People v. Ranft CA2/6 ( 2023 )

Filed 8/18/23 P. v. Ranft CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B321598
(Super. Ct. No. 21CR06283)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
STERLING PAUL RANFT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Sterling Paul Ranft appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of custodial possession of a weapon (Pen. Code,1
§ 4502, subd. (a)).2 The trial court subsequently found true
allegations that Ranft suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), that his convictions were of
increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), that
he served a prior term in prison (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)), that he
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Ranft also pleaded guilty to resisting arrest (§ 148, subd.
(a)(1)). That conviction is not at issue in this appeal.
was on parole when he possessed a weapon (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)),
and that his performance on parole was unsatisfactory (id., rule
4.421(b)(5)). It sentenced him to eight years in state prison (the
upper term of four years, doubled).
Ranft contends the judgment should be reversed because:
(1) his Faretta3 waiver was invalid, (2) he was restrained during
trial, (3) the trial court misinstructed the jury, and (4) the errors,
considered cumulatively, deprived him of due process. Ranft also
contends the matter should be remanded for resentencing
because: (5) his admission to the prior strike was invalid, and (6)
the court should have applied the amendments set forth in
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721,
§ 1) and struck the prior strike. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Deputy Anthony Ramirez
was processing arrestees at the county jail’s Inmate Receiving
Center. When searching Ranft’s bedroll for contraband, Deputy
Ramirez noticed that a cup containing crunched-up paper felt
heavy. Upon removing the paper, he found a five-inch piece of
metal wrapped in fabric. It appeared to be a “shank.” Ranft told
Deputy Ramirez that he had found the shank in the dress-out
area of the receiving center.
Deputy Ramirez notified Deputy Crystal Poquette that he
had found a shank. Detective Poquette examined the item and
believed it could be used to stab someone, or perhaps even kill
them. She believed the item had been brought into the jail
because it was made of metal that did not come from a bunk and
the fabric it was wrapped in could not be found inside.
Additionally, the pointed end of the shank had not been fully
3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
2
sharpened, which suggested it had been brought into jail in an
inmate’s rectum.
DISCUSSION
Guilt phase issues
1. The Faretta waiver
Ranft first contends the judgment should be reversed
because his Faretta waiver was invalid. We disagree.
a. Background
At a December 2021 pretrial conference, Ranft said that he
“wanted to go on [his] own or be presented with a different”
attorney because of a breakdown in communication with
appointed counsel. The trial court replied that trial was set for
February 2022 and that if new counsel were appointed there was
“going to be a setback.” Ranft replied, “That’s why my first
option was to represent myself.” The court then asked if Ranft
would be ready for a February trial if he elected to represent
himself. He said that he would.
At a hearing three weeks later, Ranft was adamant that he
wanted to represent himself. He did not request a different
attorney.
The trial court heard Ranft’s Faretta motion the following
week. At the hearing the court asked if Ranft understood how
burdens of proof and defenses worked in a criminal trial. Ranft
replied that he had “been through the trial process before.” The
court also delineated the potential perils of self-representation,
including that Ranft would “not be able to appeal on the ground
that [he] did not have a lawyer” if he were convicted. Ranft said
that he understood. The court then asked Ranft if he wanted
additional time to consider his decision to represent himself.
Ranft responded that he just wanted to resolve the case so that
3
he could be placed on probation; he only raised the Faretta
motion to get the process moving.
The trial court told Ranft that probation was not an option
in his case. The court also told Ranft that he had the option of
keeping current counsel. Ranft refused; he wanted no further
delay. The court replied that he would not go to trial any sooner
if he represented himself. Ranft said he understood, and
reiterated his desire to do so. The court granted his request.
b. Discussion
A defendant has a constitutional right to represent
themselves at trial. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819.) The
trial court must permit a defendant to do so if they make their
request: (1) knowingly and intelligently (id. at p. 835), (2)
unequivocally (ibid.), and (3) “within a reasonable time prior to
the commencement of trial” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d
121, 128). To determine whether a Faretta waiver was valid, we
review the entire record de novo (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 24) to determine whether it “demonstrates that the
defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation,
including the risks and complexities of the particular case”
(People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1225 (Bloom)). The
defendant bears the burden of showing the invalidity of their
waiver. (People v. Mellor (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 32, 37.)
