S.K. v. G.B. CA3 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/10/24 S.K. v. G.B. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
S.K., C099282
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 199298)
v.
G.B.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff S.K. appeals in propria persona from the denial of his petition to extend a
civil harassment restraining order. S.K. contends the trial court improperly classified his
request for a domestic violence restraining order as a request for a civil harassment
restraining order, and that this misclassification prevented his renewal petition from being
granted. Disagreeing, we affirm.
1
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2022, S.K. petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order against his uncle
G.B. using the standard form CH-100, titled Request for Civil Harassment Restraining
Orders. Following a contested hearing, the trial court granted the petition and issued a
restraining order for one year. The following year, S.K. requested to renew the
restraining order for another five years using the standard form CH-700. The court found
the evidence that G.B. would continue a pattern of harassment “unpersuasive” and denied
the request.
S.K. appealed. S.K. filed his opening brief on April 8, 2024. G.B. did not file a
responsive brief. S.K. did not provide us with a reporter’s transcript of the relevant
hearings.
DISCUSSION
S.K. asserts that he “sought a [domestic violence] restraining order” in this matter
but claims the “court filing clerk refused to provide the requested forms and instead
furnished [civil harassment] restraining order forms.” S.K. submits that “[t]he
misclassification of the request by the court filing clerk deprived [him] of the full
protections of a [domestic violence] restraining order . . . which resulted in the non-
renewal of the order.” He asks this court to “reverse the trial court’s decision, convert the
Civil Harassment order to a Domestic Violence order using a Nunc Pro Tunc (or similar)
motion, and renew the order for 3-5 years as originally sought.”
Nothing in the record supports the assertion that S.K. tried to request a domestic
violence restraining order but was prevented from doing so by the trial court. But even if
this claim had a factual basis, S.K. fails to establish error by the court clerk because abuse
by an uncle generally does not qualify as domestic violence. (See Fam. Code, § 6211,
subd. (f) [defining “domestic violence” to include abuse committed against anyone
related to the perpetrator “by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree”];
2
People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 653 [explaining that uncle and nephew are
related in the third degree].)1
Further, S.K. cites no statute or case law authorizing us to convert the expired civil
harassment restraining order into a domestic violence restraining order and then renew
the order for a period of three to five years. And even assuming we could grant the relief
he seeks, in the absence of a reporter’s transcript of the trial court proceedings, we cannot
determine whether such relief is warranted. (Cf. Defend Bayview Hunters Point Com. v.
City and County of San Francisco (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 846, 859-860 [“Failure to
provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against the
appellant”].)
For all these reasons, S.K.’s claim fails to persuade.
DISPOSITION
The order denying S.K.’s request to renew the civil harassment restraining order is
affirmed.
/s/
Duarte, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
Krause, J.
/s/
Mesiwala, J.
1 Domestic violence is also defined as abuse perpetrated by a person’s “former
cohabitant.” (Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (b).) Though the record suggests S.K. lived with
his uncle 15 years ago, S.K. does not establish that domestic violence protections are
available when the former cohabitation is so temporally remote.
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