People v. From CA4/1 ( 2024 )

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. From CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081103
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCN434168)
PAUL RICHARD FROM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant appeals from a judgment following a conviction on one
felony count of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of section
290.018, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code1 and one misdemeanor count of
giving false information to a peace officer in violation of section 148.9,
subdivision (a). As to each offense, he argues the conviction should be
reversed because there was no substantial evidence to support a necessary
element of the offense, and because the trial court prejudicially erred in
instructing the jury. The Attorney General disagrees, and so do we. Hence
we affirm the convictions.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s 1993 Convictions and His Ensuing Incarceration
In 1993 defendant was charged with five counts of child sex abuse:
three under section 288.5, subdivision (a); and two under section 288,
subdivision (a). Each count was described in a charging document (the 1993
charging document) that included the following notification repeated five
times, once for each count: “NOTICE: Conviction of this offense will require
you to register pursuant to Penal Code section 290. Willful failure to register
is a crime.”
By the time defendant was arraigned, the five counts had been whittled
down to just the three based on section 288.5, subdivision (a). A jury
convicted defendant on these three counts, and there followed a lengthy
period of incarceration.
B. Defendant’s 2022 Release on Parole, His Failure to Register, and
His Re-arrest
In January 2022, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
released defendant on parole. Four months later, on May 19, 2022, two police
officers encountered defendant at a motor home he had acquired following his
1 All statutory references in this opinion are to the Penal Code.
2
release. They instructed him to relocate the motor home because it was
parked on private property. In response to their questions, defendant said
that his name was Steve Oliver Graff, he was not on parole, and he had never
been arrested. But their investigation indicated otherwise, and the
encounter resulted in his arrest on a warrant for violating parole and
providing false information to a peace officer.
C. The Trial
Following the events described above, defendant was tried on the two
counts set forth above.2
At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from a correctional
counselor, a parole agent, and a parole services associate—each of whom had
met with defendant in the months leading to his release on parole, and each
of whom recounted pre-release discussions they had had with him about
requirements associated with registering as a sex offender. The prosecution
also presented testimony from one of the officers who had arrested defendant
in 2022, from a detective, and from a fingerprint expert. The defendant
presented testimony from one witness—himself.
2 Section 290.018, subdivision (b), which is the basis for count one,
states: “Except as provided in subdivisions (f), (h), (i), and (k), a person who
is required to register under the [Sex Offender Registration Act (§ 290 et
seq.)] based on a felony conviction . . . who willfully violates any requirement
of the act . . . is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years.”
Section 148.9, subdivision (a), which is the basis for count two, states:
“Any person who falsely represents or identifies himself or herself as another
person or as a fictitious person to any peace officer listed in Section 830.1 or
830.2, or subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, upon a lawful detention or arrest
of the person, either to evade the process of the court, or to evade the proper
identification of the person by the investigating officer is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”
3
1. Evidence Relating to Defendant’s Identity and to the
Legality of His Conviction
Defendant’s testimony revolved in large measure around the topic of
his identity and, in particular, his assertion that he is not who the records in
this case or in the 1993 case say he is. He acknowledged the existence of a
minute order that had issued following his arraignment in the 1993 case that
indicated he had “state[d] his true name is Paul Richard From.” But he
testified at trial that he had said no such thing: “I did not state that;” in fact
“I made a big, big scene about that.” “There was a requirement to stipulate
that I was Paul From and the biological relative of everybody there,” even
though “the DNA proved I was not” and even though “I objected that I was
not related and [a]m not Paul From.” Rather, “I was born . . . Steve Oliver
Graff.”3 But “they went ahead and stipulated [in the 1993 case] that I was
Paul From;” and, “for 30 years, I’ve been forced to answer to that” name.
Defendant bristled, not only at these circumstances, but also at other
“stuff . . . [he] had been fighting . . . from the very beginning,” including, for
example: the fact that the 1993 charging document does not bear the
signature of a judge; and the fact that the numbering of the counts set forth
in that document does not match the numbering of counts set forth in a 1993
sentencing minute order.4 Based on “fraudulences” such as these, defendant
asserted on direct examination that “I was not legally convicted.” Pressed on
cross-examination with the question, “So you are a convicted sex offender?”
