Orange County Council of Governments v. Velasquez CA2/4 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 7/27/23 Orange County Council of Governments v. Velasquez CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
    publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
    CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    ORANGE COUNTY COUNCIL                                                        B317856
    OF GOVERNMENTS, et al.,
    (Los Angeles County
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                        Super. Ct. No. 21STCP01970)
    v.
    GUSTAVO VELASQUEZ, et al.,
    Defendants and
    Respondents,
    SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
    ASSOCIATION OF
    GOVERNMENTS,
    Real Party in Interest.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
    Aleshire & Wynder, Fred Galante, June S. Ailin, Pam
    K. Lee, and Alison S. Flowers, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, and Jamee Jordan Patterson
    and Erica B. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants
    and Respondents.
    Meyers Nave, Deborah J. Fox and Margaret W.
    Rosequist, for Real Party in Interest.
    Public Law Center, Richard Walker and Jonathan
    Bremen; Public Interest Law Project, Craig Castellanet,
    Michael Rawson, and Ugochi Anaebere-Nicholson;
    Community Legal Aid SoCal, Sarah Reisman and Erica
    Embree, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
    _______________________________________________________
    Plaintiffs Orange County Council of Governments
    (OCCOG), the City of Redondo Beach, City of Lakewood,
    City of Torrance, City of Cerritos, City of Downey, and City
    of Whittier appeal from a judgment dismissing their first
    amended petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc.,
    § 1085) seeking to direct Gustavo Velasquez, Director of
    Department of Housing and Community Development, and
    the California Department of Housing and Community
    Development (collectively, the Department of Housing) to set
    aside its housing needs determination for the region
    overseen by real party in interest Southern California
    Association of Governments (SC Association of
    Governments). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held in
    2
    City of Irvine v. Southern California Assn. of Governments
    (2009) 
    175 Cal.App.4th 506
     (City of Irvine), that a local
    government’s allocation of the regional housing needs
    assessment (RHNA) made under Government Code section
    65584 et seq.1 is precluded from judicial review. We
    conclude City of Irvine’s reasoning applies to plaintiffs’
    contentions concerning the Department of Housing’s RHNA
    determination such that plaintiffs’ action is barred.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended petition for
    writ of mandate seeking an order directing the Department
    of Housing to vacate its RHNA determination for the SC
    Association of Governments region and conduct a new
    assessment. As alleged in the first amended petition, of
    which we assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual
    allegations (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 1
    ,
    20), the Department of Housing is “tasked with . . .
    determining the regional housing needs assessment for each
    regional planning body (known as a “council of
    governments”) in the State, and reviewing and approving
    housing elements of local governments to meet the housing
    needs of their communities.” Pursuant to section 65300,
    each city and county in California is required to adopt a
    general plan, which “is a comprehensive, long-term plan for
    1     All further statutory references are to the Government Code,
    unless otherwise noted.
    3
    the development of a city, including any land outside its
    boundaries that the city believes is related to its planning.”
    A housing element is a required component of the general
    plan.
    The Department of Housing oversees the RHNA
    process. At least two years before scheduled housing
    element updates within a region are set to occur, the
    Department of Housing will assign a region its share of the
    state’s housing needs in consultation with the council of
    governments located within that region. SC Association of
    Governments is the regional council of governments for
    several Southern California counties, including Imperial
    County, Los Angeles County, Orange County, Riverside
    County, San Bernardino County, and Ventura County, and
    the incorporated cities within each of these counties. SC
    Association of Governments “serves as a planning
    organization on behalf of its members, which include six
    counties and 191 cities, to develop . . . long-range regional
    housing needs allocations.”
    Plaintiffs City of Redondo Beach, City of Lakewood,
    City of Torrance, City of Cerritos, City of Downey, and City
    of Whittier are members of SC Association of Governments
    and subject to the RHNA determination issued by the
    Department of Housing and allocated by SC Association of
    Governments. Plaintiff OCCOG “is a joint powers public
    agency organized and existing pursuant to the Joint Exercise
    4
    of Powers Act . . . .”2 OCCOG “serves as a sub-regional
    planning organization on behalf of its thirty-four members,”
    and “[i]n conjunction with [SC Association of Governments],
    OCCOG assists in the development and analysis of planning
    documents prepared as part of the allocation of its members’
    regional housing needs assessment under statewide land use
    laws.”
    Plaintiffs allege that “in 2019, [SC Association of
    Governments] and [the Department of Housing] began
    developing the RHNA determination for the [relevant
    Southern California] region for the 2021-2029 planning
    period (also known as the 6th cycle).” At the same time, SC
    Association of Governments began developing its
    methodology for allocating the projected regional RHNA
    determination among the local governments within its
    region. On August 22, 2019, the Department of Housing
    provided a letter to SC Association of Governments
    informing it of the Department’s draft determination for the
    region. The Department of Housing assigned a total of
    1,344,740 dwelling units as the RHNA determination for the
    region to be allocated among the local governments.
