Cave Landing, LLC v. Cal. Coastal Com. ( 2023 )

Filed 8/18/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
CAVE LANDING, LLC, 2nd Civ. No. B322976
(Super. Ct. No. 21CV-0215)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL
COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.
The County of San Luis Obispo (County) grants a permit to
move an easement on a property in the coastal zone. The
California Coastal Commission (the Commission) denies the
permit. The Commission’s authority supersedes the County.
This appeal arises under the California Coastal Act of 1976
(Coastal Act). (Pub. Res. Code,1 § 30000 et. seq.) Property
owners sought a coastal development permit to move an
easement for a public hiking trail from their parcel to a
contiguous parcel. The terms of the easement grant prohibited
1 All further statutory references are to the Public
Resources Code unless otherwise indicated.
removing the portion of existing trail from the property. A cease
and desist order from the Commission prohibited property
owners from interfering with the public’s use of the existing trail
on their parcel. The local government, however, granted the
property owners application for a coastal development permit.
On appeal, the Commission denied the permit. The trial court
denied the property owners’ petition for writ of administrative
mandate challenging the Commission’s action. We affirm. The
Commission enforces the Coastal Act. Its authority overrides the
County.
FACTS
Robert and Judith McCarthy’s property (the McCarthy
Parcel) is located on an underdeveloped knoll overlooking the
ocean between Avila Beach and Pismo Beach in the County. The
Ontario Ridge Trail (Trail) is a popular hiking trail that crosses
the McCarthy parcel.
Express Easement
In 2009, the parcel the McCarthys eventually purchased,
and a contiguous parcel, were owned by San Miguelito Partners.
In that same year, the McCarthys acquired an option to purchase
their parcel. A week later San Miguelito Partners granted the
County an easement (easement) across the McCarthys’ future
parcel allowing access to and over the Trail. The easement grant
provides in part: “The Access Easements may be relocated at
Grantor’s reasonable discretion and at Grantor’s sole cost and
expense to a location on Grantor’s property that Grantor and
Grantee shall reasonably agree.” The County recorded the
easement on December 18, 2009.
On April 14, 2010, the McCarthys entered into an
agreement with the County that their anticipated acquisition of
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the parcel would not terminate or affect the easement. The
McCarthys acquired the parcel from San Miguelito Partners on
July 18, 2012. The contiguous parcel was later acquired by Palm
Finance Corporation (Palm Finance) from San Miguelito
Partners at a foreclosure sale.
Cease and Desist Order
In December 2013, the McCarthys installed footings,
support structures, fences, and gates on their parcel, blocking
public access to the Trail. They also posted “No Public Access”
signs. The McCarthys did not obtain a coastal development
permit for the project.
In July 2014, at a noticed public hearing, the Commission
found that the McCarthys’ unpermitted development violated the
Coastal Act. The Commission issued a cease and desist order
prohibiting the McCarthys from undertaking any activity that
discourages or prevents the public’s use of the Trail. The order
stated that it remains in effect permanently unless rescinded by
the Commission. The McCarthys did not challenge the cease and
desist order and the time for a challenge has long since passed.
The Commission has not rescinded the order.
Coastal Development Permit
In 2016, the McCarthys applied to the County for a coastal
development permit. The County had previously granted the
McCarthys a coastal development permit to construct a single
family residence on their parcel in 2012. The Commission
subsequently denied the permit on appeal in 2013. The trial
court denied the McCarthys’ petition for a writ of administrative
mandate in 2022. We affirmed the trial court. (McCarthy
v. California Coastal Commission (June 1, 2022, B309078)
__Cal.App.4th__ [2022 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 3405].)
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The McCarthys sought to move the Trail from their parcel
to the contiguous parcel now owned by Palm Finance. Palm
Finance was a co-applicant, consenting to move the Trail to its
parcel.
The proposed new Trail on Palm Finance’s parcel would be
five feet wide. The fencing would be composed of four-strand wire
and not more than 54 inches tall. The fencing would prevent the
public from using the portion of the existing Trail that crosses the
McCarthys’ parcel. The top and bottom strands of the fence
would be barbless. The fence would be placed a minimum of 20
feet from the Trail’s edge, and seven six-inch by 12-inch “No
Trespassing” signs would be affixed to the fence.
The County issued a coastal development permit for the
project.
Appeal to the Commission
A member of the public and two commissioners appealed
the County’s grant of the coastal development permit to the
Commission. A Commission staff report recommended that the
Commission take the appeal and deny the permit.
The staff report stated that the project is in a Sensitive
Resource Area and forms a scenic backdrop for the coast. The
fence and “No Trespassing” signs would be prominent in the
public view. The portion of the hillside over which the new Trail
would be graded is underdeveloped. The grading, cutting, and
filling, necessary to create the new Trail would mar the public
view and materially change the area’s scenic rural character.
The staff report also stated that the project is in a Geologic
Study Area due to the steep slope and geologic instability. The
grading for the new Trail would move approximately 1,260 cubic
yards of dirt and produce cuts approximately five feet in height.
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The area is known for geologic instability due to faults,
landslides, and unconsolidated soils. The project is also in an
Archaeological Sensitive Area. The permit appears to allow the
Trail to be constructed on or adjacent to mapped archaeological
resources.
The staff report points out that the McCarthys have no
legal right to remove the Trail from their parcel. First, the
easement grant limits the grantor’s right to move the easement
“to a location on Grantor’s Property.” The McCarthys have no
right to move the easement to a different parcel. Second, the
Commission’s cease and desist order prohibits the McCarthys
from interfering with the public’s use of the existing Trail. The
report also notes that the Trail has been heavily used by
members of the public for over 50 years, and that the public has
very likely acquired a prescriptive right to use the existing Trail
that is independent of the express grant.
