People v. Randhawa CA1/5 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Randhawa CA1/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A163938
    v.
    IQBAL SINGH RANDHAWA,                                                   (Solano County
    Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. FCR347029)
    Defendant was convicted by a jury of 12 counts of grand
    theft/embezzlement (Pen. Code, §§ 487, 506),1 one count of failure to provide
    travel services or return moneys (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17550.14, subd. (a)(1)),
    and one count of encumbering money from a trust account (Bus. & Prof. Code,
    § 17550.15, subd. (c)). The court also found true the allegation that
    defendant was out on bail when he committed two of the embezzlement
    charges. On appeal, defendant argues for reversal based on the trial court’s
    failure to instruct the jury, after seating an alternate juror, to disregard prior
    1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
    stated.
    1
    deliberations and to begin deliberations anew. We find prejudicial error and
    reverse.2
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    I.    Information
    Defendant was charged in an amended information with 18 counts of
    grand theft/embezzlement in violation of Penal Code sections 487 and 506.
    Each count involved a separate victim. As to counts 17 and 18, the amended
    information alleged defendant committed the embezzlements while he was
    out on bail. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.) In addition, the amended information
    alleged defendant failed to provide travel services or return money in
    violation of Business and Professions Code section 17550.14,
    subdivision (a)(1) (count 19) and encumbered money from a trust account in
    violation of Business and Professions Code section 17550.15, subdivision (c)
    (count 20).3
    II.   Trial Testimony
    The jury trial lasted four days. Eighteen witnesses testified, and 42
    exhibits were admitted into evidence.
    Fifteen individual victims testified that they purchased airline tickets
    from defendant for travel between the United States and either India or
    Pakistan. The majority of the victims paid for their tickets by making
    deposits into the defendant’s bank account. Although they were provided
    with travel itineraries, the victims later learned that they did not have valid
    tickets or that they only had one-way tickets instead of round-trip tickets.
    2 By separate order filed this date, we deny defendant’s petition for writ
    of habeas corpus (case No. A167332) as moot.
    3 At the close of trial, counts 10 and 16 were dismissed because the
    complaining witnesses as to those counts did not appear for trial. The
    remaining counts were renumbered.
    2
    Most of them received no refund from defendant. Others received either
    partial refunds or refund checks that bounced. One victim provided
    defendant with his credit card information to pay $3,000 for three airline
    tickets and later learned that defendant charged an additional $50,000 to the
    victim’s credit card. When the victim called defendant to complain about the
    overcharge, defendant said it was an error and that he would repay the
    victim. Defendant made three payments to the victim, for a total of $8,000,
    but did not repay the balance.
    A regional sales manager of Sky Bird Travel testified that Sky Bird
    Travel is a consolidator for airlines and contracts directly with airlines to
    negotiate reduced airfares. Sky Bird then sells the reduced-rate tickets to
    travel agents to sell to their clients. M & K Travel Services4 registered with
    Sky Bird Travel in 2018, and defendant was listed as the primary contact.
    Defendant defaulted on about $38,000 owed to Sky Bird Travel. Sky Bird
    Travel contacted defendant by phone, by email, and in person, seeking
    payment of the debt. Defendant said he would pay “ ‘tomorrow,’ ” but he
    never did.
    Department of Justice Investigative Auditor Shirley Weber testified
    that prior to 2000, defendant operated as a sole proprietorship. He was a
    registered seller of travel5 with the department’s seller of travel program. As
    a registered seller of travel, defendant is required to deliver a ticket within 72
    hours, or three days, after payment is made. Otherwise, the customer is
    entitled to a refund.6 During Weber’s investigation of defendant, Weber
    4 In 2000, defendant incorporated as M & K Travel Services, Inc.
    5 “Seller of travel” is a regulatory term that applies to those who sell,
    advertise and arrange for travel services.
