People v. Langi CA1/5 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/26/23 P. v. Langi CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166549
v.
JOHN KATOA LANGI, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. 19NF012245A)
John Katoa Langi pled no contest to one count of possessing
an assault weapon. This appeal challenges the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence seized after what he asserts was an
invalid search of his house and garage. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Langi was on medical leave from his job when he turned up
at his workplace around midnight carrying a golf club. A
coworker asked why he had the club; he replied, “ ‘because I can’t
have my guns.’ ”
Langi was still on the premises in his parked pickup truck
when his employer, Daniel Yongue, arrived later that morning,
but he left when he saw Yongue. Concerned about the incident,
Yongue called 911 to request a welfare check on Langi at his
home. Corporal Brian Blake and Officer Nielson were dispatched
to the residence at about 11:00 a.m.
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Langi’s pickup truck and an SUV were parked in the
driveway when the officers arrived. Beyond the driveway, a gate
to a front breezeway and the home’s front door were both open.
There was a leashed dog on the front porch. Corporal Blake
approached the front door while Officer Nielson stayed in the
driveway watching the second story windows for signs of
movement.
Corporal Blake tried to contact the home’s inhabitants by
loudly announcing “ ‘knock, knock’ ” from four or five feet away
and “calling to any residents from just in front of this gate[d] area
through into the door.” He could hear a television or radio from
inside, and items he could see in the breezeway and inside
indicated there were people home.
While Blake was trying to contact the house’s inhabitants,
Officer Nielson spotted two guns in plain view on the floorboard
of Langi’s pickup truck. The truck’s windows were rolled down
enough to reach inside. Both guns appeared to be Glock-style
handguns, and an illegal extended magazine, loaded, protruded
from one of them.
Corporal Blake notified dispatch and asked for additional
officers to “help establish a. . . game plan” to handle the situation
safely. He was concerned about the firearms and the report of a
disgruntled employee “with possibly some mental health issues or
other medical issues” showing up at work while on leave and
talking about bringing guns to the workplace. Moreover, Blake
did not know who was in the house or “what type of crime scene
[it might be] or if we had injured or possibly hostages inside;” the
front doors were open; and the officers’ numerous attempts to
contact Langi and his wife by phone had gone unanswered.
According to Blake, “it definitely caused us concern as maybe we
had a killed family inside or a suicidal person or it just - - as time
progressed, I became more curious and concerned.” Of yet
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further concern, the house was within about 100 yards of an
elementary school.
Eventually another 10 to 14 officers arrived at the site, out
of “what we call an abundance of caution; some for traffic control
while we tried to establish contact in the home.” Officers shut
down the street to vehicle and pedestrian traffic, called for an
armored vehicle, and advised the school to shelter in place.
Other officers established a perimeter and watched the house for
“alarms or anyone coming out.”
The officers were unable to contact anyone in the house for
an hour and ten minutes. At that point, a Lieutenant Kallas
finally reached Langi’s wife by phone. Ms. Langi then came
outside, where she spoke with Blake and told him she understood
(from Kallas) the police were there to check on her husband and
anyone else in the home. She told him that her two sons and her
mother were in the house and that Langi was sleeping in the
garage.
Ms. Langi gave the officers permission to retrieve the guns
from Langi’s truck. As an officer did so, the car alarm triggered.
At that point, Ms. Langi’s sons and mother came out of the front
door, and Mr. Langi emerged from a side door and was arrested.
An officer searched him and found a paper packet containing
what appeared to be narcotics. After the officers retrieved the
guns, they found that one had a serial number and was
registered to Langi, while the other, the loaded gun with the
extended magazine, had neither a serial number nor a registered
owner.
The officers immediately entered the house to conduct a
one- or two-minute protective sweep of the house and garage.
Blake did not know who ordered the sweep. The department
typically conducted them when they were “looking for people;
whether victims, bodies or anyone injured or any threats, anyone
hiding. Merely, as far as a safety aspect, to make sure . . . that
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we have everyone in the house” and to protect the officers against
an “ambush-type scenario.” He was not surprised a sweep was
ordered considering Langi’s appearance at work, his mention of
guns, the guns in his truck, the vague workplace threat, the
uncertainty about Langi’s mental state, and the open door and
noise from within the house but no actual people responding to
the officers for more than an hour. He described the situation as
“eerie” and was worried about what sort of “planning” might be
happening inside the house during the apparent standoff.
After the protective sweep established no safety threat,
most of the officers left the scene.
