In re Lei. P. CA2/3 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 2/22/24 In re Lei. P. CA2/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
    opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    In re Lei. P. et al., Persons                               B323464
    Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                          Los Angeles County
    DEPARTMENT OF                                               Super. Ct. Nos.
    CHILDREN AND FAMILY                                         22LJJP00197A &
    SERVICES,                                                   22LJJP00207A
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    L.P.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
    County, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Affirmed and remanded
    with directions.
    Gina Zaragosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for Defendant and Appellant.
    Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
    Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
    County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    L.P. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s family law
    exit orders terminating dependency jurisdiction over his two
    youngest children, Lev. P. (Lev) (born February 2019) and Lei. P.
    (Lei) (born July 2020). Father challenges the court’s jurisdiction
    findings, arguing there is insufficient evidence that his use of a
    belt to discipline his eldest child, Las. P. (Las) (born January
    2014),1 placed Lei and Lev at risk of being abused or neglected.
    Father also challenges the exit order pertaining to Lev, arguing
    the court erred by recommending he participate in various
    parenting and counseling services and by failing to establish a
    minimum number of visits he is entitled to have each month with
    Lev. We agree the matter must be remanded so that the juvenile
    court can correct the exit order as to Lev by specifying the
    frequency and duration of visits with Lev. In all other respects,
    we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Father has three children: Las, Lev, and Lei. Vanessa L. is
    Las’s mother, Tamera A. is Lev’s mother, and Laura L. is Lei’s
    mother. When the family came to the attention of the
    Department of Children and Family Services (Department), Las
    lived with father, and Lev and Lei lived with their mothers.
    Father was dating Lei’s mother, and she and Lei would
    sometimes sleep at father’s house. Under a family law custody
    order, Lev’s mother had physical custody of Lev, and father had
    1 Father does not challenge any of the court’s orders concerning Las.
    2
    unsupervised weekend visits with the child. Father hadn’t visited
    Lev since February 2022.
    In mid-May 2022, the Department and law enforcement
    began investigating the family after receiving reports that father
    physically abused and refused to feed Las. Las reported that
    father has hit her with a belt “a lot of times.” He recently struck
    her 10 times with a belt, hit her arm with a hairbrush, and threw
    a shoe at her face. Las also claimed Father once punched her
    stomach when she misbehaved. A sheriff’s deputy who
    interviewed Las observed swelling on the child’s right arm,
    multiple belt marks on her thighs and buttocks, and scars caused
    by a belt on both of her legs.
    Father admitted he strikes Las with a belt because she
    often gets in trouble at school and at home. He recently
    “whooped” Las’s buttocks after she was caught touching another
    student’s “private parts.” Father doesn’t hit Las “all the time,”
    and he never struck her with a hairbrush, a shoe, or his fist.
    Father sometimes uses other forms of discipline, such as talking
    to the child or putting her on time out. Father claimed he feeds
    Las three meals a day, but he doesn’t allow her to have snacks
    when she misbehaves.
    Lei’s mother knew father strikes Las with a belt because
    the child has “a lot of behavioral issues at home and school.”
    Father never struck Lei, however.
    Lev’s mother has been Lev’s sole caretaker for over two
    years. Although father has never hit Lev, Lev’s mother was
    concerned for the child’s safety around father because of his use
    of excessive physical discipline on Las.
    The children’s paternal grandmother told the Department
    that she used to hit father with a belt when he misbehaved as a
    3
    child. She told father not to use the same disciplinary method on
    Las because it never worked on him. The grandmother saw a
    “couple” of marks on Las when she helped the child change
    clothes.
    In late May 2022, the Department filed separate
    dependency petitions on behalf of Lei and Lev.2 The petitions,
    which included identical allegations, asserted father physically
    abused Las and caused the child to suffer bruising and swelling
    by striking her arms, thighs, and buttocks with a belt, striking
    her arm with a hairbrush, and punching her in the stomach, and
    that such abuse placed Lei and Lev at risk of serious physical
    harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code,3 § 300, subds. (a), (b), & (j); a-1, b-1,
    and j-1 allegations.) The court found Lei’s and Lev’s petitions
    alleged prima facie cases under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b),
    and (j) and detained the children from father’s custody.