    On September 18, 2019, SC Association of
    Governments submitted a formal objection to the
    Department of Housing’s draft determination of regional
    2      Despite its name, plaintiff OCCOG is not a council of
    governments as defined by the RHNA statutes. SC Association of
    Governments is the council of governments for the relevant region in
    this action.
    5
    housing needs. The Department of Housing did not alter its
    RHNA approach based on SC Association of Governments’
    objection, other than using more recent “cost-burden” rates
    for households.3 On October 15, 2019, the Department of
    Housing provided SC Association of Governments with its
    final RHNA determination for the region. Based on the
    more recent data, the Department of Housing determined
    the housing need for the region was slightly less than
    previously thought, 1,341,827 total dwelling units.
    OCCOG participated in and contributed to SC
    Association of Governments’ development of its RHNA
    methodology throughout 2019. OCCOG sent a letter to SC
    Association of Governments regarding its RHNA
    methodology and regional determination. OCCOG asserted
    in the letter that the Department of Housing failed to comply
    with the RHNA statutes when calculating the regional
    determination. SC Association of Governments
    subsequently submitted its draft RHNA methodology for the
    6th cycle for the Department of Housing’s review and
    reiterated its earlier objection regarding the Department of
    Housing’s RHNA determination of the regional housing
    need. The Department of Housing then sent SC Association
    of Governments a letter advising that it completed its review
    of SC Association of Governments’ RHNA methodology and
    3     The first amended petition defines cost-burdened households as
    the share of households by income level paying more than 30% of
    household income on housing costs.
    6
    found that it furthered the statutory objectives of RHNA
    statutes.
    After obtaining approval from the Department of
    Housing for its RHNA methodology, on or about September
    3, 2020, SC Association of Governments notified the local
    governments within the region of each one’s share of the
    RHNA allocation. SC Association of Governments received
    52 appeals from local governments in its region; all but two
    were denied.
    Plaintiffs then filed the first amended petition seeking
    a “writ of mandate directing [the Department of Housing] to
    vacate and set aside” its RHNA determination for SC
    Association of Governments’ region, change the input of
    information utilized in calculating its RHNA determination,
    and conduct a new assessment for the region. Plaintiffs
    contend that “[t]he 1,341,827 total dwelling units represents
    more than twice the number of projected housing units
    needed by the end of the 6th Cycle in 2029.” Plaintiffs argue
    that this is because the Department of Housing’s RHNA
    determination is based on “[The Department of Housing’s]
    use of the wrong population forecast, comparable region, and
    vacancy rates, as well as new methodology that includes
    overcrowding and cost burdening factors that [the
    Department of Housing] did not previously consider in its
    typical methodology for prior housing cycles.”
    The Department of Housing and SC Association of
    Governments each filed demurrers to the first amended
    petition arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
    7
    the RHNA challenges based on the ruling in City of Irvine,
    supra, 
    175 Cal.App.4th 506
    . The trial court agreed it lacked
    jurisdiction over the writ claim as pleaded in the first
    amended petition, and after hearing argument, sustained
    the demurrers without leave to amend. The court entered
    judgment dismissing the action, and plaintiffs timely filed
    this appeal.4
    DISCUSSION
    A.    Standard of Review
    “Because the function of a demurrer is to test the
    sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de
    novo standard of review in an appeal following the
    sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.”
    (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 
    161 Cal.App.4th 242
    , 247.) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting
    all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
    deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also
    consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]
    Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
    reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.
    [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine
    whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a
    cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without
    4     We have granted an application of the Kennedy Commission,
    Community Legal Aid SoCal, and Public Interest Law Project to file an
    amicus curiae brief in support of the Department of Housing. We have
    considered the brief and plaintiffs’ response to that brief.
    8
    leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable
    possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it
    can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
    reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we
    affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable
    possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan
    (1985) 
    39 Cal.3d 311
    , 318.)
    “We review the correctness of the trial court’s action in
    sustaining the demurrer, not the court’s statement of
    reasons for its action.” (Martis Camp Community Assn. v.
    County of Placer (2020) 
    53 Cal.App.5th 569
    , 610.)
    Accordingly, “[w]e affirm the judgment if it is correct for any
    reason, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.” (MKB
    Management, Inc. v. Melikian (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 796
    ,
    802.)
    B.    Statutory Overview
    “Under the Planning and Zoning Law (§ 65000 et seq.),
    local governments must prepare and adopt general plans for
    their ‘long-term . . . physical development . . . .’ (§ 65300.)