Two officers who performed the sweep informed Blake they
had seen assault rifle ammunition scattered in the garage. Blake
told Ms. Langi about the ammunition, asked if she was aware of
any assault rifles in the home, and asked permission to search
the garage for illegal weapons. Ms. Langi said she did not think
there were rifles in the house and initially said she preferred that
the officers obtain a search warrant but ultimately agreed to the
search.
Corporal Blake found a .223-caliber AR-15-type assault
rifle, a Tec-9 .9-millimeter assault rifle, another Glock extended
magazine, two unregistered semi-automatic shotguns, and an
unregistered .22-caliber semi-automatic rifle mounted on a wall
in the “very cluttered” garage. One of the guns was confirmed to
be stolen. A subsequent search revealed additional guns and
ammunition in a washing machine, between two mattresses, on
top of a refrigerator, and in a container in the garage.
Langi was charged with one felony count of carrying a
loaded firearm in his vehicle and two felony counts of possessing
an assault weapon. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the
evidence found in his truck, garage, and home, he pled no contest
to one count of possessing an assault weapon pursuant to a
negotiated plea. The court dismissed the remaining charges.
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DISCUSSION
Langi contends the court erred in refusing to suppress the
evidence found in his home and garage because the facts known
to the officers when they conducted the protective sweep fell short
of the standard established in Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S.
325 (Buie). Reviewing the trial court’s express and implied
factual findings for substantial evidence and exercising our
independent judgment to determine whether the sweep was
reasonable on those facts (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1206, 1212), we disagree.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, police must obtain a warrant before conducting a
search or seizure unless an exception to the warrant requirement
applies. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125-
126.) Where a defendant challenges the lawfulness of a search or
seizure, the People must produce proof sufficient to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that one of those exceptions
applies. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939.)
The protective sweep doctrine is one such exception. In
Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 327, the United States Supreme Court
established the legal standard for a protective sweep, a limited
police search of premises designed to ensure officer safety. The
court noted that “the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable
searches and seizures,” and that the determination of
reasonableness depends on a balancing of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment interests against the law enforcement action’s
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (Id. at p. 331.)
The court explained that, like a Terry stop and frisk (Terry
v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1) and the preventative search of an
automobile for weapons during a roadside encounter (Michigan v.
Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032), a protective sweep conducted without
a warrant or probable cause complies with the Fourth
Amendment if there are “articulable facts which, taken together
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with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene.” (Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 331-333, 334.) This
“reasonable suspicion” standard, “ ‘one of the relatively simple
concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment,’ . . . strikes the
proper balance between officer safety and citizen privacy.” (Id. at
p. 334, fn. 2.) It is not a “ ‘finely-tuned standard[],’ comparable to
the standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence,” but rather a “fluid concept[]” that
takes its substantive content from the concrete factual
circumstances of each individual case. (Ornelas v. United States
(1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696.)
The high court has thus repeatedly held that courts
assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion must evaluate the
totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis to see
whether the officers had a ‘ “particularized and objective basis’ ”
for their suspicion. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266,
273.) This process allows officers on the scene “to draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to
them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” (Ibid.)
Concomitantly, the high court has criticized lower court decisions
precluding police from relying on facts consistent with an
innocent as well as a guilty explanation if the circumstances and
their expertise so warrant. (Id., at pp. 274-276; United States v.
Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 9-10.)
Finally, we must be mindful of the requirement that the
government point to specific facts and reasonable inferences that
a building may harbor a dangerous person. (Compare People v.
Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679-680 (Celis) [police had no
particularized facts suggesting a dangerous person was inside
house] and People v. Chen (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 952, 956 [same]
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with People v. Ledesma (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857, 865-867
(Ledesma) [cars parked near residence used for suspected drug
dealing suggested presence of potentially dangerous person].)
Any building could, theoretically, contain a dangerous person.
The risk must be based on particularized facts, not an abstract
possibility or a mere hunch, to ensure that sweeps are not
permitted as a matter of course in derogation of the Fourth
Amendment. (United States v. Carter (10th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3d
1235, 1242-1243.)
Applying these principles, we conclude the protective sweep
in this case complied with the Fourth Amendment. As Corporal
Blake aptly said, it was an eerie situation—a puzzling, silent
standoff, during which the officers were legitimately concerned
that the occupants in the house may be planning an ambush.