3 From testified that, “about a half a year before [being] arrested” in
1993, he “was given a name that was Paul Richard From.”
4 Whereas the three counts based on section 288.5, subdivision (a), are
numbered I, IV, and V in the 1993 charging document, they are numbered I,
II, and III in the 1993 sentencing minute order.
4
he answered: “According to [the 1993 sentencing minute order], yes.” But
“[a]ccording to what I know, no.”
2. Evidence Relating to Defendant’s Belief as to Whether He
Was Required to Register as a Sex Offender
The prosecution and the defense in the present case stipulated at trial
that “Penal Code section 288.5 requires lifetime registration as a sex
offender” and that “[t]his was the law in 1993 and it remains the law today,”
and the trial court read this stipulation to the jury and took judicial notice
accordingly. But defendant nonetheless testified that, for a variety of
reasons, he had believed otherwise. That is, he said he had believed he was
under no obligation to register. Among the reasons he cited for this belief
were the fact that: he had no recollection of having ever been ordered to
register; records on which he claimed he had relied—including, for example,
an abstract of judgment and the 1993 sentencing minute order—included no
mention of an obligation to register; and, in his mind’s eye, he had not been
legally convicted. (See ante.)
It was for reasons such as these, defendant testified, that he refused in
August 2021 to read through a five-page form entitled Notice of Sex Offender
Registration Requirement when the afore-mentioned correctional counselor
presented it to him. This form included 27 separately enumerated
paragraphs describing obligations of persons required to register as sex
offenders and, next to each of the 27 paragraphs, a space for an inmate to
affix his initials. By way of example, paragraph 6 stated: “I must register in
person . . . within five (5) working days of . . . release from incarceration
. . . with the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over my place(s) of
residence or where I am physically present as a transient. (Pen. Code,
§ 290).”
5
The signature block for this document stated:
“I have been notified of my duty to register as a sex
offender pursuant to Pen. Code, §§ 290-290.024 and 290.01.
I have read or had read to me, and initialed each
registration requirement specified on pages 2, 3, and 4 of
this form. I understand it is my duty to know the
registration requirements . . . . I understand failure to
comply with the registration requirements . . . is
punishable as a criminal offense.
“(NOTE: THIS FORM DOES NOT COMPLETE YOUR
DUTY TO REGISTER. UPON RELEASE FROM
INCARCERATION OR RELEASE INTO SUPERVISION,
YOU MUST REGISTER IN PERSON WITHIN FIVE (5)
WORKING DAYS TO COMPLETE THE REGISTRATION
PROCESS.)”
Defendant did not sign or initial any part of this form. Instead, he
handwrote on the signature line, immediately below the passage quoted
above: “The before court ‘AMENDED INFORMATION’ is NOT SIGNED,
therefore FRAUDULENT”5 and added the initials “P.F.”
Two months later, in October 2021, defendant participated in a three-
way meeting with the parole agent (via videoconference) and the parole
services associate (in person). The parole agent testified that, during this
meeting, he reviewed “line by line” with defendant each condition set forth on
a six-page document entitled Special Conditions of Parole. One of these
conditions stated: “You shall register as a Penal Code 290 sex offender
registrant and comply with all registration requirements pursuant to Penal
5 We presume the words “amended information” were intended to refer
to the 1993 charging document, which (as noted ante) does not bear the
signature of a judge.
6
Code 290 through 290.015.” The parole agent testified that his line-by-line
review of the conditions with defendant proceeded as follows:
“A. I went down for each parole condition and after each
one, I’d ask Parolee From if he understood and he
acknowledged, and I would just keep going. And then
I’d momentarily ask him, do you understand so far the
parole conditions? He would say, yes. And then I
would keep going.
“Q. I want to direct your attention to Penal Code Section
290, special condition, on Page 3 of this form. Can you
tell us how that conversation went when you reviewed
this particular condition with the defendant?
