In re B.A. CA2/4 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/4/24 In re B.A. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re B.A., a Person Coming B326317
Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
22CCJP01618
22CCJP01618A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CARLOS A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Cathy Ostiller, Judge, Ashley Price, Judge
Pro Tem. Affirmed.
The Law Offices of Breana Frankel and Breana Frankel;
and Deborah Dentler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent N.R.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for minor B.A.
Appellant Carlos A. (father) appeals from a juvenile court
order terminating dependency jurisdiction over his daughter,
B.A., and issuing an exit order awarding sole physical and legal
custody to B.A.’s mother, respondent N.R. (mother). We affirm
the order. Father’s counsel specifically requested that mother
receive sole physical custody, and the court did not abuse its
discretion by awarding mother sole legal custody in light of the
unaddressed domestic violence issues in the case.
BACKGROUND
I. Previous Incident
The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in October
2021, after a domestic violence incident. According to everyone
interviewed about the incident, including father and mother,
mother screamed at father and parents pushed one another
before father left the home with B.A. According to the DCFS
summary of the incident, “During the course of the investigation
CSW [children’s social worker] became aware that the parents
had previously ended their relationship and was [sic] having
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difficulties co-parenting. . . . Per the family when the parents
were in a relationship they argued often not [sic] resulting in a
physical altercation. CSW educated the parents of any future
referral being generated and the possible outcomes which might
not be in their favor should there be any more physical
altercations. Both parents report they understood and reported
now that they are both in agreement of how they will provide and
share responsibility and that they don’t foresee any issues.” The
referral was closed as inconclusive.
II. Current Incident and Investigation
Less than six months later, on March 2, 2022, DCFS
received a referral alleging that father and mother engaged in a
violent physical altercation in front of B.A., who was then nearly
three. Father, mother, and B.A. were living together in the home
of father’s brother (paternal uncle) even though father and
mother were no longer romantically involved. Both parents were
drinking before the incident. Mother told the responding CSW
the incident began when father questioned her about receiving a
ride home from a male coworker. Mother reported she became
frustrated with father’s questioning and threatened to call his
pregnant girlfriend, A.M., to tell A.M. that mother and father
were sleeping together. Father tried to take mother’s phone and
began choking her; she bit him. Father then hit mother in the
face five to 10 times with a closed fist. The incident ended when
paternal uncle opened the door to the room in which parents were
fighting and called 911.
According to the police report, paternal uncle stated that he
kicked open the door to a bedroom when he heard arguing and
screaming coming from inside. Paternal uncle told father to
leave and waited with mother to translate for her while she spoke
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to the police. Mother’s statement to police tracks the account she
gave the CSW. According to the police report, mother “had
bruising and swelling of her right eye, swelling and deformity to
the right side of her face and her lower left jaw, a cut on her
bottom lip, and redness on her neck.” She refused ambulance
transport to the hospital but did request and receive a temporary
restraining order.
Police apprehended father outside the home. They
observed “a red mark on his left wrist consistent with a bite
mark,” and mother identified him as the perpetrator of her
injuries. Father denied involvement in any physical altercation
and told police “he did not know anything about the incident nor
where [mother] was at the time of the incident.” He admitted
drinking three or four beers earlier in the evening and said he
“may have fallen earlier.” Police arrested father and transported
him to jail.
Mother told the CSW that she was unable to eat solid foods
for three days due to “the overwhelming trauma” she sustained;
she also had to go to the hospital the day after the incident for an
injection to ease her pain. The CSW noted that mother was “very
emotional,” “still healing,” and “having difficulty talking” nearly
two weeks after the incident. During DCFS’s visit, B.A. appeared
developmentally on target and played with the CSW. B.A. did not
have any marks or bruises on her body.
Mother told the CSW that she wanted DCFS to help her
transition to a new life with B.A., apart from father. She was
“visibly distraught” and refused to return to the area around
paternal uncle’s home for any reason. She and B.A. were living
at a domestic violence shelter, where mother was participating in
parenting classes and individual counseling. Mother’s case
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manager there reported that mother was appropriate with B.A.
and there were no concerns.