    One of the essential components of a general plan is a
    housing element. (§ 65302, subd. (c).)” (City of Irvine, supra,
    175 Cal.App.4th at p. 512.)
    The Legislature enacted regional housing needs laws to
    address California’s shortage of affordable housing and has
    declared “[t]he availability of housing is of vital statewide
    importance, and the early attainment of decent housing and
    a suitable living environment for every Californian . . . is a
    9
    priority of the highest order.” (§ 65580, subd. (a); see also
    San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v. City and
    County of San Francisco (2018) 
    26 Cal.App.5th 596
    , 610
    [“The Legislature enacted the regional housing needs
    assessment (RHNA) procedure . . . to address the state’s
    shortage of affordable housing”].) The early attainment of
    this goal, together with the added goal of providing “housing
    affordable to low- and moderate-income households,”
    requires the cooperative participation of government at all
    levels. (§ 65580, subds. (b) & (c).)
    The Legislature’s intent is, among other things, “[t]o
    assure that counties and cities recognize their
    responsibilities in contributing to the attainment of the state
    housing goal,” “[t]o assure that counties and cities will
    prepare and implement housing elements which . . . will
    move toward attainment of the state housing goal,” and “[t]o
    ensure that each local government cooperates with other
    local governments in order to address regional housing
    needs.” (§ 65581, subds. (a), (b), & (d).)
    “A municipality’s housing element ‘consist[s] of an
    identification and analysis of existing and projected housing
    needs and a statement of goals, policies, quantified
    objectives, financial resources, and scheduled programs for
    the preservation, improvement, and development of
    housing.’ (§ 65583.) It must contain ‘[a]n assessment of
    housing needs and an inventory of resources and constraints
    relevant to the meeting of these needs.’ (§ 65583, subd. (a).)”
    (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) The
    10
    assessment and inventory shall include “‘a quantification of
    the locality’s existing and projected housing needs for all
    income levels’ that ‘include[s] the locality’s share of the
    regional housing need in accordance with [s]ection 65584’
    (§ 65583, subd. (a)(1)) . . . .” (Ibid.)
    Section 65584 requires the Department of Housing, “in
    consultation with each council of governments, [to]
    determine each region’s existing and projected housing need
    pursuant to Section 65584.01 at least two years prior to the
    scheduled revision required pursuant to Section 65588.”
    “This determination must be based on the ‘objectives’ of
    equitably increasing the housing supply, type, and
    affordability, encouraging conservation of agricultural and
    environmental resources through the promotion of infill
    development, improving the relationship between housing
    and jobs in the region, and using the allocation of housing
    needs by income category to eliminate disparities between
    communities in the region. (§ 65584, subd. (d).)” (City of
    Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.)
    “At least 26 months prior to the scheduled [housing
    element] revision . . . and prior to developing the existing
    and projected housing need for a region, [the Department of
    Housing] shall meet and consult with the council of
    governments regarding the assumptions and methodology to
    be used by the department to determine the region’s housing
    needs.” (§ 65584.01, subd. (b)(1).) After this consultation,
    the Department of Housing must “make a determination of
    the region’s existing and projected housing need based upon
    11
    the assumptions and methodology determined pursuant to
    subdivision (b),” which must “reflect the achievement of a
    feasible balance between jobs and housing within the region
    using the regional employment projections in the applicable
    regional transportation plan.” (§ 65584.01, subd. (c)(1).)
    “Within 30 days following notice of the determination from
    [the Department of Housing], the council of governments
    may file an objection to [the Department of Housing’s]
    determination of the region’s existing and projected housing
    need with [the Department of Housing].” (Ibid.)
    The objection shall be based on either of the following:
    “(A) The department failed to base its
    determination on the population projection for
    the region established pursuant to subdivision
    (a), and shall identify the population projection
    which the council of governments believes should
    instead be used for the determination and explain
    the basis for its rationale.
    (B) The regional housing need determined by the
    department is not a reasonable application of the
    methodology and assumptions determined
    pursuant to subdivision (b). The objection shall
    include a proposed alternative determination of
    its regional housing need based upon the
    determinations made in subdivision (b), including
    analysis of why the proposed alternative would be
    12
    a more reasonable application of the methodology
    and assumptions determined pursuant to
    subdivision (b).” (§ 65584.01, subd. (c)(2)(A)(B).)
    Within 45 days of receiving an objection filed by a
    council of governments, the Department of Housing
    “shall consider the objection and make a final written
    determination of the region’s existing and projected
    housing need that includes an explanation of the
    information upon which the determination was made.”
    (§ 65584.01, subd. (c)(3).) This regional housing needs
    determination by the Department of Housing is what
    plaintiffs assert they are challenging in their first
    amended petition.
