Pacific Manufactured Homes v. M. A. Cirillo & Associates CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/5/24 Pacific Manufactured Homes v. M. A. Cirillo & Associates CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PACIFIC MANUFACTURED HOMES D080931
et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
v.
00047554-CU-OR-NC)
M.A. CIRILLO & ASSOCIATES et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and Christopher B. Queally, for
Defendants and Appellants.
Winet Patrick Gayer Creighton & Hanes and Randall L. Winet, for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
After concluding at trial that a mobilehome park management company
had violated laws intended to protect tenants and prospective tenants, the
trial court issued a judgment enjoining the company from engaging in certain
business practices. The company concedes it violated the law, but argues
that imposition of an injunction was error because the evidence did not
support an inference that, at the time of trial, its unlawful conduct was
ongoing or likely to recur. We disagree. Hence we affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Mobilehomes, Mobilehome Parks and the Mobilehome
Residency Law
To supply context for this appeal, we begin with a brief introduction to
the topic of mobilehomes, mobilehome parks and mobilehome park regulation
in California, commencing with an observation that the term “mobilehome” is
a misnomer:
“The term ‘mobile home’ is somewhat misleading. Mobile
homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because
the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the
value of the mobile home itself. They are generally placed
permanently in parks; [and,] once in place, only about 1 in
every 100 mobile homes is ever moved.”
(Yee v. City of Escondido (1992) 503 U.S. 519, 523, italics added (Yee); see also
People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th
102, 109 (Kennedy).)
“Ordinarily, mobilehome park tenants own their homes but rent the
spaces they occupy.” (Kennedy, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 109; see also
Yee, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 523.).) Whereas the “park owner provides private
roads within the park, common facilities such as washing machines or a
swimming pool, and often utilities” (Yee, at p. 523), the “mobile home owner
often invests in site-specific improvements such as a driveway, steps,
walkways, porches, or landscaping.” (Ibid.) “Rents paid by mobilehome
residents cover park amenities, park common areas, and maintenance of in-
park infrastructure like roads and fences, and, in addition to rents, residents
are still responsible for making other payments just like other homeowners,
2
including paying mortgages and taxes, as well as making payments for
repairs and maintenance.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 125 (Assem. Bill No. 978), § 1(h)
adding Civ. Code § 798.30.5.) “When the mobile home owner wishes to move,
the mobile home is usually sold in place, and the purchaser continues to rent
the pad on which the mobile home is located.” (Yee, supra, 503 U.S. at
p. 523.)
“In California, mobilehome tenancies are governed by the Mobilehome
Residency Law” (Kennedy, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 109), a body of
legislation originally enacted in 1978 (Yee, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 523) that is
codified at Civil Code section 798 et seq.1 and commonly known as the MRL.
This body of law has been described as “extensively regulat[ing] the landlord-
tenant relationship between mobilehome park owners and residents” in the
state. (Greening v. Johnson (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1226.)
As our colleagues in the Sixth District have noted, “the singular nature
of mobilehome tenancies [renders] mobilehome park tenants . . . particularly
vulnerable . . . to eviction.” (Kennedy, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 109.)
Thus a chief purpose of the MRL, and a public policy of the state of
California, is to “protect[] mobilehome owners against arbitrary evictions.”
(Ibid.) “The Legislature finds and declares that . . . it is necessary that the
owners of mobilehomes occupied within mobilehome parks be provided with
the unique protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by the
[MRL].” (§ 798.55(a).)
Among the ways in which the MRL achieves the Legislature’s objective
of furnishing protection to mobilehome owners in the eviction context is by
prohibiting mobilehome park managers from: evicting a mobilehome owner
1 Unless stated otherwise, all further statutory references are to the Civil
Code.
