In re Robert H. CA2/3 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 6/8/23 In re Robert H. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    In re Robert H. et al., Persons                                B324774
    Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.                                                     Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. Nos.
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             19CCJP04692A,
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                         19CCJP04692B
    AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    J.D.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County. Stephen C. Marpet, Judge Pro Tempore of the Juvenile
    Court. Conditionally affirmed.
    Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court
    of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County
    Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    _________________________
    Mother and father separately appeal the juvenile court’s
    orders terminating their parental rights to their son Robert (born
    December 2012) and daughter R.H. (born May 2019). Mother
    contends the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial parent
    relationship exception to adoption did not apply under In re
    Caden C. (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 614
     (Caden C.). She also contends
    the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children
    and Family Services (DCFS) failed to make an adequate inquiry
    under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (
    25 U.S.C. § 1901
    et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code,
    § 224 et seq.).1 Father joins in mother’s arguments.2 We
    1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
    and Institutions Code. Because ICWA uses the term “Indian,”
    we do the same for consistency, although we recognize other
    terms are preferred. (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 
    70 Cal.App.5th 735
    , 739, fn. 1.)
    2      Father’s notice of appeal indicates he challenged the court’s
    denial of his section 388 petition, heard September 22, 2022
    and October 6, 2022, and the court’s October 17, 2022 orders
    terminating his parental rights. Father’ opening brief includes
    statements of the case and facts, but he merely joins in mother’s
    arguments and makes no substantive arguments of his own.
    He thus has forfeited any claim of error as to the court’s denial
    of his section 388 petition and the applicability of the beneficial
    parent relationship exception as to him. (In re A.L. (2022) 
    73 Cal.App.5th 1131
    , 1154, fn. 9.) Accordingly, we address only
    2
    conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
    finding that the beneficial parent relationship exception to
    adoption did not apply. As DCFS does not oppose a remand for
    it to make an ICWA inquiry of the children’s known and available
    extended family members, we conditionally affirm the order
    terminating parental rights and remand the matter for DCFS
    to do so.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A detailed account of the juvenile court proceedings
    through its August 4, 2020 orders sustaining DCFS’s section 387
    supplemental petition and removing the children from parents’
    custody is set forth in this Court’s earlier opinion affirming
    the court’s disposition orders (In re Robert H. (Feb. 25, 2021,
    B307041) [nonpub. opn.]). We summarize the pertinent events,
    drawing on our earlier opinion.
    1.     Earlier proceedings leading to removal of children
    In July 2019, DCFS filed a non-detained section 300
    petition in the juvenile court under subdivision (b)(1) alleging
    the children’s physical health and safety were at serious risk
    of harm due to parents’ daily marijuana use, which interfered
    with their ability to care for and supervise their children.3 At the
    detention hearing, the court found there were reasonable services
    to prevent detention, and released the children to parents under
    DCFS’s supervision.
    the applicability of the exception to mother and focus on the facts
    relevant to her.
    3     We state the allegations as amended by the juvenile court.
    3
    DCFS’s investigation revealed both parents had a long
    history of marijuana use. Robert suffered from asthma and
    had missed numerous days from school because of it. DCFS
    gave parents a referral for the mobile pediatric asthma program.
    Parents also required new housing due to issues with their
    landlord. They planned to move in with paternal great-
    grandmother.
    In October 2019, parents pleaded no contest to the
    amended petition. The juvenile court declared the children
    dependents of the court, found reasonable services available
    to prevent their removal, and released them to parents’ home.
    The court ordered mother to participate in random drug testing,
    individual counseling, and a parenting course.4 Mother no longer
    would be required to drug test if she submitted six consecutive
    clean tests.
    At the January 22, 2020 non-appearance progress report
    hearing, DCFS submitted its last minute information report
    (LMI) stating it had “unresolved safety and overall well-being
    concerns for minors.” Mother (and father) had failed to submit
    to drug testing and had not enrolled in any services. As of
    November 2019, Robert had missed 21 days of school since
    September. Mother had received a notice of eviction and notice
    to vacate the family home. She nevertheless declined the social
    worker’s offer to refer her to transitional and sober living housing
    and had yet to contact Legal Aid for assistance. DCFS opined
    parents were not “seriously focusing on complying with the Court
    orders.” The juvenile court found parents not in compliance with
    4     The court made similar orders as to father.
    4
    their case plans, ordered family preservation services, and set
    an appearance progress hearing for February 27, 2020.
    In its LMI filed for the February hearing, DCFS reported
    mother still had not submitted any drug tests. During an
    unannounced visit in early February, the social worker smelled
    marijuana in the air while mother held R.H. As of February 12,
    2020, a psychiatric social worker with the Department of Mental
    Health had been unable to reach mother by phone or mail to
    schedule a mental health treatment plan appointment for Robert.
    The agency thus closed the referral. At the February 27 hearing,
    the court admonished parents to cooperate with its orders and
    to meet their children’s needs, including Robert’s asthma and
    education needs.
    At some point in March 2020, mother and the children
    moved into the home of father and paternal great-grandmother.
    During a virtual home inspection in April 2020 (due to COVID-19
    restrictions), Robert told the social worker he “feels better with
    no breathing problems.” Both he and R.H. appeared to be happy
    and healthy. Mother still had not submitted to drug testing and
    admitted she had not followed up with medical appointments
    for either child.