    A council of governments shall then “develop, in
    consultation with [the Department of Housing], a proposed
    methodology for distributing the existing and projected
    regional housing need to cities, counties, and cities and
    counties within the region . . . .” (§ 65584.04, subd. (a).) The
    council of governments must “survey each of its member
    jurisdictions to request . . . information regarding [a list of]
    factors . . . that will allow the development of a [distribution]
    methodology.” (§ 65584.04, subd. (b)(1).) “Public
    participation and access shall be required in the
    development of the methodology and in the process of
    drafting and adoption of the allocation of the regional
    housing needs. . . .” (§ 65584.04, subd. (d).) After completion
    of the methodology development process, the council of
    13
    governments “shall provide notice of the adoption of the
    methodology to the jurisdictions within the region, . . . and to
    [the Department of Housing].” (§ 65584.04, subd. (k).)
    “After adopting a methodology, the next step involve[s]
    the preparation and revision of a draft allocation plan for the
    RHNA. It requires a ‘council of governments . . . [to]
    distribute a draft allocation of regional housing needs to
    each local government in the region or subregion’ ‘[a]t least
    one and one-half years prior to the scheduled [housing
    element] revision . . . .’ (§ 65584.05, subd. (a).) ‘The draft
    allocation shall include the underlying data and
    methodology on which the allocation is based.’” (City of
    Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 515.)
    Section 65584.05 authorizes local governments to file
    an appeal of the RHNA draft allocation and outlines the
    procedures for doing so. The council of governments “shall
    adjust allocations to local governments based upon the
    results of the appeals process. . . . The total distribution of
    housing need shall not equal less than the regional housing
    need . . . .” (§ 65584.05, subd. (f).) “The final determination
    on an appeal may require the council of governments or
    delegate subregion, as applicable, to adjust the share of the
    regional housing need allocated to one or more local
    governments that are not the subject of an appeal.”
    (§ 65584.05, subd. (e)(1).) “Within 45 days after the issuance
    of the proposed final allocation plan by the council of
    governments and each delegate subregion, as applicable, the
    council of governments shall hold a public hearing to adopt a
    14
    final allocation plan. . . . The council of governments shall
    submit its final allocation plan to [the Department of
    Housing] within three days of adoption. Within 30 days
    after the [Department of Housing’s] receipt of the final
    allocation plan adopted by the council of governments, [the
    Department of Housing] shall determine if the final
    allocation plan is consistent with the existing and projected
    housing need for the region . . . .” (§ 65584.05, subd. (g).)
    C.     City of Irvine
    In City of Irvine, supra, 
    175 Cal.App.4th 506
    , SC
    Association of Governments issued a draft RHNA allocation
    that allotted 35,000 residential units to the City of Irvine
    (Irvine). (Id. at p. 511.) Irvine filed an appeal of the
    proposed allocation with SC Association of Governments’
    appeals board, and it issued a written decision denying the
    appeal. (Ibid.) After revising the allocations of certain other
    jurisdictions, SC Association of Governments issued a
    proposed final RHNA allocation that increased Irvine’s
    allocation by more than 300 units. (Ibid.) Over Irvine’s
    opposition, SC Association of Governments approved the
    final allocation plan without change. (Ibid.) Irvine then
    filed a petition seeking to “‘[v]acate and set aside’” the draft
    allocation, the appeals board’s denial of its appeal, and the
    regional council’s final allocation plan, plus a
    “‘[r]ecalculat[ion of plaintiff’s] allocation of new housing
    units . . . .’” (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 511–512.) SC Association of Governments filed a
    15
    demurrer, arguing that the trial court lacked “‘jurisdiction of
    the subject of the petition’” for several reasons, including
    that “the Legislature’s 2004 amendments to the RHNA
    statutes ‘specifically removed the judicial writ remedy from
    the . . . statute.’” (Ibid.) The trial court sustained the
    demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment
    dismissing the action. (Ibid.) Irvine appealed. (Ibid.)
    The Court of Appeal began its analysis of judicial
    jurisdiction by acknowledging that Article VI, section 10 of
    the California Constitution gives “‘[t]he Supreme Court,
    courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges . . .
    original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in
    the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.’” (City
    of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 516.) “‘[T]he
    Legislature cannot alter the jurisdiction over extraordinary
    writs which is prescribed by the Constitution.’”
    (Ibid., quoting Modern Barber Col. v. Cal. Emp. Stab. Com.
    (1948) 
    31 Cal.2d 720
    , 729.) However, “the Legislature may
    indirectly regulate the jurisdiction of courts by abolishing or
    limiting substantial rights [citation] and prescribing the
    procedure by which the courts exercise their jurisdiction
    [Citation].” (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 516.)