(See United States v. Winston (1st Cir. 2006) 444 F.3d 115, 117-
119 (Winston) [sweep justified when suspect's girlfriend briefly
misdirected police, creating five-minute delay that may have
given suspect time to prepare ambush].) The officers had found
guns, at least one of them loaded and illegal, in Langi’s parked
truck. The house appeared to be occupied—the front door was
open; the officers could hear sounds from inside; and multiple
vehicles were parked in the driveway and front of the house. (See
Ledesma, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp.864-866.) Langi had
made the bizarre reference to guns at work, prompting his
employer and the police to be concerned about his mental state.
No one responded to the officers’ calls or appeared anywhere—for
more than an hour, in the middle of the day—despite the cars
parked outside and the sounds coming from within. Indeed, the
department was so concerned that it warned the nearby school to
shelter in place. When Ms. Langi eventually emerged from the
home, she confirmed that there were other people in the home. A
two-minute protective sweep of the residence and garage was
both reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and prudent.
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Langi disagrees. He argues there was no evidence his
elderly mother-in-law or juvenile sons posed a danger to the
officers or bystanders, or that there were other people in the
home. While that ultimately turned out to be the case, courts
may not second-guess the reasonable determinations made by
police officers in potentially dangerous and rapidly developing
circumstances. (United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675,
686–687.) Although Ms. Langi’s explanation was reassuring, the
officers were not required to accept it (see People v. Ovieda (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043 (Ovieda), particularly given the long delay,
the guns, the facts indicating the presence of people inside the
house, and the other reasons for concern discussed above. (See
United States v. Thompson (8th Cir. 2021) 6 F.4th 789, 793
[sweep justified in part by delay responding to police and other
suspicious behavior]; Winston, supra, 444 F.3d at pp. 118-119.)1
Langi relies heavily on his claim that the officers were
informed before the sweep that the report of his threatening
comment at work had proven unsubstantiated. The record tells a
different story. Langi’s claim rests on Corporal Blake’s testimony
that he was told prior to the sweep that “there wasn’t any
criminal wants [sic] for him” resulting from the workplace
incident.2 The point is of little significance here; whether or not
1Langi does not contend—and thus forfeits the argument—
that Buie does not allow police to sweep a home when they arrest
a person outside the home. (See Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp.
678-679 [flagging the issue]; United States v. Banks (10th Cir.
2018) 884 F.3d 998, 1014-1015 [agreeing with other circuit courts
that there is no categorical bar to Buie sweeps when the arrest is
outside].) The situation here suggested a risk to officers outside
the house—e.g., a person shooting through a window.
2 In full, the relevant cross-examination was as follows. “Q.
So prior to Mr. Langi or Ms. Langi exiting the residence, you had
spoken to Lieutenant Kallas and he confirmed that there were no
criminal threats or crimes that had occurred at Mr. Langi’s
workplace. Is that correct? [¶] A. No. I don’t believe I actually
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the incident resulted in a decision to issue a warrant, Langi’s
comment about bringing guns to work and the firearms in his
truck were enough to raise a reasonable concern about the safety
of officers and others.
Langi also misconstrues Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
1044, which he says stands for the proposition that “an exigent
circumstances analysis is appropriate in determining whether a
protective sweep was justified.” It does not. (See ibid.) To the
contrary, the Court has expressly stated that “unlike warrantless
entry into a house based on exigent circumstances,” which “must
be supported by probable cause,” a Buie sweep “can be justified
merely by a reasonable suspicion that the area to be swept
harbors a dangerous person.” (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 678.)
Considering the totality of circumstances, we conclude the
brief inspection of the garage and house was a valid Buie sweep.
We therefore do not address Langi’s further contentions that the
sweep was not justified under the community caretaking doctrine
or as a consensual search.
personally spoke with Lieutenant Kallas. I believe that
information was relayed - - again, with the nature of the call and
now the amount of officers on scene, I don’t know who exactly or
how that relay of info would have transpired, but I was informed
or aware that there was no - - I was updated essentially that
there was no criminal want [sic] [¶] . . .[ ¶] . . . for him, based on
what had happened. . . . [¶] Q. Okay. [¶] So it was relayed to you
and you were updated while you were waiting on scene that there
were - - essentially, there was no wants [sic] for Mr. Langi
because of any crime that had occurred at the workplace? [¶] A.
Yeah - - yes. I think the - - I mean, once we had [Ms. Langi] on
the phone, she actually very quickly came outside. So I don’t
know if there was a relay of info in that. Based on his extended
conversation with the reporting party, we knew that there wasn’t
any criminal wants [sic] for him, yes, at the workplace.”
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Langi (A166549)
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