The Commission unanimously adopted the staff report and
recommendations and denied a coastal development permit for
the project.
Petition2 for Writ of Administrative Mandate
The McCarthys petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate
to order the commission to void its denial and grant the coastal
development permit. The trial court denied the petition because
the McCarthys have no legal right to move the easement to
another parcel. The terms of the easement grant did not allow
2 The petition was brought by Cave Landing, LLC, which is
owned by the McCarthys. During the proceeding, they discovered
that the McCarthy parcel had not been transferred to the LLC.
The matter proceeded with the McCarthys as petitioners.
5
movement of the easement to another parcel, and the
Commission’s cease and desist order prevented interference with
the existing Trail.
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Background
The Coastal Act establishes a “coastal zone,” defined by an
official map and generally extending from the mean high tide line
landward 1000 yards. (§ 30103, subd. (a).) Every city or county
with jurisdiction over lands within the coastal zone is required to
create a “local coastal program” to implement the provisions and
policies of the Coastal Act. (§§ 30108.6; 30109.) The Coastal Act
seeks to protect, maintain, enhance, and restore the quality of the
coastal zone environment. (§ 30001.5, subd. (a).)
The local government must present its local coastal
program to the Commission for approval. (§ 30513, subd. (a).)
Once the local coastal program is certified by the Commission, all
actions implementing the local coastal program are delegated to
the local government. (§ 30519, subd. (a).)
A person wishing to undertake any development within the
coastal zone must obtain a coastal development permit. (§ 30600,
subd. (a).) The local government’s action on the coastal
development permit may be appealed to the Commission by the
applicant, any aggrieved person or any two Commission
members. (§ 30625, subd. (a).) On appeal the Commission
considers the matter de novo. (§ 30621, subd. (a).) An aggrieved
party has the right to judicial review of the Commission’s
decision by petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (§ 30801, subd. (a).)
The inquiry under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is
whether the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
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discretion. (Lindstrom v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 73, 93.) An abuse of discretion occurs if the
Commission’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
(Ibid.)
II. Substantial Evidence
Underlying the McCarthys’ appeal is the unstated premise
that the Commission is obligated to grant them a permit that
exceeds their property rights. To state the premise is to refute it.
The McCarthys have no right to move the easement from their
parcel or to interfere with the public use of the Trail on their
land. The express words of the easement grant limit movement
of the Trail to the McCarthy parcel. The Commission’s cease and
desist order prevents the McCarthys from interfering with the
public’s use of the existing Trail. Either of those factors alone
justifies the Commission’s denial of the coastal development
permit.
The Commission also found such factors as the project’s
impact on the public view, the geologic fragility of the area and
the potential for the degradation of archaeological resources
justified denial of the permit. The trial court, however, did not
rely on such factors to deny the petition, and the McCarthys do
not challenge those findings on appeal.
The McCarthys argue that at the time of the easement
grant San Miguelito Partners owned both the McCarthy parcel
and the contiguous Palm Finance parcel. But the easement grant
describes only the McCarthy parcel. The phrase “relocated . . . to
a location on Grantor’s Property” refers only to the McCarthy
parcel– the only parcel involved in the grant.
The McCarthys argue that the Commission ignored that
the project would take place in two phases. First, the new Trail
7
would be constructed on the Palm Finance parcel and then
dedicated to the County. Second, the County would quitclaim the
existing Trail easement to the McCarthys. The McCarthys claim
that somehow this would satisfy both “procedural barriers” to the
coastal development permit.
But both phases are part of the same project for which it is
undisputed a coastal development permit is necessary. Assuming
the McCarthys have obtained the right from Palm Finance to
construct a Trail across its parcel, the McCarthys have no right to
move the easement from their parcel or demand that the County
quitclaim the easement.
The McCarthys argue that the County is a party to the
easement, but the Commission is not. It is the Commission,
however, that has the ultimate authority to ensure that coastal
development conforms to the policies in the Coastal Act and to
ensure those policies prevail over the concerns of local
government. (§ 30330; San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. California
Coastal Com. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1130.) Where the
Commission has denied a coastal development permit, the
County has no authority to proceed with the project.
Moreover, the McCarthys are subject to the Commission’s
cease and desist order that prevents them from interfering with
the public’s use of the existing Trail. The County has no
authority to abrogate the Commission’s order.
The McCarthys argue that the cease and desist order states
in part that the McCarthys must “[c]ease and desist from
engaging in any further development . . . on [their parcel], unless
authorized pursuant to the Coastal Act . . . .” The McCarthys
claim their project was authorized pursuant to the Coastal Act
8
when the County granted them a coastal development permit for
construction of their family residence.
The McCarthys rely on section 30519, subdivision (a),
which provides in part: “Except for appeals to the commission
. . . after a local coastal program, or any portion thereof, has been
certified and all implementing actions within the area affected
have become effective, the development review authority . . . shall
no longer be exercised by the commission over any new
development proposed within the area to which the certified local
coastal program, or any portion thereof, applies and shall at that
time be delegated to the local government that is implementing
the local coastal program or any portion thereof.”
The McCarthys argue that because the local coastal
program has been certified, the development review authority
has been delegated to the County. The McCarthys ignore the
first phrase of the subdivision, “[e]xcept for appeals to the
commission . . . .” The Commission has de novo review authority
over the County’s grant of the permit. (§§ 30621, subd. (a);
30625, subd. (a).) Here because the Commission denied the
McCarthys’ permit on appeal, the development is not authorized
pursuant to the Coastal Act.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the
respondent.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J. CODY, J.
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Tana L. Coates, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Gaines & Stacey, Fred Gaines and Alicia B. Bartley for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Daniel A. Olivas, Assistant
Attorney General, Andrew M. Vogel, Assistant Deputy Attorney
General, Justin J. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.