People v. Maldonado CA4/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 5/31/23 P. v. Maldonado CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080418
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. JCF003702)
VERONICA MALDONADO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
Christopher J. Plourd, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Veronica Maldonado was granted probation after she pled no contest to
two counts of hit and run driving resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001,
subd. (b)(1)) and death or serious injury to another person (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (b)(2)). As a condition of probation, she was ordered to pay a
total of $1,190,328.77 in restitution to two of the victims she injured, Garcia
and Sanchez, and the widow of the victim she killed, Rodriguez. She appeals
certain aspects of the trial court’s restitution order.
1. Restitution to Garcia
The trial court awarded Garcia a total of $415,363.36, including
$398,798.44 for medical expenses and $9,363.63 for lost wages.
Maldonado contends, and the People concede, the award for medical
expenses should be reduced to $5,002.30 because the California Victim
Compensation Board (CVCB) made payment to Garcia’s medical providers to
satisfy the balance of her medical expense claims. (See Gov. Code, § 13957.2,
subd. (a) [“A provider shall not charge a victim or derivative victim for any
difference between the cost of a service provided to a victim or derivative
victim and the [CVCB] program’s payment for that service.”].) The
concession is proper and the restitution order shall be so modified.
Regarding her lost wages, Garcia testified at the restitution hearing
she missed six months of work as a nurse in Mexico; that she earns 1,030
pesos per day in Mexico and workers there get paid for seven days each week;
and that she received 60 percent of her wages for the first three months she
could not work. The court calculated Garcia’s lost wages, based on the
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
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stipulated conversion rate of 20 pesos to the dollar, to total $9,363.63.
Maldonado asserts the $9,363.63 award for lost wages is not supported by
substantial evidence because the amount should have been offset by Garcia’s
receipt of 60 percent of her salary for the first three months she could not
work as a result of her injuries.
“The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the
evidence” and “[a] victim’s statement of economic loss is prima facie evidence
of loss.” (People v. Grandpierre (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 111, 115
(Grandpierre).) Once a prima facie case of economic loss has been made, “the
defendant has the burden to disprove the amount of losses the victim
claim[s].” (Ibid.) Here, the People contend Maldonado presented no evidence
to disprove Garcia suffered an economic loss of 100 percent of her wages,
including how Garcia’s 60 percent wages were paid and whether she may
have had to deplete sick leave or some other benefit to get paid. In response,
Maldonado speculates Garcia did not have to deplete sick leave or other
benefits and that even if she did use sick leave, it may not have been any
value to her because she no longer works for that employer. Rather than
speculate, it was Maldonado’s burden to elicit evidence to support such
possibilities and she failed to do so. (Ibid.) Consequently, on this record, we
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Garcia for
100 percent of her wages during the time that she could not work. (People v.
Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 499 [“ ‘When there is a factual and
rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no
abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’ ”].)
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2. Restitution to Rodriguez
The trial court awarded Rodriguez $763,415.41 in restitution, including
$11,638 for funeral expenses, $2,259.98 for property damages, and
$742,424.23 for loss of her deceased husband’s support.
Maldonado contends, and the People concede, the award for funeral
expenses was erroneously calculated and must be reduced to $3,045. The
record supports this concession; the trial court mistakenly included attorney
fees and property damages in its restitution award for funeral expenses.
Maldonado also contends, and the People concede, the property damage
award must be reduced to $2,000. This concession is also supported by the
record; the trial court mistakenly relied on the amount another victim (A.
Garcia) had claimed for her property damages. Rodriguez testified the value
of her property damages was “probably” $2,000. Accordingly, we shall order
Rodriguez’s funeral expenses award be reduced to $3,045 and property
damage award be reduced to $2,000.
Maldonado asserts we should vacate the $742,424.23 award for loss of
support because it is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she
contends Rodriguez’s uncorroborated recollection of her late husband’s
estimated wages was vague or inaccurate, and the trial court’s method of
calculation was not rational because it failed to establish Rodriguez’s loss of
support based on her own economic loss. We reject these contentions.
Where a “ ‘decedent was a husband and father, a significant element of
damages is the loss of financial benefits he was contributing to his family by
way of support at the time of his death and that support reasonably expected
in the future.’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 665, italics
omitted.) “[A] surviving spouse’s economic loss is not simply the wages or
income that the deceased spouse would have earned but for his or her death.”
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(Id. at p. 664.) “Generally, the calculation of the loss of support may be
informed by such factors as the earning history of the deceased spouse, the
age of the survivor and decedent, and the degree to which the decedent’s
income provided support to the survivor’s household.” (Id. at p. 665.)
Rodriguez testified at the hearing that her late husband earned
“around 700,000” pesos each year as a gym manager, which based on the
stipulated conversion rate is an annual salary of $35,000. He was 44 years
old when he was killed, had been working for the company for six or seven
years, and had planned to work until he reached retirement age. Although
the court did not explain its method of calculation, both parties agree that it
appears the court multiplied the deceased husband’s estimated annual salary
of $35,000 by 21.2 years, the approximate number of years until a retirement
age of 65, which resulted in the award of approximately $742,000.