3
on less than 60 days notice (§ 798.55, subd. (b)(1)); evicting a mobilehome
owner without disclosing to them “the date, place, witnesses, and
circumstances concerning [the] reason” for the eviction (§ 798.57); evicting a
mobilehome owner for the purpose of making the site occupied by that
owner’s mobilehome available to the park owner or its agent so that they can
sell or rent a mobilehome on that site to somebody else (§ 798.58, italics
added); or evicting a mobilehome owner for any number of other purposes
that are not among those set forth on a list of approved purposes set forth in
the MRL. (§§ 798.56, 798.58.)2)
In addition to protections such as these that apply in the eviction
context, the MRL also protects a mobilehome owner and a prospective
purchaser when the owner is attempting to sell their mobilehome and the
prospective purchaser is applying to be a resident in the mobilehome park in
which the mobilehome is situated. In a situation such as this, the MRL
mandates that the manager of the park is prohibited from: taking more than
15 days to accept or reject the prospective purchaser’s residency application
(§ 798.74, subd. (e)(1)); rejecting the prospective purchaser as a tenant other
than for one or more of three specific reasons, delineated in the Civil Code,
that pertain to non-compliance with park rules and regulations, insufficient
finances, or dishonesty in the application process (id., subd. (c)); failing to
2 The reasons for termination that are contained in section 798.56
pertain generally to: non-compliance with a local ordinance or state law or
regulation relating to mobilehomes (§ 798.56, subd. (a)); conduct that
constitutes “a substantial annoyance” to other homeowners or residents (id.,
subd. (b)); certain criminal conduct (id., subd. (c)); non-compliance with park
rules made a part of the rental agreement (id., subd. (d)); non-payment of
rent, utility charges, or reasonable incidental service charges (id., subd (e));
condemnation of the park (id., subd. (f)); and a change of use of part or all of
the park (id., subd. (g)).
4
disclose the reason why a prospective purchaser’s residency application is
being rejected (id., subd. (e)(2)(A)); or, except in certain limited
circumstances, requiring that the mobilehome be removed pending the sale.
(§ 798.73.)
With these aspects of the MRL in mind, we now turn to the mobilehome
park with which this case originated.
B. Lamplighter Park and Events Pertaining to Space 353
The mobilehome park with which this case originated is a 161-space,
rent-controlled mobilehome community located in Oceanside and named B&B
Lamplighter Mobilehome Park (Lamplighter Park). For most of the past 25
years, Lamplighter Park has been owned by B&B Lamplighter Oceanside
Mobilehome Park, LLC (B&B) and managed by M. A. Cirillo & Associates
dba Star Mobilehome Park Management (Star).
Among the park’s tenants at the start of 2017 was Gerard Schultz.
Schultz had been a tenant of the park, and his mobilehome had occupied
space 35 in the park for 28 years. Later in 2017 Schultz moved to the state of
Georgia and engaged a realtor to list his mobilehome for sale.
3 As we note below, the standard of review we apply in this case is the
abuse-of-discretion standard; however, in a case such as this, in which we are
evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion, the abuse-of-
discretion standard is akin to the substantial-evidence standard that we
apply when factual determinations are in issue. (See part II.A., post.) Hence,
in reciting evidence in this opinion, we “accept as true all evidence tending to
establish the correctness of the judgment, taking into account all inferences
which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the
same conclusion,” and we resolve “[e]very substantial conflict in the
testimony . . . in favor of the judgment.” (GHK Associates v. Mayer Group,
Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 872.) “ ‘All of the evidence most favorable to
the respondent must be accepted as true, and that unfavorable discarded as
not having sufficient verity, to be accepted by the trier of fact.’ ” (Ibid.).)
5
The realtor—Karina Giangreco—was experienced in the local market
for mobilehome sales, having handled many mobilehome transactions in
many mobilehome parks and having been the most active salesperson in
Lamplighter Park during the previous five year period. In tackling the
listing, Giangreco met with several prospects who expressed a desire to
purchase the mobilehome from Schultz and to lease the space on which it sat
(space 35) from B&B. Among these prospects were: Catherine and Gerald
McCausland, who desired to leave the mobilehome on space 35 and make it
their residence; and Lydia Miller, who desired that the mobilehome be
removed and replaced with a new mobilehome, in which she could then reside
on space 35. (Participants in the mobilehome park sales industry routinely
use the term “pull-out” to refer to a mobilehome that is being replaced, or to
the replacement process itself.)
