People v. Mendoza CA4/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 12/28/23 P. v. Mendoza CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081440
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD290697)
NAHUM MENDOZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel B. Goldstein, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick Morgan Ford, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Nahum Mendoza appeals a trial court order requiring him to register
as a sex offender for a violation of Penal Code section 261.5, subdivision (d).1
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
On appeal, Mendoza contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
requiring him to register because the court failed to make a finding that the
offense was the product of sexual compulsion or gratification.
First, we conclude that Mendoza did not forfeit his argument because
he raised the registration requirements sufficiently before the trial court.
However, we determine that the trial court sufficiently set forth its analysis
in support of its implied finding that the offense was committed as a result of
sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. We therefore affirm
the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 7, 2022, Mendoza pled guilty to one count of unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age, a felony. (§ 261.5, subd. (d).)
In his plea form, he stated, “I had sexual intercourse w/ a woman before her
18th birthday. I was 24 years old at that time. The woman was under 16.”
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At his sentencing hearing, Mendoza asked the court to decline to order
sex offender registration, contrary to the recommendation of the probation
office and the prosecutor. After discussion, the court found that discretionary
sex offender registration was proper, noting, “It’s a relationship that the
defendant is 24—we’ll give him the benefit of the doubt—she was 16. Okay.
Res ipsa, I mean, it is lewd and lascivious on its face, right?” Mendoza
appeals.
DISCUSSION
The Penal Code allows for the court to require registration as to certain
sex offenders. (§ 290 et seq.) For defendants convicted of statutorily
specified sex offenses, the registration requirement is mandatory (§ 290,
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subd. (c)). Mendoza’s conviction is not among the statutorily required
offenses.
A registration order is discretionary for a defendant convicted of any
other offense. (§ 290.006.) Section 290.006, subd. (a) provides that “[a]ny
person ordered by any court to register pursuant to the act, who is not
required to register pursuant to Section 290, shall so register, if the court
finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the
offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual
gratification. The court shall state on the record the reasons for its findings
and the reasons for requiring registration.” Thus, the statute allows a court
to impose the discretionary registration requirement if (1) the court finds that
the defendant “committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for
purposes of sexual gratification,” and (2) the court states on the record
reasons for its findings and for requiring sex offender registration.
Mendoza contends that the court abused its discretion “by failing to
make the individualized findings required by section 290.006(a).”
A. Forfeiture
The People contend that Mendoza has forfeited his sole argument on
appeal, namely that the court failed to make the required findings under
§ 290.006, because he did not ask the court to do so at the time of sentencing.
The California Supreme Court has held “that the waiver doctrine
should apply to claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are
cases in which . . . the court purportedly erred because it . . . failed to state
any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.” (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) As the Court explained, “[a]lthough the court is
required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with
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understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at
the hearing. Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily
prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Ibid.)
Here, in discussion during Mendoza’s sentencing hearing, Mendoza’s
counsel challenged the court’s conclusion that there was a basis to impose
discretionary registration, arguing that the court’s analysis amounted to
strict liability for the offense, i.e., that “in every statutory rape case, by
definition, there’s going to be the sexual component to it.” The court
countered that other factors could come into play, such as the subsequent
marriage of the parties, or a smaller age difference, or “the victim is here
telling me” her view on registration.2
We conclude that Mendoza did not waive the issue simply because his
counsel did not make a specific request for the court to use language that
precisely tracked the statute. The court’s position was clear, and there was
nothing for Mendoza’s trial counsel to gain by insisting on the court’s
recitation of the statutory language. It cannot be said that Mendoza failed to
adequately raise in the trial court the issue we now consider.
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
registration
A trial court’s decision to exercise its discretion to require sex offender
registration pursuant to section 290.006 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Eastman (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 638, 648-650.) An
appellate court will not interfere with a discretionary ruling unless it finds
that the trial judge “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
2 The victim, who by the time of sentencing was an adult, chose not to
appear at the sentencing hearing.
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patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
(People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.)
“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court
‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Thomas
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) These principles apply to the court’s sentencing
decisions. (See People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496-497
[presumption of correctness of court’s decision and regularity of judicial
exercises of discretion apply to sentencing issues].)
Here, the record reflects that the court was well aware of the
registration law, including recent changes to the tier system for assessing the
duration of the registration requirement. Further, both the probation report
and the People’s sentencing memorandum discussed the relevant standard
for discretionary registration.
In the instant case, we conclude that the trial court adequately
satisfied the requirements of section 290.006, even though it did not recite
the provisions of the statute in its ruling (i.e., that the offense was committed
as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification).
Twice during the sentencing hearing, in discussing the registration
issue, the court noted that the offense was “lewd and lascivious” “on its face”
Under section 188, the offense of lewd and lascivious acts requires “the intent
of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires” of
perpetrator or victim. By making reference to lewd and lascivious conduct,
the court could only have been referencing its conclusion that the offense was
committed for purposes of gratifying sexual desires, i.e., for purposes of
sexual gratification.
Further, the issue was squarely presented and discussed by the parties
and the court at sentencing, and the court’s comments made it clear that the
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court had concluded that Mendoza’s conduct met the factual prerequisites for
discretionary sex offender registration. (Cf. People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th
629, 691, fn. 17 [although the court did not state its findings on the record, it
nevertheless “impliedly—but sufficiently” made a true finding on a
sentencing allegation].)
Because the trial court adequately complied with the two-step inquiry
set forth in section 290.006 and its findings and reasons for requiring
registration are supported by the record, the court did not act in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing registration pursuant to section 290.006.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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