People v. Hicks CA4/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 7/3/24 P. v. Hicks CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062746
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1800767)
KRYSTOFFER DEVION HICKS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Timothy J. Hollenhorst, Judge. Affirmed.
Crystal A. Morgan for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Krystoffer Devion Hicks and the victim, L.W., were in
an intimate relationship. After an argument one evening in February 2018,
Hicks returned to the home shared by Hicks, L.W., and their two children,
and murdered her by stabbing her several times. He was convicted of second
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 with a finding that he
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the
murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He was sentenced to 15 years to life followed
by one year for the enhancement.
In this appeal, Hicks makes three claims. First, he contends the
trial court violated the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause by admitting
a video recording of an interview conducted with L.W.’s daughter, who was
five years old at the time. Hicks forfeited this issue by failing to raise it at
trial. Even if he had not forfeited this issue, because the daughter testified at
trial, there was no violation of the confrontation clause, and admitting the
video and transcript of that testimony into evidence, rather than simply
playing it for the jury, was harmless error. Second, he claims the court
erroneously instructed the jury on the now abolished natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a theory of murder. Hicks is simply incorrect on
this point, confusing the natural and probable consequences language in the
definition of implied malice with the entirely separate and now abolished
theory of murder. Finally, he argues the court’s instruction on prior acts of
domestic violence as propensity evidence confused the jury and the court’s
comments following the instruction were incorrect. We disagree and find no
error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
1
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
I
FACTS
At all times relevant, Hicks and L.W. were in a romantic
relationship and lived together. L.W. had a daughter, A., from a previous
relationship, and in 2017 she and Hicks had a son, K., together. Their
relationship was described as “volatile. They loved each other. They argued
and fought a lot.” Their fights were sometimes physical. Hicks testified that
L.W. used a knife to inflict a small cut on his face and on his hand during a
fight while they lived in Nevada. On another occasion, he testified, she hit
him with a bag while he was lying in bed. There was also evidence Hicks
inflicted a number of injuries on L.W., including black eyes on multiple
occasions, bruises on her arms, a “knot” on her forehead, an injury to her lip,
and missing hair on her scalp. Hicks had no convictions for domestic
violence, but had discussions with family where he admitted committing such
acts. After their son was born, Hicks told L.W.’s aunt that he was sorry for
being physical with L.W. and that both of them had anger issues and would
be seeking counseling.
On February 8, 2018, at around 10:40 p.m., Deputy Diego Flores
of the Riverside Sheriff’s Department was dispatched on a domestic
disturbance call to the Moreno Valley apartment complex where Hicks and
L.W. lived with their two children. As Hicks was leaving the apartment and
walking to his car, L.W. threw a brick at his vehicle, shattering the window.
She then threw the brick at him, and he called the police. Flores issued L.W.
a citation, and Hicks left. L.W. and her children, along with her cousin, T.G.,
returned to the apartment.
After this incident, there were some comings and goings. Hicks
and L.W. both returned to the apartment complex around 1:49 a.m.
3
Surveillance video showed L.W. walking to Hicks’s car and speaking to him
for a moment before returning to their apartment. Hicks followed. According
to Hicks, the argument started when they were still outside. L.W. asked him
why he had called the police. When they arrived at the door, L.W. told Hicks
she was hesitant to go inside with him because he might try to hit her. She
eventually entered the apartment.
The children were asleep on a couch near the front door. Hicks
and L.W. were in the kitchen. According to Hicks, they were both frustrated
at that point. The conversation continued and escalated, with both of them
raising their voices. At some point, L.W.’s then five-year-old daughter, A.,
began to witness what was occurring. According to her, Hicks punched L.W.
and kicked her in the stomach, and there was blood on the floor.
Hicks chased L.W. both inside and outside of the apartment.
L.W. suffered multiple stab wounds to her neck, hands and arms, and back.
The hand and arm wounds appeared defensive in nature. The neck wound,
which cut her carotid and auricular arteries, caused profuse bleeding. L.W.
ran out of the apartment screaming for help. Surveillance video showed that
L.W. collapsed to the ground at approximately 2:11 a.m. A friend of a
neighbor tried to assist L.W. Hicks fled the complex in his vehicle. The
police responded to the scene, and L.W. died from the multiple stab injuries.
The police found a significant amount of blood in the apartment’s
entry, kitchen and living room. They also found a large, bloody knife outside
of the apartment in a grassy area. The two children were found on the couch
near the front door, awake and very quiet. The police notified Child
Protective Services (CPS) about the children, and CPS took the children into
custody. A. spoke to social worker Jeanette Austin the night of the murder
4
and later participated in a forensic interview, which we shall discuss in more
detail below.