As she was evaluating the different prospects, Giangreco was informed
by an executive at Star that, if the mobilehome were purchased as a pull-out,
then Star would not permit the purchaser to replace it with a new
mobilehome on space 35. For this reason, she focused her initial efforts on
the McCauslands. But these efforts foundered when Star insisted that the
McCauslands undertake extensive repairs to the mobilehome, that they
complete those repairs on a timetable that Giangreco perceived to be
unrealistic, and that they take on that responsibility without a commitment
from Star that it would ultimately accept them as tenants.
Based on the position Star was taking, coupled with previous
challenges she had experienced in her dealings with Star, Giangreco
concluded she could not in good conscience proceed with the McCauslands:
“A. I had to let them know that, with [Star’s conditions], I
couldn’t [in good conscience] let them move forward because
of the experiences I’d had with Star. I couldn’t see how
6
they’d even have the plot plans back and approved in the
two months. And I was just worried that they’d be at risk
of losing their entire investment.
“Q. You understood if they signed this that, if they didn’t
have everything done within two months, [then Star] had
the option of basically telling them to . . . [remove the
mobilehome from the park] and they would have no further
rights?
“A. Correct.
“Q. And based upon your prior experience with Star, you
advised the McCauslands, you can’t go through with this?
“A. I did.”
When the prospect of selling to the McCauslands ran aground,
Giangreco reached back out to Star to ascertain whether it still was averse to
a pull-out; and she received in response an e-mail from a Star executive
stating (arguably inconsistent with Star’s previous position) that: “A new
home being installed would be in the park’s best interest.” Thus she shifted
her efforts to selling to Miller.
In furtherance of these efforts, Giangreco prepared a purchase and sale
agreement that Miller and Schultz each signed in February of 2018. Then
Giangreco and Miller visited Sean Feeney of mobilehome dealer AAA
American Pacific Manufactured Homes, dba Pacific Manufactured Homes
(Pacific). Feeney agreed to sell Miller a new mobilehome and to help her
accomplish the pull-out. Then Miller, Schultz, and Feeney entered escrow.
Shortly thereafter, in March, Giangreco helped Miller fill out a
residency application. She then submitted the completed application to Star
on Miller’s behalf, and Star’s resident manager at Lamplighter Park, Debbie
Clark, acknowledged receipt. But, despite the MRL’s requirement that a
park manager respond within 15 days to a prospective purchaser’s residency
7
application (see ante), some four months elapsed with no substantive
response from Star. Then, in July, Giangreco and Feeney learned that Star
was claiming it had never received the application. Thus Miller submitted a
second residency application to Star.
That same month, a miscommunication associated with the four-month
lapse in processing Miller’s original residency application resulted in a
missed rent payment and the issuance of a notice to Schultz to pay the rent
within three days or else sell the mobilehome or remove it from the park
within 60 days (the three-day notice). The three-day notice was noteworthy
in at least two respects. First, according to Clark, the “rule of thumb is that
you wait until the rent’s overdue at least 30 days before you send out a three-
day notice;” but in this instance Star did not wait. Second, the three-day
notice was defective, because (the record is somewhat unclear on this point) it
was either incorrectly addressed or never mailed.
Although Star contends “Schultz never responded to the three-day
notice,” this is not true. Rather, when Schultz became aware of the three-day
notice (approximately one week after Star had posted it on the now-
uninhabited mobilehome and possibly mailed it to an obsolete address), he
attempted to make the payment electronically (from Georgia) but found that
he had been “locked out of the system” Star uses to accept rent. When
Feeney then drove to Lamplighter Park to make the payment on Schultz’s
behalf, his check was accepted by Clark—but then returned two days later
accompanied by a letter that had been prepared at the behest of Star’s
president and sole shareholder, Mike Cirillo, stating that Star was “unable to
accept payment from anyone other than the homeowner.” (This statement
was untrue, inasmuch as Star had a policy of accepting payment from non-
owners and even had a form to be used for just that purpose.)
8
Then, on August 21, matters took a turn. On that day, Star executive
Maryann Tran acting at the direction of Mike Cirillo, prepared and mailed
three letters, each addressed to a different participant in the Miller-Schultz-
Pacific escrow. To Schultz, she wrote:
“It has been brought to our attention that you have sold
your mobilehome located in space 35 to Pacific
Manufactured Homes. Your tenancy in the park is now
terminated.”