Ranft has not borne his burden here. He first claims his
Faretta waiver was invalid because the trial court granted his
self-representation request without conducting a hearing
pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Such a
hearing is required “when there is ‘at least some clear indication
by defendant,’ either personally or through [their] current
counsel, that [they] ‘want[] a substitute attorney.’ ” (People v.
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Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90.) A Marsden hearing is not
required, however, if the defendant merely expresses
dissatisfaction with counsel. (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d
843, 855 (Burton).) The failure to conduct a required Marsden
hearing can result in an invalid Faretta waiver. (See, e.g., People
v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 755-756; People v. Cruz (1978)
83 Cal.App.3d 308, 317-318.)
Here, there was no clear indication that Ranft wanted to
substitute attorneys. At a pretrial conference, Ranft said that he
“wanted to go on [his] own or be presented with a different”
attorney. But when informed that substituting attorneys would
likely delay trial, Ranft said that his “first option was to
represent [him]self.” Then, at subsequent hearings, Ranft
reiterated his desire to represent himself several times. No
Marsden hearing is required when a defendant repeatedly insists
on representing themselves. (Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 855;
see also People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 156-157,
superseded by statute on another point as stated in People v.
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 62, fn. 8.)
Moreover, even if Ranft did clearly indicate that he wanted
to substitute attorneys, we would conclude that he abandoned his
request. Ranft obliquely raised his desire to substitute attorneys
once, but then never brought up the matter again. That
constitutes the abandonment of any Marsden request. (People v.
Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 355, 362.) Ranft’s Faretta waiver
was not invalid due to the lack of a Marsden hearing.
Alternatively, Ranft asserts his Faretta waiver was invalid
because the trial court failed to inform him that he could not
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal if it
permitted him to represent himself. But the court told Ranft that
5
he would “not be able to appeal on the ground that [he] did not
have a lawyer” if it granted his Faretta motion and he were later
convicted. And even if it hadn’t, our Supreme Court has rejected
Ranft’s assertion. (Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1225.) We do
too. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 455.) Ranft’s Faretta waiver was valid.
2. The wrist restraint
Ranft next contends the judgment should be reversed
because the trial court ordered him to wear a wrist restraint
during trial. We again disagree.
a. Background
Prior to trial, county counsel moved to restrain Ranft in the
courtroom. According to Deputy Poquette, Ranft had fought with
other inmates in December 2021, had a shank in his bedroll in
July 2021, refused to comply with a strip search and had to be
sent to a more secure housing unit in August 2018, threatened
other inmates with assault in March 2018, and refused to comply
with instructions to be seated in court in June 2016. Based on
these incidents, county counsel moved the trial court to order the
use of a wrist restraint and leg shackles.
The trial court granted county counsel’s motion as to the
wrist restraint. It instructed all parties to remain seated during
jury selection and trial to hide the restraint. The prosecutor also
noted there would be black fabric around the counsel table “so the
jury [wouldn’t] be able to see” it.
Ranft later said that he “[j]ust wanted to comment on the
prejudicial nature of the handcuffs, just get it on the record.” The
trial court said that jurors could not see the wrist restraint if
Ranft remained seated and kept his hand in his lap. He could
6
also use his jacket to cover the restraint. The court warned him
when the jacket possibly did not.
The prosecutor asked whether the trial court was going to
instruct jurors pursuant to CALCRIM No. 204. Ranft said that
he did not want the instruction. The prosecutor replied that she
had nevertheless included it in the jury packet because she had
seen Ranft’s wrist restraint during jury selection. Jurors may
also have seen the restraint when Ranft scratched his face. The
court said that the matter was up to Ranft since no juror had said
they could see the restraint, though some had said that they had
seen his feet. Ranft confirmed that jurors had seen his sandals,
not the restraint. He reiterated that he did not want the court to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 204.
b. Discussion
A “ ‘trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom
security and orderly proceedings.’ ” (People v. Stevens (2009) 47
Cal.4th 625, 632.) But “extraordinary security practices” like
wrist restraints “carry an inordinate risk of infringing [on] a
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial” because they “may erode
the presumption of innocence.” (Ibid.) Such “exceptional
practices must be justified by a particularized showing of
manifest need sufficient to overcome the substantial risk of
prejudice they pose.” (Ibid.)
A “manifest need can be made with ‘ “evidence that the
defendant has threatened jail deputies, possessed weapons in
custody, threatened or assaulted other inmates, and/or engaged
in violent outbursts in court.” ’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7
Cal.5th 905, 934 (Young).) A manifest need can also be made by
showing that the “ ‘defendant poses a safety risk[] [or] a flight
risk, or [that they are] likely to disrupt the proceedings or
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otherwise engage in nonconforming behavior.’ ” (People v.
Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1270.) If the trial court determines
that such a need exists, the restraints ordered “ ‘should be as
unobtrusive as possible, although as effective as necessary under
the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201,
1217.) We review for abuse of discretion. (Young, at p. 934.)
There was no abuse of discretion here. Ranft accrued
several disciplinary infractions while in custody in the years prior
to trial. He fought with other inmates, had a shank in his
bedroll, refused to comply with deputies’ commands, and
threatened other inmates. He had also previously disrupted trial
proceedings. Ordering him to wear a wrist restraint was
accordingly proper. (Young, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 934-935
[restraints appropriate where defendant had “ ‘numerous
problems while in custody’ ”]; People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 388-393 (Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler) [restraints appropriate where defendants previously
disrupted court proceedings].)
“The trial court [also] imposed the least[-]intrusive means
of restraint to accomplish its goal of maintaining courtroom
safety.” (People v. Billie (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 434, 438.) Ranft
had one hand free throughout trial. His restrained wrist was
kept in his lap, under a jacket, hidden by a black table skirt. And
all parties remained seated throughout trial. Such mitigation
measures rendered Ranft’s wrist restraint as unobtrusive as
possible. (Id. at pp. 438-439.)
Ranft complains that the trial court did not hold a hearing
on the motion to restrain him and instead left the decision to
county counsel. But no formal hearing was required. (Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 391.) And “[t]he court
8
here was clearly aware of its obligation to make its own
determination on the need for restraints.” (Ibid.) It discussed
the matter on no fewer than five occasions, indicated that it had a
copy of county counsel’s motion, and ensured that all parties did
too. We presume the court considered the evidence attached to
the motion when granting it. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th
876, 919.) That the court rejected the request for leg shackles,
took pains to ensure that Ranft’s wrist restraint was as hidden as
possible, and gave him the option of telling jurors that they could
not infer guilt if they saw it reinforces our presumption that the
court understood the standards for granting county counsel’s
motion. (Cf. People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 616 [appellate
court presumes trial court knows and properly applies the law].)
There was no error.
Any error also would have been harmless. Courts “have
consistently found any unjustified or unadmonished [restraint]
harmless where there was no evidence it was seen by the jury.”
(People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584; see also People
v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 596 [compiling cases].) This is
because “[t]he potential effect on the presumption of innocence is
eliminated if the jury does not see the” restraint. (People v.
Jackson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1829.) Here, Ranft points to
no evidence showing that any juror was aware he was wearing a
wrist restraint. Instead, he speculates that jurors may have seen
the restraint because the trial court and prosecutor each briefly
saw it. Speculation is not evidence. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22
Cal.4th 690, 735.) Any unjustified restraint was harmless.
3. Jury instructions
Next, Ranft contends the trial court should have sua sponte
instructed the jury on attempted possession of a weapon in jail in
9
addition to instructing on actual possession. But a court has such
an instructional duty only if there is substantial evidence the
defendant is guilty of the attempted crime. (People v. Strunk
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 265, 271 (Strunk).) No such duty arises
where, as here, there is no substantial evidence that the
defendant did not possess a weapon. (Id. at p. 272.) Because
Deputy Ramirez located a shank inside Ranft’s bedroll, an
instruction on attempted possession was not required.
Ranft attempts to salvage his instructional error claim by
arguing that jurors could have found him guilty of attempted
possession of a weapon because Deputy Ramirez and Deputy
Poquette both testified the shank was not sharp. To him, this
purported dullness would have permitted jurors to conclude
either that the shank was not “capable of ready use as a stabbing
weapon” or that it could not “inflict great bodily injury or death”
and was thus not a dirk or dagger. (See § 16470 [defining dirk or
dagger].) But at trial, Ranft never argued that the shank’s
dullness prevented it from being a dirk or dagger. He cannot
raise this argument for the first time on appeal. (People v. Powell
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 169.)
Moreover, Ranft’s argument ignores Deputy Poquette’s
testimony that the shank could be used to stab or even kill
someone—despite not being fully sharpened. It ignores the
deputy’s testimony that she had seen duller items be used as
stabbing weapons. And it ignores the jury’s finding that the
shank was, in fact, a dirk or dagger. (See People v. Belloso (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 647, 653 [whether instrument a dirk or dagger is
a factual question for the jury].) There was not substantial
evidence that Ranft merely attempted to possess a dirk or dagger.
