Chavez v. Golden Auto Group CA4/2 ( 2023 )

Filed 8/1/23 Chavez v. Golden Auto Group CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ISSAYD CHAVEZ,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E078712
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIC2000992)
GOLDEN AUTO GROUP, INC. et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John W. Vineyard, Judge.
Affirmed.
Cedar Adams and Adam K. Obeid, for Defendants and Appellants.
Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Auto Fraud Legal Center, Christopher P. Barry and
Arlyn L. Escalante, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and respondent Issayd Chavez bought a used car from appellant Golden
Auto Group, Inc., after negotiating a downpayment schedule. But the purchase’s Retail
Installment Sale Contract (RISC), which Golden later assigned to appellant Mechanics
Bank, did not accurately reflect the schedule. Chavez therefore sued appellants for
various causes of action, including one under the Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ.
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Code § 2981 et seq.; ASFA ), also known as the Rees-Levering Act.
After a bifurcated bench trial on Chavez’s ASFA claim, the trial court found the
RISC violated the ASFA because it did not accurately reflect the parties’ downpayment
agreement. The trial court ordered rescission of the car purchase, awarded Chavez about
$16,000 in damages, and entered judgment in his favor on his ASFA claim. Chavez then
dismissed his other claims, and appellants appealed. We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chavez bought a used car from Golden on June 22, 2019. The parties agreed he
would pay a $2,000 downpayment, consisting of $1,000 down on the date of purchase
and then another $1,000 in three installments drawn from his bank account: $333 on July
8, 2019, $333 on July 20, 2019, and $334 on August 5, 2019. Chavez’s monthly
payments would then begin on August 6, 2019.
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All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.
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The RISC, however, does not reflect the parties’ down payment agreement.
Instead, the RISC states only that Chavez paid a $2,000 downpayment in “Cash, Cash
Equivalent, Check, Credit Card, or Debit Card,” and that he would pay no “[d]eferred
[d]ownpayment[s].” The RISC thus shows that Chavez paid $2,000 downpayment on the
date of sale, not that he made a $1,000 downpayment on that date and then three
installments in the following months.
After the purchase, Golden assigned the RISC to Mechanics Bank. The
assignment provides that Mechanics Bank is liable for all claims and defenses that
Chavez could assert against Golden.
Chavez later came to believe that the car was substandard and that Golden had
made several misrepresentations and violated various statutes during the sale. Chavez
therefore sued Golden, its surety, and Mechanics Bank, alleging claims under the ASFA
and other consumer-protection statutes, as well as claims for fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations.
The case proceeded to a bifurcated trial on Chavez’s ASFA claim on stipulated
facts. The trial court found Golden had committed “a clear violation” of the ASFA,
ordered Chavez to return the car, and awarded him $15,995.90 in “[r]escission
[d]amages.” Chavez later dismissed his remaining claims and the trial court entered
judgment for him. Appellants timely appealed.
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III.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend the trial court erroneously found that Golden violated the
ASFA and erroneously entered judgment for Chavez. We disagree.
The ASFA requires car dealers to disclose all the terms of a conditional sale
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contract in a single document. (Raceway Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 165-166.) If
a conditional sale contract violates this so-called “single document rule,” the contract is
“unenforceable and the buyer may recover the total amount paid to the seller.” (Rojas v.
Platinum Auto Group, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 997, 1002 (Rojas).)
Among other things, the single document “must itemize the purchaser’s
downpayment.” (Rojas, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1002.) The itemization must state:
“(A) The agreed value of the property being traded in. [¶] (B) The prior credit or lease
balance, if any, owing on the property being traded in. [¶] (C) The net agreed value of
the property being traded in . . . . [¶] (D) The amount of any portion of the
downpayment to be deferred until not later than the due date of the second regularly
scheduled installment under the contract . . . . [¶] (E) The amount of any manufacturer’s
rebate . . . . [¶] (F) The remaining amount paid or to be paid by the buyer as a
downpayment. [¶] [AND] (G) The total downpayment . . . .” (§ 2982, subd. (a)(6).)
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No one disputes that the RISC is a conditional sale contract covered by the
ASFA.
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Chavez and Golden agreed that he would pay a $2,000 downpayment, consisting
of $1,000 on the day of the purchase and another $1,000 in three separate installments.
The RISC, however, states that Chavez put down a single $2,000 downpayment with no
further installments. We agree with the trial court that this is “a clear violation” of the
ASFA. As a result, the RISC is unenforceable and Chavez was entitled to recover the
amount he paid to Golden ($15,995.50). (See Rojas, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003;
see also § 2983, 2983.1, subd. (d).) The trial court therefore properly rescinded the RISC
and awarded Chavez $15,995.50 in damages. Appellants argue otherwise for several
reasons, none of which has merit.
First, appellants argue the three installments Chavez agreed to make do not
constitute a “deferred downpayment” under the ASFA. They correctly observe that the
ASFA does not define “deferred downpayment,” but provides that a “downpayment” also
includes “the amount of any portion of the downpayment the payment of which is
deferred until not later than the due date of the second otherwise scheduled payment.” (§
2981, subd. (g).) Appellants thus argue that the installments do are not “deferred
downpayments” under the ASFA—and thus did not need to be itemized in the RISC—
because they were due before Chavez began making scheduled payments.
Appellants misread section 2981, subdivision (g). The statute defines a “deferred
downpayment” as any portion of the downpayment that is deferred at the latest until the
purchaser’s second scheduled payment. Chavez’s three downpayment installments were
made after the purchase but before his first schedule payment was due. Those
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installments thus are “deferred downpayments” section 2981, subdivision (g), and had to
be itemized on the RISC. (See Rojas, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1002-1003
[plaintiff’s four installments after car purchase were “deferred downpayments” that had
to be itemized under section 2982, subdivision (a)(6)]; accord, Munoz v. Express Auto
Sales (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5 [same as to two $250 cash payments made
within month of sale].) Because they were not, Golden violated the ASFA.
Appellants next argue Golden did not violate the ASFA because it “substantially
complied” with its requirements. That may be, but substantial compliance cannot
preclude appellants’ liability for Golden’s ASFA violation. (Rojas, supra, 212
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003-1004.)
Next, appellants argue they should not be held liable for any ASFA violation
because Chavez suffered no harm. But “the purpose and history of [the ASFA] establish
that [Chavez] need not have suffered actual damage from [Golden’s] violation of the
statute’s disclosure requirements” to recover on his ASFA claim. (Rojas, supra, 212
Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.)
Appellants then argue Mechanics Bank, as a “bona fide assigned for value,”
cannot be liable for “the downpayment issue.” But, as appellants acknowledge, nothing
in the record suggests they made this argument in the trial court.3 We therefore decline
3
Appellants claim they made the argument orally at trial, but there is no
reporter’s transcript of the proceedings. Appellants bear the burden of providing an
adequate record. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.)
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to consider it. (See People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 301-302 [appellant forfeits
argument not made in the trial court].)
Finally, appellants argue the trial court erred by disregarding three of its
affirmative defenses. Again, nothing in the record suggests appellants advanced these
defenses in the trial court, so we decline to consider them for the first time on appeal.
(See Park Place Estates Homeowners Assn. v. Naber (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 427, 433.)
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff may recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
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