Marriage of Moore ( 2024 )

Filed 6/25/24; on rehearing
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re the Marriage of MONIQUE
COVINGTON MOORE and
CHARLES MOORE,
MONIQUE COVINGTON MOORE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A165038
CHARLES MOORE,
(San Francisco City & County
Defendant;
Super. Ct. No. FDI20793151)
ROCKET LAWYER, INC.
Appellant.
In re the Marriage of MONIQUE
COVINGTON MOORE and
CHARLES MOORE,
MONIQUE COVINGTON MOORE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A165039
CHARLES MOORE,
(San Francisco City & County
Defendant;
Super. Ct. No. FDI20793151)
ACENDI INTERACTIVE
COMPANY, LLC
Appellant.
1
These consolidated appeals arise from marital dissolution proceedings
between plaintiff Monique Covington Moore (Covington) and defendant
Charles Moore. During discovery, Covington served deposition subpoenas for
production of business records on nonparties Rocket Lawyer, Inc. (Rocket
Lawyer) and Acendi Interactive Company, LLC (Acendi) (collectively
appellants). After appellants asserted objections and refused to comply with
most all of the subpoenas’ demands, Covington filed a motion to compel their
compliance under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480.1 The trial court
granted the motion in substantial part and ordered appellants to each pay
Covington $25,000 in monetary sanctions. Appellants now raise numerous
claims of error regarding the trial court’s rulings on the timeliness of
Covington’s motion against Rocket Lawyer, the sufficiency of her attempts to
meet and confer with Acendi, and the reasonableness of the monetary
sanctions award, among other matters. We agree with only one of their
contentions and hold that the fees and costs Covington incurred in mediation
as meet and confer attempts after her discovery motions were already filed
were not compensable as discovery sanctions because they were not incurred
as part of the necessary costs of bringing the motions. (Ghanooni v. Super
Shuttle (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262 (Ghanooni).) Accordingly, we reverse
the orders in part and remand for redetermination of the sanctions awards.
In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We glean the following facts from the parties’ trial court briefings and
submissions regarding the discovery at issue.
Covington and Moore were married from 1998 until March 2020 when
Covington commenced these divorce proceedings. Moore is the chairman of
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
the board and chief executive officer of legal technology company Rocket
Lawyer. He is also the managing member and an officer of Acendi.
According to Covington, both Acendi and Rocket Lawyer were formed
during the parties’ marriage, and Covington worked at both companies from
their dates of formation to the start of this litigation. Covington maintains
that she and Moore are 100 percent owners of Acendi (even though ownership
is in Moore’s name), and that Acendi holds approximately 24 percent of
Rocket Lawyer stock. Acendi’s ownership interest in Rocket Lawyer is,
according to Covington, the most significant of the marital estate.
In March 2021, the trial court entered a stipulated protective order
governing discovery of records from Rocket Lawyer, Acendi, and another
nonparty entity.
A. The Rocket Lawyer Subpoena
Unless otherwise indicated, the following events occurred in 2021.
On January 22, Covington’s counsel issued a deposition subpoena for
production of business records on Rocket Lawyer (hereafter the 1/22
subpoena). A copy of the 1/22 subpoena was mailed to Rocket Lawyer’s
custodian of records on February 2. The 1/22 subpoena identified 14
categories of documents relating to valuations of Rocket Lawyer, Covington’s
interest in Rocket Lawyer, Moore’s employment with Rocket Lawyer,
including his income and expenses paid by the company, and other corporate
governance and financial information of the company.
Rocket Lawyer’s counsel, Prashanth Chennakesavan, contacted
Covington’s counsel and received a 30-day extension for Rocket Lawyer to
respond to the deposition subpoena. Counsel for both sides met and
conferred over the subpoena, during which Chennakesavan argued for
“attorneys’ eyes only” protection for any documents produced.
3
On March 23, Rocket Lawyer served written responses and objections
to the 1/22 subpoena. Rocket Lawyer asserted an objection to the subpoena
for lack of personal service, as well as substantive objections to each of the
document demands on the grounds they were vague, ambiguous, and
unintelligible; overly broad and unduly burdensome; not relevant or
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence;
violative of third-party privacy rights; duplicative of discovery already
produced by or more easily obtained from parties to the action; and violative
of the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine.
On March 26, Covington served an identical subpoena on Rocket
Lawyer’s records custodian (the 3/26 subpoena), this time personally. On
April 15, Rocket Lawyer served its written objections to the 3/26 subpoena,
lodging the same substantive objections as before.
B. The Acendi Subpoena
On March 16, Covington’s counsel personally served Acendi’s custodian
of records with a deposition subpoena for the production of 16 categories of
documents: (1) Acendi “valuation” documents and reports; (2) Acendi
“governance documents”; (3) documents evidencing Acendi “membership
interest(s) and capitalization”; (4) Acendi board-meeting minutes relating to
Moore’s work, ownership, and interest in Acendi; (5) Acendi “investor letters”;
(6) documents “reflecting financings or investment offerings”; (7) documents
reflecting Covington’s interest in Acendi; (8) agreements between Moore and
Acendi; (9) documents evidencing payments from Acendi to Moore;
(10) documents regarding any Acendi plan for deferred compensation to
Moore; (11) “documents evidencing ownership interests offered or received
by” Moore from Acendi; (12) expense account statements and requests for
reimbursements from Moore to Acendi; (13) statements for credit cards
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issued by Acendi to Moore; (14) documents reflecting any “actual or proposed
sale” or other transfer of Moore’s interest in Acendi; (15) Acendi “financial
statements”; and (16) “documents referring to the type and scope of any
business, or line of business, conducted by Acendi.” (Capitalization omitted.)