To Feeney (as Pacific) she wrote:
“It is our understanding that you have completed the
purchase of the mobilehome located on space 35 and
attempted to tender rent for said space.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“The management is hereby requiring you to remove the
home from the park. The park will relet the space as it
sees fit.”
And to Miller she wrote:
“[Your] application for residency is denied . . . , as the
purported seller listed on your application [Schultz] does
not have any rights to the space.”
In essence, Star was taking the position—notwithstanding the fact that
escrow had not yet closed and thus title to the mobilehome had not yet
conveyed to Pacific—that it (Star) was at liberty to treat (1) Schultz as
though he were no longer vested in title, (2) space 35 as having reverted to
the possession of Star, and (3) Miller’s executory right to occupy space 35 as
nothing more than the vestigial remains of a gutted promise.
On receiving the letter addressed to him, Feeney reached out to Star to
discuss the matter. But Star did not call him back. Nor did Star or B&B
relent in their position. Instead, they doubled down. That is, at a meeting
the following month (September), the principals of B&B’s ownership group
9
decided—on the recommendation of Mike Cirillo—“that we should hold the
line and demand that Mr. Feeney remove the home.”
Ultimately, Star took possession of the mobilehome, sold it at credit bid
to B&B, replaced it (in space 35) with a new motorhome furnished by Star’s
mobilehome dealership affiliate, Star Mobilehome Sales (also owned by Mike
Cirillo), and sold the new mobilehome to a third party to whom it leased
space 35. Thus, rather than the mobilehome owned by Schultz being
replaced with a new mobilehome to be sold to Miller in a transaction from
which Pacific would earn a profit, it instead was replaced with a new
mobilehome sold to some other new tenant in a transaction from which Star
and B&B profited.
Meanwhile, in September of 2018, the day after Star and B&B had
made the decision to “hold the line,” Pacific and Miller filed this lawsuit
against Star and B&B. In the lawsuit, Pacific and Miller requested damages
and an injunction to prohibit Star and B&B from continuing to engage in the
types of practices that had drawn out, obstructed, and ultimately torpedoed
the sale to Miller.
C. The Trial and Judgment
The case went to trial before a jury in April of 2022. At trial, the jury
heard from twelve witnesses, including: Miller, Feeney, Giangreco, Schultz,
(via excerpts from his deposition), Tran, Clark, Mike Cirillo, the principals of
the B&B ownership group, an escrow officer (who testified as both a
percipient witness and an expert witness), and two defense experts. In his
closing argument, counsel for Star and B&B methodically walked the jury
and the trial court through each violation of the MRL that Miller and Pacific
had alleged against his clients. As to each alleged violation and each
defendant, he argued that the conduct in which Star and B&B had engaged
10
was permissible. And he concluded by stating that “there [was] no violation
of the mobile home residency law” in this case.
But the jury and the trial court disagreed. The jury found that Star
and B&B had engaged in all, or nearly all, of the prohibited acts described in
part I.A., ante, of this opinion; the trial court ruled that those acts constituted
no less than six (or, by Star’s count, seven) distinct violations of the MRL;
and the trial court further ruled that those acts also constituted violations of
Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (commonly known as the
Unfair Competition Law or UCL),4 which prohibits any business practice
that is unfair or unlawful. (See Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.)
Then the trial court quoted Business & Professions Code section 17203
and stated in its conclusion that an injunction should issue, as follows:
“Business & Professions Code § 17203 provides, in
pertinent part: ‘Any person who engages, has engaged, or
proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined
in any court of competent jurisdiction. The Court may
make such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to
prevent the use or employment by any person of any
4 The jury expressed its findings of fact on the special verdict form, and
the trial court expressed its ruling in a document entitled Ruling on
Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for Alleged Violations of Business &
Professions Code § 17200 et seq., dated May 11, 2022 (Ruling on Injunctive
Relief). The Ruling on Injunctive Relief was not designated for inclusion in
the Clerk’s Transcript on this appeal. However, in the interests of justice and
to assist us in resolving this appeal, we obtained a copy of the Ruling on
Injunctive Relief from the superior court and, on our own motion, augment
the record to include it. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WallDesign Inc. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1529, fn. 1
[“We have frequently used our discretionary authority under California Rules
of Court, rule 8.155 to augment the appellate record with documents
contained in the trial court record that were omitted by the parties, through
mistake or neglect, in order to assist us in reviewing appeals on their
merits.”].)