    6 Weber also testified that in 2004 and 2005, she investigated about 30
    consumer complaints against M & K Travel Services. Civil and criminal
    3
    received a letter from defendant admitting that M & K Travel Services owed
    reimbursement to one of the victims and that a refund check for $5,600 that
    defendant gave to the victim bounced.
    III.   Jury Deliberations and Instructions
    On July 30, 2021, a Friday, the trial court instructed the jury.
    Following closing arguments, the original 12 jurors left to begin
    deliberations. The trial court asked the alternate jurors to remain in the
    courtroom and stated: “The record will reflect the jury has departed. My
    to [sic] alternates are here. [¶] . . . [W]hat’s going on now is that the jury is
    going to begin deliberating and you all are still alternates. You don’t get to
    deliberate because there are 12 of them. [¶] If someone has a family
    emergency this afternoon and can’t be here, I am going to call you up. I am
    going to start calling [Alternate Juror Number 1] first. The reason I am
    telling you not to discuss or make up your mind is, if they are deliberating—
    let’s just say, next Monday, and I lose a juror. When I bring you in [Alternate
    Juror Number 1], they have to start from the beginning. They don’t get to
    tell you, we have worked out the first eight. Hop on in. Let’s ride this out.
    [¶] No, we start from the beginning and you—your opinions from the
    beginning get counted and deliberated. Same thing, [Alternate Juror
    Number 2]. If we have two and there’s been—we figured out the first 16. No,
    it starts from the beginning and that can be the second time. So it’s
    important you not make up your mind. Don’t talk about it.” (Some
    charges were filed against defendant, and his seller of travel registration was
    suspended. In 2006, the Travel Consumer Restitution Corporation, a
    nonprofit, nongovernment entity, paid nearly $200,000 in consumer claims
    for amounts owed by M & K Travel Services. Defendant pleaded guilty to
    grand theft in 2010.
    4
    capitalization omitted.) This admonition was not given to the original 12
    deliberating jurors.
    On July 30, 2021, the jury deliberated from 11:01 a.m. to 3:45 p.m.
    This time period included any recesses the jury may have taken for lunch and
    breaks, the lengths of which were not recorded. The court adjourned until
    the next court date, which was Wednesday, August 4, 2021, at 9:00 a.m.
    On August 4, 2021, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court
    reported to counsel for the parties that a juror contacted the court to state
    that she could not continue on the jury due to work obligations. The trial
    court stated it contacted an alternate juror and asked for any comments from
    the parties. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel raised any issues.
    The trial court then stated, outside the presence of the other 11 jurors: “Let’s
    get [Alternate Juror Number 1] sworn in. [¶] As I think I told you last week,
    you would be the first one we would call. They were here Friday, so they
    haven’t deliberated much; and they’ll have to start fresh, the deliberating
    process. I’ll get you sworn in as a juror and send you down to the jury
    deliberation room.” The alternate was sworn in and sent to the jury
    deliberation room.
    The reconstituted jury deliberated on August 4, 2021, from 9:15 a.m. to
    3:30 p.m., inclusive of unrecorded time for recesses for lunch and any other
    breaks. At 11:50 a.m. on August 4, 2021, the jury requested a readback of
    testimony from one of the individual victims.
    Deliberations continued on August 5, 2021, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:20 p.m.
    At 9:50 a.m., the jury requested a readback of testimony from another
    individual victim, and at 1:15 p.m., it requested a readback of the testimony
    5
    from the Sky Bird Travel regional sales manager. At 4:20 p.m., the jury
    returned its verdict.7
    The jury convicted defendant of 12 counts of grand theft/embezzlement
    (Pen. Code, §§ 487, 506; counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16), one count
    of failure to provide travel services or return moneys (Bus. & Prof. Code,
    § 17550.14, subd. (a)(1); count 17), and one count of encumbering money from
    a trust account (Bus. & Prof. Code¸ § 17550.15, subd. (c); count 18).
