Theis v. Theis CA2/2 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 9/25/23 Theis v. Theis CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
    certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
    certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    JILL A. THEIS,                                                  B320844
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No.
    v.                                                    BD566197)
    MARK E. THEIS,
    Defendant and Respondent.
    APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Bruce Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed.
    Law Offices of James R. Eliaser and James R. Eliaser for
    Plaintiff and Appellant.
    Law Office of Ron Rale, Ron Alan Rale; Law Offices of Joel S.
    Seidel and Joel Stuart Seidel for Defendant and Respondent.
    ________________________________________
    Appellant Jill Theis (Jill) appeals from a March 7, 2022 order
    denying her postjudgment requests for orders to modify spousal
    support, to divide a purportedly unadjudicated community asset, and
    for attorney fees and sanctions against her former spouse, Mark Theis
    (Mark). Jill also challenges an attorney fees award against her as a
    sanction under Family Code section 271.1 We affirm the March 7, 2022
    order and the sanctions award.
    BACKGROUND
    Request to modify spousal support
    On November 22, 2019, Jill filed a request for order (RFO) to
    modify spousal support, which had previously been set at zero pursuant
    to a stipulated judgment entered on October 22, 2013 (the 2013
    stipulated judgment).2 In a declaration filed in support of her request,
    Jill stated that she received on average $10,000 per month in dividends
    and interest but her monthly living expenses were approximately
    $14,000. Jill stated in her income and expense declaration that she had
    $5,600,000 in cash assets.
    In his responsive declaration to Jill’s request, Mark averred that
    before December 2020 he had cash assets of approximately $500,000
    before receiving bonuses from his employment as a branch manager at
    Golden Empire Mortgage.
    Request for order to divide unadjudicated asset
    On November 23, 2020, Jill filed an RFO to divide a purportedly
    unadjudicated community asset—HMS Capital. Jill alleged that
    during the marriage, the parties owned and operated HMS Capital, a
    mortgage brokerage business. Jill further alleged that although Mark
    closed HMS Capital before the parties filed for dissolution of their
    marriage in 2012, he had since reopened the business.
    In his responsive declaration, Mark stated that he owned and
    operated HMS Capital before the marriage and continued to do so until
    1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code.
    2 On our own motion, we augment the record to include the
    October 22, 2013 stipulated judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155.)
    2
    ceasing operations in 2009, approximately three years before the
    parties separated.
    On December 23, 2021, Jill filed a request for attorney fees and
    costs pursuant to sections 2030, 2032, 271, and rule 5.14 of the
    California Rules of Court. On January 5, 2022, Jill filed a request for
    sanctions against Mark and his counsel, superseding a previous request
    for sanctions she had filed on November 23, 2020. Mark opposed the
    requests for attorney fees and sanctions and in turn sought sanctions
    against Jill.
    Jill’s RFO’s to modify spousal support, to divide an unadjudicated
    asset, and for attorney fees and sanctions were reassigned to Judge
    Bruce Iwasaki on May 27, 2021. The matters were calendared for a
    February 22, 2022 hearing.
    The parties agreed to participate in a voluntary settlement
    conference before Judge Iwasaki. In a January 28, 2022 minute order,
    Judge Iwasaki ordered the parties to serve and file, by February 4,
    2022, a settlement conference brief setting forth their respective
    positions and an executed waiver and consent to have him conduct the
    settlement conference on the matters assigned to him for hearing.
    Mark filed his waiver and consent on February 4, 2022. The
    record does not include a waiver and consent by Jill, who filed and
    served her voluntary settlement conference brief on February 7, 2022.
    The record does not include Mark’s voluntary settlement conference
    brief.
    The parties were unable to reach a settlement, and the matter
    proceeded to a three-day evidentiary hearing before Judge Iwasaki.
    Jill, Mark, and their respective forensic accountants testified at the
    hearing. After taking the matter under submission, Judge Iwasaki
    issued a written ruling on March 7, 2022, denying Jill’s RFO’s in their
    entirety. Judge Iwasaki further found that Jill should be sanctioned
    under section 271 “in an amount to be determined by the Home Court.”
    In his written ruling, Judge Iwasaki found that HMS Capital, a
    residential mortgage brokerage company formed before the marriage,
    was Mark’s sole and separate property. Judge Iwasaki further found
    3
    that although both parties devoted efforts to HMS Capital before and
    during the marriage, Jill’s efforts did not transmute HMS Capital into
    a community asset. HMS Capital generated substantial profits for the
    community until the 2008 financial crisis. From 2008 until their
    separation in 2012, Jill and Mark had virtually no income, although
    they had accumulated sufficient savings to live comfortably. At the
    time the parties separated, HMS Capital had no income, no employees,
    and no tangible assets. Because HMS Capital was no longer an entity
    worth dividing, the 2013 stipulated judgment did not equitably
    apportion HMS Capital’s net worth. Moreover, because HMS Capital
    was not a community asset, the family court lacked jurisdiction to
    divide it.