11
practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in
this chapter.
“In this case, the Court finds that it is appropriate to enter
a permanent injunction against each of the two defendants,
prohibiting each of them from doing any of the following:
(1) during the term of any homeowner’s rental agreement
or during the 60 days following the giving of a 60 day
notice, requiring the removal of the subject mobilehome
based upon the sale of the mobilehome to a third party; (2)
terminating the tenancy of any mobilehome park tenant for
the purpose of making the tenant’s space available for the
sale of a mobilehome by the owner or the owner’s agent; (3)
within a period of less than 60 days of the time a three-day
notice to pay rent is served, terminating or refusing to
renew a tenancy by demanding that the subject
mobilehome be sold or removed; (4) withholding approval of
any prospective mobilehome park tenant for any reason
other than (a) the prospective tenant’s unwillingness or
inability to comply with the park’s rules and regulations,
(b) the prospective tenant’s financial inability to pay the
rent, estimated utilities and other charges of the park, or
(c) the prospective tenant’s fraud, deceit or concealment of
material facts; (5) within 15 days of receiving all
information reasonably requested from a prospective
homeowner, failing to notify the prospective homeowner
that her application has been accepted or rejected; and (6)
failing to set forth in any notice of termination of tenancy
the reason relied upon for the termination, with specific
facts showing the date, place, witnesses and circumstances
concerning the reason for termination.”
The trial court then issued a judgment in which it awarded damages to Miller
and Pacific and imposed the injunction it had articulated in its ruling.
Star timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
Although it insisted at trial that there had been no violation of the
mobilehome residency law, Star now concedes on appeal that “what happened
12
with regard to space 35 in 2018 was . . . a violation of the MRL.” In addition,
Star acknowledges in its reply brief, not only that “the UCL provides
injunctive relief for unlawful business practices,” but that the scope of the
UCL is broad inasmuch as, under the UCL, “a single act can constitute an
unlawful business practice.”5
Star assigns error, however, to the court’s conclusion that the evidence
at trial warranted imposition of an injunction. According to Star, that
evidence was insufficient to support an inference that the violations of the
MRL that had been proven at trial represented anything other than one-off-
type deviations from the manner in which Star customarily transacts its
business, and that these “aberrations” were neither ongoing at the time of
trial nor likely to recur.
In examining this contention, we begin with the standard of review.
A. The Standard of Review
In this state, it is well settled that “[t]he grant or denial of a permanent
injunction rests within the trial court’s sound discretion.” (Horsford v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 390.) It
also is well settled that that discretion, when exercised in the context of
considering equitable relief under the UCL, “is very broad.” (Cortez v.
Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 180; accord
Benson v. Kwikset Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1277 (Benson) [“A trial
court has ‘very broad’ discretion in formulating equitable relief in unfair
5 The case law is in accord. (See, e.g., UFW v. Dutra Farms (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1163 [affirming injunction]; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc.
v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570; Klein v. Earth Elements, Inc.
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 fn. 3; Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn.
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 113 [an unlawful business practice within the meaning of
the UCL includes “ ‘anything that can properly be called a business practice
and that at the same time is forbidden by law’ ”].)
13
competition law actions.”].) Consequently, a permanent injunction “will not
be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.”
(Horsford, at p. 390.)
“A court abuses its discretion only when” the decision it makes is
“ ‘ “ ‘an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 641 (Caden C.)). As a consequence,
“ ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the
trial court’ ” ’ ” (ibid.) and “should interfere only ‘ “if . . . under all the
evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge
could reasonably have made the order that he [or she] did.” ’ ” (In re Robert
L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 (Robert L.).) As can be seen, the abuse-
of-discretion standard that we apply to our review of the injunction in this
case is much like the substantial-evidence standard that we apply when a
trial court’s factual determinations are at issue. (Cf. Caden C., supra,11 Cal.5th at p. 641 [“where . . . ‘the appellate court will be evaluating the
factual basis for an exercise of discretion, there likely will be no practical
difference in application’ ” between the abuse-of-discretion and substantial-
evidence standards of review (italics omitted)]; see also In re Jasmine D.