We disagree with Maldonado that Rodriguez’s testimony regarding her
late husband’s estimated wages was vague or deficient because she did not
submit documentary evidence to support her recollection. Although
Rodriguez did not have any documentary proof of his income because it had
been two years since the fatal accident, her estimate is prima facie evidence
of her late husband’s wages prior to his death and documentation is not
required. (Grandpierre, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 115 [prima facie case for
restitution may be based on a victim’s testimony]; People v. Goulart (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 71, 82–83 [the loss may be based on the victim’s estimate].)
The burden shifted to Maldonado to disprove Rodriguez’s estimate and she
failed to do so. (Grandpierre, at p. 115.) We reject Maldonado’s further
contention that Rodriguez’s testimony was inaccurate because she has failed
to direct us to any record evidence to support that contention.
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Regarding the court’s calculation method, it appears the trial court
assumed that Rodriguez was entitled to receive the full amount of her late
husband’s lost future wages. The court could have reasonably determined
that this was appropriate based on information in the probation report that
he was the family’s “main provider,” he left behind two sons ages 14 and 17,
and his sons now attend public school due to the family’s “financial
struggles.” Maldonado could have, but did not, question Rodriguez about the
extent to which her late husband’s income provided support to her and the
household, whether any of his income did not go toward supporting her and
the household, or whether there was any basis for reducing an award for loss
of support. Because the trial court was provided no factual basis for
awarding Rodriguez less than the full amount of her late husband’s lost
future wages, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion in awarding her the
full amount.
3. Offsets from Insurance Payments
Maldonado’s insurer settled with the victims. The trial court’s
restitution awards to Garcia, Sanchez, and Rodriguez included their attorney
fees incurred in obtaining the settlements. Maldonado asserts the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to offset their restitution awards by the money
they each received from her insurance policy “for the same losses,” for two
reasons. (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) First, she claims each
restitution award as a whole should have been reduced by the total amount of
insurance payment to each victim. Second, she claims that because each of
the insurance payments included attorney fees, the trial court erred in also
awarding restitution specifically for attorney fees. We reject both
contentions.
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If a defendant’s insurance compensates a victim, the defendant is
entitled to an offset for the sums paid, but only “to the extent that those
payments are for items of loss included in the restitution order.” (People v.
Bernal (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 155, 165–168 (Bernal).) Restitution does not
cover noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering, which are recoverable in
a civil action. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3); People v. Vasquez (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1126, 1132 (Vasquez).) Thus, if a settlement payment is
attributable to noneconomic losses, there would be no grounds to offset a
restitution award by that payment. (Vasquez, at p. 1138.) As the party
seeking an offset, Maldonado has the burden of proving she is entitled to the
offset. (Id. at p. 1137.)
Maldonado did not meet her burden of establishing that any offset was
appropriate. (Vasquez, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.) There is no
evidence of how much of the settlements, if any, covered any specific items of
loss included in the restitution order. (Bernal, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 165–168.) Absent any factual bases for offsetting the restitution awards
by the settlement payments, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to do so. We reject Maldonado’s argument that remand is
necessary to allow the trial court to determine whether any portion of the
settlements were allocated to economic losses covered in the restitution order.
The court had indicated that offset was appropriate as a matter of law and
Maldonado had her chance but failed to meet her burden of establishing it
was factually appropriate.
We next turn to Maldonado’s claim that because each of the insurance
payments included attorney fees, the trial court erred in also awarding
restitution for attorney fees. “Actual and reasonable” attorney fees constitute
an economic loss recoverable in a restitution order. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4,
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subd. (f)(3)(H).) Attorney fees are recoverable unless a civil settlement
includes payment for attorney fees. (People v. Grundfor (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 22, 28 (Grundfor) [“Such fees are recoverable unless they are
offset in a civil settlement.”].) Additionally, attorney fees are not recoverable
as restitution if they are incurred solely to recover noneconomic losses.
(People v. Marrero (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 896, 906 (Marrero).) When fees
cannot be reasonably divided between the pursuit of economic losses and
noneconomic losses, the victim is entitled to full reimbursement for all
attorney fees. (Id. at p. 907.) Again, Maldonado bears the burden of
establishing that any portion of a victim’s attorney fees were incurred solely
to collect noneconomic losses. (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7,
33–34.)
Here, there is no evidence that any portion of the settlements were
payment for attorney fees, as opposed to compensation for economic and/or
noneconomic damages. (Grundfor, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 28.) There is
also no evidence that any portion of the fees were incurred solely to recover
noneconomic damages. (Marrero, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 906.) As such,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Garcia, Sanchez, and
Rodriguez restitution for their attorney fees.
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is modified, reducing Garcia’s award of
$398,798.44 for medical expenses to $5,002.30; reducing Rodriguez’s award of
$11,638 for funeral expenses to $3,045; and reducing Rodriguez’s award of
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$2,259.98 for personal property to $2,000. As modified, the restitution order
is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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