People v. Hodges CA2/3 ( 2023 )

Filed 8/7/23 P. v. Hodges CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B317734
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA021980
v.
RUFUS HODGES, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Rufus Hodges, Jr. (Hodges) of
two counts of second degree robbery and found him not guilty of
one count of receiving stolen property. Hodges later filed a
petition under the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act,
commonly known as Proposition 47, which allows persons
convicted of certain theft-related offenses to have those offenses
reduced to misdemeanors. The court denied Hodges’s petition,
finding none of Hodges’s convictions qualify for relief under
Proposition 47. On appeal, Hodges argues the court should have
reduced his receiving stolen property conviction to a
misdemeanor. Because Hodges was not convicted of receiving
stolen property and his robbery convictions do not qualify for
relief under Proposition 47, the court properly denied Hodges’s
resentencing petition. We therefore affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In 2001, the People charged Hodges with two counts of
second degree robbery (Pen. Code,2 § 211; counts 1 & 2) and one
count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 3). The
People alleged that Hodges suffered four prior serious or violent
felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and two prior
serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
A jury found Hodges guilty of both counts of robbery and
not guilty of receiving stolen property. The trial court found true
the prior conviction allegations and sentenced Hodges to a total
1 Because the facts underlying Hodges’s convictions are not relevant to
the issues raised in this appeal, we provide only a summary of the
lower court proceedings.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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term of 60 years to life in prison. Hodges’s convictions were
affirmed in 2004.3 (People v. Hodges (Jan. 29, 2004, B162303)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2021, Hodges filed a resentencing petition under section
1170.18. The trial court denied the petition, finding none of
Hodges’s convictions qualify for resentencing.
Hodges appeals.
DISCUSSION
In 2014, California voters enacted Proposition 47, which
makes certain theft- and drug-related offenses punishable as
misdemeanors rather than felonies. (§ 1170.18; People v. Page
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1179.) Proposition 47 provides in relevant
part: “(a) A person … [currently] serving a sentence for a
conviction ... of a felony ... who would have been guilty of a
misdemeanor under the act ... had this act been in effect at the
time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence ... to
request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357,
or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473,
476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have
been amended or added by this act.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)
Proposition 47 also created a resentencing procedure under
section 1170.18, through which a person “serving a felony
sentence at the time of Proposition 47’s passage may be
3 The reviewing court in Hodges’s first appeal noted that Hodges was
sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. According to the sentencing
minute order from Hodges’s trial, however, the trial court imposed a
term of 25 years to life for count 1, and a consecutive term of 25 years
to life plus an additional 10 years for two prior serious felony
convictions for count 2, for a total sentence of 60 years to life. Hodges’s
abstract of judgment also reflects the court sentenced him to 60 years
to life in prison. Thus, the record reflects Hodges was sentenced to 60,
not 50, years to life in prison.
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resentenced to a misdemeanor term if the person ‘would have
been guilty of a misdemeanor under [Proposition 47] had th[e] act
been in effect at the time of the offense.’ ” (People v. Page, supra,3 Cal.5th at p. 1179; § 1170.18, subd. (a).) If a petitioner meets
the statutory criteria set out in section 1170.18, the court shall
recall the petitioner’s sentence and resentence the petitioner to a
misdemeanor, unless the court, in its discretion, determines that
resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. (People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th
1102, 1109; § 1170.18, subd. (b).)
The petitioner bears the burden of proving eligibility for
relief under section 1170.18 by a preponderance of the evidence.
(People v. Zorich (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 881, 886.) We
independently review an order denying a resentencing petition
where the court’s decision turns on undisputed facts. (People v.
Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)
As Hodges recognizes, his two robbery convictions are not
eligible for relief under Proposition 47. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)
[robbery is not listed as an eligible offense].) Instead, Hodges
argues the court should have reduced his receiving stolen
property conviction because that offense is eligible for
resentencing under section 1170.18 and the People never proved
the property that he possessed was worth at least $950. But
Hodges was not convicted of receiving stolen property. Indeed, as
we noted above, the jury acquitted Hodges of that charge in
2002.4 Hodges does not argue, nor has he otherwise shown, that
he suffered any convictions that qualify for resentencing relief
4 It appears Hodges bases his argument on a 2013 minute order
denying one of his petitions for habeas corpus, which erroneously
states that “[f]ollowing a jury trial in 2002, [Hodges] was found guilty
of violations of Penal Code § 211 and § 496.”
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under Proposition 47. The trial court therefore properly denied
Hodges’s resentencing petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
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