In re K.M. ( 2024 )

Filed 6/3/24; Certified for Publication 6/20/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re K.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________
THE PEOPLE,
A168834
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Mendocino County
v. Super. Ct. No. 23JD0004301)
K.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In this proceeding, the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that
K.M. possessed a folding knife on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 626.10,
subd. (a)(1); undesignated statutory references are to this code.) K.M. was
barely 13 years old at the time of the incident. On appeal, he argues the
prosecution did not prove — and the evidence does not support an implied
finding — that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of
the incident. We agree and reverse the court’s order.
BACKGROUND
In December 2022, a student at Pomilita Middle School reported K.M.
was “vaping in the bathroom.” A campus supervisor took K.M. to the
principal’s office, and K.M. consented to a search of his backpack. The
principal found two vape pens — one for marijuana and the other for
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nicotine — and a folding knife with two rusted blades, each approximately
three inches long. A few hours later, the principal received a report that
K.M. threatened another student with the knife earlier in the day. A
responding police officer interviewed the students involved, confiscated the
knife, and issued K.M. a citation for brandishing a knife and for possession of
a knife on school grounds.
In March 2023, the prosecution filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602, subd. (a)) alleging K.M. brought a weapon — a folding knife —
onto school property (§ 626.10, subd. (a)(1); count one) and brandished the
knife (§ 417, subd. (a)(1); count two). In August 2023, the juvenile court held
a contested jurisdictional hearing at which the principal and the police officer
who issued the citation testified. Ultimately, the court found K.M. committed
count one and designated the offense a felony, and it dismissed count two for
insufficient evidence. On the form containing the court’s findings and orders,
the box indicating the court had found “[c]lear proof the minor knew his/her
action was wrong” was not checked.
The next month, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing. K.M.’s
counsel sought to have the matter reduced to a misdemeanor since K.M. was
doing well at his new school, helped his mother with his four siblings, and
had never been in trouble before. Counsel also argued K.M. did not know he
was breaking any rules when he had the knife at school because his father
told him the knife was legal. In response, the prosecution stated the
elements of the charge were met regardless of “whether he knew that having
a knife on school grounds was or was not illegal.” In its ruling, the court
concluded K.M. would benefit from juvenile probation based on the probation
report and acknowledged he was “really intelligent.” The court also stated it
would not be appropriate for it to comment on K.M.’s belief that the knife was
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legal. It declared K.M. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602 and placed him on probation for six months with various
terms and conditions.
DISCUSSION
Section 26 creates a presumption that a child under the age of 14 is
incapable of committing a crime unless the prosecution can show by “clear
and convincing evidence that the child understood the wrongfulness of the
charged act at the time of its commission.” (In re J.E. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th
309, 313 (J.E.).) “Courts consider the age, experience, knowledge and
conduct of a minor to determine whether [he] understood the wrongfulness of
[his] conduct. [Citation.] Knowledge of wrongfulness cannot be inferred from
the offense itself, but the court may consider ‘the attendant circumstances of
the crime, such as its preparation, the particular method of its commission,
and its concealment.’ ” (J.E., at p. 314.) A finding of capacity under section
26 “is a prerequisite to an adjudication of wardship.” (In re Manuel L. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 229, 236.)
An implied finding of capacity under section 26 is reviewed for
substantial evidence. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378–379; J.E.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 313.) “Substantial evidence is ‘evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of
proof.’ ” (J.E., at p. 313.) When reviewing a finding made under the clear
and convincing evidence standard, we review the entire record to determine
whether it contains “substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) We “view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how
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the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved
conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011–1012.) “ ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or
exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient
facts to support the findings of the trial court.’ ” (J.E., at p. 314.)
K.M. argues there is no clear and convincing evidence he understood
the wrongfulness of possessing a knife on school grounds. We agree. As an
initial matter, the juvenile court did not explicitly determine K.M. had the
capacity to be held legally responsible for his conduct. The court did not
check the box indicating it had found “[c]lear proof the minor knew his/her
action was wrong.” Moreover, at the dispositional hearing, the court said it
would be inappropriate to “comment on” K.M.’s belief — due to what his
father had told him — the knife was legal. No testimony addressed K.M.’s
understanding that it was wrong to bring a knife to school, nor was there
evidence he had previously been in trouble for similar issues such that one
could infer he knew it was wrong. (J.E., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 315
[evidence minor was taught act was wrong at school or at home supported
finding she was aware of the wrongfulness of her conduct].) Indeed, the
prosecution argued the allegation could be sustained “whether [K.M.] knew
that having a knife on school grounds was or was not illegal.”
