People v. Pruitt CA1/5 ( 2023 )

Filed 8/23/23 P. v. Pruitt CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A162580
v.
JARROD A. PRUITT, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 52007532)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant and appellant Jarrod A. Pruitt (appellant) appeals following
his conviction of several charges stemming from an April 2020 domestic
violence incident. The parties agree the trial court’s instructions erroneously
permitted appellant to be convicted of child endangerment (Pen. Code,
§ 273a, subd. (b))1 on a theory of indirect harm without a showing of criminal
negligence. We agree with respondent that the error was harmless.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2020, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an
information charging appellant with making criminal threats (§ 422, subd.
(a); count one) with a deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1));
injuring a spouse, cohabitant, or person with a past or present dating
relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count two); assault by means likely to produce
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count three); and misdemeanor child
endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (b); count four).
A jury found appellant not guilty of the three felony offenses alleged in
counts one through three. On count two appellant was found guilty of the
lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery of a person in a dating
relationship (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), and on count three he was found guilty of
the lesser included offense of simple assault (§ 240). He was found guilty as
charged on count four.
In April 2021, appellant was placed on four years’ probation, with
conditions including that he serve 45 days in jail. The present appeal
followed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 2019, Jane Doe 1 and her daughter, Jane Doe 2, moved in with
appellant and his son at their home Richmond.
On April 12, 2020, at 12:37 a.m., Deputy Ryan Shaw was dispatched to
the home appellant shared with Jane Doe 1 and the children.2 The deputy
contacted Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (who was 10 years old) in the living
room. Jane Doe 1’s eyes were red, watery, and swollen. Both Jane Doe 1 and
Jane Doe 2 were visibly shaken. Jane Doe 2 told the deputy, “I’m still
shaking.” The hallway between the bedroom and the bathroom was in
“disarray,” with shampoo and 20–50 pieces of broken glass on the ground.
Jane Doe 1’s clothing was covered with soap and shampoo.
At trial, Jane Doe 1 testified she had been in an on-and-off relationship
with appellant for almost seven years. On the evening in question, Jane
2 There was testimony at trial about several previous incidents of
domestic violence by appellant, including an alleged strangulation earlier in
the day. It is unnecessary to summarize that evidence to resolve the present
appeal.
2
Doe 1 was with Jane Doe 2 in Jane Doe 2’s bedroom watching cartoons.
Appellant kicked in the door to the bedroom and started yelling, telling Jane
Doe 1 not to touch his “scrunchy.” Jane Doe 1 realized appellant was
referring to his loofah sponge, and she explained that Jane Doe 2 had the
same sponge, and that hers had been placed in the trash.
Jane Doe 1 moved into the hallway. Appellant grabbed shampoo and
poured it on Jane Doe 1. Appellant grabbed Jane Doe 1’s mirror from the
bathroom and threw it at her. The mirror hit Jane Doe 1’s chest and then
shattered on the ground. When she bent over, shards of glass went into her
eye. Appellant leaned in and threatened to slit Jane Doe 1’s throat. He was
holding a shard of glass from the broken mirror, and he whispered, “I could so
fucking slit your throat right now.”
Jane Doe 2 was at the bedroom door about two feet behind Jane Doe 1
during the incident. Jane Doe 2 yelled at appellant, “Please stop, what are
you doing to my mommy.” Appellant responded, “Shut up, you little fucking
bitch.” Appellant then went into his bedroom and later left the house.
At trial, Jane Doe 2 testified that, before the police arrived on the night
in question, she and Jane Doe 1 were watching cartoons on the bed in her
room. Appellant kicked in the door and it scared her. Appellant was
swearing and yelling that they had thrown away his loofah. Appellant threw
a “big fit,” grabbed shampoo from the bathroom, and threw it on Jane Doe 1
while saying a “lot of curse words.” Jane Doe 2 was standing two to three feet
behind Jane Doe 1. She was watching what was happening and was very
scared and crying. Appellant then grabbed Jane Doe 1’s mirror from the
3
bathroom and threw it on the ground. A shard of glass hit Jane Doe 1’s eye.3
Jane Doe 2 returned to her room and she heard appellant call her a “bitch.”
DISCUSSION
Section 273a, subdivision (b) provides, “Any person who, under
circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or
custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that
child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a
situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”
“Section 273a encompasses a wide variety of situations and includes
both direct and indirect conduct. [Citations.] When the harm to a child is
directly inflicted, the requisite mental state for the section 273a offense is
general criminal intent. [Citations.] When that harm is indirectly inflicted,
the requisite mental state is criminal negligence. [Citations.] Criminal
negligence is aggravated, culpable, gross or reckless conduct that is such a
departure from that of the ordinarily prudent or careful person under the
same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human
life. [Citation.] A defendant may be deemed to be criminally negligent if a
reasonable person in his or her position would have been aware of the risk.”
(People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 454.)
In the present case, the prosecution informed the court it was only
proceeding on a direct child endangerment theory, and the parties agreed it
3 Jane Doe 2 also testified appellant made a slicing motion across his
throat with the glass and whispered, “I will slice.” Deputy Shaw testified
that Jane Doe 2 did not describe hearing appellant threaten Jane Doe 1 or
seeing him hold a piece of glass to his own throat.
4
was unnecessary to instruct the jury on criminal negligence. Nevertheless,
the trial court instructed the jury on both direct and indirect theories of child
endangerment. In particular, the court instructed the jury that the People
were required to prove that “The defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering on a child or willfully caused or permitted a
child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.” (Italics
added.) The court did not instruct the jury that respondent needed to prove
appellant acted with criminal negligence under the indirect theory of child
endangerment.