    Defendant was acquitted of four counts of grand theft/embezzlement
    (counts 3, 8, 9, 10). The trial court found the “out-on-bail” enhancement true
    as to two of the embezzlement counts.
    On October 21, 2021, defendant was sentenced to a total of nine years
    four months in county jail.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendant claims his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict
    was violated because the trial court failed to instruct the entire jury to
    disregard previous deliberations and to begin deliberations anew when the
    alternate juror was substituted for one of the original jurors who could not
    continue serving. The People argue there was no error; the claim is forfeited;
    and that even if there were error, it was harmless. We find that defendant
    did not forfeit his claim and that the trial court prejudicially erred when it
    failed to instruct the reconstituted jury to disregard previous deliberations
    and begin anew.
    7 The reporter’s transcript for the day the verdict was returned appears
    to be misdated. It is dated August 4, 2021, but the court clerk’s reading of
    the verdicts states they were “[s]igned by foreperson dated August 5, 2021.”
    The clerk’s transcript includes minutes stating the verdicts were returned on
    August 5, 2021. Both parties cite to the minutes in the clerk’s transcript and
    agree that the verdicts were returned on August 5, 2021.
    6
    I.    Legal Principles
    Section 1089 states, in relevant part, “If at any time, whether before or
    after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or
    upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his
    or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears
    therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of
    an alternate, who shall then take a place in the jury box, and be subject to
    the same rules and regulations as though the alternate juror had been
    selected as one of the original jurors.” The statute does not specifically
    provide that the reconstituted jury must be instructed to set aside its earlier
    deliberations and begin anew. (§ 1089.) Nearly 50 years ago, however, our
    high court construed section 1089 to require that the trial court provide such
    an instruction to avoid violating a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury
    trial provided by the California Constitution. (People v. Collins (1976) 
    17 Cal.3d 687
    , 693–694 (Collins), disapproved on another ground in People v.
    Boyette (2002) 
    29 Cal.4th 381
    , 462, fn. 19; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
    As explained in Collins, supra: “Among the essential elements of the
    right to trial by jury are the requirements that a jury in a felony prosecution
    consist of 12 persons and that its verdict be unanimous. [Citations.]
    [¶] . . . The requirement that 12 persons reach a unanimous verdict is not met
    unless those 12 reach their consensus through deliberations which are the
    common experience of all of them. It is not enough that 12 jurors reach a
    unanimous verdict if 1 juror has not had the benefit of the deliberations of
    the other 11. Deliberations provide the jury with the opportunity to review
    the evidence in light of the perception and memory of each member. Equally
    important in shaping a member’s viewpoint are the personal reactions and
    interactions as any individual juror attempts to persuade others to accept his
    7
    or her viewpoint. The result is a balance easily upset if a new juror enters
    the decision-making process after the 11 others have commenced
    deliberations. The elements of number and unanimity combine to form an
    essential element of unity in the verdict. By this we mean that a defendant
    may not be convicted except by 12 jurors who have heard all the evidence and
    argument and who together have deliberated to unanimity.” (17 Cal.3d at p.
    693.)
    Collins, supra, held that the following instruction is required when an
    alternate juror is substituted after deliberations have begun: “We
    accordingly construe section 1089 to provide that the court instruct the jury
    to set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew.
    The jury should be further advised that one of its members has been
    discharged and replaced with an alternate juror as provided by law; that the
    law grants to the People and to the defendant the right to a verdict reached
    only after full participation of the 12 jurors who ultimately return a verdict;
    that this right may only be assured if the jury begins deliberations again
    from the beginning; and that each remaining juror must set aside and
    disregard the earlier deliberations as if they had not been had.” (17 Cal.3d at
    p. 694.)8
    8 CALCRIM No. 3575 includes the Collins language.     It states: “One of
    your fellow jurors has been excused and an alternate juror has been selected
    to join the jury.
    “Do not consider this substitution for any purpose.
