RUBEN E.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, Robert J. Trentacosta and Rohanee Zapanta, Judges.
Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa Mandel and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this seemingly simple case, the juvenile court found that 14-year-old
Ruben E., accompanied by two youthful companions, committed an assault
with a deadly weapon (ADW) by stabbing John M. during an early morning
altercation at a trolley station.1 It also found that in the course of
committing the felony, Ruben personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on
the victim, who was not an accomplice, making it a “serious felony” within
the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).2 In a
complicated argument made for the first time on appeal, Ruben contends that
the GBI finding was not supported by substantial evidence because John was
Ruben’s accomplice to an underlying target crime of disturbing the peace by
participating in a public fight. (§ 415, subd. (1).) Ruben claims this is crucial
because the crime of public fighting, although uncharged, might have
provided a basis for his ADW conviction on the theory that the stabbing was
a “natural and probable consequence” of the public fight.
We reject Ruben’s argument because the court made no finding that the
participants agreed to a public fight. Nor was it required to reach such a
conclusion. Although John may have been yelling as he approached the boys,
the juvenile court believed the three young men confronted John looking for a
fight, negating the inference that John accepted an invitation to brawl.
There is, accordingly, more than substantial evidence to support the
adjudication order and judgment, which we affirm.
1 We initially refer to the defendant and victim in this case by first name
and last initial and thereafter only by first name in accordance with
California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One summer night, Ruben found himself intoxicated and unsupervised
at a trolley station in downtown San Diego at approximately 4:30 a.m. He
was with four other youths, two males and two females. At 14 years old,
Ruben was the youngest of the group; one of his companions was 22 years old
and the rest were teenagers.
John, an older man, said something to Ruben’s group while he crossed
the tracks toward them. Ruben and his two male friends crossed to the edge
of the station to meet him as he approached. Ruben took out his knife and
held it in the front pocket of his sweatshirt. According to Ruben, he had
never met John and did not know what he was saying. Based on a highly
pixelated video of the incident, the trial court believed Ruben and his group
knew they were walking into a fight and described them as “ready to rock.”3
After a verbal exchange, John punched one of Ruben’s friends. Ruben’s
other companion delivered a punch to John before the first companion
rejoined the fight. At this point, John turned away from the melee and
shielded his face. While John turned away, Ruben stabbed him in the side.
Ruben ran back to a bench and waited for his friends to return. Later,
John joined the group on the trolley platform. One of Ruben’s companions
brought the victim to a security guard to help him find medical care. Later, a
police officer found John pressing a paper towel to a stab wound on his side.
That night, the police located Ruben and found the knife on his person.
The San Diego District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging that Ruben assaulted John with a deadly
3 John did not testify. A woman on the trolley platform turned around to
see the first punch thrown by Ruben’s companion, but nothing that preceded
it. The only evidence about the moments preceding the fight came from the
video and Ruben’s testimony.
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weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The petition further alleged that he personally
used a deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and, during the commission of
a felony, personally inflicted great bodily injury on someone who was not an
accomplice (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). During an adjudication hearing, the
juvenile court found all allegations true, declared Ruben to be a ward of the
court, and placed him on probation subject to various terms and conditions.
DISCUSSION
Section 1192.7 specifies that a crime is considered a “serious felony”
with attendant consequences whenever the defendant “personally inflicts
great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice.” (Id., subd.
(c)(8).) The juvenile court found this special allegation to be true. On appeal,
Ruben argues there is no substantial evidence to support this finding because
the victim, John, was an accomplice as a matter of law in Ruben’s commission
of the ADW. He reaches this conclusion in successive steps.
First, Ruben argues the undisputed evidence shows that John and
Ruben’s group jointly committed the preliminary crime of violating section
415, subdivision (1)—commonly referred to as “disturbing the peace”—by
agreeing to fight in public. As a result, he says, he and John were necessarily
accomplices in the commission of that intended crime. Finally, he contends
that his assault on John with a deadly weapon was, as a matter of law, a
natural and probable consequence of their agreement to participate in a
public fight. (See generally People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326;
People v. Flores (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 174.)
This argument fails at its inception. Based on inferences drawn from
his own testimony, much of which the trial court did not accept, Ruben
assumes that John and members of Ruben’s group agreed to a public fight.
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But the court made no such finding. It merely determined there was “some
verbal confrontation” followed by the first punch thrown by John.
The premise for Ruben’s substantial evidence argument is that John
and Ruben’s group must have agreed to disturb the peace by fighting. But it
does not necessarily follow that the “verbal confrontation” amounted to an
express or implied agreement to engage in a fight. The video included no
sound, and even Ruben did not testify to the words that were exchanged.
Indeed, the juvenile court specifically found that the boys “were not afraid”
and “went over on a three-on-one situation with an unarmed man.” That
John apparently threw the first punch is as easily characterized as a fearful
response to being outnumbered and threatened as it is evidence of mutual
combat.
In the end, Ruben’s contention simply offers one interpretation of the
evidence, but it is far from the only reasonable interpretation and certainly
not one the juvenile court was compelled to accept. If there was no public
fight—and there is more than substantial evidence to support that
conclusion—there was no crime for John to be an accomplice to, and Ruben’s
substantial evidence argument fails.
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DISPOSITION
The adjudication order of August 11, 2022 and judgment are affirmed.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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