The CSW later spoke with father in the jail. He stated he
and mother were no longer in a relationship and he was
expecting a child with his current girlfriend, A.M. He had been
living at paternal uncle’s house with mother because he “had
nowhere to go” after being released from jail in late January
2022; he admitted a history of driving under the influence. He
was convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury (Pen. Code,
§ 273.5) in connection with the current incident in mid-April
2022, and the criminal court issued a 10-year restraining order
protecting mother from him at that time.
Father reported that he and mother previously engaged in
physical altercations, but mother “is always the one who hits me.”
Regarding the current incident, father stated that he and mother
had been drinking beer with neighbors. Father came home first
and tried to take a nap in the living room. When mother came
home, she woke up father, led him to the bedroom, and tried to
take off his clothes. Father resisted, because he was in a
relationship with A.M. Mother then “pushed father to try to
overpower him.” Mother started choking father, and he
accidentally hit her in the face and “busted her lip” with his ring
while trying to protect himself. Father also told the CSW that he
and mother had argued about mother leaving B.A. “in one of her
boyfriend’s cars while she went into the home to get her boyfriend
lunch.” Father did not tell the police any of this at the time of the
incident because he feared they would take B.A. from him.
Father had not communicated with mother and B.A. since the
incident, but told the CSW “he would like to keep his daughter.”
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Paternal uncle told the CSW that father came to the United
States from Honduras three years ago, and mother followed with
B.A. when B.A was about one year old. Paternal uncle
immediately noticed problems between mother and father, whom
he described as “toxic together.” Paternal uncle told father to
move out after the domestic violence incident in 2021 but “after
that, mother did not want to let the father see the child.” Father
moved back into the home after his release from jail in January
2022 because he was unable to live with A.M. Paternal uncle
stated that “both the parents were aggressive and physical
towards each other,” and he “believes mother may have planned
this incident however [sic] he does not justify father’s actions.”
III. Dependency Petition and Initial Hearing
On April 27, 2022, DCFS filed a dependency petition on
behalf of B.A. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.1
It alleged the following identical counts under section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b): “The child, [B.A.]’s mother
. . . and father . . . have a history of engaging in violent
altercations in the child’s presence. On 3/2/2022, the father
grabbed the mother by mother’s neck, choked the mother and
repeatedly struck the mother’s face with the father’s fists, in the
presence of the child, inflicting bruising to the mother’s eye,
swelling and deformity to the mother’s face, redness to the
mother’s neck, and a laceration to the mother’s lip. The mother
bit the father’s arm, inflicting a red mark to the father’s left arm.
The mother grabbed the father’s testicles. On a prior occasion,
the mother choked the father. On prior occasions, the mother
and father engaged in physical altercations. On 4/18/2022, the
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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father was convicted of PC 273.5(a) Inflict Corporal Injury upon
Spouse/Cohab. Such violent conduct on the part of the father and
the mother endangers the child’s physical health and safety,
creates a detrimental home environment and places the child at
risk of serious physical harm damage [sic] and danger.” The
petition also alleged that B.A. was at risk within the meaning of
section 300, subdivision (b) due to father’s current abuse of
alcohol and marijuana and mother’s failure to protect her from it.
DCFS detained B.A. from father, but she remained in mother’s
care.
In advance of the initial hearing, mother filed a request for
a domestic violence restraining order protecting herself and B.A.
from father. At the initial hearing on May 11, 2022, the court
found a prima facie case for jurisdiction over B.A. It detained
B.A. from father, who was still in custody, and ordered monitored
visitation for him. The court ordered B.A. to remain in mother’s
care, and issued a temporary restraining order protecting mother
and B.A. from father. It set the adjudication and restraining
order hearings for June 10, 2022.