“A. Yes, ma’am. I went over California Penal Code parole
conditions, which addresses [the] duty [to] register as a
sex offender[,] and Parolee From did confirm his
understanding of him having to register as a sex
offender.
“Q. How did he confirm his understanding?
“A. Verbally and physically.
“Q. What do you mean by verbally?
“A. Verbally he said yes and then he nodded his head.”
In somewhat similar fashion, the parole services associate testified
that, when she had met with defendant earlier that same day, she too
reviewed the sex offender registration requirement with him:
“Q. Can you please describe for the jury your conversation
with the defendant regarding the special conditions of
parole?
“A. [I explained] that he had to follow . . . these conditions.
And then I emphasized, basically like I do with
everybody else, that's it’s very important if there are
minors involved, to not have contact with any minors.
And then, so also victims, do not contact any of your
victims. No communication, no contact at all with your
victims of crime, which is very important. And then
the most important rule, and I always emphasize that
7
one, is the registration. You have five working days to
register, to go to a law enforcement agency to register
as a sex offender.
“Q. Why do you emphasize that?
“A. Because that’s one of the conditions, if they violate, it
can bring them back to prison.
“Q. When you told the defendant that, how did he respond,
if anything?
“A. I don’t really recall his reaction, but I do remember
reviewing those with him.
“Q. Did he indicate to you that he didn’t understand?
“A. No.”
The defendant’s description of these meetings agreed in some respects,
and differed in other respects, from the descriptions furnished by the
correctional counselor, the parole agent, and the parole services associate.
According to defendant, the correctional counselor was very polite, the parole
services associate was hostile, and the parole agent was yelling so loudly that
“his voice was . . . distorted” and “you couldn’t understand what he was
saying.” Nevertheless, defendant acknowledged on cross-examination: that
he had been aware at the time of the August 2021 meeting with the
correctional counselor that he might have an obligation to register but had
chosen not to read the document; and that he had been told at the October
2021 meeting with the parole agent and the parole services associate that in
fact he was obligated to register:
“Q. You knew at the time [of the August 2021 meeting
with the correctional counselor] that you needed to
register; correct?
“A. No, I did not. I did not read that far into that. I did
not read that. I assumed there’s a possibility of that,
but that was not what I read. I was looking at the
fraudulent stuff.
8
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“Q. [The parole agent with whom you met in October 2021]
told you that you had to register as part of your parole
condition?
“A. I – yes.”
3. Evidence Relating to Defendant’s Encounter with the
Police Officers Who Arrested Him in 2022
As noted above, during his encounter with the police in 2022, defendant
identified himself as Steve Oliver Graff, said he was not on parole, and
claimed he had never been arrested. He also told the officers that he had a
valid driver’s license. When one of the officers asked him to supply
identification in the form of a driver’s license or social security number, he
said “that is all packed.” Then, after one of the officers expressed a concern
that defendant was acting in a seemingly evasive manner, defendant
furnished a different explanation for his inability to produce identification:
“I’ve never had a Social Security number. . . . I was born without a birth
certificate, because I was born in a house.” When the other officer asked
defendant if he had “ever given a false name,” defendant said: “No.” Then
the conversation continued:
Q. “Were you born under a different name or anything like
that?
A. “Uh, that’s a high likelihood because I, I, I escaped from
a cult a long time ago.
Q. “Okay, so what was your birth name?
A. “I don’t, I was always called Steve Graff.”
(All of these statements were captured using a body-worn camera that one of
the officers was wearing that day.)
At trial, defendant testified that, in making these remarks to the
officers, he was not “trying to be evasive.” He said that Steve Oliver Graff
9
was his actual name, that he had reverted to using that name on several
occasions following his release from prison and prior to the day of his
encounter with the officers, and that he had done so on the orders of
correctional officers:
“A. One [guard] said to disappear and the other said to get
lost. The one said, ‘Do not look back.’ I’ve been
hearing that for a long time, ‘Don’t look back, ignore
anything in your past. You start a new life. Start
over. Don’t look back. Pretend it never happened.’