    The Department interviewed the family in June 2022.
    Father confirmed that he hits Las with a belt when she
    misbehaves, and he acknowledged that he could have used “other
    forms of discipline” on the child. Father continued to deny hitting
    Las with a hairbrush, a shoe, or his fist.
    Lei’s mother knew father “gives [Las] whoopings but he
    goes into another room because [Lei] do[es]n’t like loud noise[s].”
    According to Lei’s mother, father would strike Las with a belt
    when the child misbehaved at home or at school. Lev’s mother
    didn’t believe it was inappropriate for father to use a belt to
    strike Las because she never saw bruises on the child. Lev’s
    2 The Department also filed a petition on Las’s behalf.
    3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
    Institutions Code.
    4
    mother claimed she “would’ve stopped it” if father became too
    abusive toward Las. Lev’s mother also claimed Las may have lied
    when she claimed father hit her with a hairbrush and shoe.
    As of late July 2022, father was enrolled in an effective
    parenting program, an anger management program, and
    individual counseling. Father was at risk of being dropped from
    the effective parenting program because he missed a “significant
    amount of classes.”
    The court held the jurisdiction hearing in mid-August 2022.
    As to Lei and Lev, the court dismissed the a-1 and b-1 allegations
    and sustained an amended version of the j-1 allegation.4
    Specifically, the court struck language that father “physically
    abused” Las and replaced it with language that he used
    “excessive [physical] discipline” on the child. The court also
    struck language that father hit Las with a hairbrush, threw a
    shoe at the child’s face, and punched the child in the stomach.
    The court granted Lei’s mother sole physical custody of Lei, Lev’s
    mother sole physical custody of Lev, and father monitored visits
    with each child. As to Lei and Lev, the court terminated
    dependency jurisdiction, pending approval of a family law exit
    order.
    In late August 2022, the court signed Lei’s and Lev’s exit
    orders and terminated dependency jurisdiction. As to Lei, the
    court awarded father monitored visits “3x a week for 3 hours,
    minimum,” and it authorized Lei’s mother, a mutually agreed
    4 The court sustained Las’s petition under section 300, subdivision (b),
    finding father’s use of excessive physical discipline put the child at
    serious risk of physical harm.
    5
    upon monitor, or a professional monitor paid for by father, to
    supervise the visits. As to Lev, the court awarded father
    monitored visitation, and it authorized Lev’s mother, a mutually
    agreed upon monitor, or a professional monitor paid for by father
    to supervise the visits. The court also recommended father
    complete various parenting and counseling services “prior to
    modification” of Lev’s exit order.
    Father appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    1.    Jurisdiction Findings
    Father contends the court erred in sustaining Lei’s and
    Lev’s petitions because the Department failed to prove his use of
    excessive physical discipline on Las endangered their safety. As
    we explain, substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction
    findings under section 300, subdivision (j).
    A court may exercise jurisdiction over a child under section
    300, subdivision (j), where the child’s sibling has been “abused or
    neglected” as defined under subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i) of
    the same statute, if there is “a substantial risk that the child will
    be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” (§ 300,
    subd. (j).) The court “shall consider the circumstances
    surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and
    gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the
    sibling, the mental condition of the guardian, and any other
    factors the court considers probative in determining whether
    there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.) In other words, the
    court should “ ‘consider the totality of the circumstances of the
    child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at
    substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the
    6
    subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j).’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 766
    , 774.)
    The juvenile court doesn’t need to wait until a child is
    seriously injured before asserting jurisdiction if there is evidence
    that the child is at risk of future harm because of the parent’s
    conduct. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 
    7 Cal.App.5th 987
    , 993.) The
    court may consider past events as an indicator of whether the
    child faces a current risk of harm because “[a] parent’s past
    conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013)
    
    217 Cal.App.4th 126
    , 133 (T.V.).) A parent’s denial of wrongdoing
    or failure to recognize the negative impact of the parent’s conduct
    is also relevant to determining risk under section 300. (In re A.F.
    (2016) 
    3 Cal.App.5th 283
    , 293 (A.F.).)
    We review a juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding for
    substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 
    49 Cal.App.5th 195
    , 206.)
