Dimejian v. Armenian Revolutionary Federation CA2/3 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 7/28/23 Dimejian v. Armenian Revolutionary Federation CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
    opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    AIDA DIMEJIAN et al.,                                          B319337
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                                        21STCP01785
    ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY
    FEDERATION –
    DASHNAKTSUTIUN,
    WESTERN, U.S.A. et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
    Meylan Davitt Jain Arevian & Kim, Raymond B. Kim,
    Shaunt T. Arevian, and Grace C. Lee for Plaintiffs and
    Appellants.
    CSReeder, Reeder McCreary, Christopher S. Reeder; Jeffer
    Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Susan Allison, Dan Sedor, and
    Vatche Zetjian for Defendant and Respondent Armenian
    Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutiun, Western, U.S.A.
    Lauter Law and Brian D. Lauter for Defendants and
    Respondents Carmen Ohanian et al.
    _______________________________________
    INTRODUCTION
    Plaintiffs Aida Dimejian, Stepan Boyajian, and Khatchig
    Tazian are members of defendant Armenian Revolutionary
    Federation – Dashnaktsutiun, Western, U.S.A. (ARFDW).
    Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying their
    petition to set aside the December 28, 2020 election of ARFDW’s
    board of directors, known as the Central Committee.1 Plaintiffs
    argue the court abused its discretion in denying their petition
    because ARFDW did not satisfy notice and quorum requirements
    before electing the Central Committee. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    1.    Background
    ARFDW is a nonprofit corporation based in Glendale. It
    was formed to advance the rights, culture, heritage, and interests
    of the Armenian community, and its members are Americans of
    Armenian heritage living in the “Western” United States.
    ARFDW is governed by a set of bylaws that were certified in
    March 2006 (Bylaws).
    ARFDW is composed of 17 chapters, the majority of which
    are in Southern California, with chapters also in Arizona,
    Nevada, Texas, and Central and Northern California. Each
    1 Plaintiffs also named the individual committee members elected on
    December 28, 2020 as defendants in this case. Those individuals are:
    Carmen Ohanian, Garo Ispenjian, Harut Mgrditchian, Krikor Topalian
    (AKA Koko Topalian), Vahan Bzdikian (AKA Vahan Bezdikian), Alik
    Ourfalian, Levon Kirakosian, Toros Kejejian, Sarkis Berberian (AKA
    Sako Berberian), Shahen Derderian, and Arto Keuleyan (collectively,
    2020 Committee Members).
    2
    chapter is represented by a committee, known as a “gomideh.”
    ARFDW also has a student organization that “has no specific
    region or location.” The student organization is “prescribed the
    rights of a [g]omideh.”
    The Central Committee is ARFDW’s board of directors. It
    has 11 members who are elected every two years at ARFDW’s
    Regional Convention. The Central Committee directs ARFDW’s
    “overall activities” and supervises the activities of the chapters.
    The Central Committee has “final authority regarding the
    interpretation of the bylaws and the decisions of the Regional
    Convention.”
    ARFDW’s “supreme authority” is the Regional Convention,
    which elects the Central Committee and adopts ARFDW’s
    bylaws. The Regional Convention is supposed to meet every two
    years and consists of delegates representing the Central
    Committee, the chapter’s gomidehs, and each chapter’s general
    members. The Central Committee and the gomidehs may each
    elect one delegate, while each chapter may elect a number of
    delegates based on the chapter’s membership size. A quorum for
    a Regional Convention exists when “representatives of two-thirds
    of the [chapters] and gomidehs and a simple majority of the total
    delegates are present.” Only the chapters, including their
    gomidehs, “that have completely fulfilled the financial obligations
    placed upon them are fully qualified to participate in the
    Regional Convention with both voice and vote.”
    The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) is a foreign
    political party organized under Armenian law. ARF’s purpose is
    “to coordinate amongst the different groups of Armenians
    worldwide.” The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Bureau
    (Bureau) is ARF’s executive body. ARFDW and ARF are
    3
    independent organizations, and neither the Bureau nor ARF has
    decision-making authority over ARFDW.
    2.   Events Giving Rise To this Lawsuit
    Around July 2018, ARFDW elected an 11-member Central
    Committee at a Regional Convention.