    DCFS detained the children from parents on April 24,
    2020, and placed them with maternal aunt and her wife. On
    April 28, 2020, DCFS filed a supplemental petition under section
    387 alleging parents’ failure to comply with their court-ordered
    case plans endangered the children’s physical health and safety
    and placed them at risk of harm.
    In its LMI filed for the May 1, 2020 detention hearing,
    DCFS reported Robert had disclosed paternal great-grandmother
    had hit him on his limbs and stomach while the family was living
    5
    with her; mother had hit him with a belt; and paternal great-
    grandmother “smoke[d] constantly while in the home.” The court
    detained the children and ordered twice weekly monitored visits
    for parents.
    The jurisdiction/disposition report updated the court on
    the family’s circumstances. DCFS had given mother drug testing
    information on May 11, 2020, but she admitted she had been
    smoking and asked the social worker to “hold off” on submitting
    the testing referral. In a July 1, 2020 interview, Robert told
    the social worker he liked staying with his aunt. He was
    participating in on-line schoolwork but had difficulty with
    reading. He had a cell phone to call his mother. Maternal
    aunt was concerned about Robert’s mental health, anger, and
    behavior.
    On August 4, 2020, after hearing argument, the juvenile
    court sustained the supplemental petition, vacated its prior home
    of a parent order, removed the children, and ordered the children
    suitably placed with maternal aunt. The court ordered DCFS
    to provide family reunification services; mother to submit to
    drug testing, a parenting education program, and individual
    counseling; and monitored visitation twice a week for two hours
    each visit. This court affirmed those orders.
    2.    Family reunification (August 2020 to September 2021)
    DCFS’s status review report filed October 22, 2020 noted
    the children continued to live with maternal aunt, her wife,
    and her wife’s daughter. They were providing a clean, safe,
    and loving home for the children. Robert had begun mental
    health therapy that month and was attending online classes
    as a second-grader.
    6
    Parents were living with paternal great-grandmother.
    (Mother lived in the garage when father was away.) In July
    2020, mother had enrolled in an affiliate of “Shields for Families”
    and received parenting, case management, and housing referrals.
    Mother had not returned to the agency since enrolling, however.
    She apparently was receiving therapy through another agency,
    but the social worker could not confirm if that were true.
    Mother was visiting the children at maternal grandmother’s
    home. Father refused to visit and had had no contact with
    the social worker since the children’s removal.
    In its report filed January 6, 2021, DCFS noted the social
    worker visited the children’s caretakers in December 2020.
    The caretakers wanted mother to put more effort into seeing her
    children. On the weekends, they drove the children to maternal
    grandmother’s home to visit mother. They had asked mother to
    pick a weekday when she could take the bus to visit the children
    at their home as well, but she had not responded. The aunts
    were providing the children with everything they needed and
    were willing to be their co-guardians. DCFS recommended
    the court terminate reunification services.
    At the February 2, 2021 review hearing, the court
    found parents’ progress toward alleviating or mitigating the
    circumstances necessitating the children’s placement had
    “not been substantial.” Nevertheless, the court continued
    reunification services.
    In its LMI filed April 20, 2021, DCFS noted mother
    reported she was almost done with her parenting class and
    had enrolled in individual counseling, but the social worker
    was unable to verify that information with mother’s providers.
    Mother also told the social worker she would be having surgery
    7
    in a few days. The children had adjusted well to living with
    maternal aunt; they were happy and stable.
    DCFS’s status review report filed July 23, 2021 noted
    mother had been partially compliant in her case plan. Mother
    asked to defer drug testing until after her surgery, however, as
    she would be taking medication. She then had complications
    from the surgery, apparently preventing her from testing.
    Mother said she had to reenroll in the parenting class through
    Shields for Families due to her surgery. In July 2021, mother’s
    therapist from Shields for Families confirmed mother had
    enrolled in therapy last year. Mother had been “doing pretty
    well” and had missed sessions only occasionally, the last time
    having been due to her surgery in April.
    Visits were scheduled for twice a week, once at maternal
    grandmother’s home and once at maternal aunt’s home. Father
    did not come to the visits. Mother video-called father during
    her visits, so he could see the children. In June 2021, maternal
    grandmother told the social worker mother was required to
    confirm the visit in advance with maternal aunt or the visit
    wouldn’t take place. There had been times when mother hadn’t
    shown up for a visit after maternal aunt had driven the children
    to maternal grandmother’s home. Maternal grandmother
    also said mother had shown up to a few visits after she had
    been drinking or smoking marijuana and sometimes arrived late.
    According to maternal grandmother, mother sometimes yelled
    at R.H. and didn’t have the patience to care for her during visits.
    DCFS described Robert and R.H. as “doing very well.” To
    accommodate the two children, their caregivers had moved from
    their two-bedroom apartment to a larger, three-bedroom unit.
    Maternal aunt and her wife were willing to be co-guardians of
    8
    the children. Robert said, “ ‘I want to stay with my aunt. I don’t
    want to go with my dad, but I wouldn’t mind seeing my mom.’ ”
    DCFS again recommended the court terminate parents’
    reunification services. The court continued the review hearing
    to September 24, 2021 for the parents to contest that
    recommendation.
