People v. Trotter CA2/7 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 1/8/24 P. v. Trotter CA2/7
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    THE PEOPLE,                                                B329822
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                        (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. NA058971-02)
    v.
    RAMON TROTTER,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Reversed with
    directions.
    Lauren Noriega for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
    General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    In 2005 a jury convicted Ramon Trotter of first degree
    murder, three attempted murders, and related crimes in
    connection with a shooting spree on the freeway. The jury also
    found true the special circumstance allegation the murder was
    committed “by means of discharging a firearm from a motor
    vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the
    vehicle with the intent to inflict death.” (Pen. Code, § 190.2,
    subd. (a)(21).)1 The trial court sentenced Trotter on the murder
    conviction to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole,
    and on each of the three attempted murder convictions to life in
    prison with a minimum parole eligibility of seven years. The
    court also imposed additional terms for various firearm
    enhancements. We affirmed Trotter’s convictions on direct
    appeal. (People v. Trotter (July 25, 2007, B187097) [nonpub. opn.]
    (Trotter I).)
    In 2021 Trotter filed a petition under section 1172.6
    (former section 1170.95), which, as amended effective January 1,
    2022, authorized certain individuals convicted of murder under
    the felony-murder rule or murder, attempted murder, or
    voluntary manslaughter under the natural and probable
    consequences doctrine, to petition for resentencing. After finding
    Trotter had made a prima facie showing he was eligible for relief,
    the superior court issued an order to show cause, held an
    evidentiary hearing, and denied the petition.
    Trotter appealed from the order denying his petition,
    arguing the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. We
    1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    reversed the order denying Trotter’s petition on one of his
    three attempted murder convictions, modified the judgment to
    vacate his conviction and sentence on that conviction, and
    otherwise affirmed. (People v. Trotter (Oct. 20, 2022, B318152)
    [nonpub. opn.] (Trotter II).)
    In March 2023 Trotter filed a motion asking the court for a
    resentencing hearing under the full resentencing rule in People v.
    Buycks (2018) 
    5 Cal.5th 857
    . In Buycks the Supreme Court held
    that, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand
    for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
    appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
    discretion in light of the changed circumstances,’” and that “the
    resentencing court may consider ‘any pertinent circumstances
    which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.’” (Id. at
    p. 893.) Trotter argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Buycks required the superior court to resentence him on all of his
    convictions under current California law, correct various
    sentencing errors, and consider his post-sentencing conduct in
    prison.
    The superior court denied Trotter’s motion “as non-
    justiciable.” The court ruled that this court’s decision in
    Trotter II was “law of the case” and that “jurisdiction is with the
    Court of Appeal to modify its decision on resentencing.” The
    court stated: “I think that the law of the case, as far as this court
    is concerned, is the Court of Appeal decision. And so, you know,
    your remedy should really be to petition for review with the
    California Supreme Court, not to come back and relitigate this
    same issue with the Superior Court. Procedurally, that is the
    way it should work, right? We don’t come back down as soon as
    the Court of Appeal makes a decision, you go up. Why am I
    3
    giving this a second shot?” The court further stated: “You know,
    I don’t believe, and I rule at this time, that the case is non-
    justiciable to be relitigated for that issue because the law of the
    case is the Court of Appeal decision. The Supreme Court of
    California doesn’t have to do that. They can always consider a
    petition for review, but that is a different avenue. You know,
    that is not within the jurisdiction of this court.”
    Trotter argues, the People concede, and we agree the
    superior court erred in refusing to conduct a full resentencing
    after Trotter II. (See People v. Buycks, 
    supra,
     5 Cal.5th at p. 893;
    People v. Jones (2022) 
    79 Cal.App.5th 37
    , 46; see also People v.
    Bautista-Castanon (2023) 
    89 Cal.App.5th 922
    , 927 [because of
    ameliorative legislative changes in the law, a full resentencing on
    remand is appropriate].) “Resentencing is not limited to ‘just the
    portion [of the sentence] subjected to recall”; instead, “‘the full
    resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing
    decisions when resentencing a defendant.’” (People v. Trent
    (2023) 
    96 Cal.App.5th 33
    , 44.) As the People put it, quoting
    section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1), “the superior court erred in
    concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to resentence [Trotter] or
    address his claims of sentencing error. The proper remedy is to
    remand for a full resentencing hearing in accordance with
    section 1172.6’s mandate that, upon vacating a conviction under
    that section, the court must ‘resentence the petitioner on any
    remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not
    previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if
    any, is not greater than the initial sentence.’” Exactly.
    4
    The order denying Trotter’s motion for a full resentencing
    is reversed. The superior court is directed to conduct a full
    resentencing under People v. Buycks, 
    supra,
     
    5 Cal.5th 857
    .
    SEGAL, Acting P. J.
    We concur:
    FEUER, J.
    EVENSON, J.*
    *     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
    the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
    California Constitution.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B329822

Filed Date: 1/8/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/8/2024