    On September 13, 2019, the Bureau issued a letter to
    ARFDW’s members, which purported to appoint four additional
    members, including plaintiffs Dimejian and Boyajian, to the
    Central Committee (September 13 Appointees). The Central
    Committee accepted the appointees until a new committee could
    be elected at ARFDW’s next Regional Convention. Although the
    Bureau had no authority to appoint committee members, the
    Central Committee didn’t want to “quarrel with the Bureau”
    because it could lead to “substantial disruption of [ARFDW’s]
    work … and create discord in its ranks” since many ARFDW
    members had “long-standing relationships with the … Bureau.”
    According to the Central Committee’s chairperson, the September
    13 Appointees were assigned only “discrete and limited
    activities,” and they participated in only one committee vote.
    In January 2020, the Central Committee scheduled a
    Regional Convention for late April 2020. The Central Committee
    instructed ARFDW’s chapters to hold general meetings to elect
    delegates for the convention. The Central Committee later
    postponed the Regional Convention and all meetings of ARFDW’s
    chapters due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
    In October 2020, the Central Committee rescheduled the
    Regional Convention for early December 2020. The committee
    instructed ARFDW’s chapters to hold general meetings to elect
    delegates, and it authorized chapters to excuse from their
    4
    meetings any members who did not feel safe attending because of
    the pandemic.
    Around early November 2020, the Central Committee
    postponed the chapters’ meetings “at the direction of the …
    Bureau.” Later that month, the Central Committee notified the
    chapters that the Bureau’s “suspension” on holding general
    meetings had been lifted and that the chapters needed to meet to
    elect delegates for the Regional Convention by December 1, 2020.
    As of early December 2020, 13 chapters elected delegates for the
    Regional Convention.
    On December 1, 2020, plaintiff Tazian, the head of the San
    Francisco chapter, notified the Central Committee that his
    chapter didn’t hold a general meeting due to concerns about the
    pandemic. That same day, the North Hollywood chapter notified
    the Central Committee that it too did not hold a meeting to elect
    delegates for the Regional Convention. Neither chapter tried to
    hold remote meetings or seek exemptions from ARFDW’s in-
    person meeting requirement. Although the Burbank and San
    Jose chapters held meetings, both chapters failed to elect
    delegates for the Regional Convention.
    On December 3, 2020, the Bureau instructed the Central
    Committee to cancel the Regional Convention. The Bureau
    rejected the Central Committee’s request to postpone the
    convention for a “reasonable time.” In a December 27, 2020 letter
    circulated to ARFDW members, the Bureau purported to appoint
    a new 11-member Central Committee (Bureau Committee),
    which included plaintiff Boyajian, two of the other September 13
    Appointees, and two members of the Central Committee.
    On December 27, 2020, the Central Committee convened an
    emergency meeting to address the Bureau’s purported
    5
    appointment of a new committee. Only seven Central Committee
    members attended the meeting. The Central Committee did not
    invite the four September 13 Appointees or the two members of
    the original committee who were named to the Bureau
    Committee, believing those individuals were aligned with the
    Bureau and, therefore, had a conflict of interest in matters
    related to the Bureau’s attempts to interfere in ARFDW’s
    operations.2 Two other Central Committee members were listed
    as absent in the meeting’s minutes.
    The attending Central Committee members found a
    quorum was present because the six individuals who were not
    invited could have their votes “eliminated” due to an “obvious
    conflict of interest.” The attending committee members voted
    unanimously to hold the Regional Convention on December 28,
    2020 to elect a legitimate Central Committee. They did not invite
    the San Francisco, San Jose, Burbank, and North Hollywood
    chapters to the convention, believing the leaders of those
    chapters were aligned with the Bureau and purposefully refused
    to elect delegates to prevent ARFDW from holding a Regional
    Convention.
    ARFDW held a Regional Convention on December 28, 2020.
    Representatives from 18 of 26 collective chapters and gomidehs,
    and a total of 39 delegates, attended the convention. 30 delegates
    appeared in person, while 9 delegates appeared remotely. The
    Burbank, North Hollywood, San Francisco, San Jose, Torrance,
    2 Dimejian testified she never received notice of the emergency
    meeting, and the Central Committee’s chairperson testified that none
    of the September 13 Appointees, which includes Dimejian, were invited
    to the meeting.