    At the hearing, counsel for DCFS told the court DCFS
    now recommended continuing reunification services due to the
    COVID-19 pandemic and mother’s inability to test because of
    her surgery. The court disagreed. Noting the children had been
    detained 17 months earlier, and parents thus would be entitled
    only to one more month of services, the court stated it could not
    find there was a likelihood of reunification in the next month.
    The court stated parents had “done nothing,” had not shown
    the court they wanted their children “back in their life,” and had
    “stagnated for a year and a half.” The court found it “patently
    obvious . . . that services should be terminated today.” The court
    terminated reunification services over DCFS’s objection and
    ordered a section 366.26 hearing.
    3.     Permanency planning (October 2021 to October 2022)
    In January 2022, DCFS filed section 366.26, status review,
    and addendum reports. Mother continued to have monitored
    visits with the children on Sundays at maternal grandmother’s
    home. She did not attend her second scheduled weekly visit
    at the caregiver’s home. Father had not confirmed a day for
    his monitored visits, but in late December the social worker
    and he had discussed it, and father was to get back to her after
    the new year.
    The children were “comfortable and thriving” in maternal
    aunt’s home. R.H. had started school and Robert was “doing
    9
    pretty well in school.” DCFS repeated Robert’s earlier statement
    about wanting to stay with his aunt.
    Maternal aunt and her wife wanted to adopt the children.
    They “wish[ed] to provide a nurturing and stable home” for
    Robert and R.H. DCFS noted maternal aunt had been involved
    in the children’s lives since their birth. DCFS identified adoption
    as the most appropriate plan, but the adoption study was not
    yet complete due to maternal aunt and her wife having relocated
    to the larger home. They were raising their two children—
    a 12-year-old daughter and a baby born July 2021—along
    with Robert and R.H. They both worked full-time and
    shared childcare responsibilities. DCFS noted the children
    interchangeably referred to maternal aunt and her wife
    as “ ‘aunt’ and ‘mom.’ ”
    DCFS reported Robert’s statements about adoption as:
    wishing “to live with his ‘aunties’ until he is older,’ ” sometimes
    calling them “ ‘mom,’ ” and being happy living with his
    aunts, their children, and R.H. R.H. was too young to make
    “a meaningful statement regarding adoption,” but DCFS noted
    she had “been observed being comfortable and playful in the
    presence” of her caregivers.
    In January 2022, father filed a section 388 petition to
    reinstate his family reunification services and for unmonitored
    and extended visits. Father had enrolled in services and was
    testing negative. He stated he had a strong bond with his
    children based on their virtual visits each Sunday. The court
    summarily denied the petition as failing to state new evidence
    or a change in circumstances.
    In its section 366.26 and status review reports filed
    April 18, 2022, DCFS stated adoption remained the permanent
    10
    placement goal for the children and recommended the court
    terminate parental rights. DCFS noted the children continued
    to do well in the caregivers’ home. Robert had begun to have
    some behavioral issues, however. He wasn’t listening at school
    or at home, and sometimes yelled in class. The social worker
    referred Robert to therapy.
    On May 17, 2022, father filed a second section 388 petition,
    asking for the same change in orders as before, noting he had
    completed his drug treatment program and various classes, and
    was regularly participating in counseling.
    DCFS’s LMI filed the day before the May 20, 2022 hearing
    reported the prospective adoptive parents’ new home had been
    approved and there were no impediments to adoption readiness.
    At the hearing, counsel and the court discussed issues with
    the notice of the section 366.26 hearing. Minors’ counsel also
    objected to the section 366.26 report as having insufficient
    information regarding the quality of visitation; counsel asked
    for the report to provide that information. She had asked DCFS
    in January to provide more information on the quality of parents’
    visits with the children. The court set father’s section 388
    petition for hearing in July with the 366.26 hearing to trail.
    The court ordered DCFS to provide parents with proper notice
    and admonished it that the 366.26 report “needs to give me an
    update how the visits are going, when it’s going, and the dates,
    times, location so that I can make appropriate findings.”
    The section 366.26 and status review reports filed July 14,
    2022 made no change in recommendation. As of June 15, 2022,
    father had not had any visits or calls with the children, and the
    caregiver stated the children did not have a relationship with
    him. According to the caregiver, mother continued to visit the
    11
    children on Sundays at maternal grandmother’s home but
    showed “little to no pat[ience] with the children and g[ot] easily
    frustrated with them.” DCFS recommended the court deny
    father’s petition and proceed with termination of parental rights.
    The court set father’s section 388 petition for a contested
    hearing in September and continued the section 366.26 hearing
    for the same day. At minors’ counsel’s request, the court ordered
    DCFS to provide delivered service logs to all counsel.
    DCFS provided delivered service logs from May 20, 2022
    to August 9, 2022. On June 16, 2022, the caregiver told the social
    worker mother visited every Sunday but was “very impatient
    with the kids” and “easily frustrated.” When the social worker
    asked Robert where he wanted to live, he said he wanted “to
    continue to be with his aunt.” On August 3, 2022, the social
    worker contacted father about re-establishing his visits.
    In its addendum report filed August 12, 2022, DCFS noted
    the social worker had been in contact with father about setting
    his visitation for two weekday evenings and was waiting for his
    response. The report noted Robert said he does not want to live
    with father and “continues to voice that he wants to be adopted
    by maternal aunt.” The caregiver told the social worker that
    Robert had been acting out and becoming defiant. Robert shared
    with the caregiver that he acted out because people had told him
    he was “going to live with his dad and he does not want that to
    happen.” The report also revealed a domestic violence incident
    had occurred between parents in October 2021.