Hicks was arrested the same night after attempting to evade the
police. He had a large, fresh cut on his finger.
Hicks was charged with one count of murder pursuant to section
187, subdivision (a). It was further alleged he personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon within the meaning of sections 12022, subdivision (b)(1),
and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23).
At trial, Hicks argued self-defense. The jury ultimately found
him guilty of both the murder charge and the enhancement. The court
sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, followed by a one-
year term for the weapon enhancement. Hicks filed a timely appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Statements of the Child Witness
As best we can tell, Hicks concedes both statements—A.’s
statement to Austin after the murder, as recorded in Austin’s notes, and the
contents of the forensic interview—were admissible under hearsay exceptions
pursuant to California law. His complaint appears to be that the court
erroneously admitted the transcript and the video into evidence, rather than
simply allowing the jury to hear their contents. His contention here is that
“these transactions cumulatively resulted in a violation of [Hicks’s]
Constitutional rights.” Separately, he argues that allowing the jury to hear
these statements at all violated the confrontation clause.
In response, the Attorney General argues Hicks forfeited any
confrontation clause claim by not raising it at trial; Hicks’s reply brief did not
5
address this issue. The Attorney General also argues there was no
confrontation clause error because A. testified at trial, and any state law
evidentiary error that occurred by admitting the forensic interview transcript
and video recording were harmless.
1. Procedural History
Prior to trial, the prosecution submitted a motion in limine
seeking to admit A.’s statements to the social worker on the night of the
murder and her later forensic interview. After A. and her brother were taken
into custody, they were taken to the CPS office and slept there for the
remainder of the night. When A. awoke, she and Austin, the social worker,
sat together and colored. Without questioning, A. stated: “[S]omething bad
happened. Daddy was beating up Mommy. He punched her and then there
was blood everywhere. I wanted to talk to him and tell him to stop but I was
scared. I didn’t want to step in all of the blood. Then he kicked her. That
was bad. Mommy ran out the door and said, ‘I’m dying.’ Then the police
came and took Daddy. They put Mommy in the ambulance to fix her and
wipe off all the blood.” The prosecution argued the statement was
“admissible as a spontaneous statement and as past recollection recorded.”
With regard to the forensic interview, the prosecution contended it was
admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1237 as a past recollection
recorded.
At a hearing prior to trial, as to the statement the morning after
the murder, the prosecutor contended that if A. testified at trial and did not
recall the night of the murder, her prior statements were admissible as a past
recollection recorded. The defense raised several points, but did not raise any
issue with respect to the confrontation clause. The court found the statement
6
admissible as an excited utterance, noting the statement was probably also
admissible as past recollection recorded if A. did not remember the events of
the night of the murder.
As to the forensic interview, the court initially deferred ruling
pending A.’s testimony, after which the prosecution could decide if there were
particular portions it wanted to admit.
At trial, A. testified. She was nine years old at the time of trial,
and she understood the difference between the truth and a lie. She
remembered the apartment where she used to live. One night when she was
five years old, something scary happened. It was scary because her mother
and Hicks were “running around,” and A. “didn’t know what was happening.”
A. testified that her mother was “running from [Hicks].” Hicks chased her
mother both in and out of the house. She did not remember what, if
anything, they said to each other. A. remembered seeing blood on the living
room floor. The police came to the house and picked her up off the couch so
she would not step in the blood. She did not remember where the blood came
from and was “super positive” she did not see anyone bleeding.
A. did not remember certain details, and she testified that night
was not something she liked to think about. She stated: “I don’t like to
worry about it because I do other things in life. And then if I worry about
that, then other things don’t get done; so I don’t like to think about it because
I just don’t like to.” She testified that when she was five years old, if she
spoke to the police or the social workers, she would have told the truth.
Defense counsel did not cross-examine A. She was excused subject to recall.
Austin, the social worker, testified next. She testified about the
statement A. had made to her the morning after the murder in accord with
the court’s ruling, reading the statement into the record.
7
The issue of the forensic interview was then revisited outside the
presence of the jury. The interview had been audio and video recorded.2 The
attorneys and the court reviewed a transcript of the interview, and both
counsel agreed that the relevant portions were from pages 9 through 30 of the
interview transcript. Defense counsel argued that none of the interview
should be admitted, but asked that if the court was inclined to admit the
interview, only the specified portions should be admitted. The court
overruled the defense objection and found the interview relevant and
admissible under the hearsay objection as past recollection recorded. The
court noted that A. had testified that her statement to the social workers was
true. The court also overruled the objection based on Evidence Code section
352.