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“A. When I was . . . being released [from prison], I was told
not to use Paul From. . . I was told use the name you
grew up with and the name I grew up [with] was Steve
Graff. I grew up with that until I got thrown in
prison.”
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“Q. You never told the officer that one of the names that
you go by is Paul Richard From; correct?
“A. I never said that because that was what I was ordered
not to say when I was leaving prison.”
Defendant also cited such statements by correctional officers as a
reason for his not having registered as a sex offender. When asked, “Why
didn’t you make any plans to register,” he answered, “I had no plans at all
because I was told often before leaving and upon leaving . . . [to] forget
everything.”
“I was going specifically by what I was told upon being
released, to forget about everything from today past.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“And that’s what I did.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“I forgot about everything from the bad days past. That’s
why I went forward and started a new life. I was told to
10
start a new life. And that’s exactly what I did. I forgot
about it. And anything that was mentioned by [the
probation agent] that I was supposed to register, he’s the
only one that said anything, if there was anything. Like I
said, I was very confused with the yelling. I had not—I just
went from there, is what I was told to do.”
As for his lack of identification, defendant testified he had never had a
birth certificate or social security number and had been in the process of
attempting to obtain those forms of identification and a driver’s license at the
time of the encounter with the officers. He also testified about various
challenges he had encountered in navigating technology, finances,
government services, housing, and health issues during the period between
his release from prison and his re-arrest.
4. Further Evidence Relating to Defendant’s Identity
The prosecution presented two witnesses who furnished testimony
about fingerprints. The first such witness was the arresting officer, who
testified that, after an initial investigation had revealed no record of a Steve
Graff or of the license number that defendant had provided, he and his fellow
officer arranged for a digital fingerprint scanner to be brought to the site of
the encounter.
Q. And after the defendant’s fingerprints were scanned,
what did it reveal?
A. It came back with the name of Paul From, and it
revealed that he was a parolee at large, and that he
had a felony no-bail warrant.
The second witness who testified about fingerprints was a fingerprint
expert. She testified that she and a second fingerprint expert had compared
fingerprints that had been taken from defendant in connection with this case
against fingerprints that had been taken from the accused in the 1993 case,
and that each expert had independently concluded that the prints from the
11
two different cases “belong to one and the same source,” meaning “they’re all
the same person.”
5. Jury Instructions, Verdict, and Sentence
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty on both
counts, and found prior strike allegations to be true. Thereafter, the trial
court sentenced defendant to a term of incarceration of six years, and
defendant timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
As to each count, defendant contends his conviction should be reversed
because (1) there was no substantial evidence to support a necessary element
of the offense; and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the
jury. We begin with the first of these two contentions.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In considering a contention that a record lacks substantial evidence on
which to convict, we apply “the basic principles which govern judicial review
of a criminal conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary support.” (People
v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) That is, we review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and
of solid value—on which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)
With regard to count one, defendant correctly argues that a person
cannot be guilty of the offense of failing to register as a sex offender in
violation of section 290.018, subdivision (b), unless his failure to register is
willful, and to be willful, the defendant must have known he was obligated to
register. (See People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 752-754 (Garcia) [“in
order to willfully violate” the statute, “the defendant must actually know of
12
his duty to register”].) Here, he contends, the record is lacking in substantial
evidence that he knew he was obligated to register.
As to count two, defendant correctly argues that a person cannot be
guilty of the offense of giving false information to a peace officer in violation
of section 148.9, subdivision (a): (1) unless he has been lawfully detained or
arrested by the officer (cf. People v. Walker (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1392
[“section 148.9 applies only where the false identification is given in
connection with lawful detention or arrest, and does not apply to consensual
encounters with police”]; In re Voeurn O. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 793, 797);
(2) unless he has falsely identified himself to the officer; and (3) unless his
purpose in falsely identifying himself was to evade court process or proper
identification by the officer. Here, he contends, “[t]here was no substantial
evidence . . . that appellant was lawfully detained,” “that appellant knowingly
and intentionally provided a fake name,” or “that he did so in order to avoid
the court process or to avoid presenting proper identification.”