On April 19, Acendi served its written responses and objections to the
deposition subpoena. Acendi objected to each document request on the
grounds they were vague, ambiguous and unintelligible; overbroad and
unlimited; and irrelevant to the litigation, as “Acendi is not a party to the
litigation and no individual has any ownership rights over Acendi property.”
Notwithstanding its objections, Acendi agreed to produce publicly filed
documents regarding Acendi’s formation and its current incorporation status
in response to request no. 2. As to request no. 10, Acendi stated no
documents exist.
C. Motions to Compel
1. Against Rocket Lawyer
On June 14, Covington filed a motion to compel Rocket Lawyer to
comply with the 3/26 deposition subpoena. In her moving papers, Covington
requested $10,000 in monetary sanctions.
In opposition, Rocket Lawyer argued that the motion was untimely and
that the requests were overbroad. Rocket Lawyer requested over $14,000 in
sanctions against Covington for fees incurred in opposing the motion.
2. Against Acendi
On June 18, Covington filed a motion to compel Acendi’s compliance
with the deposition subpoena by producing documents in response to request
nos. 1–9 and 11–15. The motion was supported by a “Concise Summary Per
[Cal. Rules of Court, rule] 3.1345(b)” and the declaration of Covington’s
attorney, Nina Drucker, describing her efforts to meet and confer with
5
Acendi’s counsel, Richard Zuromski. Covington requested $7,000 in
sanctions against Acendi.
Acendi opposed the motion, arguing that Covington failed to adequately
meet and confer prior to filing the motion, and that the requests were
overbroad, burdensome, uncertain, and unintelligible. Acendi sought in
excess of $12,000 in sanctions against Covington for attorney fees incurred in
opposing the motion.
3. Mediation
After the moving and opposition papers were filed, but prior to the
hearing on the motions, counsel for Covington, Acendi, and Rocket Lawyer
attended two full-day mediation sessions in November 2021 and January
2022. There is no dispute that the purpose of this mediation was to attempt
to resolve the discovery disputes in question.
Following the mediation, counsel for Covington, Acendi, and Rocket
Lawyer each filed supplemental declarations in the trial court seeking
additional sanctions amounts for mediation-related expenses, including
preparation work, attendance, and post-mediation communications.2
2 Covington’s counsel, Jeff Riebel, stated in his supplemental declaration
that Covington incurred $74,389 in total mediation-related attorney fees and
costs, and that “[a]t least 70% of this work is attributable to issues
surrounding the Rocket Lawyer subpoena” while “the other 30% was
attributable to the Acendi . . . subpoena[.]” Thus, Covington sought $52,072
in mediation-related sanctions from Rocket Lawyer and $22,316.70 in such
sanctions from Acendi.
Rocket Lawyer’s counsel, Chennakesavan, sought an additional
$28,305 for mediation-related and other expenses. Acendi’s counsel, Richard
Zuromski, sought an additional $17,860 for mediation-related and other
expenses.
6
D. The Trial Court’s Rulings
After a hearing, the trial court issued its findings and orders on March
16, 2022. The court granted Covington’s motion against Rocket Lawyer as to
9 of the 14 document demands in the deposition subpoena. In some
instances, the court ordered that the names and identifying information of
nonparties be redacted, and that the temporal scope of production be limited
to January 1, 2018, rather than the requested January 1, 2016 date or Rocket
Lawyer’s date of inception. The court further ordered that the production of
documents was subject to the March 2021 protective order. Finally, the court
found that “Rocket Lawyer did not act with the requisite substantial
justification with respect to resisting, in its entirety, these requests,” and the
court imposed $25,000 in monetary sanctions.
As for Acendi, the trial court ordered Acendi’s compliance as to 10 of
the 14 document demands subject to the motion.3 As to nos. 1–4, 9, 12, and
13, the court ordered redaction of the names and identifying information of
nonparties. The court also limited the temporal scope of production for no. 1
to the “most recent 409A valuation” for Acendi, and to January 1, 2018, for
nos. 9, 12, 13, and 15. The court ordered that the production of documents
was subject to the March 2021 protective order. Finally, the court found that
Acendi “did not act with the requisite substantial justification with respect to
resisting, in its entirety, these requests” and imposed $25,000 in monetary
sanctions.
3 In assessing Covington’s overall success on the motion, we disregard
the trial court’s rulings on nos. 10 (grant) and 16 (deny) because they were
not part of Covington’s motion.
7
Rocket Lawyer and Acendi each filed timely notices of appeal from the
trial court’s orders.4 We consolidated the appeals for briefing, argument, and
decision.
DISCUSSION
“In civil litigation, discovery may be obtained from a nonparty only
through a ‘deposition subpoena.’ ” (Unzipped Apparel, LLC v. Bader (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 123, 127 (Unzipped), citing § 2020.010, subd. (b).) A
deposition subpoena may be issued by an attorney of record for any party
(§ 2020.210, subds. (a), (b)), and may command a nonparty to appear and give
testimony, produce business records for copying, or both, and to produce other
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things
(§ 2020.020, subds. (a)–(c)). To be effective, a deposition subpoena that is
directed at an organization must be served by personal delivery “to any
officer, director, custodian of records, or to any agent or employee authorized
by the organization to accept service of a subpoena.” (§ 2020.220,
subd. (b)(2).)
“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document,
electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s
control that is specified in the . . . deposition subpoena, the party seeking
discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or
production.” (§ 2025.480, subd. (a).) “This motion shall be made no later
than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Id.,
subd. (b).)
4 Covington, Rocket Lawyer, and Acendi each argue, and we agree, that
the orders in question are appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
(See Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1107;
Diepenbrock v. Brown (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 743, 746.)
8
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney
who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or
production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust.” (§ 2025.480, subd. (j).) The term “substantial
justification” means a justification that “is clearly reasonable because it is
well grounded in both law and fact.” (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc.
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1434 (Doe).)