(Strunk, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 271; see People v. Breverman
10
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [“existence of ‘any evidence, no matter
how weak’ will not justify instructions on” attempted offense].)
The trial court was thus not required to sua sponte instruct the
jury on attempted possession of a weapon in jail.
4. Cumulative prejudice
Finally, Ranft contends the judgment should be reversed
because the errors that occurred during the proceedings below,
considered cumulatively, violated his due process right to a fair
trial. Because we reject all Ranft’s claims of error, he cannot
show cumulative prejudice. (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37
Cal.4th 774, 810.)
Sentencing issues
1. Prior strike admission
Ranft first challenges his sentence by claiming that his
admission of a prior strike conviction was invalid because he was
not informed of, and thus did not waive, the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to confront his accusers. We are
not persuaded.
“[B]efore a [trial] court accepts [a defendant’s] admission
that [they have] suffered prior felony convictions, express and
specific admonitions as to the constitutional rights waived by
[the] admission” are required. (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857,
863.) The requisite admonitions include that the admission
waives the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury
trial, and the right to confront one’s accusers. (Id. at p. 863, fn.
5.) If these admonitions are not provided, the admission is
nevertheless valid so long as the record affirmatively discloses
that it was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the
circumstances. (People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 303-304.)
11
The trial court here did not ensure that Ranft received the
requisite admonitions. While the jury deliberated, the court
asked Ranft how he wanted to proceed on the prior strike
allegation. Ranft said that he planned to admit the allegation.
The prosecutor took Ranft’s admission: “So, Mr. Ranft, you have a
right to have a jury trial on your strike prior offense, which is
that you were convicted of a violation of Penal Code [s]ection 245,
[subdivision (a)(2)], in Santa Barbara Superior Court case
number 1465394 on August 5, 2016. [¶] Do you admit or deny
that that offense is a serious felony within the meaning of Penal
Code [s]ection 667, [subdivisions (d) and (e)]?” Ranft admitted
the offense. The prosecutor then confirmed that Ranft wanted to
“waive [his] right to have a trial on that prior and just admit it.”
Ranft said that he did.
At no time during the colloquy did the prosecutor explain
that, by admitting his prior conviction, Ranft was waiving the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confront his
accusers. Despite the lack of admonitions, however, we conclude
that Ranft’s admission was valid. When Ranft executed his
Faretta waiver prior to trial, he confirmed that he understood his
constitutional rights, including the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to confront his accusers. He
reiterated that understanding when the trial court accepted the
Faretta waiver. He later confirmed he was waiving those rights
when he executed the form in which he pleaded guilty to resisting
arrest and when the court accepted his plea. These factors weigh
in favor of a knowing and voluntary waiver. (See, e.g., People v.
Forrest (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 675, 678–679 [prior conviction
admission valid where defendant advised of rights during plea
colloquy earlier in proceeding].) Additionally, this was not
12
Ranft’s first brush with the criminal justice system; he said that
he had “been through the trial process before.” This is also
relevant to whether Ranft knowingly waived his constitutional
rights. (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365.) The record
here affirmatively discloses that Ranft’s waiver was valid under
the totality of the circumstances.
2. Senate Bill No. 81
Finally, Ranft contends the trial court should have struck
his prior strike pursuant to section 1385, as amended by Senate
Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). But Senate Bill No. 81’s
amendments to section 1385 took effect on January 1, 2022.
(People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242 (Burke).) Ranft
was sentenced the following June. Had Ranft wanted the court
to apply the provisions of Senate Bill No. 81 at sentencing, he
should have asked it to do so. Because he did not, his contention
is forfeited. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)
It also lacks merit. “Senate Bill No. 81 . . . amended section
1385 to add specific mitigating factors the trial court must
consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a
defendant’s sentence.” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 242-
243, italics added.) “The term ‘enhancement’ has a
well-established technical meaning in California law”; it is “ ‘ “an
additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ ” (Id.
at p. 243.) “It is equally well established that the Three Strikes
law is . . . an alternative sentencing scheme,” not an
enhancement. (Ibid.) As such, Senate Bill No. 81’s amendments
to section 1385 do not apply to sentences imposed under the
Three Strikes law. (Burke, at pp. 243-244.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
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Pauline Maxwell, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.