In re J.H. CA4/1 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 2/15/24 In re J.H. CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    In re J.H., a Person Coming Under
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    D082851
    SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
    AND HUMAN SERVICES
    AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J520892)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    T.H. et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with
    directions.
    Tracy M. De Soto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant T.H.
    William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
    Defendant and Appellant C.W.
    Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
    County Counsel, and Emily Harlan, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    C.W. (Mother) and T.H. (Father) (together, Parents) appeal from the
    order terminating their parental rights to their daughter, J.H. (Child).
    Parents’ sole contention on appeal is that the San Diego County Health and
    Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court did not comply with
    inquiry requirements pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
    (ICWA), 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq., and Welfare and
    Institutions Code section 224 et seq.1 They request conditional reversal and
    remand for compliance with ICWA.2
    The Agency submitted a letter conceding that a limited remand is
    necessary to ensure ICWA compliance. We agree that a limited remand is
    appropriate. We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s orders and remand
    the matter for compliance with ICWA, subject to reinstatement if the juvenile
    court determines J.H. is not an Indian child.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
    Child was exposed to marijuana and methamphetamine in utero.
    Mother was arrested for a federal probation violation and gave birth while in
    custody. Following Child’s birth, the Agency filed a dependency petition
    1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code.
    2     We deny Mother’s request for judicial notice as it is unnecessary to
    resolve the matter before us. (See generally Riley v. Alameda County
    Sheriff's Office (2019) 
    43 Cal.App.5th 492
    , 518.)
    3     Because the sole issue on appeal relates to the adequacy of the ICWA
    inquiry, we summarize the facts briefly, focusing on the ICWA inquiry.
    2
    under section 300, subdivision (b). Parents denied Native American ancestry.
    At the detention hearing in October 2021, Parents informed the court that
    neither had any known Native American ancestry. At that hearing, the court
    ordered both Parents to complete the “Parental Notification of Indian Status”
    form. Copies of those forms are not included in the record before us.
    At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in November 2021, Mother
    told the court that she may have Native American ancestry through the
    maternal grandfather, though she was not aware of a specific tribe. She
    “barely know[s]” his name and has “no communication with him.”
    Nevertheless, the maternal aunt and maternal great-aunt provided his name
    to the Agency for further ICWA inquiry. The social worker reports indicate
    they mailed formal ICWA inquiries; however, neither copies of the letters nor
    any responses are included in the record. The court terminated parental
    rights at the section 366.26 hearing in September 2023 after finding that
    ICWA did not apply.
    DISCUSSION
    Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation
    of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement
    with non-Indian families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 
    1 Cal.5th 1
    , 7.) In
    dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and the Agency have an
    “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or may be an
    Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) This duty of inquiry extends to asking
    parents, legal guardians, extended family members and others who have an
    interest in the child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) ICWA defines “ ‘extended family
    member’ ” by “the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such
    law or custom, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is
    the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
    3
    law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.”
    (
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c).)
    Mother contends the Agency failed to satisfy its duty of initial inquiry
    under section 224.2, subdivision (b) because it did not ask her available
    extended family members if they had Native American ancestry. Social
    workers spoke with several extended maternal family members throughout
    the life of the case, including a maternal aunt and the maternal great-aunt
    who raised Mother. At the same time, the Agency was aware it had not
    contacted the maternal grandmother or the maternal grandfather, even
    though it is the maternal grandfather who may have Native American
    ancestry. Although the exact relationship is unclear, Mother also argues the
    Agency should have completed an inquiry with Terry L.W.
    Father similarly contends the Agency failed to satisfy its duty of initial
    inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b), asserting it did not ask Father’s
    extended family members if they had Native American ancestry. Social
    workers spoke with Father and the paternal grandmother. The Agency was
    aware of a four paternal aunts and uncles, two of whom lived with the
    paternal grandmother. While the Agency did inquire of the paternal
    grandmother, the mother to Father’s siblings, they did not ask Father’s
    siblings about Native American ancestry.4 The record also does not reflect
    any attempts to contact the paternal grandfather.
    The Agency concedes it failed to comply with the duty of initial inquiry
    with respect to the maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, and
    4     The record is unclear which of Father’s siblings are full siblings and
    share the same father.
    4
    paternal grandfather.5 All parties agree a conditional reversal and limited
    remand is appropriate to complete the initial inquiry.
    Mother contends the Agency should also be required to ask about Terry
    L.W.’s ancestry. Based on the record before us, however, we cannot
    definitively conclude whether Terry qualifies as an extended family member
    for the purposes of ICWA. If so, it may well be appropriate for the Agency to
    inquire as to Terry’s Native American ancestry. But we note that an agency
    is only obligated to make “a good faith effort to gather information about the
    children’s membership status or eligibility” (In re D.F. (2020) 
    55 Cal.App.5th 558
    , 570) and it need not “ ‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive
    investigative leads.” (In re D.S. (2020) 
    46 Cal.App.5th 1041
    , 1053.)
    Father similarly contends the Agency should make inquiries to each of
    his siblings. Aunts and uncles are considered extended family members for
    the purposes of ICWA inquiries; however, half-aunts and half-uncles are not
    included within the definition of “extended family member.” (See 
    25 U.S.C. § 1903
    (2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c) [“ ‘extended family
    member’ . . . defined as provided in [§] 1903” of ICWA].) The Agency is not
    necessarily obligated to make inquiries to a parent’s half-siblings and the
    record before us is not clear which of Father’s siblings are full siblings. In
    5      In light of the Agency’s concession, we do not consider the significance,
    if any, of the prefatory statutory language, “[i]f a child is placed into the
    temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306
    or county probation department pursuant to Section 307 . . . .” (§ 224.2,
    subd. (b); compare In re Robert F. (2023) 
    90 Cal.App.5th 492
    , review granted
    July 26, 2023, S279743; In re Ja.O. (2023) 
    91 Cal.App.5th 672
    , review
    granted July 26, 2023, S280572; In re Andres R. (2023) 
    94 Cal.App.5th 828
    ,
    review granted Nov. 15, 2023, S282054; with In re Delila D. (2023)
    