“ ‘We review the trial court’s order imposing the sanction for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] We resolve all evidentiary conflicts most favorably to
the trial court’s ruling [citation], and we will reverse only if the trial court’s
action was “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]
‘ “It is [the appellant’s] burden to affirmatively demonstrate error and, where
the evidence is in conflict, this court will not disturb the trial court’s
findings.” [Citation.] To the extent that reviewing the sanction order
requires us to construe the applicable discovery statutes, we do so de novo,
without regard to the trial court’s ruling or reasoning.’ ” (Clement v. Alegre
(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1285–1286 (Clement).)
A. Rocket Lawyer’s Appeal
1. 60-Day Deadline for Motions to Compel
Rocket Lawyer contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to
compel because Covington did not file the motion within 60 days of Rocket’s
Lawyer’s service of written objections to the 1/22 subpoena, which marked
“the completion of the record of the deposition” for purposes of triggering the
60-day clock under section 2025.480, subdivision (b). Rocket Lawyer further
contends that Covington’s service of the 3/26 subpoena did not reset the 60-
9
day clock based on Rocket Lawyer’s service of objections to that subpoena
because a party cannot avoid the consequences of its delay in moving to
compel by serving the same discovery a second time. Because these
contentions involve the application of a statutory standard to undisputed
facts, our review is de novo. (Unzipped, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.)
Rocket Lawyer relies on a trio of cases interpreting the phrase “the
completion of the record of the deposition” under section 2025.480,
subdivision (b). In Unzipped, the court held that the record of the deposition
was complete, and the 60-day clock began to run, on the deposition
subpoena’s date of production when the nonparty deponents asserted
objections and declined to produce responsive documents. (Unzipped, supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 128, 131–136.) In Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164 (Rutledge) and Board of Registered Nursing v.
Superior Court (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011 (Board of
Registered Nursing), the courts likewise held that the record of the deposition
was complete for purposes of the 60-day clock upon the nonparties’ service of
objections to the deposition subpoena. (Board of Registered Nursing, at
p. 1031; Rutledge, at p. 1192.)
As Covington points out, however, the validity of service of the
deposition subpoenas in each of those cases was never challenged or in doubt.
(See Board of Registered Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021
[“defendants served business record subpoenas on four nonparty state
agencies”]; Rutledge, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191 [“appellants served a
deposition subpoena on Bizcom”]; Unzipped, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 128
[“Unzipped obtained and served two ‘Deposition Subpoena[s] for Production
of Business Records’ ”].) This distinction is meaningful because a deposition
subpoena that has not been personally served in compliance with section
10
2020.220 imposes no obligations on a nonparty deponent. (See In re Abrams
(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693 (Abrams) [no person is compelled to act in
judicial proceeding in which jurisdiction over person has not been obtained].)
Put another way, it is the personal service of the deposition subpoena that
triggers a nonparty’s obligation to comply with the subpoena’s commands and
subjects them to potential sanctions for disobedience, including punishment
for contempt. (See §§ 2020.220, subd. (c)(1)–(3) [“[p]ersonal service of any
deposition subpoena is effective to require” nonparty’s compliance], 2020.410,
subd. (c) [compliance date cannot be earlier than 20 days after issuance of
subpoena or 15 days after service, whichever is later], 2025.440, subd. (b)
[court may impose sanctions, including punishment for contempt, on
disobedient deponent “on whom a deposition subpoena has been served”].)
Because Unzipped, Rutledge, and Board of Registered Nursing each
interpreted the statutory phrase “the completion of the record of the
deposition” in the context of a deposition subpoena that was legally effective
to compel compliance, the rationale underlying these decisions is inapt for the
circumstances of this case. In Unzipped and Board of Registered Nursing, the
courts explained that because a business records subpoena typically results
in either a partial production based on a few objections or no production at all
based on more extensive objections, once the subpoenaing party receives
either of these responses, it “has all of the information it needs to prepare a
motion to compel.” (Unzipped, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 133; see Board of
Registered Nursing, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033.) In other words, the
60-day clock began to run upon the service of objections because at that point,
the discovery dispute is ripe for a motion to compel.
The same cannot be said here. At the time Rocket Lawyer served its
objections to the 1/22 subpoena, the discovery dispute was not ripe for a
11
motion to compel because there was no personally served subpoena that could
compel Rocket Lawyer’s compliance. (See § 2020.220, subd. (c)(1)–(3).) To
apply Unzipped and its progeny on these facts would effectively mean that
Covington was on the clock to bring a motion that was likely doomed to fail
without its merits ever being addressed.
At oral argument, Rocket Lawyer belatedly contended that any service
defects were waived by its service of a substantive response to the 1/22
subpoena and pre-response meet and confer. We are not persuaded. Setting
aside the tardiness of this contention on appeal, the fact that Rocket Lawyer
acknowledged the existence of the defective 1/22 subpoena did not constitute
a waiver of its objection to service; indeed, Rocket Lawyer expressly
preserved that objection in response to each of the subpoena’s document
demands. (See Abrams, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 693 [knowledge of
defectively-served deposition subpoena does not estop nonparty from
contesting validity of service].)
As such, Covington reasonably responded to Rocket Lawyer’s service of
process objection by effectuating valid, personal service of a new deposition
subpoena. Notably, Rocket Lawyer cites no authority that prohibited her
from doing so. Rocket Lawyer’s reliance on Professional Career Colleges,
Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490(Professional Career) is misplaced. There, the court held that a plaintiff who
propounded a first set of interrogatories but did not move to compel further
responses within the applicable 45-day deadline could not “avoid the
consequences of his delay and lack of diligence by propounding the same
question again” in a second set of interrogatories. (Id. at p. 494.)
Professional Career is distinguishable in that the same interrogatory was
propounded a second time after it had already been properly propounded,
12
whereas here, Covington properly served only one deposition subpoena—the
3/26 subpoena.