    6
    and Orange County chapters did not attend the convention.
    Although the student organization elected delegates, it also did
    not attend. All the chapters that did not attend the convention,
    including the student organization, were delinquent on their
    financial obligations to ARFDW.
    The Central Committee found a quorum of representatives
    attended the Regional Convention. The committee counted only
    those chapters, gomidehs, and delegates it believed were eligible
    to attend the convention. Specifically, the committee excluded as
    ineligible the student organization and the Burbank, North
    Hollywood, San Francisco, and San Jose chapters because they
    refused to participate in the convention and, in any event, were
    delinquent on their financial obligations to ARFDW. In the end,
    the committee found 11 of 13 eligible chapters and 7 of 13 eligible
    gomidehs, or more than two-thirds of the eligible chapters and
    gomidehs, and 39 of 53 eligible delegates, or more than a simple
    majority of the eligible delegates, were in attendance.
    Following a closed vote, the Regional Convention elected a
    new Central Committee, consisting of the 2020 Committee
    Members.
    3.    The Petition to Set Aside the December 28, 2020
    Election
    In May 2021, plaintiffs filed a petition under Corporations
    Code3 section 7616, seeking to set aside the December 28, 2020
    election of ARFDW’s Central Committee. Plaintiffs alleged the
    election was invalid because: (1) the Central Committee provided
    inadequate notice of its December 27, 2020 emergency meeting;
    3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Corporations Code.
    7
    (2) the Central Committee failed to provide adequate notice of the
    December 28, 2020 Regional Convention; and (3) a quorum of
    ARFDW’s chapters, gomidehs, and delegates did not attend the
    Regional Convention.
    On January 18, 2022, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs’
    petition. That same day, the court issued a 38-page ruling
    denying the petition.
    The court found the Central Committee failed to provide
    adequate notice of the December 27, 2020 emergency meeting to
    committee members. Nevertheless, the court refused to
    invalidate the committee’s vote to schedule the Regional
    Convention for December 28, 2020 because the governing statute
    did not identify any remedy for a board’s failure to provide
    sufficient notice of a board-member meeting. In any event, the
    court observed, plaintiffs failed to show the Central Committee
    would have reached a different vote at the emergency meeting—
    i.e., that it would not have voted to schedule the Regional
    Convention for December 28, 2020—had every member of the
    committee been notified of the meeting.
    The court also found the December 28, 2020 election was
    valid. A quorum of representatives attended the Regional
    Convention at which the election was held, and it was fair and
    reasonable for the Central Committee to provide only one day’s
    notice of the convention considering the Bureau’s extraordinary
    efforts to overthrow the committee.
    As an alternative ground for denying the petition, the court
    found plaintiffs were precluded from contesting the December 28,
    2020 election because they were complicit in the Bureau’s efforts
    to overthrow the Central Committee and, therefore, had “unclean
    hands.”
    8
    Plaintiffs appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
    Section 7616 allows any “director,” “member” or “person
    who had the right to vote” in a nonprofit corporation’s election to
    bring an action to determine the validity of the election. (§ 7616,
    subd. (a).) The court “may determine the person entitled to the
    office of director or may order a new election to be held or
    appointment to be made, may determine the validity of the
    issuance of memberships and the right of persons to vote and
    may direct such other relief as may be just and proper.” (Id.,
    subd. (d).) The court must hear a petition challenging a corporate
    election within five days of the date the petition is filed unless
    there is good cause to hold the hearing on a later date. (Id., subd.
    (c).)
    A corporate election challenge “is a broad-based equity
    action in which the court may examine the entire transaction
    without being limited to technical or procedural issues and may
    adjust the rights of the parties to do justice among them.” (Goss
    v. Edwards (1977) 
    68 Cal.App.3d 264
    , 271.) The ultimate issue
    the court must resolve is who “rightfully control[s] the
    corporation.” (American Center for Education, Inc. v. Cavnar
    (1972) 
    26 Cal.App.3d 26
    , 37.)