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [“[t]he practical differences between the
two standards of review are not significant”].)
Thus the question with which we are confronted is: Was the record of
violations on which the trial court decided to impose an injunction in this
case so utterly lacking in indicia of a likely recurrence as to render the trial
court’s decision to issue an injunction “arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd?”
14
B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
In answering the question just posed, we begin by noting that Star does
not appear to be challenging the substance of the injunction. That is to say,
Star is not parsing the scope or duration or phraseology of the injunction, nor
is it arguing that any particular behavior that the injunction prohibits is
behavior that should instead be permitted. Rather, it is challenging the
notion that an injunction of any sort should have issued at all. And, as we
have noted above, it is premising this challenge on an argument that there
was not “sufficient evidence of an ongoing unlawful practice by Star at the
time of judgment, or [of] the probability of a future violation,” to warrant
issuance of an injunction against it.
It is indeed “the general rule . . . that an injunction may not issue
unless the alleged misconduct is ongoing or likely to recur” (Madrid v. Perot
Systems Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 440, 464; see also Davis v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1326-1327); and it is
equally the law that the UCL has not altered this rule. (Madrid, at pp. 464–
465.) But for reasons we discuss below, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence to support an inference that violations of the sort in which Star had
engaged were likely to recur and, therefore, that the decision of the trial court
to issue the injunction cannot reasonably be said to have been “arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)
First, of course, there was the evidence of how Star comported itself
with regard to the transaction involving space 35. While one could interpret
the MRL-violating business practices with which Star burdened Miller,
Pacific, and Schultz as deviations from the Star norm, the test is not whether
evidence can be interpreted in way that cuts against the judgment. Rather,
as discussed above, our charge is to “interfere only ‘ “if . . . under all the
15
evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge
could reasonably have made the order that [the trial judge] did.” ’ ” (Robert
L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 (italics added).) And, indeed, there was
ample evidence to support an inference that the pile-up of violations with
respect to space 35 was not merely a fluke, but instead amounted to a
sustained campaign of sharp practices intended to dispossess Schultz of space
35, so that Star and B&B, in lieu of Pacific, might profit on the sale of a new
mobilehome.
Second, there was evidence from which it could be inferred that Star’s
violations were representative of a broader pattern and practice, if not a
modus operandi, of treating mobilehome park tenants and prospective
tenants (and competing mobilehome dealerships that served their needs)
unfairly in direct contravention of the Legislature’s expressly stated policy
“that . . . it is necessary that the owners of mobilehomes occupied within
mobilehome parks be provided with the unique protection from actual or
constructive eviction afforded by the [MRL].” (§ 798.55(a).) In this regard,
when Giangreco was asked to reflect on the previous 50-100 residency
applications that she had submitted to mobilehome parks, and to state
whether she perceived “a difference between the way Star . . . and
Lamplighter handled [residency] applications and the way other
mobilehome[] [park managers] handled applications,” she responded: “Yes.”
The difference, she said, was “vast.” And she illustrated what she meant, in
several ways.
Thus, for example, in reflecting on her experience in helping
prospective tenants with their residency applications at mobilehome parks
over the years, Giangreco testified that most park managers would respond
promptly, some within 72 hours—but that, of the dozens of residency
16
applications she had submitted to Star-managed parks, she did not believe a
single one had ever been accepted within the 15 days required by the MRL.
Instead, she said, Star would routinely respond with “a standard letter”
saying that the application was incomplete but without specifying what in
Star’s view was missing.
When asked specifically about her experience with Star at Lamplighter
Park, Giangreco testified that “it [was] obvious . . . that Star . . . was making
it difficult for other mobilehome dealers to come in” and transact business in
the park. In illustration of this point, Giangreco described a transaction
(involving a space other than space 35) that had resulted in a mobilehome
dealer named Prestige Manufactured Homes (Prestige) deciding to decline
any further business that involved putting new mobilehomes into
Lamplighter Park. In that transaction, “nothing [that was the responsibility
of Star] was done in a timely manner,” it felt as though Star was “making
[Giangreco] unnecessarily jump through hoops,” and Star’s conduct in
“dragg[ing] out the process” ended up imposing costs on the mobilehome
purchaser, the agent (Giangreco), and the dealer. As Giangreco explained
matters, the practices in which Star had engaged, Prestige had been “very
much at the . . . mercy” of Star and B&B, and the motivation behind its
decision to exit the Lamplighter Park market was not simply that “it was
such a pain,” but that “it was too much of a risk.”
