People v. Robles CA2/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Robles CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B329594
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA390804
v.
ARMANDO ROBLES, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Armando Robles, Jr. (Robles) appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition to vacate his two attempted murder
convictions and resentence him under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 Robles contends the court abused its discretion when it
denied his petition without holding a hearing on his request to
substitute new counsel. Because the record of conviction
establishes Robles is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law, any error in denying his petition was harmless. We therefore
affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Trial
The People charged Robles and a codefendant each with
two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one
count of shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246). The People
alleged the attempted murders were committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) and for
the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22). The People also
alleged that a principal personally used a firearm during the
commission of the attempted murders (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c),
& (e)(1)).
Robles and his codefendant were tried by the same jury.
The court instructed the jury on the elements of attempted
murder, premeditation and deliberation, and direct aiding and
abetting. (See CALCRIM Nos. 401, 600, & 601.) Relevant here,
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Robles
filed his petition under former section 1170.95, which the Legislature
later renumbered to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion
for ease of reference.
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the court instructed the jury it could convict either defendant of
aiding and abetting attempted murder if it found he knew the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime, the defendant
intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime,
and, through his words or acts, the defendant aided and abetted
the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. (See CALCRIM No.
401.) The court did not instruct the jury on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or any other imputed malice
theory. Nor did the prosecutor argue that the jury could convict
Robles or his codefendant of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or any other imputed malice
theory.2
The jury convicted Robles and his codefendant of two
counts each of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one count each of shooting at
an occupied vehicle (§ 246). The jury also found true that Robles
and his codefendant committed the crimes for the benefit of a
street gang and, as to Robles, that a principal personally used a
firearm. The court sentenced Robles to a total term of 63 years to
life in prison.
2. Robles’s Resentencing Petition
In June 2020, Robles filed his resentencing petition. The
court denied the petition without appointing counsel to represent
Robles or requesting briefing from Robles or the People. The
court found Robles was ineligible for relief because he was
convicted of attempted murder, which at the time wasn’t listed as
an offense eligible for resentencing.
2 In the trial court, the People attached to their response to Robles’s
resentencing petition several exhibits, including copies of the jury
instructions and the reporter’s transcripts from Robles’s trial. We have
reviewed those exhibits.
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After we issued our original opinion affirming the court’s
order denying Robles’s petition, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 775), which made
attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences
theory an offense eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) The Supreme Court granted Robles’s
petition for review and ordered us to reconsider his appeal in
light of S.B. 775. We reversed the court’s order denying Robles’s
petition and remanded the matter for the court to reconsider
whether Robles made a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief.
On March 28, 2023, after the case was remanded to the
trial court, Robles filed a 16-page letter asking the court to
discharge his appointed counsel, who represented him at trial,
and substitute in a new attorney to represent him for purposes of
his resentencing petition. Robles claimed he had a conflict of
interest with appointed counsel because she refused to introduce
at the prima facie hearing on his resentencing petition evidence
that was not presented at trial. The evidence included, among
other things, statements from potential alibi witnesses who
appointed counsel never interviewed before trial. Robles claimed
the evidence contradicted several assertions in the People’s
opposition to his resentencing petition and raised doubts about
whether he should have been convicted of attempted murder.
Robles believed that appointed counsel was reluctant to present
the new evidence because she feared it would tarnish her
reputation and could show she provided ineffective assistance at
trial.
In addition, Robles claimed appointed counsel refused to
include as part of his resentencing petition a request for the court
to strike his sentence enhancements. Robles believed his sentence
was unfair because one of his cohorts who pled to attempted
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murder and admitted gang and personal-use gun allegations
received a lesser sentence. Robles also asserted that his
relationship with appointed counsel was compromised because
they had “too many heated arguments regarding examples of
ineffective assistance of counsel” at Robles’s trial.
Robles attached several exhibits to his letter, including
summaries of two interviews his private investigator had with
potential alibi witnesses.
On March 29, 2023, the court held a hearing on Robles’s
resentencing petition. Robles wasn’t present, and stand-in
counsel appeared in place of appointed counsel. The court noted
that Robles was unable to appear remotely because his prison’s
video equipment wasn’t working.
At the beginning of the hearing, stand-in counsel noted
that Robles made a request under People v. Marsden (1970) 2
Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) to discharge his appointed counsel and
substitute new counsel to represent him for purposes of his
resentencing petition. Stand-in counsel stated it would be
difficult to proceed past the prima facie stage without hearing
what concerns Robles had with his appointed counsel.
The court responded: “[Robles] sent a packet to the court.
They really deal with—he would like to litigate underlying
facts—is not happy with [appointed counsel] for not doing it. [¶]
And if we get past this proceeding, then these issues may be
relevant at that point. I think it’s a misunderstanding as to what
the proceedings are up to this stage. [¶] [Robles’s] comments are
filed. They’ll be part of the court record, but the bottom line is the
only question before me now is is there—because all the boxes
were checked off, we got this far. [¶] Then the next question
becomes after briefing and presentation of the court record,
whether there’s a basis to issue an order to show cause, whether
there’s a prima facie case, order to show cause to have an
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evidentiary hearing, in which case, many of those issues he’s
trying to raise may or may not become relevant. [¶] … [S]o I
understand his frustration. However, we are where we are. So
I’ve read the moving papers that were filed and the response and
as well as the reply. And at this point, I’m ready to conduct the
hearing and move forward.” Over stand-in counsel’s objection, the
court proceeded with the hearing on Robles’s resentencing
petition without Robles present and without ruling on his request
to substitute new counsel.