    Courts reviewing corporate elections are afforded “wide
    discretion” to consider all matters relevant to the determination,
    and they are not limited by technical legal rules or procedural
    issues. (Haah v. Kim (2009) 
    175 Cal.App.4th 45
    , 53–54.) Thus,
    the corporate election statutes provide courts “a free hand to
    enable them to make such orders or grant such relief as justice
    9
    may require. In the exercise of the power thus conferred, trial
    judges must be allowed wide discretion, for they are expressly
    required to ‘proceed in a summary way.’ They may and ought to
    be governed by equitable principles and should deal with cases
    arising under the statute[s] in accordance with substantial right
    and justice, but they must not be bound to any hard and fast
    legal or equitable rules.” (2 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 370, citing
    Lawrence v. I.N. Parlier Estate Co. (1940) 
    15 Cal.2d 220
    ; see also
    Greb v. Diamond Internat. Corp. (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 243
    , 266, fn.
    31 [describing Fletcher as “leading treatise” on corporations
    law].)
    We review a court’s exercise of its equitable powers for
    abuse of discretion. (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 
    91 Cal.App.4th 749
    , 771.)
    2.    The court properly excluded plaintiffs’ evidence that a
    different set of bylaws governs ARFDW.
    As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs contend the court erred
    when it excluded evidence that ARFDW is governed by a set of
    rules other than the Bylaws. This argument is meritless.
    In their petition, plaintiffs alleged there is “a dispute
    within ARFDW[] about which bylaws govern the Corporation.”
    According to plaintiffs, ARFDW and the 2020 Committee
    Members believed the Bylaws govern the organization. Plaintiffs
    attached a copy of the Bylaws to their petition, and the court
    admitted a copy of the Bylaws in the parties’ joint trial exhibits.
    Plaintiffs did not attach any other set of bylaws to their petition,
    nor did they try to introduce evidence of another set of bylaws as
    part of their opening trial papers. Plaintiffs also did not identify
    another set of bylaws that they believed governed ARFDW.
    Instead, in their petition and opening trial brief, plaintiffs
    10
    conceded that the Bylaws governed ARFDW “for purposes of this
    action.”
    In their reply trial brief, plaintiffs also did not dispute that
    the Bylaws governed ARFDW. However, as part of their reply
    papers filed below, plaintiffs submitted several new exhibits,
    including “Exhibit 48,” which is a copy of an alternate set of
    bylaws that plaintiffs now claim governs ARFDW (Alternate
    Bylaws). Plaintiffs also submitted several declarations as part of
    their reply papers, in which Dimejian, Boyajian, and other
    witnesses testified that the Alternate Bylaws were ratified at the
    2018 Regional Convention and have governed ARFDW ever since.
    The court sustained ARFDW’s and the 2020 Committee
    Members’ objections to the witnesses’ statements in those
    declarations claiming the Alternate Bylaws govern ARFDW.
    At the hearing on their petition, plaintiffs argued for the
    first time that the court should consider the Alternate Bylaws.
    Plaintiffs claimed the Alternate Bylaws allowed the Bureau to
    control many aspects of ARFDW, and that plaintiffs’ reliance on
    those bylaws showed they had a good faith belief that the Bureau
    was authorized to unilaterally appoint a new Central Committee.
    The court denied plaintiffs’ request, finding plaintiffs were bound
    by their admission in the verified petition that the Bylaws
    governed ARFDW.
    The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
    consider plaintiffs’ evidence concerning the Alternate Bylaws.
    When a party admits a fact in a pleading, the party becomes
    bound by that admission. (Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist
    Construction (2002) 
    103 Cal.App.4th 1264
    , 1271.) The admission
    precludes “consideration of contrary evidence, [and] any
    discussion of such evidence is irrelevant and immaterial.” (Ibid.)
    11
    In a bench trial, “ ‘ “a fact admitted by the pleadings should be
    treated as ‘found.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) In other words, the court “may not
    ignore a judicial admission in a pleading, but must conclusively
    deem it true as against the pleader.” (Thurman v. Bayshore
    Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 
    203 Cal.App.4th 1112
    , 1155,
    disapproved of on other grounds by ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court
    (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 175
    .)
    Plaintiffs admitted in their verified petition that the
    Bylaws govern ARFDW for purposes of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs did
    not qualify their admission, but instead reiterated it in their
    opening trial brief. Plaintiffs also never sought relief from their
    admission by asking for leave to amend their petition, nor did
    they argue that they were somehow misled or deceived into
    making the admission. (See Thurman v. Bayshore Transit
    Management, Inc., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.) Plaintiffs,
    therefore, were precluded from relying on evidence concerning
    the Alternate Bylaws to contradict their admission that the
    Bylaws govern ARFDW.