    The court continued the hearing to September 22, 2022.
    The hearing on father’s section 388 petition proceeded over two
    days, September 22 and October 6. Father and the supervising
    social worker testified, primarily about father’s visitation.
    12
    DCFS provided an LMI to the court with updated
    information for the October 6, 2022 hearing. The court had
    ordered it to provide a report “detailing/itemizing the parents[’]
    visitation with the children from at least the last 3 to 4 months.”
    The new social worker assigned August 19, 2022 interviewed
    Robert at school on September 27, 2022. She asked Robert about
    his recent September visits with father. Robert, who now saw
    his father on Wednesdays and Saturdays, said the visits were
    “new to him,” as “ ‘before [he] wouldn’t see him and it had been
    a very long time since [he] saw [his] dad.’ ”
    Robert also talked about his visits with mother. He saw
    mother at his grandmother’s every Sunday, and said he had
    a better relationship with her than with father. He said he
    “really enjoys being able to hug his mom.” They usually eat
    at his grandmother’s and play and watch television together.
    Sometimes they walk to the park. When asked about phone calls
    with mother, Robert said he sometimes asks “his auntie to call
    mom.” He said “he would actually like to visit mom more.”
    Robert did not understand why this was happening to him.
    He said he asked his auntie why he was taken from his parents,
    and she said it was because he was left alone at home. Robert
    explained he didn’t remember ever being left alone, stating, “ ‘All
    I would do was go to school and be with my mom.’ ” He described
    mother walking him to the corner and waving “bye” after he
    crossed the street to enter the school.
    The social worker also asked Robert if he knew what
    “being adopted” meant. Robert responded that it meant “not
    being a part of his mom anymore.” When asked if he wanted
    to be adopted, Robert stated he wasn’t sure. He said “that is a
    question that he asks himself.” When asked if would like to be
    13
    returned to his parents’ care, Robert said he “did not know if he
    wanted that.” The social worker then asked Robert if would
    like his aunt to adopt him, and he said, “ ‘Yes, I would like to
    be adopted by my aunt as long as I can still have visits with my
    mom and dad.’ ” He said “he would be very upset if he did not
    see his mom because he enjoys hugging her a lot and has a good
    relationship with his mom.”
    The social worker interviewed mother and father
    separately that same day. Mother said she visits the children
    on Sundays and calls them about once a week. When asked why
    she didn’t also visit on Saturdays, mother responded she didn’t
    know that was an option. Mother said she and the children play
    games at maternal grandmother’s home and sometimes go to
    the park. Mother said she sometimes brings toys and food for
    the children during her visits. She described R.H. as crying
    when she leaves, but mother said R.H. would stop if she gave
    R.H. money. Mother said she never had alone time with the
    children, as someone always was present. The social worker
    explained monitored visits required the monitor to be “within
    ear and eye shot.”
    Mother said she and father were living in paternal
    grandmother’s home with his sister. Mother received state
    disability income due to a learning disability. She told the social
    worker she had completed the required six clean tests and was
    getting ready “to do parenting” with Shields for Families, where
    she goes for counseling.
    Mother was against adoption. She said that “given it’s her
    sister, and she’ll be able to still see her children, she guess[es]
    it’s okay, but she would like to be more involved with the decision
    making, like parties, etc.”
    14
    The social worker also interviewed father. He told her that
    before she scheduled his first visit on September 17, he hadn’t
    had a set visitation schedule. Father stated the former social
    worker did not help him arrange visitation. Rather, he had
    video calls with the children on mother’s phone when she visited
    them on Sundays.
    The social worker spoke with the caregiver by phone
    about parents’ visits. She said the social worker tried to arrange
    visitation for father in the past, but he would never follow
    through. He also never called to check on the children. The
    caretaker described father’s recent visits at parks near his home
    and near the caretaker’s home.
    The caregiver confirmed mother consistently visited the
    children on Sundays, usually at maternal grandmother’s home.
    The caregiver said the previous social worker had arranged
    for mother to visit once during the week but “that has never
    happened.” Rather, mother visited only when the caretaker
    drove the children to maternal grandmother’s home in
    Los Angeles. The caregiver said mother usually watched
    television with the children or would give them her cellphone.
    Sometimes they walked to the park, but mother wouldn’t bring
    anything to play with the children there. Rather, she would
    just sit there and not engage with the children. As for calls, the
    caregiver said mother called only to confirm her visit on Sundays;
    she did not otherwise call to check on the children’s wellbeing.
    The caregiver told the social worker she was willing to
    have an open adoption if the children wanted to visit mother and
    father. The report recommended the court terminate parental
    rights and the children be placed for adoption. The report
    noted that, “[i]f the children were to be adopted, there is not
    15
    a detriment in attachment with [mother or father] as caregiver,
    [maternal aunt] is open to having an open adoption and allow
    the children to have ongoing visits with their biological parents.”
    4.      Final section 366.26 hearing
    The court convened the section 366.26 hearing on
    October 17, 2022. Mother was not present. Father testified
    about his difficulties with the former social worker in arranging
    visitation, and his interactions with the children. The court
    noted the former social worker stated in her reports that she had
    contacted father about visitation dates, but he never followed-up
    with her. Father’s counsel argued the children would benefit
    from a relationship with him.