In due course, the court read into the record a stipulation
between the parties that the forensic interview which they would hear is a
true and accurate account of the interview with A. Counsel agreed that the
court reporter was not required to transcribe the video recording of the
interview as it was played for the jury. Both the video recording and the
interview transcript were marked as exhibits. Later, the prosecution made a
blanket request to admit all exhibits into evidence, and defense counsel did
not offer any further objection. The exhibits published to the jury were
received into evidence by the court, including both the video recording and
transcript of the interview.
There was a discussion about whether to make the video
recording of the interview available to the jury in the event of a readback
request. No readback request occurred with respect to A.’s forensic interview.
2
Only the transcript is part of the record on appeal.
8
2. Standard of Review
“‘In determining the admissibility of evidence, the trial court has
broad discretion. . . . A trial court’s ruling on admissibility implies whatever
finding of fact is prerequisite thereto . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘We review the trial
court’s conclusions regarding foundational facts for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] We review the trial court’s ultimate ruling for an abuse of
discretion [citations], reversing only if “‘the trial court exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’”’” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269,
320-321; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
3. Hearsay Objection to A.’s Statement and Forensic Interview
Hicks apparently concedes that A.’s statements—both her
statement to the social worker, as recorded in Austin’s notes, and the forensic
interview—were admissible as a matter of California hearsay law.3 His
complaint appears to be that the video recording and transcript of the
forensic interview were later admitted into evidence.
Evidence Code section 1237, subdivision (b), which addresses the
past recollection recorded hearsay exception, states the writing itself (or in
this instance, writing and video recording) “may be read into evidence, but
3
Hicks appears to confuse the two statements somewhat. The first
statement, which A. gave to Austin after the murder, was not recorded.
Austin wrote down A.’s statement to her, and the court admitted it as a
spontaneous statement, as noted above. It was not separately admitted as an
exhibit. The second statement was the forensic interview, which was both
transcribed and video recorded. Both were admitted into evidence late in the
trial. He offers no argument as to why the first statement, A.’s oral
statement to the social worker, was incorrectly admitted under a hearsay
analysis.
9
the writing itself may not be received in evidence unless offered by an
adverse party.”
We agree that the transcript and video recording of the forensic
interview should only have been read to the jury rather than admitted into
evidence. We conclude, however, that the error here was harmless under the
relevant standard. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) There is simply
no tenable argument that Hicks might have received a more favorable
outcome if the contents of the exhibits had been heard by the jury, but the
writings themselves were not admitted into evidence. The jury would still
have heard the contents of the exhibits, and apparently, hearing them once
was sufficient; the jury never requested a readback of this testimony.
Separate from his confrontation clause argument, Hicks offers no argument
that the admission of the exhibits caused him any prejudice, and we find
none.
4. Confrontation Clause
Hicks next contends that both of A.’s prior statements—her
statement to the social worker after the murder, and the subsequent forensic
interview—should not have been admitted under the confrontation clause.
We disagree.
The confrontation clause states that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., Amend. VI.) “The right to
confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure to object to the
offending evidence; and States may adopt procedural rules governing the
exercise of such objections.” (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S.
305, 314, fn. 3.)
10
Asserting the confrontation clause requires an objection at trial.
“As a general rule, a defendant’s failure to object to an alleged trial error
relieves an appellate court of the obligation to consider the claim on review.
[Citation.] The reason for this rule is to allow the trial court to correct its
errors and ‘to prevent gamesmanship by the defense.’ [Citation.] We have
applied this rule numerous times to find forfeiture of a constitutional right of
confrontation claim.” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 710.) The
Attorney General explicitly argued this in its respondent’s brief, but Hicks
offered no response to this contention at all in his reply brief. We conclude
that Hicks has forfeited this argument.
Even if he had not done so, any claim of confrontation clause
error here is without merit. “‘The Sixth Amendment confrontation clause
does not bar hearsay statements of a witness who testifies at trial and is
subject to cross-examination.’” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 601.)
Hicks appears to assert that A.’s lack of memory as to the events
might make a difference, saying her lack of memory made A. “definitionally
considered to be ‘unavailable.’” This is not the law in California, and the
cases Hicks cites are not confrontation clause cases. “‘[W]hen the declarant
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.’ [Citation.]
This is true even if the witness cannot recall the statement.” (People v.
Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 42.) What matters is the witness’s availability
for unrestricted cross-examination, which was indisputably present here.