    93 Cal.App.5th 953
    , review granted Sept. 27. 2023, S281447; In re C.L. (2023)
    
    96 Cal.App.5th 377
    ; In re Jerry R. (2023) 
    95 Cal.App.5th 388
    ; In re V.C.
    (2023) 
    95 Cal.App.5th 251
    .)
    5
    any event, the Agency may be able to resolve questions of Father’s possible
    Native American ancestry through the paternal grandfather. Should this be
    the case, it may not be necessary to conduct inquiries of Father’s siblings,
    full, half, or otherwise.
    Once the Agency complies with initial inquiry efforts with extended
    family members, the court will evaluate if further inquiry is necessary.
    Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights
    and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the Agency and the juvenile
    court to comply with ICWA and section 224.2. (In re Benjamin M. (2021)
    
    70 Cal.App.5th 735
    , 746; In re K.H. (2022) 
    84 Cal.App.5th 566
    , 621.)
    6
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s September 25, 2023 orders terminating parental
    rights to J.H. are conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded with
    directions that the Agency comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and
    section 224.2, including at least the maternal grandmother, maternal
    grandfather, and paternal grandfather. If, after completing ICWA inquiry,
    neither the Agency nor the juvenile court has reason to believe or to know
    that J.H. is an Indian child, the order terminating parental rights to J.H.
    shall be reinstated. Alternatively, if after completing the initial inquiry the
    Agency or the juvenile court has reason to know J.H. is an Indian child, the
    court shall proceed according to statute.
    DATO, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    IRION, Acting P. J.
    BUCHANAN, J.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D082851

Filed Date: 2/15/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/15/2024