IV. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
DCFS filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on June 2,
2022. It reported that B.A. “appeared to be close [sic] bonded
with the mother,” who had no concerns about B.A.’s well-being or
development. Mother told DCFS that she had a picture of B.A.
with father, and B.A. “saw it and did not want to let it go. [B.A.]
said that she want [sic] to see him.” It appears that B.A. had not
seen father; the only visitation documented in the report is a 15-
minute phone visit on May 23, 2022. Mother was not present
during the visit, which a CSW monitored. Mother said she did
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not “want [father] to have any visits.” She added, “I don’t want
him to know anything about us. I want him out of our lives.”
A dependency investigator (DI) interviewed mother about
the allegations.2 Mother told the DI that on the day of the
incident, she and father had been drinking with the neighbors.
Mother returned home around 9:00 p.m. to watch a movie with
B.A. Father came home around midnight, entered the room, and
took off his clothes. He then began questioning mother about her
coworker. Mother responded that the coworker had just given
her a ride and asked father why he was asking, since he and
mother were no longer in a relationship. Father became upset
and told mother she had been texting his girlfriend and to “stop
bothering” her. Mother said she would text her if she wanted to.
Mother grabbed her phone, and father “jumped on top of [her]
and said no” and “grabbed” her neck. Mother told father to leave
and began to have difficulty breathing. Father said, “I will kill
you,” but released mother after she bit his hand. Parents fell to
the floor, which woke B.A., who started yelling for mother.
Father continued trying to grab mother’s neck; she responded by
“grabbing his balls.” Mother then ran for the door, but father
grabbed her hair, pushed her to the floor, and started punching
her in the face. Father continued striking mother until paternal
uncle knocked down the door.
Mother reported that father had consumed five beers that
day and was drunk at the time of the incident. When asked
about the substance abuse allegation, she reported that father
“drinks a lot.” Mother stated that she does not drink, though she
2 For reasons unclear from the record, the DI did not
interview father. The parties agreed to continue the adjudication
hearing so father could be interviewed.
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also said she had one beer on the day of the incident. The DI
noted that DCFS “will continue to assess mother’s potential
alcohol use despite her denying excessive use,” given the
circumstances of the incident.
DCFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain all
allegations in the petition and declare B.A. a dependent. It
recommended that B.A. stay in mother’s care, and that mother
receive family maintenance services including parenting classes,
domestic violence victims’ classes, and individual counseling.
DCFS further recommended that father continue to receive
monitored visitation, monitored by someone other than mother,
and “enhancement services”3 including parenting and anger
management classes, domestic violence perpetrators’ classes,
individual counseling, and on-demand drug and alcohol testing.
V. Continuance and Supplemental Report
On June 10, 2022, the court continued the adjudication
hearing so DCFS could interview father. It held the restraining
order hearing as scheduled, however, and issued a three-year
permanent restraining order protecting mother and B.A. from
father with a “carve out for visitation.”
On July 7, 2022, DCFS filed a supplemental report. It
documented a June 26, 2022 interview with father, who told the
DI that on the day of the incident, he was working on a car
outside and saw mother leave the house with B.A. around 3:00
3 Enhancement services are offered to a parent not retaining
custody and are designed to enhance the child’s relationship with
that parent by requiring the parent to address the issues
underlying jurisdiction. Enhancement services are not designed
to reunify the child and parent. (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 197, 212-213.)
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p.m. Mother and B.A. returned around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. “in a
man’s car.” Mother left B.A. in the car while she went into the
house. Father “did not like that” because B.A. “is a little girl and
you can’t leave her alone with a man I don’t know.” At around
8:00 p.m., father finished working on the car and went to the
neighbors’ house to drink. He returned home around 9:00 p.m.,
while mother stayed later. Father tried to sleep in the living
room, but when mother got home she grabbed his hand and told
him to go to the bedroom because she wanted to have sex. Father
said no and reminded mother he had a girlfriend. Mother then
said she would text his girlfriend. Father told mother to leave his
girlfriend alone and grabbed mother’s phone. Mother then began
hitting father. She grabbed him by the neck and pushed him to
the floor. When he tried to push her away, she bit his arm.
