People v. Wright CA1/5 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/27/23 P. v. Wright CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, A165872
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco City & County
ANTHONY WRIGHT, Super. Ct. Nos. SCN220707,
CT11026885)
Defendant and Appellant.
Charged with murder and related crimes in 2011, Anthony
Wright pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted the
personal use of a firearm. In 2022, the trial court denied his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 On
appeal, he contends the court employed the wrong standard of
proof. It did not. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437), effective January 1, 2019, changed
the law relating to accomplice liability for murder to better align
punishment with individual culpability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §
1(b), (f).) To that end, Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as to murder and narrowed
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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the felony murder exception to the malice requirement. (People v.
Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 862 (Mancilla).)
As relevant here, it amended section 189 to require that the
perpetrator of a felony murder was either (1) the actual killer; (2)
aided and abetted the killer with the intent to kill; or (3) was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; §
189, subd. (e); see § 190.2, subd. (d).)
Through former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6), Senate Bill
1437 also created a mechanism for offenders convicted under the
former felony murder rule to petition the trial court to vacate
their conviction and for resentencing if they could not have been
convicted of murder under the amended statutes. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4; Mancilla, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 862.) A
person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
prior to Senate Bill 1437 may seek retroactive relief under this
provision if (1) the information or indictment allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any
other theory under which malice is imputed based solely on the
defendant's participation in a crime; and (2) the petitioner could
not be convicted of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(a)(1), (a)(3).)
If the petition makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner satisfies these requirements, the court must issue an
order to show cause and hold a hearing at which the prosecutor is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is
guilty of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) If
the prosecutor fails to sustain that burden of proof, the court
must vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner
on the remaining charges. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
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B.
Wright was socializing, drinking, and smoking
methamphetamine with acquaintance Richard Fowler, Jr., and
several others when he pulled out a handgun, pointed it at
Fowler, pursued him as he fled down the hall, scuffled with him,
and shot him in the head.
Wright pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter while
personally using and intentionally discharging a firearm. The
court sentenced him to a 15-year prison term.
In 2022, Wright filed a petition for resentencing in the trial
court pursuant to former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.
The court found he had made a prima facie showing of eligibility
for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary
hearing.
The hearing took place over two days. At the outset of the
first day the court stated, “it’s the People[’s] burden to prove that
Mr. Wright could still be convicted under current law, and the
proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.” When the hearing resumed
for the second day the court reiterated this point: “the People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Wright is not eligible for relief, and the determination here is
whether or not under current law Mr. Wright could be convicted
of murder.”
The prosecutor argued Wright was ineligible for
resentencing in light of his guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter
with personal use of a firearm and the evidence he acted alone
and was the actual killer. “[I]t’s simply not reasonably possibl[e]
that Mr. Wright was not the actual killer, and there’s not a co-
defendant. There’s no one that he possibly could have aided and
abetted,” and there was no lesser target offense that could
reasonably have resulted in Fowler’s death.
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Defense counsel argued Wright could have been convicted
of second-degree felony murder under an imputed malice theory
for committing an unintended and unforeseen killing while
committing one or more of several inherently dangerous felonies:
carrying a loaded gun into a bedroom with others present,
ingesting methamphetamine with them, and drawing a loaded
gun. She argued there was no evidence Wright harbored the
specific intent to kill and that the record supported a reasonable
doubt as to whether he acted with malice.
The trial court disagreed. In stating its ruling, it again
stated that the prosecution bore the burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Wright was guilty or could be convicted
under the amended murder law. “As you look at [section 1172.6]
under subsection (d)(3), talking about the hearing, it says that
the hearing to determine whether the petitioner’s entitled to
relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder
or attempted murder under California law as amended.” It also
expressly observed that a finding of substantial evidence to
support a murder conviction was insufficient to satisfy that
burden. The court found that, while the prosecution might have
pursued now discredited imputed liability theories of felony
murder at trial, the evidence also supported currently valid
theories based on implied or express malice. “And so based on
that, the Court finds that the People have met their burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there’s still a viable theory
of liability of murder in this case, and that they have satisfied
[that] burden here today.” Accordingly, it denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
Despite the court’s multiple statements of the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, Wright argues it misunderstood the
resentencing statute and, in fact, believed the prosecution was
required only to prove there was substantial evidence to support
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a valid murder conviction under current law. The argument is
meritless. The court repeatedly stated that the prosecutor had
the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, it
expressly noted that a finding there was substantial evidence to
support his conviction was insufficient to satisfy that burden.
Wright nonetheless claims that two remarks show the court
applied the substantial evidence standard, instead of requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They do not. In discussing the
evidence that supported an implied malice theory, the court
commented that the question was whether the People could have
convicted Wright on that basis at trial: “In terms of implied
malice, I think the question for the Court here is could the People
have relied on an implied malice theory at the trial in order to
convict Mr. Wright?” It found they could have, adding that the
purpose of the hearing was not to retry the case but to determine
“whether or not the People have proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that there’s a viable theory [of murder].” This comment,
particularly in the context of the court’s prior discussion of the
reasonable doubt standard, does not suggest that it applied a
lesser standard of proof.
The court continued, “I don’t know what a judge would do
with the facts. As [defense counsel] pointed out, there might be a
jury that, based on . . . the inconsistencies [in the trial testimony]
and other facts and circumstances of the case could very well
acquit Mr. Wright. But there’s a viable legal theory in which he
could be tried today, and the jury could be instructed on today
under current law.” Wright, properly, does not claim this was a
misstatement of the law. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v.
Guillory (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 326, 333 [offenders who could be
convicted under current murder law are ineligible for
resentencing].) Nor does it show the court failed to require proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt despite having clearly
articulated that standard.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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______________________
BURNS, J.
We concur:
____________________________
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
____________________________
CHOU, J.
A165872
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