    The court also properly excluded evidence related to the
    Alternate Bylaws because plaintiffs did not try to introduce that
    evidence until they filed their reply papers. A trial court has
    discretion to refuse to consider evidence introduced for the first
    time on reply. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 1522
    ,
    1537.) Plaintiffs did not introduce evidence of the Alternate
    Bylaws until they filed their reply papers. Plaintiffs don’t dispute
    that they were aware of the Alternate Bylaws before they filed
    their lawsuit. Indeed, Dimejian and Boyajian testified in their
    reply declarations that they believed the Alternate Bylaws had
    governed ARFDW since the 2018 Regional Convention, which
    occurred more than two years before plaintiffs filed their lawsuit.
    12
    Nor can plaintiffs claim they didn’t anticipate ARFDW and the
    2020 Committee Members would argue a set of rules other than
    the Alternate Bylaws govern ARFDW, since plaintiffs admitted in
    their petition and opening trial brief that the Bylaws govern the
    organization.
    3.    Notice of the December 27, 2020 Emergency Meeting
    Plaintiffs contend the court erred when it found the Central
    Committee’s December 27, 2020 emergency meeting was valid.
    Plaintiffs argue the results of that meeting, including the
    committee’s decision to schedule the December 28, 2020 Regional
    Convention, should be set aside because the committee failed to
    provide at least 48 hours’ notice, and did not notify all committee
    members, of the meeting. We disagree.
    Under section 7211, subdivision (a)(2), at least 48 hours’
    notice must be provided for special meetings of a nonprofit
    corporation’s board of directors. The corporation’s bylaws “may
    not dispense with notice of a special meeting.” (§ 7211, subd.
    (a)(2).) A majority of the “directors authorized in or pursuant to
    the articles or bylaws constitutes a quorum of the board for the
    transaction of business” at a special board meeting. (Id., subd.
    (a)(7).)
    It is undisputed that the Central Committee did not
    provide at least 48 hours’ notice of the December 27, 2020
    emergency meeting to any of its members. It also is undisputed
    that the committee did not notify all its members of that meeting.
    Nevertheless, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
    Central Committee’s failure to provide adequate notice under
    section 7211, subdivision (a)(7) was excusable under the
    circumstances.
    13
    By the time of the emergency meeting, the Bureau had
    interfered repeatedly with the Central Committee’s efforts to
    hold a Regional Convention on regular notice. The Bureau
    postponed the chapters’ general meetings to elect delegates and
    cancelled the scheduled December 3, 2020 Regional Convention
    at the last minute. And immediately before the emergency
    meeting, the Bureau tried to oust the sitting committee and
    appoint a new one. Although the Bureau has no authority under
    the Bylaws to involve itself in ARFDW’s operations, the Central
    Committee accepted the Bureau’s recommendations on numerous
    prior occasions and, as the chairperson testified, many of
    ARFDW’s members had “long-standing relationships” with the
    Bureau. Indeed, all the individuals the Bureau purported to
    appoint to the Central Committee were members of ARFDW.
    Thus, the Central Committee reasonably could have believed the
    Bureau’s conduct was a legitimate threat to ARFDW’s
    independence that required an immediate response—i.e., an
    election of a new Central Committee by ARFDW’s members.
    As for the Central Committee’s failure to notify all its
    members of the emergency meeting, plaintiffs haven’t shown how
    they were prejudiced by that decision. It is well-settled that
    reviewing courts won’t disturb a judgment unless the error at
    issue was prejudicial and a different result likely would have
    occurred without it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475; Cal. Const., art. VI, §
    13 [no reversal if error did not result in miscarriage of justice].)
    Two of the sitting Central Committee members who did not
    receive notice of the emergency meeting were named to the
    Bureau Committee. Even if we were to assume the September 13
    Bureau Appointees were members of the Central Committee and,
    therefore, entitled to notice of the emergency meeting, those
    14
    individuals were appointed by the Bureau, and one of those
    individuals—plaintiff Boyajian—was named to the Bureau
    Committee. All six of the individuals who were not notified of the
    emergency meeting, therefore, appeared to be aligned with the
    Bureau’s efforts to install its own Central Committee.