    “The alternate juror must participate fully in the deliberations that
    lead to any verdict. The People and the defendant[s] have the right to a
    verdict reached only after full participation of the jurors whose votes
    determine that verdict. This right will only be assured if you begin your
    deliberations again, from the beginning. Therefore, you must set aside and
    disregard all past deliberations and begin your deliberations all over again.
    8
    II.    Defendant’s Claim Is Not Forfeited
    The People argue that defendant’s claim is forfeited because defense
    counsel failed to object to the trial court’s “manner of instruction” when it
    instructed the alternate juror. Defendant correctly argues that when an
    alternate juror is substituted on a jury, the trial court has a sua sponte
    obligation to instruct the reconstituted jury to disregard all past deliberations
    and begin deliberations anew. (Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 693–694.) As
    discussed post, the trial court failed to comply with this obligation. The
    required instruction affects defendant’s substantial rights to a unanimous
    jury and is not forfeited by his failure to raise it below. (People v. Renteria
    (2001) 
    93 Cal.App.4th 552
    , 560; § 1259.)
    III.   Trial Court Erred
    The People argue that based on the trial court’s statements made to the
    alternate juror, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood
    its task. According to the People, the trial court’s admonition to the alternate
    juror, “ ‘[Y]our opinions from the beginning get counted and deliberated . . . .
    They’ll have to start fresh, the deliberating process,” was sufficient because if
    we presume the alternate followed this instruction, “it means he could not
    have allowed the other jurors to tell him they had decided any of the counts
    without his input.” If the other jurors told the alternate that certain counts
    or issues had already been decided, then the alternate was required to inform
    them that the trial court instructed him that this procedure was improper.
    The People’s argument speculates as to what may have happened
    during deliberations, and they offer no authority for the concept that the trial
    Each of you must disregard the earlier deliberations and decide this case as if
    those earlier deliberations had not taken place.
    “Now, please return to the jury room and start your deliberations from
    the beginning.”
    9
    court may delegate its duty to instruct the jury to a single alternate juror.
    We reject the People’s argument as contrary to the law. (See CALCRIM No.
    200 [Jurors must follow the law as explained by the court, and if an attorney’s
    comments on the law conflict with the court’s instructions, the jury must
    follow the court’s instructions].) Although the trial court instructed the
    alternate juror, “They’ll have to start fresh, the deliberating process,” it failed
    to give the same instruction to the entire jury.
    Moreover, the instruction given to the alternate juror was only a
    portion of CALCRIM No. 3575. Even the alternate juror was not told that
    the jury was required to disregard all prior deliberations. In People v.
    Martinez (1984) 
    159 Cal.App.3d 661
    , 665, the appellate court found that
    instructing the jury to “ ‘resume their deliberations starting over with the
    new trial juror’ ” was Collins error because the trial court did not inform the
    jury to set aside and disregard all past deliberations. Martinez explained,
    “The error in failing to admonish a jury to disregard all past deliberations is
    that it introduces the likelihood that the opinions and feelings of a juror who
    was discharged may be used by the panel as finally composed in arriving at a
    verdict. This obviously runs a foul [sic] of Collins because, if that happens,
    the decision is not entirely that of the 12 jurors who ultimately reach the
    verdict.” (Ibid.) The same is true here where the reconstituted jury was
    never instructed to disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberations
    anew. The trial court’s admonition to just the alternate juror of only a
    portion of CALCRIM No. 3575 does not adequately inform the entire jury of
    the proper procedure it was required to follow once the alternate was seated.
    10
    IV.   Prejudice
    Collins held that an error in instructing the jury upon substitution of
    an alternate juror is subject to harmless error review under the Watson test,9
    which asks whether it is reasonably probable that a more favorable verdict
    would have been returned had the jury been properly instructed following the
    substitution. (Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697.) Collins explained that the
    “reasonably probable” standard applied because the instructional error
    impacted the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict provided under the
    California Constitution. (Collins, at p. 692, fn. 3.) The Watson test applies to
    wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional
    error. (People v. Hendrix (2022) 
    13 Cal.5th 933
    , 942 (Hendrix).)
