People v. Ruiz ( 2024 )

Filed 9/5/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062596
v. (Super. Ct. No. 08WF0147)
IGNACIO RUIZ, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed.
Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall
D. Einhorn and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In August 2010, Defendant Ignacio Ruiz, Jr., was sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole for crimes he committed at the
age of 16. In March 2023, Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing under section
1170, subdivision (d). This statute allows persons sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed as minors to
petition for resentencing after they have “been incarcerated for at least 15
years.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).)1 The trial court calculated Ruiz’s
period of incarceration based on the date of his sentencing, found he had not
yet been incarcerated for 15 years, and denied the petition on its face.
On appeal, Ruiz contends the court miscalculated the length of
his incarceration. He asserts he became incarcerated in January 2008, when
he was taken into custody for the charges underlying his life sentence. Thus,
he had already been incarcerated for 15 years when he petitioned for relief in
March 2023. The Attorney General agrees with Ruiz’s argument, and so do
we. As such, the court’s order is reversed.
We publish this case since there does not appear to be any
authority interpreting the meaning of “incarcerated” in section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A).
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2008, Ruiz participated in an attack on rival gang
members, which killed one person. Ruiz was 16 years old at the time. A jury
found him guilty of first degree murder, attempted murder, and street
terrorism. Several gang and firearm enhancements and special circumstance
allegations were also found to be true.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
On August 30, 2010, the court sentenced Ruiz to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for the murder charge, a consecutive term of
life in prison with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder charge,
and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
attached to the murder charge. The court stayed Ruiz’s sentence on the street
terrorism charge and struck the gang enhancement tied to the murder charge
for sentencing purposes only. It also imposed a concurrent two-year term for
the gang enhancement tied to the attempted murder charge. Ruiz was
resentenced in 2016, but he was given nearly the same sentence as before.
The court changed Ruiz’s sentence on the gang enhancement tied to the
attempted murder charge and imposed a consecutive 15-year term instead of
a concurrent two-year term.
In March 2023, Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing (the
petition) under section 1170, subdivision (d). This section provides, “When a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years,
the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and
resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A), italics added.) A petition for relief
under section 1170, subdivision (d), must contain several statements (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(2)), which Ruiz included in the petition.2
2 Specifically, Ruiz stated he (1) was under 18 years of age when
he committed the relevant crime, (2) did not have any prior juvenile felony
adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential
for personal harm to victims, (3) committed the offense with at least one
adult codefendant, and (4) had performed acts indicating rehabilitation or the
potential for rehabilitation. He also attached a statement of remorse and
documentation of his rehabilitation efforts to the petition.
3
The court denied the petition on its face, finding Ruiz was
“statutorily ineligible for relief at the present time” because he had not yet
been incarcerated for 15 years. It explained, “[Ruiz] was sentenced to prison
on 08/30/10. [He] is ineligible for consideration for resentencing until at least
2025.”
On appeal, Ruiz argues the court miscalculated the length of his
incarceration by using his sentencing date as the starting point. He contends
his incarceration period began on January 29, 2008, when he was placed in
custody for the relevant charges (he has been in continuous custody since
then). Based on this date, Ruiz asserts he had been incarcerated for more
than 15 years when he filed the petition. The Attorney General agrees and
believes this matter should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration
of the petition.
DISCUSSION
Ruiz’s argument requires us to interpret section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A). Specifically, we must determine when a defendant
becomes “incarcerated” under the statute. Questions of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1138, 1141.) In interpreting a statute “‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’” (Sierra Club v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165–166.)
4
Here, the statute allows defendants to file petitions for
resentencing after they have “been incarcerated for at least 15 years.” (§
1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) It does not define “incarcerated.” “Absent ‘a specific
statutory definition of [that term,] we may “look to [its] plain meaning . . . as
understood by the ordinary person, which would typically be a dictionary
definition.”’” (People v. Walker (Aug. 15, 2024, S278309) __ Cal.5th __ [2024
WL 3819098, at p. *6].)
A review of several dictionaries shows the plain meaning of
“incarcerated” is to put a person in jail or prison. (Merriam-Webster’s Dict.
Online (2024) < https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incarcerated>
[as of Aug. 19, 2024], archived at https://perma.cc/6ARY-3PEJ [defining
“incarcerated” as “confined in a jail or prison”]; Cambridge Dict. Online
(2024) <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/incarcerate>
[as of Aug. 19, 2024], archived at https://perma.cc/Q6BQ-UBPT [defining
“incarcerate” as “to put or keep someone in prison”].) Indeed, in interpreting
another statute, one court has stated that “[t]he plain meaning of
incarcerated is jailed.” (Edgar O. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 13,
17 [interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subd. (e)(1)].)
The trial court believed Ruiz became “incarcerated” when he was
sentenced. But the Legislature did not use the word “sentenced” in section
1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A). Instead, it used the word “incarcerated.” “[T]he
words the Legislature chose are the best indicators of its intent.” (Freedom
Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6
Cal.4th 821, 826.) Based on the plain meaning of “incarcerated,” Ruiz’s period
of incarceration for purposes of a section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), began to
run on January 29, 2008. On that date, Ruiz was placed in jail, i.e.,
incarcerated, for the relevant charges and has remained in jail since then. By
5
the time he was formally sentenced in August 2010, he had already been
incarcerated for over two-and-a-half years.
Because the statute’s plain meaning is clear, we need not review
the legislative history of section 1170, subdivision (d). Regardless, we note
the statute’s history supports our interpretation. It shows the Legislature’s
use of “incarcerated” was meant to clarify that the 15-year eligibility period
was not based a defendant’s sentencing date. Prior to January 1, 2017, the
statute allowed defendants to petition for resentencing when they “ha[d]
served at least 15 years of [their] sentence. (Former Pen. Code, § 1170, subd.
(d)(1)(A)(i), Stats. 2015, ch. 378, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2016, italics added.) However,
effective January 1, 2017, this language was changed by Senate Bill No. 1084
(SB 1084) so a defendant could petition for resentencing after being
“incarcerated for at least 15 years.” A legislative report of SB 1084 explains
this revision was intended to “clarif[y] language that has caused some
confusion in the courts in the following ways: [¶] ‘Clarif[y] that the person
convicted for a crime committed while under the age of 18 and sentenced to
LWOP can submit a petition after he or she has been incarcerated at least 15
years.’” (Sen. Third Reading of Sen. Bill No. 1084 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) Aug.
18, 2016, p. 2, italics added.)
Here, the record shows Ruiz has been continuously incarcerated
for the underlying offenses since January 29, 2008. He filed the petition in
March 2023, more than 15 years after his period of incarceration had begun.
As such, the trial court erred in denying the petition.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. On remand, the trial court should consider
the petition as set forth in section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A).
MOORE, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
BEDSWORTH, J.
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