People v. Pickard CA2/4 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Pickard CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
    opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324268
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. LA009272
    v.
    STEVEN RAY PICKARD,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Affirmed.
    John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 1992, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
    amended information charging defendant and appellant Steven
    Ray Pickard with various offenses, including murder. (Pen Code,1
    § 187, subd. (a).) The amended information alleged the special
    circumstance that Pickard committed the murder while fleeing
    from having committed burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The jury
    convicted Pickard of evading a peace officer in a manner
    proximately causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3)
    and second degree commercial burglary (§ 459), but could not
    reach a verdict on the murder count and special circumstance
    allegation. The trial court declared a mistrial. Upon retrial, a jury
    convicted Pickard of first degree murder and found the special
    circumstance allegation true. The court sentenced Pickard to life
    without the possibility of parole.
    In 2021, Pickard filed a petition for resentencing under
    former section 1170.95.2 The trial court appointed counsel on
    Pickard’s behalf. The prosecution filed a response to Pickard’s
    petition, and Pickard’s counsel filed a responsive brief arguing
    Pickard had made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.
    1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
    Code.
    2      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
    section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
    There were no substantive changes to the statute. For the sake of
    simplicity, we will refer to the statute by its new code section.
    That section provides relief for certain individuals convicted of
    murder under the felony murder rule, natural and probable
    consequence doctrine, or any other theory of imputed-malice
    liability. (See § 1172.6.)
    2
    After hearing argument, the trial court denied Pickard
    relief, concluding although Pickard was convicted of murder
    under a felony murder theory, the record demonstrated as a
    matter of law he was the actual killer.
    Pickard timely appealed, and we appointed counsel to
    represent him. On May 22, 2023, appellate counsel filed a brief
    raising no issues and requesting discretionary independent
    review of the record under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 
    14 Cal.5th 216
    .
    On July 17, 2023, Pickard filed a supplemental appellant’s
    brief as a self-represented party. In his supplemental brief,
    Pickard admits: “Appellant was the driver of a vehicle which
    during a [p]olice pursuit from a traffic stop, struck another
    vehicle which crossed in front of [a]ppellant’s vehicle, causing the
    vehicle to flip [ ] numerous times, striking and killing Ms. Reyna
    Martinez-Duarte, a[n] innocent bystander sitting on a [b]us
    [b]ench.”
    DISCUSSION
    Pickard’s concession is dispositive. (See, e.g., Gelfo v.
    Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 
    140 Cal.App.4th 34
    , 48 [“A judicial
    admission is a party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a
    matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case.”].)
    Although section 1172.6 provides relief for certain individuals
    convicted under the felony murder rule, that relief does not
    extend to individuals who were the actual killer. (See § 189, subd.
    (e)(1) [actual killers still liable for felony murder under current
    law]; People v. Lewis (2021) 
    11 Cal.5th 952
    , 959 [section 1172.6
    relief extends to convicted murderers who could not be convicted
    under current law, but does not extend to actual killers].)
    Because Pickard’s concession that he was the actual killer
    3
    conclusively demonstrates as a matter of law he is ineligible for
    relief, we reject his various arguments that he is entitled to relief
    based on due process principles or recently-enacted changes to
    the felony murder rule under section 1172.6.
    In addition to rejecting the arguments Pickard raised in his
    supplemental brief, we have exercised our discretion to
    independently review the record, and we conclude no arguable
    issues exist in light of Pickard’s concession that he was the actual
    killer. (See People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying relief is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    CURREY, P. J.
    We concur:
    COLLINS, J.
    ZUKIN, J.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B324268

Filed Date: 12/22/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/23/2023