    Mother’s counsel joined in father’s argument. She asked
    the court to find the beneficial parent exception applied and
    to order legal guardianship as the children’s permanent plan.
    Mother consistently visited and called the children every week.
    Counsel also noted Robert had said he enjoys being able to spend
    time with parents, hug mother, and go to the park with mother
    and engage in activities with her. Counsel argued those
    activities were “typical for a parent and child to do to bond.”
    Robert also said he would like to see mother more often and
    had a good relationship with her, demonstrating his strong bond
    with mother. He wanted to be adopted by his aunt as long as
    he still could visit parents. Counsel argued Robert “is clearly
    telling us that he does not approve of nor does he want an
    adoption as that would potentially sever the relationship between
    . . . him and his parents.”
    Minors’ counsel acknowledged mother had a better
    argument than father, as she did visit consistently and arguably
    had a beneficial relationship with the children, though not
    16
    necessarily in the role of a mother. Assuming mother had a
    beneficial relationship with the children, counsel argued that
    relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. Counsel
    noted the children had been with maternal aunt for two and
    a half years and had a very strong connection to her. Minors’
    counsel did not believe “it would . . . be overly detrimental”
    to the children to be adopted by maternal aunt, noting mother
    essentially would become the children’s legal aunt. Counsel
    argued the court should terminate parents’ parental rights
    as parents had not met their burden to establish the exception.
    Counsel for DCFS also argued that, assuming arguendo
    mother met the second prong of the exception, she didn’t
    “believe there’s any way that the court can find” mother “can
    meet the third prong that terminating that attachment would
    be detrimental to the child when balanced against the benefit
    [of] the new adoptive home.”
    The court noted it had read and considered the documents
    introduced into evidence, listened to arguments of counsel, and
    listened to father’s testimony. The court found father did not
    meet the first prong of Caden C.—regular visitation—and found
    the exception did not apply as to him. The court found mother
    had visited the children consistently, but “the issue is whether
    [they] would benefit from a continuing relationship with
    the mother and that’s where it fails.” The court continued,
    “I reviewed this file and I’m satisfied that . . . it would not
    be harmful to sever the relationship between the parents and
    [these children] as the adoptive home is the best place for
    [the children].” The court terminated parents’ parental rights
    as to both children and named the caretaker as the prospective
    adoptive parent. Parents separately appealed.
    17
    5.     Facts relating to ICWA
    The Indian Child Inquiry Attachment (ICWA-010(A)) forms
    attached to DCFS’s initial July 2019 petition indicated a social
    worker had made an “Indian child inquiry” for the children and
    they had no known Indian ancestry. The initial detention report
    also noted mother denied having any Indian ancestry on July 15,
    2019. Mother and father also each filed ICWA-020 Parental
    Notification of Indian Status forms on July 26, 2019. Each
    checked the box, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.”
    At the July 26, 2019 detention hearing, the juvenile court
    confirmed with mother and father that they had no American
    Indian heritage in their families’ backgrounds as far as they
    knew. The court found it had no reason to know the children
    were Indian children under ICWA. The court ordered parents
    to keep DCFS, their attorneys, and the court aware of any new
    information relating to possible ICWA status.
    DCFS’s initial jurisdiction/disposition report states mother
    denied having Indian heritage. She was born in Los Angeles and
    raised by her mother. The report states father also was born in
    Los Angeles and denied having Indian heritage. He was raised
    by his grandmother and great-grandmother.
    DISCUSSION
    1.     The court did not err in terminating mother’s
    parental rights
    a.    Applicable law and standards of review
    Under section 366.26, once the juvenile court terminates
    reunification services and determines a dependent child is
    adoptable—a finding not in dispute here—it must select adoption
    as the permanent plan and terminate parental rights unless
    it finds doing so would be detrimental to the child under one of
    18
    several statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Caden C.,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.)
    The beneficial parent relationship exception applies
    where the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact
    with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
    relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Our Supreme Court
    recently clarified the three elements a parent must prove,
    by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the exception:
    (1) the parent’s regular visitation and contact with the child;
    (2) the child’s “substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
    the parent,” “the continuation of which would benefit the child”;
    and (3) that the termination of “that attachment would be
    detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
    countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C.,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.)
    In assessing whether terminating parental rights
    would be detrimental to the child, the court must perform a
    “case-specific inquiry,” asking, “does the benefit of placement
    in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would
    experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional
    relationship with [the parent?]’ [Citation.] When the
    relationship with a parent is so important to the child that
    the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh
    its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’
    the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C.,
    supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.)
    “A showing the child derives some benefit from the
    relationship is not a sufficient ground to depart from the
    statutory preference for adoption.” (In re Breanna S. (2017)
    
    8 Cal.App.5th 636
    , 646, disapproved on another ground in
    19
    Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637–638, fns. 6–7.) Rather,
    the parent must show the relationship “promotes the well-being
    of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the
    child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive
    parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 
    27 Cal.App.4th 567
    , 575.)
    In evaluating the existence of a beneficial parental
    relationship, courts consider several factors, including “[t]he age
    of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
    custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between
    parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” (In re
    Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) The Caden C.
    court clarified, however, that a parent’s failure to make adequate
    progress with her case plan or “continued struggles” with issues
    that led to the dependency—standing alone—do not preclude
    application of the exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
    pp. 637–638.)