    Consequently, it was not unreasonable for the Central Committee
    to believe those individuals were conflicted and could be
    precluded from voting on what measures the committee should
    take to address the Bureau’s conduct. (See Columbia Engineering
    Co. v. Joiner (1965) 
    231 Cal.App.2d 837
    , 849 [when reviewing
    corporate elections, courts may disregard procedural or legal
    infirmities if “necessary to a just direction of the relief”]; Goss v.
    Edwards, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 271 [courts reviewing
    corporate elections are not limited by “technical or procedural
    issues and may adjust the rights of the parties to do justice
    among them”].)
    4.    Notice of the December 28, 2020 Regional Convention
    Plaintiffs next contend the court erred in finding it was
    appropriate for the Central Committee to provide only one day’s
    notice of the December 28, 2020 Regional Convention. Again, we
    disagree.
    When members of a nonprofit corporation are allowed to
    vote at a meeting, the corporation must provide at least 10 days’
    written notice of the meeting to every member who is entitled to
    vote. (§ 7511, subd. (a).) The notice must identify: (1) “the place,
    date and time of the meeting”; (2) any means of remotely
    participating in the meeting, (3) any matters the board intends to
    present for action at the meeting; and (4) if directors are to be
    elected at the meeting, “the names of all those who are nominees
    at the time the notice is given to members.” (Ibid.) “A court may
    15
    find that notice not given in conformity with this section is still
    valid, if it was given in a fair and reasonable manner.” (Id., subd.
    (g).)
    The court did not abuse its discretion in finding it was “fair
    and reasonable” for the Central Committee to provide only one
    day’s notice of the December 28, 2020 Regional Convention. The
    Central Committee provided more than one month’s notice of the
    originally-scheduled December 3, 2020 Regional Convention. The
    committee instructed all of ARFDW’s chapters to hold general
    meetings to elect delegates for the convention, which 13 did.
    Thus, most of ARFDW’s chapters were prepared to convene a
    Regional Convention as of early December 2020. But, as we just
    discussed, the Bureau repeatedly interfered with the Central
    Committee’s plans to hold its Regional Convention and, in the
    end, tried to oust the sitting committee.
    The Bureau’s conduct violated ARFDW’s Bylaws and
    threatened the organization’s independence. As the Central
    Committee’s chairperson testified, the Bureau’s decisions caused
    disarray and confusion throughout ARFDW because the members
    didn’t know which body—the Central Committee or the Bureau—
    was running the organization. In light of the Bureau’s conduct
    and the confusion it caused it among ARFDW’s ranks, it was
    more than reasonable for the Central Committee to believe it was
    necessary to hold a convention on short notice to elect a new,
    legitimate committee. It also was reasonable for the committee to
    believe ARFDW’s chapters were prepared to attend a convention
    on short notice, since most of the chapters had already elected
    delegates. The court, therefore, acted well within the scope of its
    equitable powers in finding one day’s notice of the December 28,
    16
    2020 Regional Convention was fair and reasonable under section
    7511, subdivision (g).
    We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the notice was invalid
    because the Central Committee did not notify all of ARFDW’s
    chapters of the Regional Convention—i.e., the Burbank, North
    Hollywood, San Francisco, and San Jose chapters. Plaintiffs cite
    no authority suggesting section 7511, subdivision (g) is limited
    only to notice that is defective because it was not provided in a
    timely manner. (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 
    189 Cal.App.4th 647
    , 655
    [the court’s judgment “is presumed to be correct, and the
    appellant has the burden to prove otherwise by presenting legal
    authority on each point made”].) In any event, for the reasons we
    just discussed, the court reasonably could have found that even
    though the Central Committee did notify all chapters of the
    convention, the balance of equities weighed in favor of upholding
    the committee’s decision to schedule a Regional Convention on
    short notice considering the extraordinary circumstances in
    which that decision was made.
    5.    A Quorum for the December 28, 2020 Regional
    Convention
    Plaintiffs also contend the court erred in finding a quorum
    of ARFDW’s chapters, gomidehs, and delegates attended the
    December 28, 2020 Regional Convention. This argument lacks
    merit.