    The Legislature’s intent to defeat the exercise of the court’s
    jurisdiction must be expressly provided or clearly intended.
    (Id. at p. 516–517.)
    The Court of Appeal then found that “the nature and
    scope of a general plan’s housing element and the length and
    intricacy of the process created to determine a municipality’s
    16
    RHNA allocation reflects a clear intent on the part of the
    Legislature to render this process immune from judicial
    intervention.” (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 517.) The court summarized the “intricate steps” of the
    RHNA allocation process as follows:
    “First, it requires the setting of statewide and
    regional housing goals and the creation of a
    methodology to quantify the goals and distribute
    the projected additional housing needs
    throughout the state. This step mandates
    consultation between [the Department of
    Housing] and the respective councils of
    government. Second, each respective council of
    government must create a methodology for
    distributing its region’s housing needs to the local
    governments under its jurisdiction. This requires
    not only consultation between the regional
    council of government and local governments, but
    also public hearings to obtain input from a wide
    variety of concerned parties. Third, the council of
    government’s proposed allocation of housing units
    to local governments is subject to review and
    reassessment at the request of individual
    governments. Ultimately, each council of
    government’s final RHNA allocation is subject to
    further review and revision by [the Department
    of Housing] to ensure it is consistent with the
    17
    region’s housing needs.” (City of Irvine, supra,
    175 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.)
    The Court of Appeal concluded that “the administrative
    procedure created to determine a municipality’s RHNA
    allocation precludes judicial review of that decision.” (City of
    Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 512.)
    Although Irvine argued that it was seeking only to
    correct its own RHNA allocation, the court noted that
    “[u]nder the RHNA procedure, when a local government
    successfully obtains a downward revision of its RHNA
    allocation, the council of governments must then reallocate
    the excess units to other jurisdictions within the region.”
    (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 518.)
    Consequently, allowing judicial review “would require the
    joining of all affected local jurisdictions in the lawsuit,
    thereby precluding each affected municipality’s completion of
    its housing element revision.” (Ibid.)
    Moreover, the court cited Tri–County Special Educ.
    Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne (2004)
    
    123 Cal.App.4th 563
    , 578, for the proposition that “‘a
    governmental entity has no vested, individual rights in the
    administration of a particular program,’” and determined
    that “the structure and scope of the RHNA statutes reflect a
    clear intent to vest in [the Department of Housing] and the
    respective council of governments, along with the extensive
    input from local governments and the public, the authority
    to set the RHNA allocation for each local government.”
    18
    (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.) The court
    rejected Irvine’s contentions that precluding judicial review
    would be unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 520.) The court
    reasoned that the RHNA process was primarily legislative
    and required the involvement of many different entities,
    none of which had complete control of the scheme. (Ibid.) It
    noted that even in cases where investigative, prosecutorial,
    and adjudicatory functions were combined within a single
    administrative agency, due process could be provided. (Ibid.)
    Further, Irvine was not without an adequate alternative
    remedy for having to account for 100 percent of the housing
    allocation assigned to it, as there were statutory exceptions
    that it could utilize if appropriate. (Id. at pp. 520–521.)
    Lastly, the City of Irvine court stated that the “2004
    amendments to the RHNA statutes” supported its decision.
    (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.) “Before
    those amendments, former section 65584, subdivision (c)(4)
    declared, ‘The determination of the council of governments
    [concerning a city or county’s share of the state housing
    need] . . . shall be subject to judicial review pursuant to
    Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.’ This
    provision was eliminated in 2004.” (Ibid.) The court
    reasoned that “the 2004 repeal of the judicial remedy
    reinforces our conclusion the Legislature clearly intended to
    eliminate judicial remedies for challenging a municipality’s
    RHNA allocation.” (Id. at p. 522.) “Given the RHNA
    statutes’ nature, their allowance for public input, and their
    lengthy and extensive administrative procedure, it is clear
    19
    the Legislature intended to eliminate resort to traditional
    judicial remedies to challenge a local government’s regional
    housing needs allocation so as to avoid the disruption of local
    planning that would result from interference through the
    litigation process.” (Ibid.)
    D.    Analysis
    1.      City of Irvine Controls
    Plaintiffs argue that City of Irvine is distinguishable
    from their case because they are challenging the preliminary
    determination of regional housing needs by the Department
    of Housing, not the later allocation of housing by SC
    Association of Governments. According to Plaintiffs, City of
    Irvine held only that judicial review was precluded as to the
    allocation of the regional housing need, not a determination
    upon which that allocation is based. We disagree.
    In City of Irvine, “the court broadly held that ‘the
    statutes governing the RHNA allocation procedure . . .
    reflect a clear intent to preclude judicial intervention in the
    process’ . . . .” (City of Coronado v. San Diego Association of
    Governments (2022) 
    80 Cal.App.5th 21
    , 41 (City of
    Coronado), citing City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p.