The court denied Robles’s resentencing petition. The court
found that Robles was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because the record—including the charging documents, the jury
instructions, and the parties’ arguments at trial—showed he was
convicted under a valid theory of attempted murder.
Robles appeals.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 2) (S.B. 1437) eliminated natural and probable
consequences liability for aiding and abetting murder and limited
the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) It also created a mechanism, now
codified in section 1172.6, for a defendant previously convicted of
murder to petition the trial court to vacate his conviction and be
resentenced if he could not now be convicted of murder because of
changes made by the new law. (Lewis, at pp. 959–960.) S.B. 775
later amended section 1172.6 to allow resentencing for a
defendant convicted of, among other crimes, attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v.
Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174; see also § 1172.6, subd.
(a).)
A defendant seeking resentencing under section 1172.6
must file a petition that includes a declaration stating he is
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eligible for relief and indicating whether he wants counsel
appointed to represent him. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b).) Upon receiving
a facially sufficient petition, the court must appoint counsel if
requested and determine whether the defendant “has made a
prima facie case for relief.” (Id., subds. (b)(3), (c).)
Section 1172.6’s prima facie analysis is designed “to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court
may consider the record of conviction and the allegations in the
defendant’s petition. (Ibid.) The court may not engage in
factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion. (Ibid.) If the record of conviction shows the defendant
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, the court may deny the
petition. (Id. at pp. 971–972; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 (Strong).)
Robles contends the court erred when it denied his
resentencing petition without allowing him the opportunity to
address, either in person or remotely, his request to replace his
appointed counsel. When a defendant moves to discharge his
appointed counsel and substitute new counsel, the trial court
must give the defendant the opportunity to express specific
reasons why he believes he is not receiving adequate
representation from his current counsel. (Marsden, supra, 2
Cal.3d at pp. 123–125; People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970,
979.) The court must appoint substitute counsel if the record
clearly shows that “ ‘ “appointed counsel is not providing
adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have
become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that
ineffective representation is likely to result.” ’ ” (People v. Streeter
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 230.)
We need not decide whether the court was required to hold
a hearing on Robles’s request to replace his appointed counsel
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before making its prima facie determination under section 1172.6
because, even assuming the court was required to do so, any error
was harmless. To establish a trial court’s error at the prima facie
stage was prejudicial, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that but for the error, the court would
have issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 973–974; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836.)
Here, Robles was convicted of two counts of premeditated
attempted murder. The jury was not instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or any other imputed malice
theory. Instead, the court instructed the jury only on the
elements of attempted murder and the principles of direct aiding
and abetting, intent to kill, and premeditation and deliberation.
Thus, to find Robles guilty of either count of attempted murder,
the jury was required to find he acted with malice aforethought,
either as the perpetrator of the crime (see CALCRIM No. 600
[attempted murder instruction]) or as the direct aider and abettor
of the crime (see CALCRIM No. 401 [direct aiding and abetting
instruction]). (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848
[S.B. 1437 did not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability
because a direct aider and abettor must possess malice
aforethought].) In other words, the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that Robles is ineligible for resentencing
because he was convicted of attempted murder under a theory
that remains valid notwithstanding changes made to the law of
attempted murder by S.B. 1437 and S.B. 775. (See People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [“if the record shows that
the jury was not instructed on either the natural and probable
consequences or felony-murder doctrines, then the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].)
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Robles does not dispute that the jury was never instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Nor does he
otherwise contend that he was convicted of attempted murder
under an invalid theory. Instead, Robles argues that had the
court granted his request to replace his appointed counsel,
substitute counsel may have been able to show appointed counsel
provided ineffective assistance at Robles’s trial by failing to
present evidence that Robles was not the perpetrator of the
attempted murder. Additionally, substitute counsel may have
been able to proffer new evidence that, had it been presented at
trial, may have caused the jury to reach a different verdict.
Without allowing him the opportunity to further address the
concerns he has with appointed counsel’s performance, Robles
argues, we cannot conclude the court’s refusal to hold a hearing
on his request to replace appointed counsel was harmless. This
argument is misguided.
The filing of a section 1172.6 petition does not afford a
defendant “a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or
attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) Nor
does anything in section 1172.6, subdivision (c) permit the trial
court to consider evidence outside the record of conviction at the
prima facie stage. Instead, the “ ‘purpose of section [1172.6] is to
give defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with
respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-
over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’ ”
(Farfan, at p. 947.) In other words, a defendant seeking
resentencing under section 1172.6 is limited to showing he could
not be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made to sections 188 or 189 by S.B. 1437 and subsequent
legislation (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)), not because he may have
obtained a more favorable verdict but for alleged deficiencies in
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appointed counsel’s performance at trial. (See Farfan, at p. 948;
see also People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1477 [a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be raised on direct
appeal or through a petition for writ of habeas corpus].)
In sum, the record of conviction conclusively establishes
that Robles is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
Thus, Robles has not shown it is reasonably likely that the court
would have issued an order to show cause and held an
evidentiary hearing even if it held a hearing on his Marsden
request and replaced his appointed counsel. (See Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708 [“If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition”].) Any error in the
court’s denial of Robles’s resentencing petition was, therefore,
harmless. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Robles’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
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