    We review the court’s findings as to whether the parent
    has maintained regular visitation and whether the child
    would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship
    for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–
    640.) In so doing, we do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate
    the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts,’ ” and
    we will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations even where
    substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.)
    Where, as here, a parent contends the court erred in finding she
    did not meet her burden of proof, we must determine whether
    “the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
    matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes
    whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
    unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
    20
    no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
    support a finding.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.W. (2009) 
    180 Cal.App.4th 1517
    , 1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship
    of O.B. (2020) 
    9 Cal.5th 989
    , 1003, fn. 4, 1010, fn. 7.)
    “[T]he ultimate decision—whether termination of parental
    rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s
    relationship with [her] parent—is discretionary and properly
    reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
    at p. 640.)
    b.    The court did not err in finding the beneficial parent
    relationship exception did not apply
    As to the first element, the juvenile court found—and
    counsel for the children and DCFS agreed—mother consistently
    visited the children on Sundays at the maternal grandmother’s
    home. DCFS does not dispute that finding on appeal.
    As to the second and third elements, the juvenile court
    stated, “the issue is whether this child”—presumably referring
    to Robert— “would benefit from a continuing relationship with
    the mother and that’s where it fails. . . . I reviewed this file and
    I’m satisfied that [for] both children . . . it would not be harmful
    to sever the relationship between the parents and this child as
    the adoptive home is the best place for this child.”
    The record demonstrates at least Robert felt a positive
    emotional attachment to mother.5 Robert was seven years old
    5      R.H. was situated differently. She was removed from
    parents’ care at only 11 months. She thus had spent more than
    two thirds of her life out of mother’s custody and with maternal
    aunt. The only evidence in the record of a bond between her and
    mother was the fact she cried when mother left at the end of her
    visits. (She would stop crying, however, when mother gave her
    21
    when removed from parents’ custody. He thus had lived most of
    his life with mother even after having spent two and a half years
    living with maternal aunt by the time of the section 366.26
    hearing. He referred to mother as “mom.” He considered his
    relationship with mother to be better than that with father. He
    confirmed he saw “his mom” every Sunday at “his nanny’s house”
    and described his interactions with mother there positively: he
    “really enjoy[ed] being able to hug his mom” during their visits;
    they ate, played, and watched television; and “sometimes they
    walk[ed] to the park.” During her interview, mother said she
    played card games with the children during her visits and
    sometimes brought the children toys and food. When asked
    whether mother phoned him, Robert said he sometimes would
    ask “his auntie” to call mother. He also said he “would actually
    like to visit mom more.”
    When the social worker spoke with Robert in September
    2022 about his feelings toward adoption, he was a couple of
    months shy of ten years old. At first, he said he wasn’t sure if
    he wanted to be adopted. He knew that adoption meant he would
    not be “part of his mom anymore.” When asked, he also didn’t
    know that he wanted to return to parents’ care. But, when
    specifically asked if he wanted maternal aunt to adopt him,
    Robert said, “ ‘Yes . . . as long as I can still have visits with my
    mom and dad.’ ” He told the social worker “he would be very
    money.) We assume DCFS would recommend the siblings be
    treated the same, so that if the beneficial parent exception
    applied only to one of them, DCFS would recommend legal
    guardianship for both children. Accordingly, we focus—as the
    parties do—on Robert.
    22
    upset if he did not see his mom because he enjoys hugging her
    a lot and has a good relationship with [her].”
    The record does not include any observations by the
    social worker of mother’s visits with her children. Although
    the record indicates the social worker visited the children in
    their placement, it is unclear whether a social worker ever
    was present at one of mother’s visits with them at maternal
    grandmother’s home. Accordingly, only the social worker’s notes
    and DCFS reports of what the participants told the social worker
    about the visits were before the juvenile court. We conclude
    Robert’s own statements reflect he had a substantial, positive,
    emotional attachment to mother. Although the court did
    not explicitly rule mother satisfied the second element of the
    exception, we assume it found she did.
    Mother argues the juvenile court failed to consider the
    evidence of an emotional bond between Robert and mother and
    ignored Robert’s expressed wishes. She thus contends the court
    did not engage in the analysis of the detriment to the child should
    that “substantial, positive relationship be severed” necessary to
    the balancing test required under Caden C. We disagree. We
    do not read the court’s ruling as finding Robert did not have
    an emotional attachment to mother, as she suggests. Rather,
    we read the court’s ruling to reflect its finding that on balance
    the security and stability of adoption outweighed any harm
    to the children from the loss of their parent-child relationship
    with mother so that terminating parental rights would not be
    detrimental to them.
    First, as DCFS notes, the juvenile court was not required
    to recite its specific factual findings in determining the beneficial
    parent relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (In re
    23
    A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1155–1156.) Second, the court
    here was well versed in our high court’s directives in Caden C.
    and specifically referred to the case and its requirements
    throughout the proceedings. Indeed, the court admonished DCFS
    to ensure its reports complied with Caden C. Responding to
    minor’s counsel’s objection in May 2022 that the section 366.26
    report did not provide sufficient information about the visits
    between parents and the children, the court stated, “I know that
    [DCFS] was given a tutorial on Caden C.[,] but it doesn’t seem
    to have trickled down to some of these social workers who are
    writing these reports. I won’t accept these reports. I need the
    information that is necessary for an appropriate finding at a .26.”