    522.) In other words, City of Irvine’s reasoning was not
    limited solely to analyzing SC Association of Governments’
    allocation of the regional housing need to Irvine. City of
    Irvine considered the greater RHNA process, and the
    Department of Housing’s role and vested authority in it,
    concluding that judicial review was precluded.
    20
    The City of Irvine court’s reasoning applies with equal
    force to plaintiffs’ claims here. The Legislature enacted the
    RHNA statutes to address California’s shortage of affordable
    housing promptly. The intricate and years long
    administrative process that leads to the allocation of
    regional housing needs “reflects a clear intent on the part of
    the Legislature” to restrict judicial intervention. (City of
    Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.) The process
    involves the setting of statewide housing goals and
    interaction among the Department of Housing, a regional
    council of governments, local governments, and concerned
    parties. It provides opportunities for extensive input and
    consideration of objections, and no “single entity has
    complete control of the scheme.” (Id. at p. 520.) To the
    extent that the RHNA statutes authorize the Department of
    Housing to act in multiple capacities, a single administrative
    agency may legally combine investigative, prosecutorial, and
    adjudicative functions. (Ibid., citing Morongo Band of
    Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009)
    
    45 Cal.4th 731
    , 737.)
    Allowing judicial review of the Department of
    Housing’s RHNA determination “would interfere with the
    administrative process and be both unmanageable and cause
    unreasonable delay.” (See City of Coronado, supra,
    80 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) Because plaintiffs challenge the
    RHNA determination for the entire SC Association of
    Governments region, their action “would require the joining
    of all affected local jurisdictions in the lawsuit,” preventing
    21
    all the municipalities within the region from completing
    their housing element revisions. (See City of Irvine, supra,
    175 Cal.App.4th at p. 518.) Plaintiffs’ case would
    “‘essentially bottleneck the process and create gridlock while
    a particular city’s case winds through the courts.’”5 (Ibid.)
    City of Coronado, supra, 
    80 Cal.App.5th 21
    , supports
    this conclusion. In City of Coronado, which was decided
    after the trial court entered its judgment in this matter, the
    Cities of Coronado, Imperial Beach, Lemon Grove, and
    Solana Beach (collectively “the Cities”) filed a combined
    petition for writ of administrate mandate and complaint for
    injunctive and declaratory relief against the San Diego
    Association of Governments, which is the council of
    governments for the San Diego region, and its board of
    directors (collectively, SD Association of Governments).
    (Id. at p. 27, fn. 2.) The Cities alleged that SD Association of
    Governments abused its discretion and failed to provide a
    fair and impartial hearing in ruling on the Cities’
    administrative appeals of the draft RHNA allocations.
    (Id. at p. 28.) The Cities sought an order rescinding SD
    Association of Governments’ denial of the Cities’ appeals and
    the final RHNA allocation. (Id. at p. 30.) After SD
    Association of Governments demurred to the petition, the
    trial court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and sustained the
    5      As alleged in the first amended petition, the Department of
    Housing provided its final RHNA determination to SC Association of
    Governments for its region on October 15, 2019. The relief plaintiffs
    seek, therefore, would restart a process that was completed nearly four
    years ago.
    22
    demurrer without leave to amend. (Id. at p. 34.) The Cities
    appealed, arguing their action was not barred by City of
    Irvine because that case involved a substantive challenge,
    while their action involved a procedural challenge. (Id. at
    pp. 27–28, 41.)
    However, the City of Coronado court recognized that
    City of Irvine broadly held that the statutes governing the
    RHNA allocation procedure reflect a clear intent to preclude
    judicial intervention, and there was no suggestion that
    procedural claims were outside the scope of its clear holding.
    (City of Coronado, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 41.) Even if
    procedural claims were not considered in City of Irvine, the
    court’s rationale for precluding judicial review would still
    apply and bar the Cities’ action. (City of Coronado, supra,
    80 Cal.App.5th at p. 42.) The ultimate relief the Cities
    requested was to recalculate the RHNA allocation, and “the
    City of Irvine court has already concluded that a judicial
    challenge that seeks an alternative RHNA allocation is
    barred.” (Id. at p. 42, fn. omitted.) As such, all the
    rationales identified in City of Irvine supported the
    conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
    adjudicate the Cities’ claims. (Id. at p. 44.)
    Similarly here, the first amended petition asks the trial
    court to vacate and set aside the Department of Housing’s
    RHNA determination for the SC Association of Governments
    region, change the input of information used in the
    Department of Housing’s RHNA determination, and conduct
    a new assessment for the region. This relief would
    23
    ultimately result in the RHNA allocations for the entire
    region being changed, and “the City of Irvine court has
    already concluded that a judicial challenge that seeks
    an alternative RHNA allocation is barred.” (City of
    Coronado, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 42, italics in original.)