In the absence of applicable authority, Rocket Lawyer fails to persuade
us that, as a matter of law, Covington did not timely file her motion on June
14, exactly 60 days after Rocket Lawyer served its objections to the only
subpoena personally served upon it.
2. Protective Order
Rocket Lawyer contends the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering compliance with the deposition subpoena without ordering two-tier
protection, including a so-called “attorneys’ eyes only” tier, for any financial
and trade secret information produced. Covington argues, and we agree, that
Rocket Lawyer forfeited this argument by failing to present it to the trial
court in connection with Covington’s motion to compel.
The failure to raise an issue in the trial court forfeits the claim of error
on appeal. (See Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739,
767.) Rocket Lawyer insists the issue was adequately preserved because its
opposition brief below recounted counsels’ meet and confer discussions over
the need for attorneys’ eyes only protection. But Rocket Lawyer made no
request to the trial court to include such protection in its ruling on the motion
to compel. Rocket Lawyer cites no authority suggesting that a trial court
abuses its discretion by failing to add protective measures sua sponte based
on its general awareness of matters discussed during meet and confer talks.
Rocket Lawyer’s reply brief claims it raised the attorneys’ eyes only
issue at the hearing. But if anything, the cited portion of the record
underscores Rocket Lawyer’s knowing forfeiture of the matter. At the
hearing, Chennakesavan told the trial court, “With respect to the protective
order I don’t think it’s properly before you. But there have been discussions if
13
you look at our exchanges about . . . an additional tier. [¶] . . . . What we did
request [an] additional tier [for], I don’t believe this is quite ripe yet because
it’s not before the Court on a request for order or a motion, is for additional
protection on an [attorneys’ eyes only] basis for narrow categories of
documents.”5 (Italics added.) In other words, Rocket Lawyer’s attorney
explicitly told the court that the dispute over attorneys’ eyes only protection
was still being discussed among counsel and was not currently before the
court. And even after the court made its ruling, Rocket Lawyer apparently
failed to request the protective tier it claims should have been ordered. As
such, Rocket Lawyer’s accusation that the trial court “simply ignored the
issue” rings hollow.
For these reasons, we conclude Rocket Lawyer forfeited its argument
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to include attorneys’ eyes
only protection in connection with its order on the motion to compel.
3. Sanctions Award and Amount
Rocket Lawyer contends the trial court’s sanctions award was an abuse
of discretion because the court based its decision on Rocket Lawyer’s conduct
of “ ‘resisting . . . these requests,’ ” without finding that Rocket Lawyer’s
opposition to the motion was unjustified. This argument is meritless.
Regardless of the trial court’s phrasing of the factual basis for the sanctions
award, there is no dispute that Rocket Lawyer unsuccessfully opposed
Covington’s motion to compel. Thus, section 2025.480, subdivision (j),
mandates the imposition of monetary sanctions against Rocket Lawyer.
5 Contrary to Chennakesavan’s assertions at oral argument, the record
reflects it was he—not “the other side”—who told the trial court the issue of
two-tier protection was not before the court at that time.
14
Moreover, by requiring monetary sanctions “under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 2023.010)[,]” section 2025.480, subdivision (j),
expressly incorporates the authorization under section 2023.030,
subdivision (a), for imposition of monetary sanctions against one engaging in
“the misuse of the discovery process.” Section 2023.010, subdivision (e),
defines such misuse as including “[m]aking, without substantial justification,
an unmeritorious objection to discovery.” Thus, the trial court’s finding that
Rocket Lawyer unjustifiably resisted the deposition subpoena was a valid
basis for the award of sanctions under the general sanctions provisions
incorporated into section 2025.480, subdivision (j).
Rocket Lawyer further challenges the $25,000 sanctions award on the
ground that Covington’s request was “inflated by hours spent ‘meeting and
conferring.’ ” On this score, Rocket Lawyer fails to provide cogent argument
and citation to supporting legal authority, which typically would result in
forfeiture of the contention. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) However, in light of our consolidation of the appeals
and Acendi’s similar (and more developed) arguments on this pure question
of law, we elect to reach the issue for both appellants. For the reasons
discussed in more detail in part B.5, post, we conclude that although
expenses incurred during the meet and confer process are generally
compensable as a discovery sanction, the trial court improperly awarded
sanctions for mediation-related fees and costs that Covington incurred after
she filed her discovery motions, as such expenses were not part of the
necessary costs of bringing the motions.
B. Acendi’s Appeal
Acendi’s appeal challenges the trial court’s finding that Acendi lacked
substantial justification to oppose the motion to compel, as well as the
15
amount of the awarded sanctions. Accendi insists its opposition was
substantially justified on the grounds that (1) Covington failed to adequately
meet and confer prior to filing the motion; (2) Covington failed to include the
requisite separate statement with her moving papers; and (3) the document
requests were overbroad and unduly burdensome. As to the amount of the
award, Acendi contends that the court was not authorized to include
mediation-related fees and costs (which were part of the litigants’ efforts to
meet and confer after Covington’s motion to compel was filed), and that the
amount awarded was excessive and unreasonable.
1. Additional Facts
At all relevant times, Covington was represented by the DeLacey
Riebel Shindell law firm (the DeLacey firm). Again, the following events all
occurred in 2021 unless otherwise indicated.
On June 14—56 days after Acendi served its responses and objections
to Covington’s deposition subpoena—a legal assistant at the DeLacey firm
emailed a two-page meet and confer letter by attorney Drucker to Acendi’s
counsel, Zuromski. Two others at the DeLacey firm, attorney Jeff Riebel and
paralegal Navid Ramirez, were copied on this email.