    At the time Collins was decided, the United States Supreme Court had
    ruled that the federal Constitution does not require unanimous jury verdicts
    in state criminal trials. (Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 692, fn. 3; Apodaca v.
    Oregon (1972) 
    406 U.S. 404
    , 406 [
    32 L.Ed.2d 184
    ].) Thus, at the time Collins
    was decided, the stricter Chapman harmless error standard,10 which asks
    whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, was not
    applicable to this type of instructional error.
    However, defendant contends that the recent decision in Ramos v.
    Louisiana (2020) ___ U.S. ___ [
    206 L.Ed.2d 583
    ], which held that the Sixth
    Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to state and federal trials
    equally (id. at p. 591), requires that the instructional error at issue here
    should be decided under the Chapman harmless error standard. The People
    argue that neither Ramos nor any other United States Supreme Court case
    has decided the more specific question of whether the Sixth Amendment
    9 People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836.
    10 Chapman v. California (1967) 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 [
    17 L.Ed.2d 705
    ].
    11
    requires that upon substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations, a
    trial court must instruct the jury to disregard earlier deliberations and begin
    deliberations anew. We need not decide which standard applies because we
    find prejudice even under the Watson reasonably probable standard. As our
    high court has explained, reasonable probability in the context of the Watson
    standard “ ‘ “ ‘does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable
    chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” ’ ” (Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
    p. 944.)
    In determining prejudice, we may consider “whether the case is a close
    one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the
    substitution of the alternate juror.” (People v. Proctor (1992) 
    4 Cal.4th 499
    ,
    537 (Proctor).) We also may consider the complexity of the case. (Martinez,
    supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at p. 665.) Here, the original jury deliberated from
    11:01 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. on July 30, 2021, approximately 4 1/2 hours, less any
    unrecorded recesses for lunch or other breaks. The alternate was substituted
    on the morning of Wednesday, August 4, which was the next court date. The
    reconstituted jury then deliberated from 9:15 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on August 4th,
    and from 9:00 a.m. to 4:20 p.m. on August 5th, less unrecorded recesses for
    lunch or other breaks. Although the reconstituted jury deliberated
    approximately three times as long as the original jury, the original jury
    deliberated for a significant period of time on July 30th. Thus, the facts here
    are distinguishable from other cases that have found no prejudice based, in
    part, on the minimal duration of deliberations before substitution. (See, e.g.,
    Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 690, 697 [no prejudice where original jury
    deliberated for little more than an hour]; Proctor, 
    supra,
     4 Cal.4th at p. 537
    [no prejudice where original jury deliberated for less than an hour before
    substitution and two and a half days after substitution]; People v. Guillen
    12
    (2014) 
    227 Cal.App.4th 934
    , 1031–1032 [no prejudice where duration of
    original jury’s deliberation was “minimal” and reconstituted jury deliberated
    for nine days].)
    The People argue that the case was not complex and that the evidence
    of guilt was conclusive. We agree that there was substantial evidence of
    defendant’s guilt as to the counts on which the jury convicted, including the
    testimony of multiple individuals and investigator Weber. However, this
    does not end our inquiry.
    We disagree with the People that the case was “devastatingly simple.”
    As defendant notes in his briefing, even the prosecutor acknowledged the
    complexity of the case during closing argument. Eighteen counts were
    submitted to the jury; there were 18 witnesses and 42 exhibits. There were
    16 individual victims who testified about separate interactions with
    defendant. Defendant did not call any witnesses and, instead, argued the
    People did not prove two of the four elements of grand theft by
    embezzlement: that defendant fraudulently converted or used the money for
    himself, or that he intended to convert the money for his own personal use.
