Contreras v. Superior Court CA2/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 2/16/24 Contreras v. Superior Court CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
ISRRAEL RODRIGUEZ B331737
CONTRERAS,
(Los Angeles County
Petitioner, Super. Ct. No.
21STCV38701)
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent;
CHAMPION DODGE, LLC, A
CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY DBA CHAMPION
CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM
FIAT et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Rupert A.
Byrdsong, Judge. Petition granted.
Knight Law Group, Roger Kirnos and Jeffrey Mukai, for
Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ongaro PC, Scott S. Shepardson, for Real Party in Interest
FCA US LLC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Isrrael Rodriguez Contreras is the plaintiff in a
lawsuit filed against real parties in interest Champion Dodge,
LLC and FCA US, LLC (FCA). Petitioner contends the trial court
erred when it denied his motion to reconsider the court’s earlier
granting of a motion to compel arbitration. We grant the
petition.
II. BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2019, petitioner purchased a 2019 Dodge
Ram 1500 (the vehicle) from a dealership,1 pursuant to a form
Retail Installment Sale Contract (the sale contract), which
included an arbitration clause.
On October 20, 2021, petitioner filed a complaint alleging
that when the suspension system on his vehicle began to exhibit
“[d]efects and nonconformities,” FCA, the vehicle’s manufacturer,
failed to make necessary repairs or to reimburse petitioner for
the vehicle, in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act (Song-Beverly Act). Petitioner’s complaint also alleged a
cause of action for negligent repair against Champion Dodge.
1 The dealership is not a party to this dispute.
2
On January 6, 2022, FCA filed a motion to compel
arbitration, which Champion Dodge joined. The motion to compel
relied on the arbitration clause of the sale contract, which
provided, in relevant part: “Any claim or dispute, whether in
contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation
and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of
the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees,
agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to
your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this
contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including
any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this
contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral,
binding arbitration and not by a court action.” FCA cited in
support of its motion the Court of Appeal opinion in Felisilda v.
FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486 (Felisilda), in which the
court held that plaintiffs who had entered into a sale contract
that included an identically-worded arbitration clause were
compelled to arbitrate their Song-Beverly claims against the
vehicle’s manufacturer. (Id. at pp. 498–499.) The court in
Felisilda reasoned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which
allows a “‘“nonsignatory defendant [to] invoke an arbitration
clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when
the causes of action against the nonsignatory are ‘intimately
founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying contract
obligations,”’” prohibited plaintiffs from refusing to arbitrate
their claims against the manufacturer. (Id. at p. 495.) The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly claims were
“intimately founded in and intertwined” with the plaintiffs’
obligations under the sale contract, in which they agreed to
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arbitrate “‘[a]ny claim or dispute . . . which arises out of or relates
to . . . [the] condition of this vehicle . . . .” (Id. at p. 496.)
On March 7, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to
compel arbitration.
On June 23, 2023, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration. Petitioner
argued that although at the time the court granted the motion to
compel, Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 486, was the only
appellate opinion to address whether an arbitration clause
contained in a sale contract could require a plaintiff to arbitrate
his claims against a nonsignatory manufacturer, a later-filed
opinion, Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324,
review granted July 19, 2023, S279969 (Ford Motor), expressly
rejected Felisilda’s holding and supported a contrary result. In
Ford Motor, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel did not require plaintiffs to arbitrate their Song-Beverly
claims against a third-party manufacturer because “no plaintiffs
alleged violations of the sale contracts’ express terms. Rather,
plaintiffs’ claims are based on [the manufacturer’s] statutory
obligations to reimburse consumers or replace their vehicles
when unable to repair in accordance with its warranty. . . . Not
one of the plaintiffs sued on any express contractual language in
the sale contracts.” (Ford Motor, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1335.) Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial
of the manufacturer’s motion to compel arbitration. (Id. at
pp. 1336, 1343.)
On July 19, 2023, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion
to reconsider. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court
“acknowledged” that if it had heard the motion to compel
arbitration “following the publication of [Ford Motor],” it would
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have denied it. Nonetheless, it declined to reconsider its earlier
order because it “was the correct decision in March 2022.”
On September 15, 2023, petitioner filed this petition for
writ of mandate challenging the order denying reconsideration.
On October 31, 2023, we issued an alternative writ, tentatively
concluding that “[c]ourts retain the power to reconsider their
orders compelling matters into arbitration based on changes in
the law at any time prior to the entry of judgment” and ordering
the trial court to either “vacate [its] order denying the motion for
reconsideration and analyze the motion in light of the above” or
show cause why a peremptory writ ordering it to do so should not
issue. The trial court did not respond to the order to show cause.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying its
motion for reconsideration. We agree. A motion for
reconsideration, which must be filed within 10 days of service of
written notice of entry of the order, requests that the court
“reconsider the matter” based “upon new or different facts,
circumstances, or law . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)
If “a court at any time determines that there has been a change of
law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may
do so on its own motion and enter a different order.” (Id., subd.
(c).)
“A change in the law is always an appropriate basis, up
until a final judgment is entered, for changing an interim order;
courts retain the inherent power, regardless of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1008, to change their orders at any time prior
to entry of judgment. [Citation.] And the fact that a party brings
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the basis for such a change to the court’s attention, even if via a
motion for reconsideration pursuant to section 1008, and even if
such motion is made after the 10-day period, does not negate this
inherent power.” (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 739,
fn. 10, disapproved of on another ground by Le Francois v. Goel
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107.) We review orders denying a
motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. (Wilson v. The
La Jolla Group (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 897, 921.)
Here, as the trial court acknowledged, changes in the law,
namely, the opinion in Ford Motor, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1324,
supported a reconsideration of the court’s earlier granting of the
motion to compel arbitration. On the same day that the court
denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider, our Supreme Court
granted review of Ford Motor on the following issue: “Do
manufacturers’ express or implied warranties that accompany a
vehicle at the time of sale constitute obligations arising from the
sale contract, permitting manufacturers to enforce an arbitration
agreement in the contract pursuant to equitable estoppel?” (Ford
Motor (S279969, July 19, 2023) [order granting review].)
Although we await further guidance from the Supreme Court, we
note that every other Court of Appeal decision to consider the
issue has rejected Felisilda’s reasoning and concluded that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to permit a third-
party manufacturer to enforce an arbitration clause included as
part of a sale contract to compel arbitration from a consumer.
(See e.g., Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
958, 971–972; Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614,
620; Yeh v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 264, 272, 278.)
Accordingly, the court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to
reconsider.
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IV. DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial
court to vacate its July 19, 2023, order denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and issue a new order granting the
motion. Petitioner Isrrael Rodriguez Contreras shall recover his
costs in this proceeding.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM, J.
We concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
LEE, J.*
* Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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