Father then “backhanded” mother, but “did not measure [his]
swing” because he was drunk and “ripped her lip open.” Paternal
uncle broke down the door, and mother blamed father for the
incident. Paternal uncle kicked father out of the home. Father
stated that on previous occasions mother had hit and slapped
him, and “tried to cut me with a knife while I had the baby.”
When asked about his substance use, father denied using
drugs. He said he drank about 12 beers “from Friday to
Saturday.” Father denied having a drinking problem, explaining,
“If there is beer I would drink but if not I would not. Also, if I
have to do things or care for my daughter I would not drink.”
Father stated that he and B.A. loved one another. When he
called her on the phone, she said she missed him. Father enjoyed
playing with and caring for B.A., and he fed her and paid for
childcare. He told the DI, “I would do the classes but I want my
daughter back when I am done.”
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DCFS reiterated its previous recommendations.
VI. Adjudication
The court held a combined jurisdiction and disposition
hearing on July 13, 2022. After reviewing the evidence and
hearing argument from counsel, the court concluded that
“mother’s statements are more credible than father’s rendition of
what happened. When first interviewed by law enforcement,
father claimed not to know anything about the incident or not
remember anything about the incident. It was unclear to me.
However, mother had significant facial injuries such that she was
unable to eat solid food for three days after the incident. That is
more consistent with repeated blows to the face which is what
mother indicated happened.” The court further found that the
violence was not mutual, and mother had been defending herself.
The court accordingly ordered the language referring to mother
stricken from both counts relating to the incident. It sustained
both domestic violence allegations as modified, finding that “it’s
sufficient for an (a) count” because “B.A. was on the same bed
that the parents were on when the fighting began.” The court
found a “lack of nexus” between father’s “excessive” drinking and
any risk to B.A., however, so it dismissed the allegation related to
substance abuse and said it would “address those issues in
disposition.”
At disposition, the court declared B.A. a dependent and
removed her from father, citing “the level of violence in this
domestic violence incident right next to the child. The child was
calling out for her mother during the incident. It was clearly very
traumatizing to the child, and the court believes that father has
some unresolved issues he needs to work on in his case plan.”
The court ordered father to complete a 52-week domestic violence
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program, parenting classes, anger management classes,
individual counseling, and on-demand or random drug and
alcohol testing. The court ordered monitored telephonic
visitation “until father is released from custody” and gave DCFS
discretion to liberalize. The court ordered mother to participate
in individual counseling, complete a program for victims of
domestic violence, and comply with the terms of the protective
order issued by the criminal court. The court set the matter for a
section 364 six-month review hearing on January 11, 2023.
VII. Status Review Report
DCFS filed a status review report on December 23, 2022, in
advance of the six-month review hearing. DCFS reported that
B.A. remained placed with mother, who had cooperated with
DCFS throughout the proceedings. It described B.A. as “a loving,
curious, and happy toddler” who was “easy going and can be
soothed or self-sooth when upset.” B.A. “appear[ed] to be well-
bonded to both mother and father.”
DCFS reported that mother had provided B.A. with a safe
and healthy home environment and met all B.A.’s needs. It
further stated that mother “has demonstrated she has acquired
the necessary skills to foster healthy relationships and continue
providing safety and permanency for her daughter.” At a child
and family team meeting involving mother and B.A., mother
stated that her goals were to provide B.A. with a safe and loving
home and for DCFS to close the case.
DCFS reported that father had “shown progress in
completing his court ordered services.” He enrolled in an 18-
month “treatment program” at The High Road in July 2022, and
was scheduled to complete it in January 2024. His counselors
there reported that he was in compliance with the programming,
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and had attended 10 individual and nine group counseling
sessions and one parenting class. Father’s enrollment letter and
contract for The High Road, both in Spanish, were attached to
the report. Father tested negative for substances three times but
missed his scheduled tests four times; he told the DI that his
employer’s attendance policies and his involvement in other
court-ordered services made it difficult for him to test
consistently.
