People v. Pineda CA4/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Pineda CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E081270
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI18001635)
MARIO DANIEL PINEDA, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Debra Harris,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Matthew A. Lopas, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B.
Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Mario Daniel Pineda, Jr., was ordered to serve a
previously suspended sentence of four years in state prison after violating the terms of his
probation. He now appeals this order on the grounds that, when the trial court issued it, it
mistakenly believed it was prohibited from considering the nature of his probation
violation. He argues that, by relying on a misunderstanding of the law when it decided to
terminate his probation, the trial court abused its discretion.
The People argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it was not
required to consider the nature of the probation violation; and that, regardless of whether
the trial court committed error, there was no prejudice to defendant because the trial court
would have terminated his probation anyway. Thus, according to the People, reversal is
unnecessary.
We conclude that reversal is warranted. The record shows that the trial court was
mistaken about the scope of its discretion and should, therefore, be given the opportunity
to exercise its full discretionary authority.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2022 defendant pled no contest to one count of domestic violence and one count
of violating a domestic violence restraining order under Penal Code1 sections 273.5,
subdivision (a) and 273.6, subdivision (a), respectively. The charges had arisen from
allegations that, while visiting his girlfriend in violation of a restraining order, defendant
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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struck her in the face and smothered her with an article of clothing. At the time of the
incident, defendant and his girlfriend shared two children, and his girlfriend was pregnant
with their third child.
After entering his guilty plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term
of four years in state prison, but suspended the execution of the prison sentence pending
defendant’s successful completion of probation. However, less than six months after the
trial court granted probation, defendant was accused of violating its terms by failing to
perform his monthly check-in with his probation officer and failing to inform his
probation officer of a change in residence. Defendant’s whereabouts were unknown; and
he did not respond to his probation officer’s contact attempts. He was eventually taken
into custody, after which the trial court held a Vickers2 hearing. The trial court found that
defendant had violated his probation and decided to terminate probation and execute the
suspended prison sentence. Defendant has timely appealed this order.
DISCUSSION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The order in question was issued after a Vickers hearing, i.e., a hearing on a
motion to modify, revoke, or terminate a defendant’s probation. (§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1).)
“The decision whether to reinstate probation or terminate probation (and thus send the
defendant to prison) rests within the broad discretion of the trial court.” (People v.
Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421 (Bolian).)
2 People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451.
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“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court, for example, is unaware of its
discretion, fails to consider a relevant factor that deserves significant weight, gives
significant weight to an irrelevant or impermissible factor, or makes a decision so
arbitrary or irrational that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (In re White (2020)
9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
knew and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390
(Gutierrez).)
However, “when the record indicates the court misunderstood or was unaware of
the scope of its discretionary powers, we should remand to allow the court to properly
exercise its discretion.” (Bolian, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.) This is distinct
from when the record “is merely silent on whether the court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion” (ibid); “[e]rror may not be presumed from a silent record” (People v. Brown
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229).
B. THE APPLICABLE SCOPE OF THE COURT’S DISCRETION
A trial court may “revoke and terminate” a defendant’s probation “if the interests
of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report
of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the
conditions of their supervision . . . .” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) Its discretion, however, “is
not strictly limited to the grounds specified” in this statute. (People v. Pinon (1973) 35
Cal.App.3d 120, 124.)
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Furthermore, California Rules of Court, rule 4.435, specifically states that, when
“deciding whether to permanently revoke supervision, the judge may consider the nature
of the violation and the defendant’s past performance on supervision.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.435(a).)
Here, the trial court found at defendant’s Vickers hearing that defendant had
violated the terms of his probation. It then gave defendant leave to argue “whether or not
to reinstate probation based on the facts of the instant case, or to sentence defendant to
the suspended sentence.” Defendant began by asking the court to “consider reinstating”
probation because his violation was “minimal.” However, the court interrupted
defendant to state, “As you are aware, the Court cannot consider the nature of the
[probation] violation. I have to consider the facts of the instant case on whether or not he
should be granted probation or sentenced to the suspended sentence.” The context of this
exchange indicates that, by “instant case,” the trial court was referring to the underlying
domestic violence convictions.