    We will affirm the finding if it is supported by evidence that is
    reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re R.V. (2012) 
    208 Cal.App.4th 837
    , 843.) We review the record in the light most
    favorable to the court’s findings and draw all reasonable
    inferences from the evidence in favor of those findings. (In re
    R.T. (2017) 
    3 Cal.5th 622
    , 633.) As we explain, substantial
    evidence supports the court’s findings that father’s use of
    excessive physical discipline on Las placed Lei and Lev at serious
    risk of being abused or neglected under section 300, subdivision
    (j).
    As a threshold matter, father doesn’t dispute that
    substantial evidence supports the court’s finding sustaining
    jurisdiction over Las under section 300, subdivision (b). Indeed,
    the record is replete with evidence that father subjected Las to
    excessive physical discipline. In May 2022, Las told law
    7
    enforcement that father recently struck her 10 times with a belt,
    and she told the Department that she remembers father hitting
    her “a lot of times.” Father confirmed that he frequently strikes
    Las with a belt when she misbehaves, although he denied using
    other forms of physical discipline on the child. The sheriff’s
    deputy who interviewed Las observed scarring and belt marks on
    the child’s legs and thighs, as well as swelling on the child’s arm.
    One of the Department’s social workers also observed swelling
    and redness on Las’s arm, and the child told the social worker
    she had “bruising on her legs and buttock area due to her father
    hitting her with a belt.” (See In re Mariah T. (2008) 
    159 Cal.App.4th 428
    , 438 [mother’s use of a belt to inflict “deep,
    purple bruises” on child supports jurisdiction]; In re David H.
    (2008) 
    165 Cal.App.4th 1626
    , 1645 [mother’s repeated use of belt
    to inflict “bruises, linear red marks, welts and broken skin”
    supports jurisdiction].)
    Nevertheless, father argues, Lei and Lev did not face a risk
    of being abused or neglected because they were differently
    situated than Las. Specifically, father argues, Lei and Lev were
    not at risk of being harmed by him because they were younger
    than Las, lived with their mothers, and did not have the same
    behavioral problems as Las. We disagree.
    Before the Department began investigating him, father had
    access to Lei and Lev. Lei’s mother reported that she and Lei
    often visited father and sometimes slept at his home. Lei’s
    mother also reported that father would strike Las with a belt
    while Lei was at his home. And although father hadn’t seen Lev
    for several months by the time the Department received the
    initial referral, he was entitled to unsupervised visits with her
    every weekend.
    8
    The court also could infer that father would strike Lei and
    Lev with a belt if they misbehaved while under his supervision
    based on his extensive history of doing the same to Las. (See T.V.,
    supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [a parent’s past conduct is a
    good predictor of future behavior].) According to Las, father hit
    her “a lot of times” with a belt when she got into trouble at home
    and at school. Although father claimed he sometimes used other,
    non-violent methods of discipline, he admitted he frequently hit
    Las with a belt when she misbehaved. The children’s paternal
    grandmother and Lei’s mother were also aware that one of
    father’s primary methods of disciplining Las was to strike the
    child with a belt. While Lei and Lev are younger than Las, they
    are still old enough to misbehave. And their younger ages make
    them more vulnerable to suffering serious injury if father were to
    hit them with a belt.
    Importantly, father showed a lack of insight into the
    severity of his disciplinary methods. While father acknowledged
    he could have used less violent means to correct Las’s behavior,
    he also minimized his conduct. He blamed Las for his decision to
    strike her with a belt, and he didn’t believe his use of a belt was
    excessive, despite inflicting several visible injuries on the child.
    (See A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [mother’s failure to
    appreciate seriousness of her conduct supports finding that she
    continued to pose a risk of harm to her child].) And although
    father enrolled in an effective parenting program before the
    jurisdiction hearing, he had missed a “significant” amount of
    classes and was at risk of being dropped from the program. In
    addition, Lei’s mother, the other adult who was sometimes
    present when father struck Las, didn’t disapprove of father using
    9
    a belt to discipline Las, and she minimized his conduct, blaming
    it on Las’s behavioral issues.
    In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
    that father’s use of excessive physical discipline on Las placed Lei
    and Lev at risk of being abused or neglected as required by
    section 300, subdivision (j).