Father had four in-person and seven virtual visits with
B.A. The CSW who monitored the visits noted that B.A. was
“happy and comfortable in the presence of her father,” and father
was “engaged during play and activities” with her. Father
brought toys, clothing, and food to the visits, and redirected B.A.
appropriately. At a child and family team meeting involving
father and B.A., father stated his goal was “to continue having a
relationship with his daughter . . . and see her on a frequent and
consistent basis.” Father also stated that he was “committed to
complete all is [sic] court ordered programs” and wanted to be a
better father and role model to B.A.
DCFS recommended that jurisdiction be terminated with a
family law or exit order granting parents joint legal custody of
B.A. and mother sole physical custody, with monitored visits for
father.
VIII. Termination of Jurisdiction and Exit Order
The court held the six-month review hearing on January
11, 2023. At the outset, the court noted DCFS’s recommendation
and asked counsel for their arguments.
Counsel for B.A. argued that mother should receive both
sole legal and physical custody. She noted that the status review
report had not mentioned father participating in or completing a
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domestic violence program, and asserted that was “prima facie
evidence that the causes for jurisdiction still exist.” She
continued, “I don’t know how these parents can co-parent if
father hasn’t done anything to address the underlying issues of
DV. . . . DV is the physical manifestation of issues of power and
control. There is a restraining order. I don’t believe that co-
parenting can be effectively done as long as the father – I don’t
see any evidence that he has addressed the underlying DV issue.”
Minor’s counsel further asserted that an order of joint legal
custody “would preclude special immigrant juvenile findings”4 for
B.A., and thus would “compromise her ability to obtain legal
documentation in the United States.” Mother’s counsel joined
these arguments. She added that mother “is very uncomfortable
4 Special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status is a federal
immigration status created “to protect certain immigrant
children and allow them to remain in the United States when it
would not be in their best interests to be returned to their home
countries.” (Guardianship of Saul H. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 827, 837.)
A child may apply for SIJ status if “(1) the child is a dependent of
a juvenile court, in the custody of a state agency by court order,
or in the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the
court; (2) it would not be viable to reunify the child with one or
both parents because of ‘abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a
similar basis found under State law’; and (3) ‘it would not be in
the [child’s] best interest to be returned to the [child’s] or parent’s
previous country of nationality or country of last habitual
residence.’” (Id. at pp. 837-838.) “Each of these predicate
findings must be made in state court proceedings. [Citation.] A
state court order containing these findings is a required
component of an immigrant child’s application to the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services for special
immigrant juvenile status, which allows the child to seek lawful
permanent residence in the United States.” (Id. at p. 838.)
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with having to go through co-parenting with a restraining order
in place and not having a relationship with the father,” and
asserted that “having to go through the father to make any
decisions” about B.A. would “put so much pressure” on mother.
Father’s counsel asked the court “to follow the
recommendation of joint legal and sole physical to mom.” She
emphasized that father was “engaged in some programs,” having
consistent “quality visits” with B.A., and testing clean. She
reiterated, “I am asking the court to follow the
recommendations.” Counsel for DCFS stated, “I also noted that
father had not done any domestic violence courses, so I was going
to ask for monitored visits but mother not to monitor. Because I
don’t think those issues have been addressed by father through
services yet, but I would otherwise submit.”
The court stated that it was “persuaded by [B.A.’s
counsel’s] arguments. . . . [G]iven the circumstances, I do think it
makes sense for mother to have sole legal and sole physical
custody of the child, so I am prepared to terminate jurisdiction
with [an exit order] that provides for that.” The court terminated
jurisdiction over B.A., an order it stayed pending receipt of a
family court order giving mother sole legal and physical custody
of B.A. with monitored visits to father. At the request of B.A.’s
counsel, who represented that she planned to seek SIJ status
findings in the future, the juvenile court also referred B.A. to the
“special immigration juvenile status unit” while the exit order
was pending.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the court erred by awarding mother sole
physical and legal custody of B.A. He argues the order was
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unsupported by substantial evidence and the court’s
consideration of SIJ status was improper.