Drucker presented five arguments in her letter: first, because Acendi
was 100 percent owned by Moore in name, “there is no reason why all
requested documents should not be produced voluntarily, and in response to
the subpoena pursuant to [Moore’s] fiduciary duties and disclosure duties to
[Covington]”; second, Acendi’s lengthy and unmeritorious objections were
part of Moore’s efforts to stonewall Covington from obtaining documents and
information about her own assets in this case; third, Acendi failed to produce
the documents it stated it would produce in response to demand no. 2; fourth,
Acendi is a community property company where Covington worked, and she
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regularly communicated with Moore regarding the inner workings of Acendi,
as demonstrated in an “attached email”; and finally, Acendi’s privacy
objections were meritless, as Acendi had already successfully obtained a
robust protective order from the trial court. Drucker also requested an
extension of time to file a motion to compel.
Zuromski responded by email the following morning, June 15,
informing Drucker that her June 14 letter did not have the attachment it
referenced. A few minutes later, Drucker sent Zuromski the attachment and
reiterated her request for a motion extension.
The next morning (June 16), Drucker sent Zuromski a voicemail and
email “attempting to meet and confer with you regarding the Acendi
subpoena.” Drucker attempted to narrow the dispute to “simple question[s]”
that could “help us move forward—is [Moore] the sole member of Acendi? If
[Moore] is not the sole member, how many others are there and what
percentage of the LLC do they own? What valid reason does [Moore] have, as
sole owner of Acendi, to not produce all documents and records related to
same? [¶] Why would the protective order that you proposed and which the
Court adopted not be sufficient to cover the production of documents in
response to the subpoena?” Drucker closed by stating that because she had
not received a response regarding her extension request, she would
commence preparation of the motion to compel and seek monetary sanctions
against Acendi.
Just over an hour later, at 10:30 a.m., Zuromski attempted to respond
to Drucker by email. However, the sole addressee was paralegal Ramirez.
Zuromski contended that Drucker’s “eleventh hour” meet and confer efforts
were inadequate but said he would grant Drucker’s request for a motion
extension.
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On June 18, Covington filed her motion to compel Acendi’s compliance
with the deposition subpoena, and paralegal Ramirez emailed a courtesy copy
of the motion to Zuromski. In a supporting declaration, Drucker stated that
Zuromski “did not respond to our request for an extension on the deadline to
file the Motion to Compel” and that she had not heard from him after leaving
a voicemail and follow-up email on June 16.
Zuromski responded on Sunday, June 20, asking, “Will there be any
response to my email regarding your failure to meet and confer, or will we be
meeting and conferring before you file this?” Drucker responded shortly
thereafter, claiming she had not received a response from Zuromski on her
extension request and informing him that the motion had already been filed.
The following day, June 21, Drucker informed Zuromski that his June
16 email was sent to “a paralegal on our team, addressing her as ‘Ms.
Drucker[,]’ ” and “was inadvertently not brought to my attention.” Drucker
proposed to continue to “meet and confer in the interim period and see if we
can reach a resolution.”
2. Sufficiency of Meet and Confer Efforts
A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena “shall be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040”
(§ 2025.480, subd. (b)), which “shall state facts showing a reasonable and
good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the
motion” (§ 2016.040). This requirement “is designed ‘to encourage the parties
to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a
formal order. . . .’ [Citation.] This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court
and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through
promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.”
(Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435 (Townsend).)
18
“A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails
something more than bickering . . . . Rather, the law requires that counsel
attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and
deliberate.” (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1439.) “Argument is not
the same as informal negotiation,” and “debate over the appropriateness of an
objection, interspersed between rounds of further interrogation, does not . . .
constitute an earnest attempt to resolve impasses in discovery.” (Id. at
pp. 1437–1438.) Instead, “ ‘[t]he parties must present to each other the
merits of their respective positions with the same candor, specificity and
support during informal negotiations as during the briefing of discovery
motions. Only after all the cards have been laid on the table, and a party has
meaningfully assessed the relative strengths and weaknesses of its position
in light of all available information, can there be a “sincere” effort to resolve
the matter.’ ” (Id. at p. 1435.)
Determining the adequacy of an attempt at informal resolution
contemplates the exercise of judicial discretion. “The level of effort at
informal resolution which satisfies the ‘reasonable and good faith attempt’
standard depends upon the circumstances. In a larger, more complex
discovery context, a greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted.
In a simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may
suffice. The history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between
counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested,
the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant. Judges
have broad powers and responsibilities to determine what measures and
procedures are appropriate in varying circumstances.” (Obregon v. Superior
Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431 (Obregon).) “A trial judge’s perceptions
on such matters, inherently factual in nature at least in part, must not be
19
lightly disturbed.” (Ibid.) Discretion is abused when the court’s decision
exceeds the bounds of reason or transgresses the confines of the applicable
principles of law. (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare
REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789 (Cornerstone).)
Emphasizing that Covington waited 56 days after being served with
Acendi’s objections to initiate meet and confer talks, Acendi insists “[t]his
delay alone undermines the reasonableness of her effort.” Acendi
additionally argues that Drucker’s June 14 meet and confer letter was
inadequate because it made only broad pronouncements and did not lay out
the factual and legal grounds requiring a different response on any specific
discovery demand. Acendi further maintains that because the trial court
never explicitly addressed the meet and confer issue in its order, there are no
factual findings to which we may defer.
We are not convinced that Acendi has demonstrated the trial court’s
decision exceeded the bounds of reason or transgressed the confines of
applicable law. (Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 789.) As a
threshold matter, we reject the contention that we may not imply findings to
support the ruling. Acendi cites no authority requiring a trial court to make
express findings on the sufficiency of meet and confer efforts; as such, we may
infer all findings necessary to support the court’s decision. (See Pulte Homes
Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 267, 272.)