    Concluding that judicial review of the Department of
    Housing’s RHNA determination is appropriate here would
    essentially render City of Irvine’s and City of Coronado’s
    holdings meaningless, as a local government could challenge
    the entire RHNA allocation process by challenging the
    Department of Housing’s initial RHNA determination. We
    will not construe City of Irvine “in a manner that is
    inconsistent with its reasoning and would evade the
    legislatively imposed limits on judicial review that the court
    sought to enforce.” (City of Coronado, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 44.) This would cause delay in the entire region and
    preclude each local government from completing its housing
    element.
    2.    The Legislature’s Intent to Remove Judicial
    Review
    a.     2004 Amendments Indicate Judicial Review
    is Precluded
    Plaintiffs argue that the 2004 amendments to the
    RHNA statutes indicate that there was no legislative intent
    to eliminate judicial review of the Department of Housing’s
    determination of regional housing needs. According to
    plaintiffs, the deletion of judicial review from the RHNA
    24
    statutes applies to a council of governments’ allocation of the
    regional housing need, not the Department of Housing’s
    RHNA determination. Plaintiffs’ arguments are
    unpersuasive.
    Before the amendments to the RHNA statutes, “former
    section 65584, subdivision (c)(4) declared, ‘The
    determination of the council of governments [concerning a
    city or county’s share of the state housing need] . . . shall be
    subject to judicial review pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the
    Code of Civil Procedure.’ This provision was eliminated in
    2004.” (City of Irvine, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 521.)
    “We must presume the Legislature’s deletion of the express
    provision allowing review by administrative mandamus
    reflects its intent to preclude that judicial remedy to
    challenge a municipality's RHNA allocation under the
    revised law.” (Id. at p. 522; see also City of Coronado, supra,
    80 Cal.App.5th at p. 43 [“we see nothing in either the
    Legislative amendment or in the City of Irvine court’s
    discussion of that amendment that limits its impact to . . .
    ‘substantive’ challenges to RHNA allocations”].)
    As the Department of Housing asserts, the Legislature
    deleted the sole provision that authorized judicial review of
    the RHNA allocation process. It would not follow that the
    deletion of the only provision providing for judicial review
    meant that the Legislature intended to provide judicial
    review for all other preliminary steps in the RHNA process,
    including the Department of Housing’s RHNA
    determination. If allowing judicial review of a council of
    25
    governments’ allocation of regional housing needs would
    “effectively nullify” the RHNA statutory process, so too
    would allowing judicial review of every step of the process
    leading up to the allocation. (City of Irvine, supra, 175
    Cal.App.4th at p. 518.)
    Moreover, the Legislature “is deemed to be aware of
    existing laws and judicial constructions in effect at the time
    legislation is enacted.” (People v. Weidert (1985) 
    39 Cal.3d 836
    , 844.) If the Legislature desired to provide for judicial
    review of the Department of Housing’s determination of
    regional housing needs following the 2004 amendments, it
    knew how to craft such a provision because it had previously
    provided for judicial review in former section 65584,
    subdivision (c)(4). (Bernard v. Foley (2006) 
    39 Cal.4th 794
    ,
    811.) The Legislature’s decision to omit judicial review from
    any subsequent amendments is another confirmation of its
    clear intent to restrict judicial review of the RHNA allocation
    process.
    A contrary finding would not serve the Legislature’s
    intent or purpose. The Legislature declared housing
    availability to be of “vital statewide importance” and the
    “early attainment of decent housing and a suitable living
    environment . . . a priority of the highest order.” (§ 65580,
    subd. (a), italics added.) Allowing any of the many local
    governments in the SC Association of Governments region to
    challenge the Department of Housing’s RHNA determination
    would be contrary to the purpose of the RHNA statutes and
    render the 2004 amendments meaningless.
    26
    (Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995)
    
    10 Cal.4th 257
    , 274 [“Well-established canons of statutory
    construction preclude a construction which renders a part of
    a statute meaningless or inoperative”].)
    b.     Cases Involving Other Statutory Schemes
    are Inapposite
    In support of their argument that there is no clear
    legislative intent to remove judicial review of Department of
    Housing’s RHNA determination from the courts, plaintiffs
    cite to International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-
    CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 259
     (International Fire Fighters) and Sims v. Department of
    Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 
    216 Cal.App.4th 1059
    (Sims). These cases, however, addressed different statutory
    schemes, not whether judicial review of the RHNA allocation
    process is precluded under the present circumstances.
    In International Fire Fighters, the California Supreme
    Court considered whether a union could obtain judicial
    review of a Public Employment Relations Board (Board)
    decision refusing to issue a complaint against a city for
    failing to meet and confer with the union about layoffs.