I. Legal Standards
When “the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile
court . . . the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an
order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.”
(§ 362.4, subd. (a).) “When making a custody determination in
any dependency case, the court’s focus and primary consideration
must always be the best interests of the child.” (In re Nicholas H.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268.) The juvenile court also “‘has a
special responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look
at the totality of the child’s circumstances’” when considering his
or her best interests. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196,
206.) The juvenile court therefore is not bound by presumptions
regarding joint custody enshrined in the Family Code. (Ibid.; see
also In re C.M. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 101, 108-109; In re Jennifer
R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 711-712.)
“[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case.” (In
re Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 265, fn. 4.) We do
not disturb the court’s decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
318.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’” (Id. at pp. 318-319.) Thus, “[i]n most
cases, the juvenile court will not abuse its discretion if
substantial evidence supports its underlying factual findings.”
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(In re D.R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 852, 863 [discussing abuse of
discretion standard in context of motion to terminate de facto
parent status].)
II. Analysis
A. Physical Custody
Respondents DCFS and mother assert that father has
forfeited any argument regarding sole physical custody because
his counsel below specifically asked the court to follow DCFS’s
recommendation of awarding mother sole physical custody.
Respondent B.A. joins the argument. In his reply brief, father
“assum[es] arguendo that [he] may have forfeited his challenge to
the order of sole physical custody to mother by acquiescing to
that order at the hearing.” We agree.
A parent’s submission on a DCFS recommendation “dispels
any challenge to and, in essence, endorses the court’s issuance of
the recommended findings and orders.” (In re Richard K. (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) “If, as occurred in this case, the court
in turn makes the recommended orders, the party who submits
on the recommendation should not be heard to complain.” (Id. at
pp. 589-590.) Here, father’s counsel asked the juvenile court
twice “to follow the recommendation of joint legal and sole
physical to mom.” Father accordingly cannot challenge the
award of sole physical custody to mother.
B. Legal Custody
Father argues that the juvenile court should have awarded
joint legal custody because “evidence in the record demonstrated
that [he] was complying with the court ordered case plan,
admitted responsibility for his actions, and was committed to
having a continuing relationship with his daughter.” He further
argues that any evidence to the contrary was insufficient to
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“justify” the grant of sole legal custody to mother, and asserts
that the court “improperly penalized [him] for his alleged lack of
participation in a single aspect of the case plan” rather than
placing B.A.’s best interests at the fore. We are not persuaded
the court abused its discretion.
The juvenile court credited mother’s statements about the
incident. That is, it found that father brutally attacked mother
in front of B.A. because she questioned him and possibly
communicated with his girlfriend, causing “deformity” to her face
so extensive she was unable to eat solid food for three days and
appeared distraught and injured two weeks later. The record is
also replete with other evidence of parents’ inability to get along.
Paternal uncle characterized parents’ relationship as “toxic,”
their difficulties co-parenting B.A. dated at least to the previous
2021 incident, and mother was so fearful of father that she
refused to return to the area around paternal uncle’s home and
sought a second restraining order to protect both herself and B.A.
Contrary to father’s claim, there is no evidence in the record
suggesting father took responsibility for his role in the incident or
broader problems in parents’ relationship. Instead, he initially
denied knowledge of and involvement in the incident and later
maintained that he “accidentally” hit mother a single time,
“busting” her lip with his ring.
The juvenile court reasonably could conclude from this
evidence that joint legal custody, which would require parents to
effectively communicate about important matters involving B.A.,
was not in B.A.’s best interests. Even if the juvenile court
credited father’s statement about the genesis of the 2022
incident—he questioned mother because she briefly left B.A. in
the car with someone she trusted, in full view of father—parents’
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inability to resolve this minor issue amicably does not bode well
for their ability to collectively make more substantial decisions
concerning B.A.’s medical, educational, and other needs.
