Williams v. Love CA1/5 ( 2024 )

Filed 6/28/24 Williams v. Love CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SHAWNY K. WILLIAMS, as Trustee,
etc.,
A168790
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(City and County of San Francisco
SHANDA LOVE et al., Super. Ct. No. CUD-23-671215)
Defendants and Appellants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In this unlawful detainer action, the trial court granted a
motion for summary judgment—filed by Shawny K. Williams, as
Trustee of the Williams Calderon Trust—and agreed that Shanda
Love, Shannon Williams, and Mashama Nolan (collectively,
appellants) could not show the existence of a triable issue of
material fact after admitting (in discovery responses) the
allegations of the Trustee’s complaint. Accordingly, the trial
court entered judgment—for possession of the premises, past due
rent, and damages—in the Trustee’s favor. Appellants, who have
been proceeding in propria persona at all relevant times, appeal
We resolve this appeal by a memorandum opinion
1
pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration,
standard 8.1, and the First Appellate District Local Rules, rule
19.
1
from that judgment,2 contending that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment because there is a triable issue of
material fact as to whether they agreed to pay the Trustee rent.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2).) We affirm because
appellants wholly fail to meet their burden to demonstrate error.
It is well established that appellate courts must presume a
trial court’s judgment is correct and that errors must be
affirmatively demonstrated on appeal. (Howard v. Thrifty Drug
& Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 443; Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To do so, the appellant
has the burden of providing a record adequate for the task of
determining whether error occurred. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1281, 1295; Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) Accordingly, because we must
make all presumptions in favor of the validity of the judgment,
failure to provide an adequate record means that the issue must
be resolved against the appellant. (Maria P., at pp. 1295-1296;
Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
Here, although appellants suggest that the trial court erred
in concluding there was no triable issue of material fact, the
2 The notice of appeal indicates appellants appeal from a
judgment entered after an order granting summary judgment but
does not include the date that judgment was entered. And the
clerk’s transcript does not contain any judgment. However, the
exhibits appellants filed in support of their petition for writ of
supersedeas, which we previously denied, include a judgment
dated October 13, 2023. Although appellants filed their notice of
appeal after the court’s summary judgment ruling but before the
entry of judgment, we treat their premature notice of appeal as
having been timely filed after the judgment. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(d)(2); Johnson v. Alameda County Medical
Center (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 521, 531 [“[a]n order granting
summary judgment is not appealable—it is the later judgment
that is appealable”].)
2
record—which appellants designated and made no effort to
augment—contains little more than the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment, the trial court’s order denying
reconsideration of the same order, and the notice of appeal.
Notably, the record does not contain the Trustee’s moving papers,
appellants’ opposition to the summary judgment motion, or any
declarations filed therewith. Thus, there is nothing in the record
to support appellants’ assertions that they timely served verified
responses to the Trustee’s requests for admission or that they
otherwise denied the existence of an oral lease agreement.
We are sympathetic to the fact that appellants are
representing themselves without the benefit of an attorney. But
their status as self-represented litigants does not exempt them
from the rules of appellate procedure. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) On this record, we are compelled
to presume that the trial court’s ruling in the Trustee’s favor was
correct. (See Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1295-1296;
Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc., supra, 99
Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 [if the record is inadequate for meaningful
review, “ ‘the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Trustee is entitled to his
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.
Williams v. Love et al. (A168790)
3