But, notwithstanding defendant’s correct statements of the law, we
find, in our review of the record, plentiful evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value on which the jury could conclude that the
prosecution’s burden on the challenged elements had been satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Focusing first on the elements challenged with regard to count one,
multiple correctional and parole personnel testified that they had informed
defendant, in the months leading up to his release from prison, that he had a
duty to register, and defendant himself acknowledged having been informed
of this duty by at least one of those personnel (the parole agent). “Although
notice alone does not satisfy the willfulness requirement, a jury may infer
from proof of notice that the defendant did have actual knowledge, which
13
would satisfy the requirement.” (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 752.)
Moreover, the jury was at liberty to reject as self-serving and not credible
defendant’s testimony that he did not understand or believe the information
that these persons had conveyed to him. So, too, was it at liberty to reject an
inference that defendant truly believed the information these persons had
conveyed to him must yield to his grievances regarding the 1993 conviction,
to the absence of a reference to such a duty on those of the records of his 1993
conviction on which he says he chose to rely, or to correctional officers’ casual
remarks about forging a new life.
As for count two, we have no difficulty discerning, from the elements of
the record described above, evidence that was reasonable, credible, and of
solid value supporting a conclusion that defendant had been lawfully
detained, that his name was Paul Richard From, and that he was trying to
conceal that fact from the officers when he told them during his detention
that his name was Steve Graff. In his encounter with the officers, defendant
made a series of assertions—about a cult, identification records, his arrest
history, his parole status, and his name—each of which could reasonably be
characterized as unusual, ostensibly evasive, contradictory, or at odds with
law enforcement records that the officers consulted during the encounter or
with fingerprints taken during the encounter. These assertions, especially
when juxtaposed against the law enforcement records and fingerprints,
generated a reasonable suspicion on the part of the officers—and sufficed to
warrant a conclusion on the part of the jury—that information defendant had
provided to the officers, and continued to provide to the officers, was false and
that defendant’s purpose in providing false information was to evade arrest
14
on the outstanding felony warrant.6 Hence there was substantial evidence
on which to conclude the challenged elements had been established.
The jury, moreover, could have found not only that aspects of
defendant’s testimony were implausible, but that such implausible aspects
were mutually reinforcing, such that disbelief as to an aspect of defendant’s
testimony bearing on count one might undercut the jury’s view of his
credibility when testifying about count two, and vice versa. Such evidence
also could have been viewed by the jury, not only as implausible or mutually
reinforcing, but as revealing consciousness of guilt.
B. Instructional Error
As an additional assignment of error, defendant contends his
convictions are tainted by instructional error. Specifically, he contends as to
count one that the court should have given an instruction on the defense of
mistake of law, and as to count two that the court should have instructed the
jury that the prosecution must prove defendant had been lawfully detained or
arrested. As to each of these contentions, our review is de novo. (See People
v. Koenig (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 771, 806 (Koenig) [“We review a trial court’s
refusal to give a requested defense instruction de novo.”]; People v. Serrano
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 909 [“ ‘The independent or de novo standard of
review is applicable in assessing whether [jury] instructions correctly state
the law.’ ”].)
6 During the encounter with the officers, and throughout trial, defendant
repeatedly maintained he was Steve Graff and not Paul From. Indeed, even
after the officers expressed suspicion about his identity and twice told him
“you’re not free to leave,” defendant doubled down by insisting “I was always
called Steve Graff” (italics added)—despite his subsequent testimony at trial
that, “for 30 years, I’ve been forced to answer to” the name Paul From.
15
With regard to the first of these two contentions, we begin by noting
that “ ‘[m]istake of law can be a valid defense when the crime requires
specific intent if the mistake of law negates the specific intent of the crime’ ”
(Koenig, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 806) and that a trial court is obligated to
instruct a jury on that defense if (as here) the defense is consistent with the
defendant’s theory of the case and supported by substantial evidence. (People
v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 775.) However, “a defendant is
entitled to a mistake of law instruction only ‘if the evidence supports a
reasonable inference that any such claimed belief [as to what the law did or
did not require] was held in good faith.’ ” (Koenig, at p. 808; italics added.)