(See People v. Perez (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 760, 766.)
Hicks appears to contend that a confrontation clause violation
occurred because he “did not have a chance to confront the witness at the
11
time that she gave these statements,” but he offers no authority for this
argument.
He also claims that he did not have sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine A. because “some of the statements were introduced after she
had been excused from the stand.” The record belies his assertion. After
defense counsel chose not to cross-examine A., she was excused subject to
recall. Hicks cites to no portion of the record where he attempted to recall
her, instead stating A. “was not recalled to the stand.” The burden is on the
party who wishes to elicit testimony to summon the witness to the stand.
Hicks had every opportunity to cross-examine A., and there is nothing in the
record to indicate the trial court prevented him from doing so.
Because we find both forfeiture and no error on the merits of
Hicks’s confrontation clause claim, we need not consider his argument
regarding prejudice.
B. Implied Malice Instruction
Hicks next argues that the court committed error by allowing the
introduction of an unconstitutional alternate theory of murder. Specifically,
he argues that the jury was improperly instructed on the now defunct natural
and probable consequences doctrine. We review claims of instructional error
de novo. (People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 990.)
Hicks, however, offers no citation to the record reflecting the jury
was instructed on the now abolished natural and probable consequences
doctrine. His only argument refers to the inclusion of the natural and
probable consequences language in CALCRIM No. 520, the implied malice
instruction. Although the instruction uses the words “natural and probable
consequence,” it does so in a different context. It is not the same as the
12
abolished natural and probable consequences doctrine, which was set forth in
CALCRIM Nos. 402 and 403. There is nothing in the record to suggest the
jury was given those instructions or otherwise instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.
CALCRIM No. 520 is a lengthy instruction. As relevant here, it
states: “There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and
implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind
required for murder. [¶] The defendant acted with express malice if he
unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] The defendant acted with implied malice if:
[¶] 1. He intentionally committed an act; [¶] 2. The natural and probable
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the time he
acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He
deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (CALCRIM No.
520.)
Although implied malice is partly defined by an act, the “natural
and probable consequences” of which are dangerous to human life, it is not
equivalent to the “natural and probable consequences” theory of murder,
which applied to aiders and abettors. “‘[T]he use of the term “natural
consequences” in the . . . definition of implied malice does not import into the
crime of murder the case law relating to the distinct “natural and probable
consequences” doctrine developed in the context of aiding and abetting
liability.’” (People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 144.) The changes to
the law abolishing the natural and probable consequences doctrine for aiders
and abettors “did nothing to remove implied malice as a basis for a second
degree murder conviction.” (People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997,
1005.)
13
In People v. Carr, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at page 139, which
involved a murder conviction following a drunk driving incident, the court
noted: “Implied malice is not imputed malice. It requires that the
perpetrator actually and personally harbor malice. [I]mplied malice may be
inferred from a defendant’s conduct before, during, and after driving drunk —
not imputed from the bare fact of driving drunk. Petitioner’s contrary
argument is an artificial concoction that takes the words ‘natural
consequences’ and/or ‘natural and probable consequences’ out of their proper
legal contexts and dumps them all together into a confused semantic stew.”
“The natural and probable consequences doctrine is a theory of liability for
aiding and abetting. It made an aider and abettor guilty of a murder
committed by the perpetrator, even if the aider and abettor lacked malice . . .”
(id. at p. 143), if certain other requirements are met.
The murder at issue here does not involve imputed malice. Hicks
was not an aider or abettor – he was the principal and only possible
perpetrator. Not only would instructing the jury on the natural and probable
consequences theory of murder have been illegal, it would have made
absolutely no sense. But there is no evidence that is what happened here.
Instructing the jury on implied malice, however, was not error.
C. Propensity Instruction
Finally, Hicks asserts the trial court’s instruction regarding prior
acts of domestic violence as propensity evidence violated due process, and
further, that the trial court’s comments on the instruction confused the jury.
As pertinent, the court instructed the jury as follows. The
portion of the court’s instructions that are not part of the text of CALCRIM
No. 852 are italicized. Minor changes in language are in nonitalicized
14
brackets. “The next instruction is 852, and this instruction links back to the
reasonable doubt instruction I read to you. Remember I said to you whenever I
say that the prosecution must prove something I mean they must prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell you otherwise? Well, this
is a narrow category of evidence with a different burden of proof; that lower
burden that we talked about, preponderance of the evidence. [¶] . . . [¶]
“The People presented evidence that the defendant committed
domestic violence that was not charged in this case, specifically acts of about
allegedly committed against [L.W.] We had some witness that came in and
said that – offered some evidence on that point.