Feeney testified similarly. Asked what his reaction had been when he
learned of the position Star had taken in its August 21 letters, Feeney
testified that he “wasn’t surprised . . . Star would do that.” Then he
elaborated, with reference to Star, that: “It’s never easy. It’s just one thing
after another, so it wasn’t shocking that they’d try to pull that.”
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Stepping back from the events associated with space 35 and speaking
more broadly to his experience with Star generally during the preceding 20-
25 years, Feeney stated that the experience of “trying to put a new
mobilehome into [a] park” managed by Star was “unlike all the other
communities we do business in” because Star made it “very, very, very, very,
very difficult” in a way that was “not normal.” “It’s . . . laborious, almost
impossible, . . . they just add rules after rules after rules, and it just seems
like a big roadblock from start to finish, . . . unlike all the other
communities.” Although Feeney did not explicitly state that the MRL-
defying practices in which Star had engaged with respect to space 35 were
examples of what he was referring to in these statements, that that was his
meaning could reasonably be inferred.
The trial court heard this testimony, it heard the testimony of Star’s
principal (Mike Cirillo) and two Star employees, and it heard the testimony of
several other witnesses who had had direct dealings with Star. It occupied a
front-row seat, from which it had an opportunity—one not afforded to an
appellate court (see, e.g., Camarena v. State Personnel Board (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 698, 703)—to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and to assess
their credibility. And, on the basis of what it heard, it concluded that an
injunction was warranted.
Although the trial court’s ruling did not include a discussion regarding
the probability that Star’s conduct would recur (instead it merely stated that
an injunction was warranted), we cannot say on the record before us that it
would be “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd” to conclude that the
plaintiffs had established a likelihood of recurrence. (Cf. Howard v. Thrifty
Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443 [“[E]ven if there is no
indication of the trial court’s rationale . . . , the court’s decision will be upheld
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on appeal if reasonable justification for it can be found. ‘We uphold
judgments if they are correct for any reason, “regardless of the correctness of
the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion.” ’ ”].) The body of
evidence here was enough.
In an effort to persuade us otherwise, Star argues the evidence was too
limited in scope, too “anecdotal,” and too stale. But, as we discuss below,
these arguments do not propel Star over the high hurdle it must clear to
prove an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Star’s argument that the evidence was too limited in scope is premised
on the fact that the offending conduct that received the most detailed
attention at trial related to just one single mobilehome pad in just one single
mobilehome community: space 35 in Lamplighter Park.6 Its argument that
the evidence was too “anecdotal” turns on its contention that Giangreco and
Feeney’s accounts of their dealings with Star apart from space 35 were
insufficiently particularized to warrant imposition of injunctive relief. But,
for each of several reasons, these arguments are of limited force. First, the
evidence regarding the practices whereby Star illegally parted Schultz from
space 35 and thwarted the sale of the mobilehome to Miller was exceedingly
6 There is a tension between this argument and what Star argued at
trial. At trial, Star objected to questioning about practices in which Star had
engaged other than with respect to space 35 and other than at Lamplighter
Park. In support of this objection, Star argued that testimony to the effect
that “Star does this all the time” had been “covered ad nauseum,” that
“questioning associated with other spaces and other homeowners and their
predicaments . . . [was] completely irrelevant,” and that testimony about
“experiences Ms. Giangreco [had had] with other residents and tenants” of
Star-managed properties was too prejudicial.” In other words, whereas Star
argues now that the plaintiffs did not adduce enough evidence of its conduct,
the argument it made before was that the volume of such evidence was too
much.