Hence the “instruction is properly refused if circumstances ‘ “indicate that
although defendant may have ‘believed’ he acted lawfully, he was aware of
contrary facts which rendered such a belief wholly unreasonable, and hence
in bad faith.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
In this case, the evidence that defendant says required the trial court to
instruct the jury on mistake of law consists of (1) what defendant describes as
his testimony that he “had never been ordered or instructed by a judge that
he would be required to register pursuant to Penal Code section 290” and (2)
his testimony that the abstract of judgment (which, per the testimony of the
correctional counselor, is a type of document on which “prisoners regularly
rely”) and the 1993 sentencing minute order were silent on the topic of
registration.
This evidence, such as it is, arguably supports a mistake of law defense;
and so, too does defendant’s testimony to the effect that correctional officers
instructed or ordered him to “forget everything” and leave the past behind.
But it is not evidence of a quantum or character that can fairly be said to be
substantial (i.e., reasonable, credible, and of solid value). In this regard,
16
defendant’s testimony did include a statement arguably to the effect that no
judge had ever told him he would be required to register.7 But it also
included a statement to the effect that he had no recollection, one way or the
other, as to whether a judge had told him that.8 And the mere fact that two
of the records on which defendant chose to rely did not mention a duty to
register does not support a reasonable inference that his claimed belief that
he did not have such a duty was held in good faith.
Other evidence, moreover, suggests any such belief was not held in
good faith. By way of example, defendant himself testified that he knew
when he met with the correctional counselor that he might be required to
register. Yet he nonetheless refused to read the notice to this effect. Then he
was told, when he met with the parole services associate and the parole
agent, that he in fact was required to register. Yet, rather than give the
matter due consideration, he instead chose to bury his head in the sand based
on a wholly unsupported contention that his 1993 conviction was invalid, an
arbitrary and irrational conclusion that two documents’ silence regarding a
duty to register negated the existence of such a duty, and a fanciful inference
that casual remarks by correctional officers suggesting he move on with his
life amounted to an order that he conceal his past from authorities by not
registering, thereby absolving himself of a duty that had been imposed for the
very purpose of preventing such concealment. Such heedless indifference and
7 The court reporter’s transcription of this testimony may be garbled: “Q.
Has the judge ever instructed you that you have the order pursuant to Penal
Code section 290? A. He has not.”
8 “Q. When you were in court, were you ever ordered to register? A. I do
not remember . . . I do not remember being ordered that, no.”
17
willful ignorance do not constitute good faith, and did not warrant an
instruction on mistake of law.
As for the charge of giving false information to a peace officer,
defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the
jury that the prosecution was required to prove, not just that defendant
falsely represented or identified himself to the officers to evade the process of
the court or proper identification by the officer, but that he did so upon a
lawful detention or arrest.
Here, at the request of defense counsel, the court instructed the jury
that: “A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she
is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone.” On appeal, defendant argues
that this requested instruction did not go far enough, because it did not
require the jury to find that defendant’s false identification was made in the
context of a lawful detention or arrest.
The Attorney General argues that defendant did not present this issue
to the court, and it is therefore forfeited. But even if the trial court had
refused a requested defense instruction as to what constitutes a lawful
detention and arrest, we would conclude that any asserted error was
harmless. There was no evidence that the officers’ detention and ultimate
arrest of defendant was unlawful in any respect. (Cf. People v. Olguin (1981)
119 Cal.App.3d 39, 44 [“excessive force by a police officer renders unlawful an
otherwise lawful arrest”].) Further, after the officers had detained defendant,
by making it clear that he was no longer free to leave, defendant continued to
insist on the false identity. In the absence of any evidence to suggest that
the detention or arrest was in any way unlawful, the trial court’s error in
failing to give an additional instruction, beyond the instruction requested by
defense counsel, is harmless.
18
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
19