While it is true that Covington failed to provide an explanation for
initiating meet and confer talks so close to the 60-day motion deadline, the
timing of meet and confer efforts is but one factor in a broader analysis. (See
Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 432–433.) As indicated, other relevant
factors include the legitimacy and breadth of the discovery sought, the
complexity of the dispute, the history of the litigation, the nature of the
20
interactions between counsel, the nature of the issues, and the prospects for
success. (Id. at p. 433.)
Here, the trial court presumably found that Covington had legitimate
discovery objectives, since it granted her motion to compel in substantial
part. The court could also have reasonably concluded that this discovery
matter—which involved two individuals who owned and/or managed the
third party deponent—was not so large and complex as to require a greater
effort at informal resolution. We may also fairly assume the court was aware
of the history of this litigation, including prior orders compelling Moore to
respond to Covington’s discovery requests, which, in light of Moore’s role and
purported ownership interest in Acendi, could have reasonably impacted the
court’s view of Acendi’s discovery conduct. Given that Covington had
legitimate discovery objectives in seeking discovery against Acendi but was
met with numerous boilerplate objections and a near complete refusal to
comply, the court could reasonably have found that the prospects for further
success were dim, and that Drucker’s initial letter and follow-up
communications on June 16 constituted an adequate and sincere attempt to
apprise Acendi of the weaknesses of its position. (Obregon, supra, 67
Cal.App.4th at p. 432.)
Acendi criticizes the brevity of Drucker’s initial letter but cites no
authority requiring extensive analysis of each demand and objection in every
case, particularly where, as here, Covington’s position rested on broader
arguments about the relevance of the discovery and the existing protections
afforded to Acendi under the previously issued protective order. Moreover,
Drucker followed up her initial letter with further communications that
reflected a reasonable attempt to narrow the focus of the dispute. When she
did not immediately hear back from Zuromski on her extension request—a
21
miscommunication attributable in part to Zuromski’s failure to send his June
16 email to the person he was purporting to respond to—it appeared
reasonable for Drucker to go forward with filing the motion in the belief that
Zuromski had refused her request for an extension of time.
Finally, Acendi argues that even if the trial court was within its
discretion to accept Covington’s “bare-bones efforts,” it was still an abuse of
discretion for the court to conclude Acendi had no reasonable legal or factual
basis to point out the deficiencies. We are ultimately unpersuaded for two
reasons. First, Acendi’s argument about the motion being premature was
beside the point because the trial court was sanctioning Acendi for its
wholesale refusal to produce documents, which is most naturally understood
as a condemnation of the unreasonable set of objections Acendi served.
Acendi’s sanctionable discovery misconduct was complete (see § 2023.010,
subd. (e)) before Covington’s efforts at meet and confer.
Second, Acendi raised the meet and confer issue in order to convince
the trial court to deny the motion outright, without providing the requisite
facts and argument to support such a consequential decision. “[N]ot every
finding that additional informal resolution efforts are required can be
categorized as a failure so egregious as to justify summary denial of
discovery. Such categorical rulings should be reserved for cases of clear
intent to burden or harass, cases of clear flaunting of statutory
responsibilities, cases of established track records of lack of good faith, and
the like.” (Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 434.) Here, Acendi identified
no conduct reflecting a clear intent on Covington’s part to burden or harass,
or a clear flaunting of statutory responsibilities, or an established track
record of a lack of good faith during discovery. Accordingly, the trial court
could reasonably have concluded that Acendi failed to show this was an
22
“egregious” case justifying summary denial of discovery and that Acendi’s
attempt to have the motion denied outright was not well grounded in law or
fact. (Doe, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434.)
3. Separate Statement
Acendi next contends it was substantially justified in opposing the
motion because Covington failed to submit a separate statement. We may
quickly dispose of this contention.
The California Rules of Court6 provide that a motion to compel
production of documents at a deposition must be accompanied by a separate
statement, which is “a separate document filed and served with the discovery
motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each
discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.” (Rule
3.1345(c).) When a motion fails to include a separate statement, a trial court
is “well within its discretion” to deny the motion. (Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893.) However, a separate statement is not required
“[w]hen a court has allowed the moving party to submit—in place of a
separate statement—a concise outline of the discovery request and each
response in dispute.” (Rule 3.1345(b)(2).)
Here, Acendi acknowledges that Covington included a concise outline in
support of her motion but maintains she was required to obtain prior court
permission to do so. However, rule 3.1345(b) does not impose a prior
permission requirement, and we may reasonably infer from the trial court’s
granting of the motion that it exercised its inherent discretion to accept
Covington’s concise outline in lieu of a separate statement. (See Sinaiko
Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 390, 409, fn. 14 [separate statement rule “does not limit a trial
6 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
23
court’s discretion to compel further answers notwithstanding the absence of a
separate statement”].) The contention is rejected.
4. Partial Success
Acendi next contends the trial court’s finding of no substantial
justification was arbitrary and capricious because the court agreed with
Acendi on many counts and ordered responses that were reduced in number,
substance, and time. We again are unconvinced that Acendi has shown an
abuse of discretion. That the court denied the motion on a handful of
requests, limited the temporal scope of others, and allowed for redactions of
nonparty information does not eclipse the fact that the court rejected Acendi’s
main arguments in support of its flat refusal to comply with most of the
deposition subpoena’s demands. Acendi may have been willing, when
opposing Covington’s motion, to produce documents with a scope
approximating what the trial court eventually ordered, but any such
concession came too late, as Acendi had already engaged in discovery
misconduct by responding to the deposition subpoena with a flat refusal to
produce documents not already in the public domain. (See § 2023.010,
subd. (e).) “The trial court could look at the whole picture of the discovery
dispute and was well within its discretion in rejecting [Acendi’s] claim of
substantial justification.” (Clement, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.)
