In re D.A. CA2/8 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 6/7/23 In re D.A. CA2/8
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    In re D.A., a Person Coming                                       B321748
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                Los Angeles County
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                            Super. Ct. No. DK15837A
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    K.S. et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
    Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant K.S.
    Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant De.A.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Senior
    Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ____________________________
    A mother, K.S., and a father, De.A., appeal termination of
    their parental rights as to their son, D.A. The parents’ lone
    contention on appeal is that the court erred in finding the Indian
    Child Welfare Act (
    25 U.S.C. § 1901
     et seq., Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 224 et seq., the Act) does not apply because the Los Angeles
    County Department of Children and Family Services failed to
    interview three specified extended family members. We affirm.
    These proceedings began in 2016 when D.A. was three and
    a half years old. D.A. was then staying at his maternal
    grandmother’s house, where the mother came and went. The
    father was not part of these living arrangements—he lived
    elsewhere with the paternal great-grandmother and a female
    cousin. The father’s cousin is D.A.’s cousin once removed. We
    refer to her as “paternal cousin once removed.”
    D.A. was placed in foster care, and later returned to the
    maternal grandmother’s home, where he had been living when
    the case began. The court ordered legal guardianship by the
    maternal grandmother as D.A.’s permanent plan. The maternal
    grandmother, then D.A.’s legal guardian, filed to adopt D.A. The
    court terminated the parents’ rights, and ordered adoption as
    D.A.’s permanent plan. The mother and the father appealed.
    The father identifies three relatives he contends were
    available to the Department but as to whom no inquiry was
    conducted under the Act. (The father initially said the
    Department made no inquiry of the maternal grandmother. In
    his reply brief, he concedes the Department made this inquiry.)
    The mother concurs with the father’s inquiry argument.
    The first two relatives at issue are the paternal great-
    grandmother and the paternal cousin once removed, with whom
    2
    the father lived in May 2016. The parties agree the first two are
    not extended family members under the statute. Specifically, the
    father says the Act’s “plain terms” do not include these relatives
    and asking them “is not mandated.” Given this agreement, this
    issue is not in contention. We need not and do not tackle the
    question of whether the Legislature intended these relatives to
    fall within the definition of “extended family members.”
    There is insufficient evidence either the paternal great-
    grandmother or the cousin once removed has an interest in the
    child. Neither has been involved in D.A.’s life. As a separate and
    independent ground, the father acknowledges he did not raise the
    issue of these relatives’ interest in the child in his opening brief,
    and he indeed forfeited this argument.
    The third relative is a maternal aunt. The Department
    interviewed the maternal grandmother on the issue of Indian
    ancestry. We presume the maternal grandmother had as much
    knowledge of family heritage as the maternal aunt. Any error in
    the Department’s failure to interview this aunt was harmless.
    DISPOSITION
    The court’s orders terminating the mother’s and the
    father’s parental rights are affirmed.
    WILEY, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    GRIMES, Acting P. J.                  VIRAMONTES, J.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B321748

Filed Date: 6/7/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/7/2023