    2.    Recommended Services
    Father next argues the court abused its discretion when, as
    part of Lev’s exit order, it recommended he complete various
    parenting and counseling services. As we explain, father forfeited
    this argument.
    An appellate court “ ‘ordinarily will not consider a
    challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not
    made in the trial court.’ ” (In re Daniel B. (2014) 
    231 Cal.App.4th 663
    , 672.) A parent must raise a specific objection stating the
    ground or grounds on which the objection is based. (Ibid.)
    Likewise, “ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, when a party by
    its own conduct induces the commission of the error, it may not
    claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of
    that error.’ ” (In re G.P. (2014) 
    227 Cal.App.4th 1180
    , 1193
    (G.P.).)
    Here, the record shows father asked the court to issue an
    order recommending he complete various parenting and
    counseling services. At the disposition hearing, father objected to
    any order requiring him to participate in court-ordered services,
    “like parenting, anger management, and/or individual
    counseling.” Father proposed, however, that the “court might
    recommend … [he] complete those programs but not require it as
    an order.” The court agreed with father and, as part of Lev’s exit
    order, recommended that he participate in the following
    10
    parenting and counseling services: “(1) Parenting children with
    Special Needs; (2) Parents Beyond Conflict[;] (3) Individual
    Counseling to address case issues to include appropriate forms of
    age-appropriate discipline, childhood trauma, grief and loss,
    mental health, domestic violence, healthy relationships,
    appropriate coping skills, child safety, protective parenting and
    effective coparenting[;] and (4) Conjoint Counseling with the
    minor when deemed appropriate by child’s respective therapist.”
    Because father requested the court issue an order
    recommending he complete various parenting and counseling
    services, he cannot challenge the recommendations in that order
    on appeal. (G.P., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.) In addition,
    father does not argue he was prejudiced by the court’s
    recommendations or cite any legal authority explaining why
    recommendations, as opposed to requirements, should be
    construed as orders that cannot be changed absent a significant
    change of circumstances.
    3.    Lev’s Visitation Order
    Finally, father argues the court abused its discretion when
    it awarded him monitored visitation with Lev because the child’s
    exit order does not establish a minimum number or frequency of
    visits. We agree.
    The authority to determine the extent of a parent’s
    visitation resides solely with the court. (In re T.H. (2010) 
    190 Cal.App.4th 1119
    , 1123.) While a court may delegate to third
    parties the responsibility for managing the details of visits, such
    as their time, place, or manner, the court must determine
    whether visits will occur as well as the frequency and length of
    visits. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 
    181 Cal.App.4th 1310
    , 1314
    (Rebecca S.).) A court, therefore, abuses its discretion when it
    11
    awards visitation without ensuring that visitation will in fact
    occur. (In re S.H. (2003) 
    111 Cal.App.4th 310
    , 317.) This rule
    applies to exit orders issued when the court terminates
    dependency jurisdiction. (T.H., at p. 1123.)
    Here, Lev’s exit order does not establish the extent of
    father’s visitation with the child. Although the order provides
    that Lev’s mother, a mutually agreed upon monitor, or a
    professional monitor paid for by father may supervise father’s
    visits, it does not specify a minimum number of visits with Lev
    that father is entitled to each month. Nor does the exit order
    specify a minimum number of hours father may visit the child
    each month.5 (See T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124 [by
    failing to specify a minimum number of visits per month, parent’s
    right to visitation was “ ‘illusory’ ”].) The matter, therefore, must
    be remanded to allow the court “ ‘to make a new visitation order
    that specifies both the frequency and duration’ ” of father’s visits
    with Lev. (Rebecca S., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
    5 Unlike Lev’s exit order, Lei’s exit order specifies that father is
    entitled to visit Lei at least three times a week for three hours.
    12
    DISPOSITION
    The exit order as to Lev is remanded to allow the juvenile
    court to specify the frequency and duration of father’s visits with
    Lev. The orders terminating dependency jurisdiction are
    otherwise affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    LAVIN, Acting P. J.
    WE CONCUR:
    EGERTON, J.
    ADAMS, J.
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B323464

Filed Date: 2/22/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/22/2024