5. Sanctions Amount—Meet and Confer Efforts
Acendi contends the trial court erred in awarding monetary sanctions
for Covington’s mediation-related expenses because nothing in the Civil
Discovery Act authorizes the award of sanctions for meet and confer efforts,
which must occur prior to the filing of a discovery motion, and because here
the mediation was conducted after Covington filed her motion. This appears
to be an issue of first impression that requires us to interpret the Civil
24
Discovery Act’s provisions on monetary sanctions, misuse of the discovery
process, and the meet and confer requirement.
“ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We begin with the plain language of the statute,
affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and
viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in
the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent.’ [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no
ambiguity in the statutory language.” (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th
1261, 1265.)
Section 2023.030 empowers a court to “impose a monetary sanction
ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process . . . pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result
of that conduct.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) The phrase “as a result of that
conduct” reflects a principle of causation. (Cornerstone, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 790.) It must be shown the expenses requested as sanctions
were reasonably incurred because of the other side’s misuse of the discovery
process. Misuses of the discovery process include failing to respond or submit
to an authorized method of discovery; making, without substantial
justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making or opposing,
unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or
limit discovery; and making an evasive response to discovery. (§ 2023.010,
subds. (d)–(f).)
A propounding party may obtain relief for such conduct by filing an
appropriate motion to compel compliance with its discovery. (See, e.g.,
§§ 2025.450 [compliance with deposition notice], 2025.480 [compliance with
25
deposition subpoena], 2030.300 [further response to interrogatories],
2031.310 [further response to inspection demand], 2033.290 [further response
to request for admission].) Expenses directly associated with such motions
include filing fees, copying costs, and attorney fees incurred in researching
the issues, drafting the moving papers, reviewing any opposition papers,
drafting any reply papers, and attending the hearing on the motion. (See
Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 790 [“Reasonable expenses may
include attorney fees, filing fees, referee fees, and other costs incurred”].)
Attorney fees incurred during efforts to meet and confer are no less
integral to the process of obtaining relief for discovery abuses as these more
direct expenses. As discussed, a motion to compel compliance with a
deposition subpoena “shall” be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.
(§ 2025.480, subd. (b).) The same is required for other types of motions to
compel. (See §§ 2025.450, subd. (b)(2), 2030.300, subd. (b)(1), 2031.310,
subd. (b)(2), 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).) Thus, in order to bring a motion to
compel discovery, the propounding party must first engage in reasonable and
good faith attempts at informal resolution and then document those efforts in
a declaration filed with the motion. A failure to do so may jeopardize the
movant’s ability to obtain relief for the other side’s alleged misuse of the
discovery process. (See Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1438–1439;
Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433–434.) Because the efforts a
movant expends in meeting and conferring are, as a general matter, directly
and causally related to the other side’s misuses of the discovery process, the
costs of such efforts may reasonably constitute compensable expenses
incurred “as a result of that conduct.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).)
Although we are not aware of any case law directly on point, our view is
consistent with decisions interpreting the “as a result of” phrase in section
26
2023.030. For instance, in Ghanooni, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 256, the trial
court awarded the defendants in a personal injury action $3,100 in sanctions
for the plaintiff’s failure to submit to X-rays. Of that amount, $2,100 “was
based on attorney fees and costs defendants incurred in the preparation and
argument of the motion to compel; the remaining $1,000 was imposed as a
penalty on plaintiff for failing to comply with her discovery obligations.” (Id.
at p. 262.) The court concluded the $1,000 amount was impermissible as a
discovery sanction because it “was unrelated to the expenses defendants
incurred in compelling plaintiff to submit to X-rays.” (Id. at pp. 262–263.)
Relying on Lund v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 698 (Lund),7 Ghanooni
held that statutory provisions permitting sanctions for fees incurred “ ‘as a
result of’ ” misuses of the discovery process “ ‘contemplate only that a
defaulting party may be assessed the costs of bringing the motion, including
attorneys’ fees.’ ” (Ghanooni, at p. 262.)
That reasoning applies here. To the extent Covington incurred fees
and expenses in meeting and conferring with Acendi prior to bringing her
motion to compel under section 2025.480, subdivision (b), they are
appropriately considered part of the necessary “ ‘costs of bringing the
motion’ ” to compel Acendi’s compliance. (Ghanooni, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at
p. 262.)
By the same token, meet and confer expenses may be awarded as
sanctions against a propounding party that misuses the discovery process by
7 In Lund, the Supreme Court held that a $1,100 sanctions award was
not authorized where the figure reflected “the costs for the time of two
attorneys and one court reporter who stood by to take a deposition which they
had been told would not be attended by the witnesses (and for which they
served subpoenas after being advised that the court had lost jurisdiction
because of the lapse of five years).” (Lund, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 715.)
27
“[m]aking . . . , unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion
to compel . . . discovery.” (§ 2023.010, subd. (h).) Just as a prevailing movant
incurs meet and confer expenses as part of the “ ‘costs of bringing the
motion’ ” against an entity that misuses the discovery process (Ghanooni,
supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 262), so too does an opponent that prevails
against a movant’s misuse of the discovery process. Accordingly, when a
prevailing opponent incurs meet and confer expenses “as a result of” the
moving party’s misuse of the discovery process, such expenses are
compensable as discovery sanctions. (§§ 2023.030, subd. (a), 2023.010,
subd. (h).)
This is not to say that all meeting and conferring expenses must be
compensated. Like monetary sanctions generally, an award of sanctions for
time spent meeting and conferring must be reasonable in amount.
(§ 2023.030, subd. (a); Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.)
