Bernal v. Evolv Integrated Technologies Group CA4/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 2/21/24 Bernal v. Evolv Integrated Technologies Group CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SAMUEL L. BERNAL,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G061879
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-00992808)
EVOLV INTEGRATED OPINION
TECHNOLOGIES GROUP INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Melissa
R. McCormick, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Appellant Samuel L. Bernal’s request
for judicial notice granted. Respondents KLBED, Inc., All-In Energy Group LLC and
Kenneth Bruce Shaevel’s request for judicial notice denied.
Amezcua-Moll & Associates and Rosemary Amezcua-Moll for Plaintiff
and Appellant Samuel L. Bernal.
Kull + Hall, Robert F. Kull and Kevin P. Hall for Defendants and
Respondents KBLED, Inc., All-In Energy Group LLC and Kenneth Bruce Shaevel.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents Evolv Technologies
Group, Inc. and Inesa International Corp.
* * *
After being terminated from his employment with Evolv Integrated
Technologies Group, Inc. (Evolv), appellant Samuel L. Bernal filed suit against Evolv,
KBLED, Inc. (KBLED), All-In Energy Group LLC (All-In), Inesa International Corp.
(Inesa), Feilo International Trade Co. Ltd. (Feilo), and Kenneth Bruce Shaevel, alleging
he was jointly employed by all. The trial court sustained, without leave to amend,
demurrers by KBLED and Shaevel to most of the claims on the ground the joint
employer allegations were insufficient. The court also sustained, without leave to amend,
KBLED and Shaevel’s demurrers to Bernal’s first cause of action for wrongful
termination in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) (section
1102.5(b)) on the additional ground the claim failed to specify any statute, rule or
regulation violated by the conduct Bernal allegedly reported. Bernal timely appeals those
rulings.
It has long been the rule that “the allegations of the complaint must be
liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.
[Citation.] Even as against a special demurrer a plaintiff is required only to set forth the
essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to
acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.”
(Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 244–245.) We find the joint
employer allegations are sufficient to acquaint the entities with the nature, source, and
extent of the claims. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order sustaining without
leave to amend the demurrers by KBLED and Shaevel to the first, second, third, fifth,
sixth, and seventh causes of action. As to the first cause of action against KBLED and
2
Shaevel for wrongful termination in violation of section 1102.5(b), we also find the court
abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer to that claim without leave to amend,
because Bernal could amend to cure the defect. We reverse the court’s ruling and remand
to allow Bernal leave to amend this claim.
In addition to appealing the trial court’s ruling on the demurrers, Bernal
appeals portions of the default judgment entered against Evolv and Inesa. Following a
prove-up hearing, the court dismissed the breach of contract and wrongful termination
claims against Inesa “for reasons similar to those the court addressed in prior orders with
respect to other defendants”, i.e., the supposedly insufficient joint employer allegations
and insufficient pleading of the wrongful termination claim. Although the court entered
judgment for Bernal against Evolv on the breach of contract and waiting time penalty
claims, it dismissed Bernal’s wrongful termination claim against Evolv, finding the claim
“does not allege sufficient facts showing section 1102.5(b) applies.” Because we find the
joint employer allegations were sufficient, we reverse the court’s dismissal of the breach
of contract claim against Inesa. Because we find Bernal should have been given leave to
amend his wrongful termination claim, we reverse the court’s dismissal of the wrongful
termination claims against both Inesa and Evolv and remand for further default
proceedings following Bernal’s amendment of the claim.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ALLEGATIONS
Bernal filed his initial complaint in May 2018, alleging seven employment-
related causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (2) breach
of contract; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to pay minimum wages; (5) failure to pay overtime
wages; (6) waiting time penalties; and (7) violations of Business and Professions Code
section 17200. Inesa responded with a demurrer, and in December 2018, before the
demurrer was heard, Bernal filed a first amended complaint alleging the same causes of
action. Two of the defendants, Inesa and Evolv, answered the First Amended Complaint,
and three other defendants, All-In, KBLED, and Shaevel, demurred to all causes of action
3
on various grounds, including: (1) the wrongful termination claim failed to identify a
statute or other provision of law allegedly violated by the termination; and (2) the joint
employer and alter ego allegations were insufficient to state a claim against the
demurring defendants.