    Judge Iwasaki denied Jill’s RFO to modify spousal support,
    finding she had failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances
    justifying an increase in the spousal support she had agreed to in the
    2013 stipulated judgment. Judge Iwasaki further found that even if he
    were to apply the factors set forth in section 4320 for modifying spousal
    support, Jill was not entitled to support. He noted that both parties
    left the marriage with more than $7 million in liquid assets, and that
    Jill’s current liquid assets of $5 million exceed Mark’s. He credited the
    testimony of Mark’s forensic accountant, who stated that reallocating
    Jill’s investment portfolio would generate sufficient earnings for her
    support. Judge Iwasaki found that Jill’s reasonable needs require
    income of $14,000 per month. He discounted Jill’s testimony at the
    hearing that her monthly expenditures exceed $29,000. Judge Iwasaki
    found that Jill has the ability and opportunity to return to work and
    earn at least $40,000 annually. After weighing these factors, Judge
    Iwasaki found that Jill has no need for, and is not entitled to an order
    for spousal support.
    Finally, Judge Iwasaki denied Jill’s requests for fees and
    sanctions and found her liable for sanctions under section 271. He
    found Jill’s requests for spousal support and to divide a purportedly
    unadjudicated asset were meritless and that statements she made in
    declarations submitted under oath were admittedly false.
    4
    This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    In this appeal, Jill challenges only the imposition of sanctions
    against her under section 271.3 Section 271 provides:
    “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court may base
    an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct
    of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to
    promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost
    of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and
    attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this
    section is in the nature of a sanction.” (§ 271, subd. (a).)
    We review an award of sanctions under section 271 for an abuse
    of discretion. (In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 
    21 Cal.App.5th 218
    ,
    233; In re E.M. (2014) 
    228 Cal.App.4th 828
    , 850.) The imposition of
    section 271 sanctions “will be upheld on appeal unless the reviewing
    court, ‘considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its
    support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor,
    [determines] no judge could reasonably make the order.’ ” (In re E.M.,
    at p. 850; In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 
    194 Cal.App.4th 1095
    ,
    1100 [the applicable standard of review is highly deferential].)
    Jill’s principal basis for challenging the sanctions award is that
    she never consented to have Judge Iwasaki serve as both the
    settlement judge and the hearing officer on the merits of her RFO’s.
    She claims that her failure to file a signed waiver and consent to have
    Judge Iwasaki serve as both the settlement judge and the hearing
    officer (as she was ordered to do in the January 28, 2022 minute order)
    obliged Judge Iwasaki to recuse himself from hearing the merits of the
    3 Failure to raise an issue in an opening brief forfeits the issue.
    (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 
    53 Cal.App.5th 733
    , 786 [“issues not addressed as error in a party’s opening brief with
    legal analysis and citation to authority are forfeited”].) Because Jill’s
    opening appellate brief fails to address the denial of her RFO’s to
    modify spousal support, to divide HMS Capital, and for attorney fees
    and sanctions against Mark, those issues are forfeited.
    5
    case. Jill further claims that Judge Iwasaki’s failure to recuse himself
    rendered his March 7, 2022 order null and void.
    Jill forfeited any challenge premised on her purported lack of
    consent to have Judge Iwasaki serve as both the settlement judge and
    the hearing officer on the case. Although Jill apparently did not file an
    express waiver and consent to have Judge Iwasaki serve as the
    settlement judge, she did participate in the voluntary settlement
    conference before Judge Iwasaki and filed and served, without
    objection, a voluntary settlement conference brief. When the parties
    failed to reach a settlement, Jill raised no objection to Judge Iwasaki as
    the hearing officer to adjudicate the merits of her RFO’s. Jill is
    precluded from raising for the first time on appeal any challenge
    premised on her lack of consent to have Judge Iwasaki serve as both
    the settlement judge and the hearing officer on her RFO’s.
    Judge Iwasaki was not obliged to recuse himself from
    adjudicating the merits of the RFO’s, and his participation in the
    parties’ settlement discussions was not a ground for disqualification.
    (See Roth v. Parker (1997) 
    57 Cal.App.4th 542
    , 549.)
    The record discloses no abuse of discretion in the section 271
    sanctions order against Jill. Jill does not challenge the findings that
    her requests for spousal support and to divide HMS Capital were
    without merit or that she submitted statements under oath that she
    subsequently claimed were false. Featherstone v. Martinez (2022) 
    86 Cal.App.5th 775
    , on which Jill relies in support of her position, is
    inapposite. The court in Featherstone reversed section 271 sanctions
    imposed by a family court, in part because a mother in a child custody
    dispute took litigation positions with which the court disagreed. (Id. at
    pp. 777, 785.) That is not what happened here. Judge Iwasaki’s
    written ruling clearly states the bases for the sanctions order against
    Jill—asserting meritless claims and making false statements under
    6
    oath—conduct that needlessly lengthened court proceedings and
    increased litigation costs.4
    DISPOSITION
    The March 7, 2022 order and the sanctions award under Family
    Code section 271 are affirmed. Mark shall recover his costs on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    LUI, P. J.
    We concur:
    CHAVEZ, J.
    HOFFSTADT, J.
    4 The record does not support the argument advanced by Jill’s
    counsel during oral argument that Judge Iwasaki relied on the parties’
    settlement discussions as a basis for imposing sanctions against Jill.
    The statement of decision plainly states that Jill’s “litigation conduct”
    and not her settlement positions “frustrated the policy of the law to
    promote settlement and reduce the cost of litigation. The mere
    statement that Judge Iwasaki was “familiar with each party’s
    settlement positions and reasons” does not establish that the parties’
    settlement positions were the basis for the sanctions ruling.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B320844

Filed Date: 9/25/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/25/2023