“Domestic violence includes [(means)] abuse committed against
an adult who is a person with whom the defendant has had a child or a
person whom the defendant dated or is dating.
“In this context ‘abuse’ means intentionally or recklessly causing
or attempting to cause bodily injur[y].
“You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the
uncharged domestic violence. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a
different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more
likely than not that the fact is true.
“More likely than not, 51/49, if we can quantify it, is
preponderance of the evidence.
“If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must
disregard this evidence entirely.
“If you decide that the defendant committed this uncharged
domestic violence, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that
15
evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic
violence; and you may conclude, based on that decision, that the defendant
was likely to commit and did commit the crimes charged here, murder or
voluntary manslaughter [as charged here].
“If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged
domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all
the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is
guilty of murder or manslaughter. The People still must prove the charge
and allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except for
the limited purpose of determining the defendant’s credibility.
“Okay. Let’s take another look at that. We heard some testimony
of people that if you accept that testimony, you would be able to find that Mr.
Hicks committed violence against [L.W.] in the past. It’s not part of the
charges in this case. That evidence, this instruction, tells you may be used by
you to conclude, well, if he did it in the past, maybe he did it this time and
maybe he committed this murder. That’s up to you to decide if you’re going to
use it for that purpose. You may also use it to consider his credibility or
believability.
“Now, the way I suggest you do this is when you go to evaluate
that evidence, that testimony, imagine you have a table; you take that
testimony and set it on the table. You take all of the evidence that was
uncharged -- alleged uncharged acts of domestic violence, and then as part of
your deliberations you ask yourself: Am I satisfied by a preponderance of the
evidence that he did those other acts? Preponderance, remember, more likely
than not.
16
“If you are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he
committed those uncharged acts, then you can take them off the table and you
use it as part of your evidence in this case. If you don’t decide, if you’re unable
to conclude that those acts were committed by a preponderance of the evidence,
then you must disregard it and you must not use it in your deliberations. You
must leave it sitting on that table.”
In his opening brief, Hicks cites only one paragraph of the court’s
instruction in support of his claim that the instruction confused the jury or
was erroneous. From that point, his analysis skips to an explanation of the
admissibility of propensity evidence, in which he seems to concede the
evidence was admissible: “In cases of domestic violence, such as what was
raised in [Hicks’s] case the admission of these ‘other offenses’ as proof of
propensity is permissible.” He then argues that pre-1999 instructions
“effectively authorized a route to conviction on evidence falling short of the
reasonable doubt standard.”4 He does not quote or explain these instructions
or state why they are similar to any part of the instructions actually given.
We find no error. “In assessing a claim of instructional error or
ambiguity, we consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury was misled.” (People v. Tate (2010)
49 Cal.4th 635, 696.) No such reasonable likelihood exists here because the
actual instruction given was CALCRIM No. 852. The additional language the
court added to explain the instruction did not lower the burden of proof;
indeed, the court made it clear that the jury could not use the prior acts to
convict Hicks of murder, but “‘that conclusion is only one factor to consider
4
Moreover, he relies only on Ninth Circuit cases, and does not mention that
in People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 71-74, the California Supreme Court
found the pre-1999 instruction constitutionally permissible.
17
along with all the other evidence.’” (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
513, 541.)
The jury was also instructed elsewhere that Hicks was
“presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People
must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt
unless I specifically tell you otherwise.” The jury was also instructed on the
elements of murder and manslaughter and the union of act and intent.
Taken together with the other instructions, no reasonable juror would find
the court’s comments confusing or interpret them as lowering the burden of
proof required to convict Hicks of murder.
In his reply brief, Hicks claims it was “uncertain” as to whether
the jury relied on the preponderance or reasonable doubt standard to find
him guilty of murder. His claim of jury “confusion” is supported only by one
question from the jury during deliberations: What would happen if the jury
could not unanimously agree on first or second degree murder? Hicks
provides no reason at all why this question should be interpreted as reflecting
jury confusion as to the propensity evidence, the standard required to find
him guilty of murder, or anything else related to this instruction.
The jury was given a correct instruction, and “courts presume
that juries can and will dutifully follow the instructions they are given,
including instructions that limit a jury’s consideration of evidence for certain
purposes or against certain parties.” (People v. Washington (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 19, 26.) Accordingly, Hicks’s claim of instructional error lacks
merit.
As we have found no error, Hicks’s claims of cumulative error
warrant no further discussion.
18
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, J.
GOODING, J.
19