Sutherland v. Arent CA1/1 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 12/22/23 Sutherland v. Arent CA1/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    CANDYCE K. SUTHERLAND, as
    TRUSTEE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    A166632
    (Lake County
    v.                                                                     Super. Ct. Nos. PR502326 &
    BRIEN J. ARENT et al.,                                                 CV418910)
    Defendants and Appellants.
    After this court affirmed a judgment against appellants Brien Arent
    and Eva Keiser (Sutherland v. Arent (Mar. 24, 2022, A160404) [nonpub. opn.]
    (Sutherland I)), respondent Candyce Sutherland sought to recover her
    appellate costs. The trial court rejected appellants’ argument that the costs
    should be denied since the underlying judgment against them was “void.” In
    this memorandum opinion, we affirm.1
    Sutherland and Arent are siblings, and Keiser is Arent’s longtime
    partner. After Arent and Sutherland’s father died in February 2017,
    yearslong litigation about their father’s estate followed. The trial court
    1 A memorandum opinion disposes of cases that raise “no substantial
    issues of law or fact,” including appeals that raise “factual issues that are
    determined by the substantial evidence rule.” (California Standards of
    Judicial Administration, section 8.1.)
    1
    appointed Sutherland trustee over the trust that contained the property of
    Sutherland, Arent, and their other two siblings’ late parents. Sutherland
    thereafter initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against both Arent and
    Keiser to remove them from their home, which was trust property. Following
    a brief trial, the trial court denied Sutherland relief after appellants produced
    a lease agreement that purported to permit them full access to the property.
    Sutherland filed a civil suit against both appellants to cancel the lease and
    for other relief. She also filed a petition for instructions in the probate action.
    The two cases were consolidated for trial.
    Arent and Keiser have been unrepresented throughout most of these
    proceedings. Keiser testified at the bench trial on Sutherland’s claims.2 She
    also took an active role in the trial, as she made arguments to the court and
    also questioned witnesses. At one point Sutherland’s trial attorney objected
    to Keiser raising an issue relevant to the probate proceeding since Keiser was
    not a beneficiary of the trust and thus not a party. Keiser argued that since
    the trust held property where she had been living for decades she “ha[d] a
    right to speak about being evicted and being put out on the street, and that
    whether it’s the successor trustee who’s doing it or a regular landlord who is
    doing it that is not a trustee, I still have a right to address those issues.” The
    trial court allowed Keiser to question the witness at issue. Following trial,
    the trial court concluded that the lease agreement appellants had presented
    was a forgery and that both appellants had misappropriated property
    belonging to the trust, and it granted Sutherland the discretion to sell trust
    property.
    2 On its own motion, the court augments the record to include the
    reporter’s transcript from Sutherland I.
    2
    After entry of judgment, Sutherland filed a memorandum of costs in
    the trial court. At the hearing on appellants’ motion to tax costs,3 Keiser
    argued that she was being asked to pay costs for an action where she was not
    a party. The trial court observed that “[w]hen I first started hearing this
    case, I was a little confused, Ms. Keiser, as to why you were making all the
    commentary, and you insisted that you were a party to all of these things and
    therefore you weren’t practicing law without a license. You were a party, a
    defendant, et cetera. [¶] To make the argument now that somehow that’s not
    the case is difficult for this Court to see as anything but disingenuous. I was
    always confused as to why you were always in the cases, you’re listed in the
    cases . . . , and the general statement was that this affected you and you were
    a party. [¶] I have accepted that going forward, but to now make the
    argument that somehow you are not a party this, well, makes everything that
    you did look like you were trying to practice law without a license. [¶] So I’m
    going to say that that argument is not going to be considered by the Court
    because it’s just simply—it’s just simply inconsistent with what has been
    stated by you and/or Mr. Arent through the entire case.”
    In Sutherland I, this court affirmed the judgment against appellants.
    The disposition stated, “Sutherland shall recover her costs on appeal.” This
    was a reference to California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) (rule 8.278),
    which provides that a prevailing party in a civil case is entitled to costs on
    appeal. Appellants petitioned for review in the Supreme Court, but the
    petition was denied on June 22, 2022 (S274358). This court issued the
    remittitur on June 28.
    3 On its own motion, the court augments the record to include the
    reporter’s transcript from Sutherland v. Arent (June 14, 2022, A161411)
    [nonpub. opn.] (Sutherland II), which affirmed the costs award.
    3
    Within 40 days after the issuance of the remittitur (rule 8.278(c)(1)),
    Sutherland filed a memorandum of costs on appeal. She sought filing fees
    and record-preparation and copying costs, for a total of $3,950. Appellants
    filed a “Motion to Strike Costs on Appeal in its Entirety as Founded Upon a
    Void Judgment.” For the first time, they claimed that the “void judgment”
    against them was “replete with jurisdictional defects [that] affected the[ir]
    procedural due process rights.” Apparently they contended that since Keiser
    was not a beneficiary of the trust at issue and was not a party to the probate
    proceeding, the single judgment entered in the consolidated action was void.
    Appellants’ motion did not include any objection to the amounts set forth in
    Sutherland’s memorandum of costs.
    At the hearing on the motion, Keiser acknowledged that she was a
    party to the civil action but argued that the civil and probate actions required
    two separate judgments, and that the single judgment entered was thus void.
    The trial court denied the motion to strike costs on appeal, stating that “[i]t’s
    simply not the right motion for what’s trying to be accomplished, especially
    since there is something about the judgment and it’s been on appeal already
    [and] . . . the motion itself just doesn’t make any sense.” Keiser and Arent
    appealed.
    Nowhere in appellants’ opening brief do they argue that the amount
    Sutherland was awarded for her appellate costs was excessive. Instead, they
    contend that the judgment entered against them in Sutherland I was “void”
    since it was “replete with jurisdictional defects.” In a section of their brief
    that includes no citations to the record, appellants suggest that Keiser lacked
    proper notice of the proceedings below, when the overwhelming evidence from
    Sutherland I and Sutherland II is to the contrary. In another section of the
    4
    opening brief that likewise lacks record citations, appellants appear to attack
    the judgment that this court already upheld in Sutherland I.
    Appellants’ reliance on Moore v. Kaufman (2010) 
    189 Cal.App.4th 604
    is entirely misplaced. There, the court concluded that a judgment was void
    as to an attorney, but not her client, since the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit
    against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) does not
    authorize an award of attorney fees against a nonparty attorney. (Moore at
    pp. 607, 615.) Here, there is nothing whatsoever to suggest the Sutherland I
    judgment is void.
    The order denying the motion to strike costs on appeal is affirmed.
    Sutherland shall recover her costs on appeal. (Rule 8.278(a)(1).)
    5
    _________________________
    Humes, P.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Banke, J.
    _________________________
    Getty, J.*
    *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Solano, assigned by the
    Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    Sutherland v. Arent A166632
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A166632

Filed Date: 12/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/22/2023