    (International Fire Fighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 264,
    267-271.) The union alleged that the city’s failure to meet
    and confer violated California’s Meyers-Milias-Brown Act.
    Section 3509.5 of this Act generally provides for judicial
    review of a final Board decision in an unfair labor practice
    case, “except a decision of the [B]oard not to issue a
    27
    complaint in such a case . . . .” The Supreme Court held
    judicial review of the Board’s decision was appropriate
    because section 3509.5 did not expressly provide or clearly
    indicate that judicial review was prohibited in all
    circumstances under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act.
    (International Fire Fighters, supra, at pp. 268, 271.) In
    particular, the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act did not expressly
    bar traditional mandamus review under three limited
    circumstances in which such review was available under the
    National Labor Relations Act, upon which the Meyers-
    Milias-Brown Act was modeled. The court emphasized, “We
    stress, however, that it remains true that a refusal by PERB
    to issue a complaint under the MMBA is not subject to
    judicial review for ordinary error, including insufficiency of
    the evidence to support the agency’s factual findings and
    misapplication of the law to the facts, or for abuse of
    discretion. Also, to avoid undue interference with the
    discretion that the Legislature has intended PERB to
    exercise, courts must narrowly construe and cautiously
    apply the exceptions we here recognize.”6 (International
    Assn. of Fire Fighters, 
    supra, at 271
    .)
    6      While plaintiffs argue in their briefs that the Department of
    Housing’s actions exceeded its authority or were based on an erroneous
    statutory construction, the first amended petition alleges only that the
    Department of Housing should have used different data or a different
    approach for its methodology than what it chose. This would amount
    to a claimed error in application of the law to the facts or abuse of
    discretion, which would not be reviewable under the narrow exceptions
    identified in International Fire Fighters were they applicable here.
    28
    In Sims, the issue was whether regulations
    promulgated by the California Department of Corrections
    and Rehabilitation (Department of Corrections) regarding
    the way the death penalty is carried out substantially
    complied with the California Administrative Procedure Act.
    (Sims, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 1063.) In part, the
    Department of Corrections argued that the trial court lacked
    authority to determine whether the subject proposed
    regulations complied with the “necessity” and “clarity”
    requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act because
    the issue was committed solely to the Office of
    Administrative Law. (Id. at p. 1075.) However, the court
    found the Legislature unambiguously indicated the opposite
    intent. (Id. at 1077.) Section 11350, subdivision (a), under
    which the regulations were challenged, provides that “[a]ny
    interested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to the
    validity of any regulation . . . by bringing an action for
    declaratory relief in the superior court in accordance with
    the Code of Civil Procedure.” Thus, “[t]he text of the
    [Administrative Procedure Act] . . . makes clear that initial
    review of a proposed regulation by the [Office of
    Administrative Law] is not exclusive but subordinate to
    judicial review.” (Sims, supra, at pp. 1077–1078.)
    International Fire Fighters and Sims are inapposite.7
    We note that they concerned fire fighters being laid off from
    7    After the Department of Housing and SC Association of
    Governments argued in their responding briefs that International Fire
    (Fn. is continued on the next page.)
    29
    their jobs and inmates’ facing punishment by death. This
    case involves governmental entities’ challenges to the
    administration of a program, something in which the entities
    have “‘no vested, individual rights.’” (City of Irvine, supra,
    175 Cal.App.4th at p. 519, quoting Tri–County Special Educ.
    Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne, supra, 123
    Cal.App.4th at p. 578.) Furthermore, International Fire
    Fighters and Sims involved circumstances and statutes, the
    Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and the California Administrative
    Procedure Act, not at issue here. Plaintiffs do not establish
    that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and the California
    Administrative Procedure Act are analogous or comparable
    to the RHNA statutory scheme. Thus, International Fire
    Fighters and Sims fail to provide authority to support the
    assertion that the judicial review is available under the
    RHNA statutes. (People v. Knoller (2007) 
    41 Cal.4th 139
    ,
    154–155 [“‘It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion
    is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues
    before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions
    not considered’”])8
    Based on the foregoing, the trial court was correct that
    the RHNA statutes reflect a clear intent to preclude judicial
    intervention in the process under the facts presented, and
    Fighters and Sims involved inapposite statutory schemes, plaintiffs
    failed to address the arguments in their reply brief.
    8      We need not address the Legislature’s ability to limit the court’s
    jurisdiction under other circumstances and acts.
    30
    the trial court properly sustained the demurrers to plaintiffs’
    first amended petition.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. The Department of Housing
    and SC Association of Governments are to recover costs on
    appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    MORI, J.
    We concur:
    CURREY, P. J.
    COLLINS, J.
    31