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particularized. Second, as Star has acknowledged (see ante), the case law
makes clear that one violation alone may constitute an unlawful business
practice warranting imposition of an injunction under the UCL. Yet, by
Star’s count in this case, “[t]he jury determined [that] Star and B&B [had]
engaged in seven violations”—obviously, much more than is required by the
UCL. Third, bearing in mind that the grant of equitable power to courts in
UCL matters is “broad” (Benson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277), and that
the discretion accorded to the trial courts in such matters is “ ‘very broad’ ”
(ibid.), we do not see fit to shackle such authority by, in effect, requiring that
a UCL plaintiff investigate, conduct discovery, and present evidence
regarding the behavior of a UCL defendant in all (or most or even more than
one) of the locales in which the defendant operates before the issuance of
company-wide equitable relief may be considered. Indeed, to impose such a
restriction would be especially inapt in a case, such as this, in which the
defendants’ unfair, illegal, public-policy-defying business practices originated
at, and were driven by, the uppermost levels of management.
As for Star’s argument that the evidence was too stale, it is premised
on the notion that, by the time this case went to trial and resulted in a
judgment in 2022, too much water had passed under the proverbial bridge.
Specifically: (1) “Star . . . ha[d] been terminated by B&B in 2020,” so it “was
no longer in a position to engage in unfair practices in Lamplighter Park;”
(2) Giangreco had left the mobilehome sales industry toward the end of 2018,
so she had no current knowledge about the business practices of Star; and
(3) the demise of the Miller-Schultz-Pacific transaction (earlier in 2018) dated
back even further than that.
But this argument defies logic, and it disregards Star’s stance at trial.
The argument defies logic inasmuch as the unfair and illegal practices of Star
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on which most of the evidence in this case focused were traceable, not to some
rogue employee in Lamplighter Park, but rather to the corporate suite and
the company’s topmost officer: its president and sole shareholder, Mike
Cirillo. Thus it is reasonable to presume that the practices in which Star
engaged with tenants, prospective tenants, and Star-unaffiliated mobilehome
dealerships at Lamplighter Park are indicative of practices in which it
engages with such persons at other mobilehome parks that it manages.
Hence we see no reason why the fact that B&B terminated Star’s services at
the mobilehome parks it owns should counsel against issuance of an
injunction applicable to mobilehome parks that others own.
The staleness argument disregards Star’s stance at trial in that, at all
times during the trial, Star strenuously maintained that the practices in
which it had engaged did not violate the MRL. Thus, however true it may be
that the offending conduct to which Giangreco and many of the other
witnesses testified was four years old at the time of trial, Star’s insistence on
the permissibility of that conduct was right up to the minute at the time of
trial, thus rendering those witnesses’ evidence not stale at all. (See People v.
Overstock.com, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1064, 1092 [affirming injunction,
even though defendant had “discontinued [offending] practice . . . several
years before trial,” because the fact that the defendant “continued [through
trial] to take the position that the use of formulas was proper” demonstrated
risk of recurrence]; Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
304, 315 [“there is no hard-and-fast rule that a party’s discontinuance of
illegal behavior makes injunctive relief . . . unavailable”]; Aguilar v. Avis Rent
A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 133 [similar]; Marin County Board
of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 929 [“ ‘It is settled that
[even] the voluntary discontinuance of alleged illegal practices does not
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remove the pending charges of illegality from the sphere of judicial power or
relieve the court of the duty of determining the validity of such charges where
by the mere volition of a party the challenged practices may be resumed;’ ”
reversing judgment to extent it denied injunctive relief].)
C. Attorney’s Fees
Miller and Pacific request an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. The
request finds support in Civil Code section 798.85, which provides: “in any
action arising out of the provisions of [the MRL], the prevailing party shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” The request also finds
support in Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, in which the court of
appeal held that “[a] statute authorizing an attorney fee award at the trial
court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically
provides otherwise.” (Id., at p. 1499 [court of appeal awarded fees on appeal];
accord Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal. App.5th 286, 313; cf. Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(d)(2) [court of appeal may order that attorney’s fees be included in
an award of costs].) Star opposes the request on the grounds that “[a]
reversal by this Court of the injunction could result in a change of the
prevailing party status by the trial court or a determination of no prevailing
party.” But we are affirming, not reversing. Hence we conclude an award of
attorney’s fees to Miller and Pacific is warranted.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Miller and Pacific shall recover their costs
and attorney’s fees on appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial
court.
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KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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