Nor do the attendant circumstances of the offense support an implicit
finding of capacity. There was no preparation for or particular method to
K.M.’s conduct suggesting he knew it was wrong. There was evidence he told
the principal that he didn’t “have anything” in his backpack before it
was searched despite it containing the vape pens and knife. (J.E., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 314.) The prosecution contends this statement supports
an inference that K.M. knew having the knife at school was wrong. K.M.
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responds that he was not hiding the knife but simply storing it with all his
other belongings; moreover, he notes he consented to the search, which he
would not have done had he known the knife was forbidden. Either way,
even considering this statement in the light most favorable to the judgment,
we find it falls short of the substantial evidence necessary for the juvenile
court to “have found it highly probable” that K.M. understood the
wrongfulness of his conduct. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 1011–1012.)
The other evidence relied upon by the prosecution is similarly
unavailing. First, the prosecution contends K.M.’s age makes it more likely
that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his act. K.M. turned 13 years old one
month before the incident. “But the capacity determination requires a trial
court to consider the particular circumstances and perspective of the
individual child before it, rather than to rely on generalizations about what
children of a certain age should know.” (J.E., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 314–315.) Moreover, to give independent weight to K.M.’s age is in
tension with the Legislature selecting the age of 14 as the threshold age for
capacity.
Second, the prosecution contends the juvenile court’s finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that K.M. committed the offense necessarily entails a
finding of capacity. Not so. Section 626.10, subdivision (a)(1) is a general
intent crime,1 so the court’s determination did not include a finding of
criminal intent. (J.E., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 314 [“Knowledge of
wrongfulness cannot be inferred from the offense itself”].)
1 “Any person, except a duly appointed peace officer . . . , who brings or
possesses any . . . knife having a blade longer than 2 1/2 inches . . . , upon the
grounds of, or within, any public or private school . . . is guilty of a public
offense.” (§ 626.10, subd. (a)(1).)
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Third, the prosecution argues the juvenile court’s acknowledgment that
K.M. is “really intelligent” supports an inference that he understood the
wrongfulness of his conduct. The court, however, made that statement at the
dispositional hearing — not the jurisdictional hearing — and it is therefore
irrelevant. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 739 [appellate courts
“review the correctness of the trial court’s ruling at the time it was
made, . . . and not by reference to evidence produced at a later date”].)
Moreover, that a child under the age of 14 is described as intelligent does not
demonstrate that they knew something was wrongful. Indeed, “children ‘are
more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including
from their family and peers.” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.)
Based on the statements at the dispositional hearing, K.M. may have
honestly believed it was lawful to have the knife with him at school based on
his father’s misrepresentation. At least, no evidence to the contrary was
presented.
Finally, the prosecution argues K.M.’s appreciation of the illegality of
his conduct is distinct from his awareness of its wrongfulness. Here,
however, the conduct’s wrongfulness and legality cannot be so easily
separated. Possessing a knife — that may have innocent uses — on school
grounds appears to be wrongful because it is illegal or otherwise violates
school rules; at least, the prosecution does not persuade us otherwise.
Moreover, even if K.M. need not have appreciated the illegality of his conduct
in order for the allegation to have been sustained, section 26 required a
finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. (J.E., supra,
54 Cal.App.5th at p. 313.) Substantial evidence does not support such a
finding.
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On this record, we find insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s implied finding that K.M. understood the wrongfulness of bringing a
knife onto school property at the time of the incident.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A168834
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Filed 6/20/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re K.M., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________
THE PEOPLE,
A168834
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Mendocino County
v. Super. Ct. No. 23JD0004301)
K.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT :
*
The opinion in this appeal, filed on June 3, 2024, was not certified for
publication in the Official Reports. For good cause appearing, pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b) and (c), the opinion is certified for
publication. Accordingly, Pacific Juvenile Defender Center’s request for
publication is GRANTED.
The order effects no change in the judgment.
Dated: 6/20/2024 ____/Tucher, P.J.____________________, P. J.
* Tucher, P. J., Petrou, J., and Rodríguez, J. participated in the
decision.
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Superior Court of Mendocino County, Hon. Ann C. Moorman.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Donna M.
Provenzano and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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