    Ultimately, the court ordered DCFS to provide a supplemental
    report on visitation that included “interviews of the parents,
    caregivers[,] and the child Robert.” In response, DCFS filed
    the September 30, 2022 LMI that included Robert’s statements.
    Accordingly, we can infer the court understood what it must and
    must not consider in assessing the beneficial parent relationship
    exception.
    Moreover, the court stated it had read and considered
    the evidence before it—which included DCFS’s reports—and the
    arguments of counsel. DCFS’s LMI included Robert’s statements
    about being “very upset” if he didn’t see his mother, and his
    desire to be adopted by maternal aunt if he could continue
    seeing his parents. Mother’s counsel specifically argued Robert’s
    statements were “clearly telling us” he did not want adoption
    as it would sever his relationship with parents.
    We thus can infer the court considered Robert’s wish
    to see his mother, and the other evidence before it, in finding
    termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to him
    24
    when balanced with the benefits of adoption. As the court stated
    in In re C.B. (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 102
    , 125, “[w]hile the court
    had to consider each child’s wishes, it was required to act in each
    child’s best interest (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1)) and a child’s wishes
    are not necessarily determinative of the child’s best interest.”
    The record here supports the juvenile court’s implied finding
    that the benefits of stability, security, and permanence Robert
    would receive through adoption were in his best interest and
    outweighed the upset he would experience from the loss of his
    relationship with mother.
    The record shows that, for the two and a half years Robert
    had been living with maternal aunt, his relationship with mother
    was limited to monitored visits once a week at his grandmother’s
    home or a nearby park. Although Robert enjoyed those visits
    and his hugs with mother, the record does not indicate mother
    asked Robert about his schooling, his well-being, or his feelings.
    Rather, mother’s visits with the children—by her own account—
    consisted of playing games, watching television, and going to
    the park. She sometimes brought the children food and toys.
    According to maternal aunt, mother “usually” watched television
    with the children or gave them her cellphone. Mother also
    wouldn’t bring anything to the park to play with the children
    and would “just sit there and . . . not engage with her children.”
    The court reasonably could find mother was not particularly
    engaged with her children during their visits.
    We acknowledge “[t]he quality of the minor’s attachment
    to his parents must be evaluated in the context of the contact
    they were permitted to have with him during the course of the
    dependency proceeding.” (In re M.G. (2022) 
    80 Cal.App.5th 836
    ,
    851.) Critically, here, the record shows mother was scheduled
    25
    to visit with the children twice per week—once at maternal
    grandmother’s home and once at maternal aunt’s home—but
    mother chose not to.6 Robert wished he could see mother more
    often, but mother never made the effort to take the bus to visit
    the children at maternal aunt’s home despite maternal aunt’s
    invitation. In September 2022, maternal aunt confirmed with
    the new social worker that mother visited the children only when
    maternal aunt drove them to maternal grandmother’s home.7
    And, during the two and a half years the children were out of
    her custody, mother never once asked DCFS to liberalize her
    visits to unmonitored—despite their authority to do so—or what
    she would need to accomplish to be granted an unmonitored visit.
    The DCFS reports also show the caretaker described
    mother as having “little to no” patience with the children and
    said mother got “easily frustrated with them” as late as June
    2022. In her September 2022 interview, maternal aunt told
    the social worker mother never called to check on the children’s
    6     The court’s original disposition order from August 2020
    ordered monitored visits for mother “at least twice a week for
    two hours in duration” and gave DCFS discretion to liberalize.
    DCFS’s reports repeatedly stated mother was scheduled to visit
    the children twice per week, once at maternal grandmother’s
    home and once at the caregiver’s home.
    7      The new social worker asked mother why she didn’t visit
    on Saturdays. Mother responded she didn’t know that was
    an option. The record shows, however, that mother’s second
    visit was scheduled for a weekday at maternal aunt’s home. In
    September 2022, maternal aunt confirmed the previous social
    worker had “set up” mother to visit once during the week, but
    mother never did.
    26
    well-being, only to confirm her Sunday visit. Nor, as minors’
    counsel noted, is there any evidence in the record that mother
    attended any of the children’s medical or school appointments—
    or asked to attend them—despite Robert’s struggles with asthma
    and earlier issues with school. Rather, when mother said she
    would like to be more involved in decision making concerning
    the children, she cited “parties” as an example. And, mother did
    not appear at the section 366.26 hearing, like father did, to testify
    about her interactions with the children during their visits or to
    explain why she didn’t travel to maternal aunt’s for a second visit
    with her children during the week.8
    Robert wanted to see mother but also consistently said he
    wanted to stay with his aunt. He and R.H. referred to maternal
    aunt and her wife interchangeably as “aunt” and “mom.” Both
    children were thriving in their caregivers’ home—Robert’s
    asthma was under control and he was doing better in school.
    Maternal aunt and her spouse were committed to adopting the
    children to provide them with “a nurturing and stable home.”