    The record establishes that there was a significant amount of testimony and
    exhibits for the jury’s evaluation. Further, the jury did not convict on all
    counts. It deliberated for approximately three days, which included one day
    before the substitution with the alternate juror, and it requested readbacks of
    testimony from three witnesses. We find that this record indicates the case
    was far closer than the People claim. (People v. Pearch (1991) 
    229 Cal.App.3d 1282
    , 1295 [jury questions and requests for readback indicate close case]; see
    People v. Perry (1985) 
    166 Cal.App.3d 924
    , 933 [four days of deliberation and
    acquittal on some counts suggested close case].)
    13
    The People argue that the four counts on which the jury acquitted are
    easily explained and do not detract from their position that any error was
    harmless. As to the acquittals on counts 8, 9, and 10, the evidence was that
    the victim’s losses were under $950. According to the People, the jury was
    instructed that in order to convict, it had to find that the victims suffered a
    loss of at least $950. The People fail to provide a record citation for the jury
    instruction given. Our own review of the record establishes that the jury
    instruction given was CALCRIM No. 1806, theft by embezzlement (§§ 484,
    503), which does not state a minimum dollar amount of loss. Accordingly, we
    reject the People’s position that three of the four acquittals are easily
    explained by the jury instructions.11
    The People also argue that the fact that the verdict forms for counts 1–
    10 are dated August 4, and the verdict forms for counts 11–18 are dated
    August 5, suggests that the jury considered the counts in the order charged.
    They further contend that because the jury’s first readback request, which
    was made at 11:50 a.m. on August 4, related to count 3, this suggests that the
    jury did not even begin consideration of count 4 until August 4th. The People
    concede that it is possible the jury considered counts 1, 2, and 3 before the
    alternate was seated, but they claim the record shows that the jury did not
    consider counts 4–18 until after the alternate was seated. Thus, the People
    contend, there can be no prejudice “at least as to counts 4 through 18.”
    11 The jury also acquitted defendant of count 3, as to which Harman S.
    testified that he paid defendant $2,400 for airline tickets to India. The
    People concede that as to this count it is possible the jury believed there was
    some doubt as to whether the defendant or another person was responsible
    for the fraud. This further suggests to us that the case was closer than the
    People contend.
    14
    The People’s argument is heavy on speculation. Moreover, we find it
    highlights the likelihood of prejudice resulting from the failure to properly
    instruct the jury to disregard all prior deliberations and begin anew once the
    alternate was seated. Because this instruction was not given, the likelihood
    remains that “the opinions and feelings of a juror who was discharged may be
    used by the panel as finally composed in arriving at a verdict.” (Martinez,
    supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at p. 665.) We do not know whether the original jury
    reached verdicts on certain counts or whether it simply considered the
    viewpoints and impressions of each member. However, we do know that the
    original jury deliberated for a significant amount of time on July 30th and
    the jury was not instructed to disregard those deliberations and begin anew
    when the alternate was seated. Although the reconstituted jury deliberated
    for two more days, we find that the first day of deliberation by the original
    jury was for a significant amount of time in which opinions and impressions
    were likely formed as to at least some of the issues or counts. (See id. at p.
    666 [finding prejudice in a close case where jury deliberated approximately
    2 1/4 hours before substitution, which was “sufficient time to formulate the
    danger that is likely without the proper instruction,” despite fact that the
    jury deliberated six days after substitution].)
    Based on the circumstances of this case, which includes numerous
    counts, witnesses, and exhibits, and the not insignificant period of
    deliberations by the original jury, we find prejudicial error. The failure to
    instruct with CALCRIM No. 3575 was certainly not harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Nor can we find that
    there is no reasonable probability that a more favorable verdict would have
    been returned had the jury been properly instructed following the
    15
    substitution. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Martinez, supra, 159
    Cal.App.3d at pp. 665–666.)
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is reversed.
    Jackson, P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    Burns, J.
    Chou, J.
    A163938/People v. Iqbal Singh Randhawa
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A163938

Filed Date: 12/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/22/2023