    Under section 7512, subdivision (a), a corporation’s bylaws
    may define a quorum—otherwise a quorum consists of one-third
    of the corporation’s “voting power.” (§ 7512, subd. (a).) “If a
    quorum is present, the affirmative vote of the majority of the
    voting power represented at the meeting … shall be the act of the
    members unless the vote of a greater number or voting by classes
    17
    is required by this part or the articles or bylaws.” (Ibid.) If a
    quorum is not present at the beginning of the meeting, no
    business, aside from voting to adjourn the meeting, may be
    conducted. (Id., subds. (c) & (d).)
    ARFDW’s Bylaws define a quorum for a Regional
    Convention as “representatives of two-thirds of the [chapters]
    and gomidehs and a simple majority of the total delegates.”
    Under Article 41(a) of the bylaws, only the chapters and
    gomidehs “that have completely fulfilled the financial obligations
    placed upon them are fully qualified to participate in the
    Regional Convention with both voice and vote.”
    The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding a
    quorum of ARFDW’s chapters, gomidehs, and delegates attended
    the December 28, 2020 Regional Convention. 39 of 53 eligible
    delegates attended the convention. Thus, nearly 75 percent, or
    more than the required simple majority, of delegates were in
    attendance.
    Representatives of 11 chapters and 7 gomidehs also
    attended the Regional Convention. Although ARFDW has 17
    chapters and 18 gomidehs, the Central Committee did not
    include in its quorum calculation the San Francisco, San Jose,
    Burbank, and North Hollywood chapters or the student
    organization because they were delinquent on their financial
    obligations to ARFDW and chose to either not elect delegates (the
    geographic chapters) or not attend the convention despite
    electing delegates (the student organization). Excluding those
    chapters and gomidehs, the Central Committee found 11 of 13
    eligible chapters and 7 of 13 eligible gomidehs were present,
    constituting 69 percent, or more than the necessary two-thirds, of
    the total eligible chapters and gomidehs.
    18
    Plaintiffs argue the court erred in deferring to the Central
    Committee’s decision to exclude from its quorum count the
    student organization and the San Francisco, San Jose, North
    Hollywood, and Burbank chapters. We disagree.
    ARFDW’s Bylaws give the Central Committee the “final
    authority regarding the interpretation of the bylaws and
    decisions of the Regional Convention.” As we noted above, Article
    41(a) of the Bylaws permits only those chapters and gomidehs
    that have satisfied their financial obligations to participate in a
    Regional Convention. The Central Committee interpreted this
    provision to mean only those chapters and gomidehs that are
    current on their financial obligations should be counted toward a
    quorum for a Regional Convention. Although Article 41(a) doesn’t
    expressly address whether the Central Committee may make
    such an exclusion when calculating a quorum, nothing in the
    Bylaws precludes the committee from doing so. Indeed, because
    Article 41(a) strips delinquent chapters and gomidehs of not only
    their right to vote, but also their right to a “voice,” at the
    Regional Convention, the Central Committee reasonably could
    have interpreted that provision to exclude delinquent chapters
    and gomidehs from a Regional Convention quorum calculation.
    (Berke v. Tri Realtors (1989) 
    208 Cal.App.3d 463
    , 469 [“The
    practical and reasonable construction of the constitution and
    bylaws of a voluntary organization by its governing body is
    binding on the membership and will be recognized by the
    courts.”].)
    Finally, plaintiffs argue the Central Committee’s quorum
    calculation was arbitrary because two chapters that plaintiffs
    claim were delinquent on their financial obligations to ARFDW—
    the Glendale and West San Fernando chapters—participated in
    19
    the December 28, 2020 Regional Convention. The court however,
    refused to consider evidence that the Glendale and West San
    Fernando chapters were delinquent because plaintiffs did not
    present that evidence until they filed their reply papers. As we
    explained above, a court may disregard evidence that a plaintiff
    introduces for the first time on reply. (Jay v. Mahaffey, supra,
    218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1537.)
    In sum, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion
    in upholding the December 28, 2020 election of ARFDW’s Central
    Committee.4
    4 In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether the court
    correctly found plaintiffs were precluded from challenging the election
    under the “unclean hands” doctrine.
    20
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their
    costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    LAVIN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    EDMON, P. J.
    EGERTON, J.
    21
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B319337

Filed Date: 7/28/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/28/2023