The trial court sustained the demurrers by All-In, KBLED, and Shaevel to
the first amended complaint with leave to amend. Its order read, in pertinent part:
“Plaintiff alleges that Defendant [Evolv] employed him, yet Plaintiff alleges numerous
employment claims against KBLED, All-In and Shaevel. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to
rely on his alter ego and/or joint employer allegations as support for any of his claims
against KBLED, All-In, or Shaevel, those allegations are conclusory and do not allege
sufficient facts to state alter ego or joint employer liability. With respect to the first cause
of action, the [first amended complaint] does not identify any alleged public policy that
could be the basis of a wrongful termination claim . . . . [¶] . . . In any amended
complaint, Plaintiff should specifically allege the defendant(s) Plaintiff contends is liable
for each cause of action and allege facts demonstrating why each specific defendant(s) is
purportedly liable for each claim. Plaintiff should avoid allegations that lump all
‘Defendants’ together.”
In February 2020, Bernal filed a second amended complaint alleging the
same causes of action, except the title of the first cause of action was changed from
wrongful termination in violation of public policy to wrongful termination in violation of
Labor Code section 1102.5. In it, Bernal made the following allegations: He worked as a
consultant for KBLED in February 2017 on a possible joint venture between KBLED and
Feilo. Shaevel was the chief executive officer and owner of KBLED. In July 2017,
Bernal accepted an oral contract of employment with Evolv, another company for which
Shaevel was chief executive officer. Although the complaint is not specific on the point,
read broadly, the allegations suggest Evolv may have been the possible joint venture
between KBLED and Feilo. Shortly after Bernal’s employment with Evolv began,
4
Shaevel, who acted as if KBLED and Evolv were “one and the same venture,” began
asking Bernal to perform work for KBLED even though Bernal was employed by Evolv.
In December 2017, plaintiff’s employment with Evolv was confirmed in a written
agreement. Days later, Bernal complained to Shaevel and another Evolv board member
that the money Feilo had invested in Evolv was being misused, as Evolv employees were
spending most of their time on work unrelated to Evolv. Several weeks later, Bernal
reported to a Feilo executive that he suspected Shaevel was using Evolv employees to
work on projects unrelated to Evolv’s business. The following day, Bernal reported his
concerns regarding this misuse of Evolv funds to two other Feilo executives. Six days
later, Shaevel suspended Bernal, and five days after that, Shaevel terminated Bernal’s
employment .
All-In, KBLED, and Shaevel demurred to all causes of action in the second
amended complaint on the same grounds argued in their prior demurrer, including: (1)
the wrongful termination claim failed to identify a statute or other provision of law whose
violation Bernal allegedly reported; and (2) the joint employer and alter ego allegations
were insufficient to state a claim.
The trial court sustained All-In’s demurrers to all claims without leave to
amend on the grounds: (1) the second amended complaint did not allege sufficient facts
to state any claim directly against All-In; and (2) the joint employer and alter ego
allegations were insufficient to support any claim against All-In. The ruling as to All-In
is not challenged on this appeal.
The trial court also sustained without leave to amend the demurrers by
KBLED and Shaevel to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action
on the grounds the alter ego and joint employer allegations “do not allege sufficient facts
to state . . . claims against Shaevel and KBLED . . . .” Those rulings are the subject of
this appeal. The court sustained KBLED and Shaevel’s demurrers to the fourth cause of
action with leave to amend.
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Bernal filed his third amended complaint in October 2020. It named
KBLED and Shaevel as defendants on the fourth cause of action for failure to pay
minimum wages and on a newly added eighth cause of action for quantum meruit.
KBLED and Shaevel again demurred. Their demurrers were overruled, and KBLED and
Shaevel answered the third amended complaint in July 2021.
In August 2021, a month after the answers were filed, Bernal moved for
leave to file a fourth amended complaint to “reinstate” the claims against All-In, KBLED,
and Shaevel on which the demurrer to the second amended complaint had been sustained
without leave to amend. At the time Bernal filed this motion, it was set for hearing four
days before the scheduled trial date. Two weeks later, Bernal filed an ex parte
application seeking either to have the motion for leave to amend heard earlier or to
continue the trial date. The ex parte application was denied. Subsequently, for reasons
unrelated to the motion or the ex parte application, the trial was continued to December 6,
2021. On November 4, 2021, the trial court denied Bernal’s motion for leave to file a
fourth amended complaint.