The parties agree the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the
indirect theory of child endangerment without requiring a finding of criminal
negligence. (See CALCRIM No. 823, Bench Notes [directing the trial court to
instruct on criminal negligence where the jury is asked to determine whether
the defendant “willfully caused or permitted a child to suffer”].) “Where a
jury is instructed on alternate theories of liability, one legally valid and one
legally invalid, a federal constitutional error has occurred. The defendant
has been deprived of his or her right to ‘a jury properly instructed in the
relevant law.’ [Citations.] The error therefore requires reversal unless we
determine the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Lopez
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 580.) “[T]he applicable test [is] as follows: ‘ “Is it clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the
defendant guilty absent the error?” ’ ” (Id. at p. 581.)
We need not address whether the jury would have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant acted with criminal negligence in indirectly
harming Jane Doe 2 because it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt any
rational jury would have convicted appellant based on a direct theory of child
endangerment, which was the focus of the closing arguments.
5
In closing, the prosecutor argued, “[D]id he willfully inflict unjustifiable
mental suffering on [Jane Doe 2]? He didn’t know where his sponge was, so
what did he do? What any reasonable person would do, which is to kick open
a door hard and start yelling and screaming at [Jane Doe 2] and her mom.
And then start throwing soaps on her mom and throw a mirror and call a ten-
year-old girl a bitch and scare the hell out of her. And 20 minutes later, her
hands are still shaking when Deputy Shaw is talking to her. There is no way
that this is justifiable mental suffering inflicted on this little girl.”
Defense counsel also focused on the direct theory in his closing,
arguing, “The language here concerns a willful infliction of unjustifiable
mental suffering on the child. . . . I think everybody in this room hopefully
would agree that it’s awful for a kid to witness a fight . . . between their
mother and their mother’s boyfriend. Absolutely. But then we get back to
this spectrum we talked about earlier - good, bad, or criminal conduct. . . .
And the question is did [appellant] actually do anything to [Jane Doe 2]. I
think it was [Jane Doe 1] who testified that [appellant] swore at her, but was
this a willful infliction of unjustifiable mental suffering?”
Defense counsel’s argument below disregarded the true scope of the
mental suffering inflicted on Jane Doe 2 during the incident. As the
prosecutor pointed out below, appellant kicked open the door to her bedroom
and yelled about a sponge he apparently found in the trash. He then
continued to rage and swear, and then threw and shattered a mirror while
Jane Doe 2 stood only a few feet behind her mother. When Jane Doe 2
protested appellant’s actions towards Jane Doe 1, appellant called the child a
“bitch.” Jane Doe 2 testified she was very scared and crying during the
incident, and she told Deputy Shaw she was “still shaking” when he
responded to the residence.
6
Appellant argues the not-guilty verdicts on the felony charges show the
jury only selectively believed the evidence. But there is no basis to conclude
any doubts involved the direct theory of child endangerment. The jury found
appellant not guilty of making a criminal threat, which was based on
appellant’s alleged comment about slicing Jane Doe 1’s throat. But Deputy
Shaw testified Jane Doe 2 did not mention that when he interviewed her (see
fn. 3, ante), which provided a basis for doubt as to that charge. In count two,
the jury found appellant not guilty of inflicting an injury, which (as relevant
on appeal) was based on redness in Jane Doe 1’s eyes allegedly due to a shard
of glass.4 But the redness could also have been caused by crying. Finally, in
count three, the jury found appellant not guilty of assault likely to cause
great bodily injury. To support that charge, the prosecutor relied on an
earlier incident involving alleged strangulation of Jane Doe 1, rather than
the incident involving Jane Doe 2.
Although the jury’s verdicts reflected some doubt regarding the extent
of Jane Doe 1’s injuries and her allegations regarding an earlier incident, the
convictions on the lesser included offenses reflected findings that appellant
did touch Jane Doe 1 in a forceful and harmful manner (assault and battery).
And, critically, the jury’s conviction for child endangerment reflects that it
found Jane Doe 2 suffered “unjustifiable . . . mental suffering.” It is not clear
whether the jury actually found such suffering was inflicted by direct or
indirect means, because both theories were presented to it. But the jury
necessarily rejected defense counsel’s argument below that the incident was
just an argument and that Jane Doe 2’s suffering was insufficient to support
4 There was also testimony about marks on Jane Doe 1 from incidents
earlier in the day, but Jane Doe 1 did not testify Jane Doe 2 was present
during those incidents.
7
criminal liability. Accordingly, although the jury was unable to find beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the felony charges, the
verdicts reflect a belief in the overall narrative described in the victims’
testimony as to the incident involving Jane Doe 2.
Appellant also argues some of appellant’s actions were directed at Jane
Doe 1 rather than at Jane Doe 2. It is true that, where an abuser’s conduct is
not directed at a child, the charge is analyzed under a theory of indirect
endangerment. (People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1441.)
However, in the present case, appellant kicked open the door to Jane Doe 2’s
bedroom, yelled and swore, threw a mirror at or near Jane Doe 1 while Jane
Doe 2 was standing a few feet behind, and called Jane Doe 2 a “bitch.”
Appellant cites no authority that these circumstances could not be considered
the direct infliction of mental suffering. And appellant does not argue that
any rational jury would have failed to find Jane Doe 2’s suffering from such
conduct was unjustifiable.
Because it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational jury
would have convicted appellant of child endangerment if the trial court had
not erred by instructing on the alternate indirect theory, the trial court’s
error was harmless. (In re Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 580–581.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
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SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
(A162580)
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