    Other than Robert’s statement that he would be upset if
    he could not see mother, mother presented no evidence showing
    that terminating the parent-child relationship would harm
    the children or that any harm would not be outweighed by
    the security and stability adoption would provide. As we said,
    mother did not appear at the section 366.26 hearing; her counsel
    gave no reason for her absence. Notably, Robert’s and R.H.’s
    counsel—although acknowledging mother had “a beneficial
    8     Mother said she had a learning disability. Nothing in the
    record, however, suggests mother was incapable of taking a bus.
    She also told the social worker she graduated from high school.
    27
    relationship with the children”—argued the court should
    terminate parental rights as that relationship did “not meet
    the threshold needed to outweigh the benefits of adoption.”
    Despite Robert’s obvious desire to see his mother, on this
    record we do not find the court abused its discretion in finding
    the benefits of adoption outweighed any harm to Robert if his
    relationship with mother were severed. Robert had conflicting
    feelings. He didn’t understand why “this [was] happening
    to him.” He wanted to be able to see and hug mother, but he
    also wanted maternal aunt to adopt him. The juvenile court
    reasonably could have found the stability, security, and
    permanence of adoption would benefit Robert in light of these
    conflicting feelings. And, given the limited nature of mother’s
    relationship and engagement with Robert (and R.H.)—partly
    through her own choice—we cannot conclude the court abused
    its discretion in finding those benefits of adoption outweighed
    the upset Robert might experience from the termination of his
    parent-child relationship with mother.
    Finally, we do not agree with mother’s interpretation of
    the court’s statement that, “it would not be harmful to sever the
    relationship between the parents and this child as the adoptive
    home is the best place for this child,” as having improperly
    “focused on . . . the appropriateness of the adoptive placement.”
    As we said, the court referred to Caden C. throughout the
    proceedings. Our high court’s directives were foremost in the
    court’s mind. Mother’s counsel also noted an adoptive parent’s
    willingness to allow parents to maintain contact with their child
    is an improper consideration at a section 366.26 hearing, citing
    In re C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 127–129 (remanding
    for new section 366.26 hearing where juvenile court reached
    28
    its conclusion that the termination of parental rights would not
    “ ‘ “greatly harm” ’ ” the children based in part on the expectation
    that aunt and uncle caregivers would permit children to have
    continued contact with their mother).
    Maternal aunt here said she was willing to have an open
    adoption, and mother understood her sister would allow her to
    have contact with the children. Nothing in the record suggests,
    however, the court impermissibly considered that fact, as in
    In re C.B., in finding severing the mother-child relationship
    would not be detrimental to the children when balanced with
    the benefits they would gain from adoption. We are convinced
    the juvenile court considered the evidence before it and adhered
    to our high court’s ruling in Caden C. (See In re A.L., supra,
    73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156 [rejecting parent’s claim court “simply
    considered the respective parental roles of the foster parents”
    and parent and failed to engage in balancing test, citing People
    v. Thomas (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 336
    , 361 for the proposition that
    “appellate court ‘presume[s] that the [trial] court “knows and
    applies the correct statutory and case law” ’ ”]; cf. In re J.D.
    (2021) 
    70 Cal.App.5th 833
    , 863–864 [remanding for a new
    section 366.26 hearing where neither the parties nor the court
    had the benefit of Caden C., and reviewing court could not
    be certain juvenile court did not rely on improper factors].)
    The evidence here shows Robert got some benefit from
    seeing mother—especially being able to hug her—but the
    evidence does not compel a finding that Robert’s relationship
    with mother was so significant that its loss would be detrimental
    to him. In so concluding, we do not discount Robert’s statements
    about his feelings toward mother. We recognize, as we infer the
    juvenile court did, Robert will face some upset. We cannot say
    29
    the juvenile court acted outside the bounds of reason in finding
    that upset did not outweigh the benefits of adoption, however.
    Accordingly, we conclude mother and father failed to demonstrate
    the juvenile court prejudicially erred in terminating their
    parental rights.
    2.    We remand for compliance with ICWA
    Both the juvenile court and DCFS “have an affirmative
    and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may
    be an Indian child.” (§224.2, subd. (a).) Under section 224.2,
    subdivision (b), if a child is placed in DCFS’s temporary custody,
    the agency must inquire whether the child is or may be an Indian
    child, by asking a nonexclusive group that includes the child,
    the parents, and extended family members. Parents denied the
    children were Indian children, but the record does not indicate
    DCFS asked the children’s extended family members about
    their possible Indian status. Extended family members include
    grandparents, aunts and uncles, siblings, sibling-in-laws, nieces,
    nephews, first or second cousins, and stepparents. (
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) DCFS does not oppose a remand
    “for the purpose of making ICWA inquiry of known and available
    extended family members.” We accept DCFS’s concession and
    conditionally affirm the matter for DCFS to do so.
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights
    are conditionally affirmed. We remand the case for further
    proceedings (1) to ensure DCFS has made an ICWA inquiry of
    the children’s known and available extended family members;
    and (2) for the juvenile court to determine whether ICWA applies
    based on that inquiry. If the court determines it has no reason
    to believe ICWA applies, the orders terminating parental rights
    30
    shall remain in effect. If DCFS’s inquiry gives the court a reason
    to believe ICWA applies, the court shall vacate those orders and
    conduct further proceedings consistent with ICWA and related
    state law.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    EGERTON, J.
    We concur:
    LAVIN, Acting P. J.
    HEIDEL, J.*
    *     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
    by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    31
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B324774

Filed Date: 6/8/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/8/2023