As defendant has asserted, this was a clear misstatement of the law because the
trial court can consider the nature of the probation violation. This is explicitly stated in
the California Rules of Court. Thus, the record affirmatively shows that the court was
operating under a misapprehension of the scope of its discretion.
The People do not dispute that the court may consider the nature of the probation
violation. They instead argue that this was not an abuse of discretion because the trial
court was not required to consider it. Indeed, as the People point out, the trial court heard
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argument, reviewed the probation office’s recommendation, and considered defendant’s
history of domestic violence with this particular victim. These are not impermissible
considerations; and section 1203.2 permits the court to revoke probation “if the interests
of justice so require.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) Therefore, these facts alone do not point to
an abuse of discretion.
The problem is that the trial court did not simply decline to give weight to the
nature of the probation violation: It specifically expressed its belief that it was prohibited
from considering it. The People argue that the trial court actually meant to convey that it
“would not” consider the nature of the violation, given the court’s discussion of the other
facts of the case. But this argument is entirely conjectural. As in Bolian, “a fair reading
of the court’s comments demonstrates it was not aware of its discretionary power . . . .”
(Bolian, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) Here the court explicitly stated it “cannot
consider the nature of the violation[,]” not that it “would” not consider it. A fair reading
of this comment starts with the presumption that the court meant exactly what it said:
That it believed it was forbidden from giving any weight to the nature of the probation
violation. That the trial court then considered the factors it did believe it had the
authority to weigh is congruent with this interpretation of the court’s words. We see no
reason to second guess what the court explicitly told us.
The record affirmatively shows that the trial court erroneously believed it was
prohibited from considering the nature of defendant’s probation violation. This
misunderstanding of the scope of its authority caused the court to abuse its discretion.
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C. REMAND IS APPROPRIATE
The Supreme Court has held that when “the record before us affirmatively
indicates the trial judge [misunderstood] the scope of his sentencing discretion” and
“nothing in the record excludes the possibility the judge might have exercised his
discretion in defendant’s favor[,]” the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
“to give the trial court an opportunity to exercise its discretion . . . .” (People v.
Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 257-259, superseded by statute on other grounds.) For
the reviewing court to affirm in spite of a finding that the trial court misunderstood its
discretion, the record would need to “clearly indicate that [the trial court] would have
imposed the same sentence had they been aware of the full scope of their discretion.”
(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.)
This is what the People argue in the alternative: That even if the trial court abused
its discretion, remand is unnecessary because “the record clearly indicates that the court
would have reached the same conclusion even if the court had explicitly considered the
nature of the probation violation.” They argue that the trial court had signaled its “firm
position that it would not reinstate probation” when it stated, “ ‘I’ll be glad to entertain
any facts you have to suggest to the Court that this would be a probation case.’ ”
We do not find this statement, or anything else in the record, emblematic of the
trial court’s position on the nature of the violation. If anything, the statement simply
highlights the omission in the record that had been created by the court’s misreading of
the confines of its discretion: Defendant tried to suggest that probation be reinstated
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because the violation that led to his Vickers hearing was minimal. The trial court refused
to “entertain” this argument because it believed it was prohibited from doing so. The
record on this issue is therefore undeveloped, such that we cannot fairly predict what the
trial court would have decided had it considered the argument in full.
In summary, the record does not clearly indicate how the trial court would have
ruled had it known it could consider defendant’s argument about the nature of the
probation violation. Therefore, remand is warranted to permit the court to exercise the
full extent of its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment revoking and terminating defendant’s probation is reversed.
Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to exercise its discretion whether to reinstate probation (either on the same
terms or on modified terms) or terminate probation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
J.
FIELDS
J.
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