Moreover, the prevailing party’s attempts at informal resolution must be
reasonable and in good faith. (§§ 2016.040, 2023.010, subd. (i).) Thus, an
unreasonable and/or bad faith expenditure of time in the name of meeting
and conferring should not be rewarded, and we again emphasize that the
party requesting sanctions for meet and confer expenses must causally link
the expenses to the other side’s misuse of the discovery process (Cornerstone,
at p. 790). In some cases, meet and confer expenses may not be compensable
because only after an exchange of views in the meet and confer process could
an opponent’s discovery conduct be characterized as lacking “substantial
justification.” (§ 2023.010, subds. (e), (h).) Finally, as with any request for
sanctions, the trial court retains broad discretion to use rational methods to
reduce a requested amount in order to reach a reasonable award.
(Cornerstone, at p. 791; see Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc.
28
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 294 [affirming award of one-third of sanctions
requested]; Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d
1429, 1436–1437 [affirming award of one-quarter of sanctions requested].)
In sum, we conclude, based on the statutory language and available
case law, that costs and fees incurred during the meet and confer process are
not outside the scope of compensable expenses for purposes of monetary
sanctions under the Civil Discovery Act.
Having determined that meet and confer expenses are generally
compensable, we now turn to Acendi’s more specific point that because meet
and confer efforts “are supposed to happen before a motion is filed,” but the
mediation here occurred after Covington’s motion was filed and fully briefed,
the mediation-related fees could not be included in the sanctions award. In
response, Covington criticizes Acendi for taking an inconsistent position on
this issue in the trial court proceedings below, where Acendi sought sanctions
against Covington for its own mediation-related fees and expenses.
Covington further maintains that her mediation-related fees and costs were
reasonably incurred as a result of Acendi’s misuse of discovery because the
mediation was part of a meet and confer process.
We conclude Acendi ultimately has the better position. While there is
no dispute that the mediation sessions in November 2021 and January 2022
constituted further attempts to meet and confer on the discovery dispute in
question, meet and confer expenses are compensable as discovery sanctions
only when they are incurred as part of the “ ‘costs of bringing [or opposing]
the motion.’ ” (See Ghanooni, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 262.) Applying this
principle, we conclude that expenses incurred during a voluntary mediation
of a discovery dispute that occurs after a motion to compel has been filed are
not reasonably construed as part of the costs of bringing that motion. Indeed,
29
nothing in section 2025.480 or any other section of the Civil Discovery Act
requires post-filing meet and confer efforts in furtherance of a pending
discovery motion. To the contrary, a declaration documenting reasonable and
good faith efforts at informal resolution is required only when a motion is
filed. (See, e.g., §§ 2025.450, subd. (b)(2), 2025.480, subd. (b), 2030.300,
subd. (b)(1), 2031.310, subd. (b)(2), 2033.290, subd. (b)(1).)
Certainly, post-motion efforts to informally resolve a discovery dispute
are laudable and may align with the goals of the meet and confer
requirement by mooting the motion entirely or narrowing the issues that
require resolution by the trial court. (See Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1435.) But this is precisely why it would be counterproductive to make
such voluntary conduct subject to monetary sanctions.8
For these reasons, we conclude that after a motion to compel discovery
has been filed, further expenses incurred in meeting and conferring on the
discovery dispute, whether it be through private mediation or normal
channels of communication, are not compensable as discovery sanctions.
Although it is not explicit in the trial court’s orders, we infer that each of the
$25,000 sanctions awards imposed on Rocket Lawyer and Acendi included
some amount of Covington’s mediation-related expenses. In her moving
papers filed before mediation, Covington sought $10,000 in monetary
8 That Acendi also sought mediation-related expenses as monetary
sanctions against Covington does not impact our analysis, which is based on
the plain meaning of the applicable statutes and related decisional
authorities. Although Covington appears to invoke the doctrine of judicial
estoppel in asserting that “Acendi should be bound by its initial position that
the mediation fees are compensable[,]” she fails to discuss the doctrine’s
elements, which do not apply here. (See The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 842 [judicial estoppel applies when same party
has taken two totally inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings and was
successful in asserting first position].)
30
sanctions against Rocket Lawyer, and $7,000 against Acendi. Those amounts
increased to $64,380 against Rocket Lawyer and $30,267 against Acendi in
supplemental declarations submitted after mediation, with the bulk of the
additional expenses relating to mediation preparation and attendance.
Although the trial court did not award Covington the full amounts she
requested, the reductions were not enough to rule out the inclusion of
mediation-related expenses in the final award. Accordingly, we instruct the
trial court on remand to redetermine an appropriate amount of monetary
sanctions against Rocket Lawyer and Acendi without including Covington’s
mediation-related expenses.
DISPOSITION
The portions of the trial court’s orders imposing monetary sanctions on
Rocket Lawyer and Acendi are reversed, and the matter is remanded for the
court’s redetermination of the sanctions award without inclusion of
Covington’s mediation-related expenses. In all other respects, the court’s
orders are affirmed. In the interests of justice, Covington shall recover her
appellate costs as to appeal number A165038; as to appeal number A165039,
each side shall bear its own costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)9
9 We make this costs disposition after granting Covington’s petition for
rehearing on this specific matter and receiving responsive briefing from
Rocket Lawyer. We deem it appropriate to award Covington her costs on
appeal in appeal number A165038 given that Rocket Lawyer did not prevail
on the specific appellate arguments it advanced and merely benefited from a
meritorious contention raised by Acendi in these consolidated appeals. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
31
_________________________
Fujisaki, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Tucher, P.J.
_________________________
Petrou, J.
32
Trial Court: City & County San Francisco Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. David S. Weinberg
Counsel: LTL Attorneys LLP, Prashanth Chennakesavan for
Appellant
Law Office of Ted W. Pelletier, Ted W. Pelletier; Seifert
Zuromski LLP, Richard J. Zuromski Jr for Appellant
Walzer Melcher & Yoda LLP, Christopher C. Melcher and
Cynthia J. Ponce for Petitioner and Respondent
Moore v. Moore (A165038)
Moore v. Moore (A165039)
33