People v. Ruiz CA1/3 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Ruiz CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A167157
v.
JUAN CARLOS RUIZ, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. SC046239C)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2001, a jury convicted Juan Carlos Ruiz of the murder of William
Tejada, a fellow gang member, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years
to life for the murder. This court affirmed the murder conviction. (People v.
Reyes, et al. (Apr. 19, 2004, A097648) [nonpub. opn.].)
In January 2019, Ruiz petitioned for resentencing under former Penal
Code section 1170.95 (subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to this
code),2 alleging the criminal complaint allowed the prosecution to proceed
under the theories of felony murder or natural and probable consequences,
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.)
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95
to section 1172.6, with no substantive changes in the statute. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference.
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that he was convicted pursuant to one of those theories, and that he could not
presently be convicted of murder due to recent changes in the Penal Code.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)
The trial court issued an order to show cause, and it conducted an
evidentiary hearing in December 2022. The court ultimately denied the
petition, concluding Ruiz was “an active participant in the murder,” “had the
intent to kill at the time of the commission of the crime and acted with malice
aforethought.” In so concluding, the court — over defense objection — relied
upon Ruiz’s testimony from a youthful offender parole hearing in October
2021.
In 2021, Ruiz testified he felt Tejada “had to be murdered . . . . And so,
I ended up murdering [him], because he was an informant.” Ruiz admitted
“directing conversations with [his] co-defendants . . . . [W]e caught [Tejada]
unawares . . . I murdered him. I convinced five other co-defendants . . . to
take a man’s life. I beat him, I kicked him, I stabbed him.” He also said,
“[s]omeone had handed me a screwdriver” and “because he was still alive, I
wanted to end it. . . . I walked over to him, I stood over him and I stabbed
him in the eye, I checked his pulse, and I stabbed him in the other eye. My
intention was to end his life, because I didn’t think [he] . . . deserved to live.”
Ruiz contends the trial court erred by considering his parole hearing
testimony. We disagree and address his arguments in turn. We review the
court’s ruling on the admissibility of the evidence for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Duran (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 927–928.)
First, Ruiz argues his youthful parole hearing testimony was “coerced
and therefore per se unreliable and inadmissible.” He reasons parole
hearings are inherently coercive because they create “a strong incentive” to
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provide incriminating testimony to increase the chance of parole. We are
unpersuaded.
When deciding whether a confession is involuntary, we ask whether the
defendant was promised leniency and whether the promise motivated the
decision to confess. (People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1401.)
If the government merely encourages a person to be honest but does not
promise “some benefit beyond that which ordinarily results from being
truthful,” the confession is not involuntary. (People v. Vasila (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 865, 874.)
At the outset, we decline Ruiz’s invitation to conclude the parole
hearing process is inherently coercive and statements made at parole
hearings are per se unreliable and inadmissible. “[P]arole cannot be
conditioned on admission of guilt to a certain version of the crime.” (People v.
Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 706; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236 [“The
board shall not require an admission of guilt to any crime for which the
prisoner was committed,” and a prisoner’s refusal “to discuss the facts of the
crime . . . shall not be held against” them].) Moreover, at the parole hearing
here, Ruiz was represented by counsel, the process was explained to him, he
was sworn in, and he was encouraged to be honest. The parole board did not
promise leniency in exchange for his incriminating testimony. Given this
record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence.
Next, Ruiz contends he should have been given use immunity for his
parole hearing testimony under People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867. He
acknowledges courts have repeatedly rejected this argument, but he asks us
to forge a different path. We decline to do so.
In Coleman, the prosecution began probation revocation hearings on
grounds also underlying “independent criminal charges on which defendant
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had been held to answer but had not yet been tried.” (People v. Coleman,
supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 871.) When Coleman declined to testify at the hearing,
the trial court revoked his probation. (Ibid.) On appeal, he argued that
holding the hearing prior to trial denied him procedural due process because
he was forced to forego testifying to avoid incriminating himself at trial.
(Ibid.) In response, the California Supreme Court fashioned a “judicial rule
of evidence” — upon objection, testimony “at a probation revocation hearing
held prior to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged
violation of the conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from
such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent
proceedings on the related criminal charges.” (Id., at p. 889.)
Ruiz argues the rule in Coleman should be given equal application
here. For the reasons set forth in People v. Myles, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at
pages 704 to 706 and other opinions reaching the same conclusion, we
disagree. (People v. Duran, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 928–932; People v.
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588–590; People v. Anderson (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 81, 89–93; contra, Mitchell, at pp. 596–605 (dis. opn. of
Stratton, P. J.).)
Finally, Ruiz argues his parole hearing testimony constituted
unreliable hearsay and was therefore inadmissible. Not so. As the Attorney
General notes, Ruiz’s testimony was admissible as a party admission. (Evid.
Code, § 1220 [“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a
party”].) Nothing in that provision conditions admission of a statement on a
reliability determination. Indeed, Ruiz does not address Evidence Code
section 1220 in his opening brief, the cases he cites therein do not concern the
party admission exception to the hearsay rule, and he fails to respond to the
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Attorney General’s arguments in his reply brief. To the extent Ruiz could be
interpreted as arguing his testimony was unreliable because it was coerced,
that argument has been previously considered and rejected.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Ruiz’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
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_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P. J.
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
A167157
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