In December 2021, Bernal filed a notice of partial settlement as to KBLED
and Shaevel, requesting they be dismissed on the fourth and eighth causes of action—the
only claims remaining against them. At about the same time, Inesa’s and Evolv’s
answers to the first amended complaint were stricken, and default was entered as to both.1
In August 2022, the trial court held a default prove-up hearing as to Inesa
and Evolv. Following the hearing, the court refused to enter default judgment against
Inesa because “Bernal’s third amended complaint does not state claims against Inesa for
reasons similar to those” addressed in the demurrer orders. The court awarded judgment
against Evolv in the amount of $140,725.81 on the second cause of action (for breach of
contract) and $12,500 on the sixth cause of action (for waiting time penalties) but refused
1
The trial court had granted the motion by counsel for Inesa and Evolv to be relieved and
neither corporate party ever obtained new counsel.
6
to enter default judgment against Evolv on the first cause of action for wrongful
termination on the ground it failed to “allege sufficient facts showing section 1102.5(b)
applies.”
Bernal appeals the following three rulings: (1) the trial court’s order
sustaining the demurrers by KBLED and Shaevel to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth,
and seventh causes of action of the second amended complaint without leave to amend;
(2) the order denying Bernal’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint; and
(3) the order denying Bernal’s ex parte application to advance the hearing on his motion
for leave to file an amended complaint or, in the alternative, to continue the trial. Bernal
also appeals the default judgment as to the dismissal of Evolv on the first cause of action
and the dismissal of Inesa on the first and second causes of action.
DISCUSSION
A. Demurrer
1. Standard of Review
“On appeal from a judgment after an order sustaining a demurrer, we
review the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment on whether the complaint
states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] We give the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and viewing its parts in context.
[Citation.] We deem all properly pleaded material facts as true. [Citation.] We must
also accept as true those facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly
alleged.” (McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1508–1509.) When a
demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, this court reviews for an abuse of
discretion and must “decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can
be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
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2. Joint Employer Allegations
The trial court sustained the demurrers to the second cause of action for
breach of contract without leave to amend on the grounds that neither KBLED nor
Shaevel were parties to the contract and the joint employer and alter ego allegations were
insufficient to state a claim against either of them for breach of contract. The court also
sustained KBLED and Shaevel’s demurrers to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, and
seventh causes of action asserted in the second amended complaint, without leave to
amend, on the ground the joint employer and alter ego allegations were insufficient to
state a claim against either KBLED or Shaevel.
The complaint in a civil action serves the purposes of framing the issues
and notifying the defendant of the basis on which recovery is sought. (Committee on
Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211–212.) “In
fulfilling this function, the complaint should set forth the ultimate facts constituting the
cause of action, not the evidence by which plaintiff proposes to prove those facts.” (Id. at
p. 212.) A complaint is sufficient “if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.”
(Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) Although evidentiary facts are
sufficient to state a claim, California appellate courts routinely hold that alleged
conclusions of law are not. (E.g., Shaw v. City of Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 753.) The distinction between conclusions of law and
ultimate facts is not, however, always entirely clear. “‘“[C]ourts have permitted
allegations which obviously included conclusions of law and have termed them ‘ultimate
facts’ or ‘conclusions of fact.’” [Citations.] What is important is that the complaint as a
whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the
plaintiff is seeking relief. [Citations.]’” (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc.
v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.) As a general matter,
“‘[t]here is no need to require specificity in the pleadings because “modern discovery
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procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that should be required in a pleading.”
[Citation.]’” (Ibid.)
Bare allegations of agency have been held to be allegations of ultimate fact
rather than conclusions of law. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 886, and cases cited therein.) Similarly, the California
Supreme Court has found bare allegations of ownership and negligence to be allegations
of ultimate fact. (Peninsula etc. Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (1950) 34 Cal.2d 626, 629;
Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 154.) Like those allegations,
an allegation that certain parties were joint employers is an allegation of ultimate fact.
This is particularly true because “‘“[t]here is no magic formula for determining whether
an organization is a joint employer. Rather, the court must analyze ‘myriad facts
surrounding the employment relationship in question.’ [Citation.] No one factor is
decisive. [Citation.]”’” (St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 311.)
Evidentiary facts, which need not be pleaded, determine the issue of joint employment.
The most important factor in the equation, however, is the right to control the means and
manner of the work. (Id. at p. 312.)
The second amended complaint alleges Shaevel and KBLED, “exercised
control and supervision over Plaintiff’s employment activities.” We conclude that is
sufficient to allege liability against Shaevel and KBLED on a joint employment theory.