Father’s compliance with some aspects of his case plan does
not render the court’s ruling an abuse of discretion.5 During the
six-month review period, father attended one parenting class and
a total of 19 individual and group counseling sessions. He did not
enroll in or attend any programming addressing domestic
violence, the sole basis for the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
B.A. Father asserts that DCFS “never addressed [his] purported
failure to attend domestic violence classes with either appellant
or the juvenile court.” Yet the record indicates that DCFS
provided father “with referrals as needed and requested,” and
father’s counsel did not challenge the accuracy of this
representation or introduce evidence showing father’s enrollment
in domestic violence programming or impediments thereto. This
case is not like Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 1340, 1347, a termination of rights case in which the
social worker “incorrectly informed mother that she had enrolled
in all the court-ordered programs and then, at the 12-month
mark, told her that she actually was not enrolled in all of the
required programs” and “used this lack of enrollment as a basis
to recommend that services be terminated.” There is no evidence
of a similar bait-and-switch here, nor is there evidence that the
court awarded mother sole legal custody to “punish one parent
5 Notably, father acknowledges that his “failure to complete
his case plan in the very short period of time he was provided
may support the juvenile court’s order with respect to physical
custody.”
19
. . . for failing to comply with the case plan.” (In re N.M. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1095.)
It is a parent’s “responsibility to attend the programs and
address her [or his] problems” (Amanda H. v. Superior Court,
supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347), and father did not appear to
acknowledge or undertake efforts to remedy his problems with
domestic violence here. His consistent visitation with B.A. and
dedication to a positive relationship with her do not demonstrate
an ability to engage in productive co-parenting, which was a basis
for the court’s order here. Father asserts that parents in other
cases in which awards of sole legal custody were affirmed, In re
Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 704, and In re Maya L. (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 81, had “significant” problems and generally
engaged in worse behavior than he did. The juvenile court is
tasked with making orders that serve the best interests of each
unique child before it, not comparing a parent’s efforts or
struggles to those in other cases to determine whether joint
custody is “justified” in the abstract. The juvenile court clearly
did that here, notwithstanding its failure to use the specific
phrase “best interests.” “[W]e will infer a necessary finding
provided the implicit finding is supported by substantial
evidence.” (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260.) The
juvenile court is not required to provide a specific statement of
reasons when making a custody order. (In re Jennifer R., supra,
14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 713-714.) “The court’s order was sufficient
to generally show the basis for its ruling,” and father has not
shown prejudice “since the record is clear as to the circumstances
leading to the denial of joint legal custody.” (Id. at p. 714.)
Should those circumstances change in the future, father may
seek joint legal custody in the family law court. (See ibid.)
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Father finally contends that the juvenile court erred to the
extent it considered B.A.’s eligibility for SIJ status when making
the custody determination. However, the case law father relies
upon is not on point. In Leslie H. v. Superior Court (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 340, the issue was whether the court erred in
denying a child’s request to make the necessary factual findings
to enable her to apply for SIJ status because she previously had
been committed to juvenile hall. Father accurately quotes the
appellate court’s admonishment that the trial court’s “role in the
SIJ process is not to determine worthy candidates for citizenship,
but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned alien
children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent
or be safely returned in their best interests to their home
country.” (Id. at p. 351.) Yet this admonishment refers to the
court’s refusal to make specific factual findings requested in a
petition and supported by the evidence, not a decision regarding
custody or even dependency jurisdiction. Similarly, Bianka M. v.
Superior Court (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1004, 1011 concerns a court’s
improper refusal to make requested findings because it concluded
the petitioning child had “immigration-related motivations for
filing the action.” A court is statutorily required to make
requested findings when they are supported by the evidence,
regardless of the “asserted, purported, or perceived motivation of
the child” making the request. (Code Civ. Proc, § 155, subd.
(b)(2).) Here, B.A. had not filed a petition seeking SIJ status, nor
was the court asked to make findings pertinent to any such
petition. Father has not demonstrated an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion.
21
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
ZUKIN, J.
22