Because the allegations of joint employment are sufficient to support the
first, second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action against Shaevel and KBLED,
it was error to sustain the demurrers on that ground and it is not necessary for us to reach
the issue of the alter ego allegations.2 “A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of
2
KBLED and Shaevel ask this court to take judicial notice of a discovery response in a
separate matter, allegedly concerning the alter ego issue. Because we do not address the
alter ego issue and because the document is not relevant to the claims made in this matter,
the request is denied. KBLED and Shaevel also ask us to take judicial notice of four
other court documents from separate actions. Although court records are subject to
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action to be sustained.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Because either legal theory—joint employer or alter ego—would
support these claims and we have found the joint employer allegations sufficient, the
court’s order sustaining KBLED and Shaevel’s demurrers to the second, third, fifth, sixth,
and seventh causes of action is reversed.
3. Section 1102.5(b) Claim
As noted above, the trial court erred in sustaining KBLED and Shaevel’s
demurrers to the first cause of action, for wrongful termination in violation of section
1102.5(b), on the ground the joint employer and alter ego allegations were insufficient to
state a claim against KBLED or Shaevel. Although the court’s order on the demurrers to
the second amended complaint did not specifically address whether the first cause of
action sufficiently identified the public policy allegedly violated by the termination, the
court’s order on the earlier demurrer did, and the parties address the issue on appeal.
Because our review is de novo, we review the second amended complaint to determine if
the allegations are otherwise sufficient to state a claim for wrongful termination in
violation of section 1102.5(b).
The first cause of action asserts Bernal’s termination violated section
1102.5(b), which reads, in pertinent part: “An employer, or any person acting on behalf
of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or
because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose
information, . . . to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who
has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, . . . if
the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of
state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal
judicial notice (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459), the documents offered by
respondents are not relevant to the dispositive issues on appeal and the request is denied.
(Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.)
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rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the
employee’s job duties.” (Ibid.) To come within the provisions of section 1102.5(b), “the
activity disclosed by an employee must violate a federal or state law, rule or regulation.”
(Mueller v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 809, 821–822.)
Bernal’s second amended complaint does not specifically identify a
“federal or state law, rule or regulation” (Mueller v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 176
Cal.App.4th at pp. 821–822) he reported as having been violated. We therefore look to
the pleading as a whole to determine if it alleges facts that would constitute a violation of
a federal or state law, rule, or regulation. Bernal alleges he reported possible misuse of
Evolv’s funds to Shaevel, another Evolv board member, and three Feilo executives. In
his appellate brief, Bernal now labels this alleged misuse of funds “embezzlement.”
Embezzlement, which is a crime under Penal Code section 504, is sufficient to support a
claim of wrongful termination in violation of section 1102.5(b). (Collier v. Superior
Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1127 [there is “fundamental public interest in a
workplace free from crime” and retaliation for reports of suspicions of illegal conduct
“seriously impairs the public interest”].)
Citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 (Foley),
Shaevel and KBLED argue a complaint of embezzlement cannot support a Labor Code
section 1102.5 claim. Foley does not stand for that proposition. First, Foley involved a
common law claim, not a claim under section Labor Code section 1102.5.3 Second,
Foley involved an employee’s report that his newly hired supervisor was being
3
At the time Foley was decided, Labor Code section 1102.5 did not address internal
employee complaints, but was limited to the protection of employees who disclosed
information to a government or law enforcement agency. Effective 2014, the statute was
amended to protect not only disclosures of information “to a government or law
enforcement agency,” but also disclosures of information “to a person with authority over
the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
correct the violation or noncompliance.” (Stats. 2013, ch. 781, § 4.1.)
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investigated for possible past criminal conduct at his previous employer. The Foley court
found such a report did not implicate public policy because it served only the “private
interest of the employer.” (Foley, at p. 692.) In contrast, an employee’s report to his
employer of present, ongoing unlawful conduct can support a wrongful termination claim
under section 1102.5(b). (Collier v. Superior Court, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1122–
1123 [a petitioner who reported his suspicions of current illegal conduct—including
conduct that may have violated, among other things, laws against embezzlement—
“served not only the interests of his employer, but also the public interest in deterring
crime” and supported a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy].)4
To recover on a wrongful termination claim under section 1102.5(b), a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing he engaged in
protected activity, he was subject to an adverse employment action, and there is a causal
link between the two. (Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 591–
592.) To show protected activity, the plaintiff must show he disclosed “‘“reasonably
based suspicions” of illegal activity.’” (Id. at p. 592.) “‘To have a reasonably based
suspicion of illegal activity, the employee must be able to point to some legal foundation
for his suspicion—some statute, rule or regulation which may have been violated by the
conduct he disclosed.’” (Ibid.) Although Bernal’s second amended complaint included
allegations demonstrating he reported a suspected violation of law, it failed to specify the
law. The allegations are, therefore, insufficient.
Bernal has made clear in this briefing on appeal that the underlying
violation he suspected and reported was embezzlement. The complaint readily could
4
Shaevel and KBLED also cite McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 443 for the proposition that a report of embezzlement does not fall within the
scope of section 1102.5(b). McVeigh, however, determined “Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (b) protects employee reports of unlawful activity by third parties such as
contractors and employees, as well as unlawful activity by an employer.” (McVeigh at p.
471.)
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have been amended to so allege; it therefore was error for the trial court to sustain the
demurrer without leave to amend. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318 [it is an
abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny leave to amend on demurrer when “there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”].) We reverse the
court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer to the first cause of action for wrongful termination
in violation of section 1102.5(b) and remand to allow Bernal to amend.
4. The Motion for Leave to Amend and Related Ex Parte Application
Bernal also appeals the trial court’s rulings denying his motion for leave to
file a fourth amended complaint reinstating his first, second, third, fifth, sixth, and
seventh causes of action against KBLED and Shaevel, as well as his related ex parte
application seeking an earlier hearing date on the motion. Because we reverse the court’s
demurrer ruling on the second amended complaint, these other rulings raised on appeal
are moot, and we do not address them.
B. Default Judgment
Finally, Bernal appeals the portions of the default judgment denying
Bernal’s request to enter judgment against Evolv on the first cause of action and against
Inesa on the first and second causes of action.5 The trial court refused to enter judgment
against Evolv and Inesa on the first cause of action for wrongful termination because it
found “[t]he third amended complaint does not allege sufficient facts showing 1102.5(b)
applies . . . .” As set forth above, that claim is being remanded to allow Bernal leave to
amend. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling finding the allegations insufficient is
reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on the first cause of action
against Evolv and Inesa following the amendment, if any.
In addition, the trial court refused to enter default judgment against Inesa
on the first and second causes of action because it found the joint employer and alter ego
5
Neither Evolv nor Inesa filed a brief in connection with this appeal.
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allegations were insufficient to state a claim against Inesa. As set forth above, the joint
employer allegations are sufficient to state a claim against all the defendants.
Accordingly, the court’s ruling denying default judgment as to Inesa on the first and
second cause of action is reversed.
The default judgment is reversed as to denial of entry of judgment against
Inesa on the first and second causes of action and Evolv on the first cause of action. The
trial court is directed to enter judgment against Inesa, as a joint employer, on the second
cause of action in the amount of $140,725.81 (the amount of damages the trial court
found Bernal proved on his second cause of action for breach of contract claim against
Evolv). The matter is remanded for further default prove-up hearing as to both Inesa and
Evolv on the issue of damages on the first cause of action.6
6
We address briefly Bernal’s assertion that the trial court was biased against his counsel
because that counsel had successfully appealed the trial court’s ruling in another,
unrelated matter. We grant Bernal’s motion requesting judicial notice of the notice of
appeal and unpublished opinion issued in that matter. “Accusations of judicial bias are
serious, and we treat them as such.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1557.) However, “serious accusations against a trial judge . . . had
better be supported by concrete evidence.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit
Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 793.) Bernal has not provided any
evidence of his claim of bias, which relies entirely on the fact that the trial judge here
ruled against him on a demurrer, a motion, and an ex parte application. “[A] judge’s
‘rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial
bias, especially when they are subject to review.’” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th
735, 798.) This argument is without merit.
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DISPOSITION
The order sustaining without leave to amend KBLED and Shaevel’s
demurrers to the second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action in the second
amended complaint is reversed. The order sustaining without leave to amend KBLED’s
and Shaevel’s demurrers to the first cause of action for wrongful termination is reversed
and the matter is remanded to allow Bernal leave to amend that claim. The default
judgment is reversed as to the trial court’s refusal to enter default against Inesa on the
first and second causes of action in the third amended complaint and against Evolv on the
first cause of action; the matter is remanded for further default proceedings on the first
cause of action following amendment, if any. Bernal shall recover his costs on appeal.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
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