In re D.H. CA2/6 ( 2024 )


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  • Filed 9/16/24 In re D.H. CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    In re D.H., a Person Coming                                    2d Juv. No. B330685
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Super. Ct. No. YJ40856)
    (Los Angeles County)
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    D.H.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    D.H. appeals the juvenile court’s order of home probation,
    which was based on a finding appellant violated Penal Code
    section 215, subdivision (a) (carjacking). Appellant contends:
    (1) the evidence did not support the court’s finding that he
    understood the wrongfulness of his conduct; and (2) the court
    erred by including a maximum term of confinement in the
    dispositional hearing’s minute order. We will affirm with
    direction for the court to delete that minute order’s references to
    a maximum term of confinement.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Early one afternoon, Jessica Santos parked her BMW in a
    shopping center parking lot. When she turned around after
    exiting her car, she saw a male pointing a gun at her. The male
    was later identified as appellant. He was standing about two or
    three feet away from Santos. He was wearing a face mask and a
    hoodie. He screamed at Santos to give him the car keys. Out of
    shock, Santos initially did not react, but she ultimately gave him
    her keys.
    Santos saw another male standing about five to nine feet
    away from appellant. After giving appellant her keys, the other
    male demanded Santos’ bag. She said no, but the other male
    pulled it. Santos pulled back and ran. She turned back and saw
    the males inside her car. One appeared to be 15 years old or
    younger, while the other looked a little bit older—perhaps 16
    years old. Appellant was just under 13 years, 6 months old at the
    time. A detective who reviewed video surveillance of the area
    testified that appellant and the other male targeted Santos.
    Appellant’s mother testified she taught appellant the
    difference between right and wrong and that he “knows the
    difference . . . .” According to her, appellant knew better than “to
    take things from people.” Appellant’s mother acknowledged
    issues with appellant running away and being influenced by
    others. She had filed missing persons reports. She described him
    as “out of control.”
    The court found true the carjacking allegation. It ordered
    home probation, including a period of house arrest under the
    Community Detention Program. The court did not set a
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    maximum term of confinement at the disposition hearing, but the
    minute order includes that term and its calculation.
    DISCUSSION
    Understanding of Conduct’s Wrongfulness
    Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support
    a finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. We
    disagree.
    “Penal Code section 26 articulates a presumption that a
    minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime.”
    (In re Manuel L. (1994) 
    7 Cal.4th 229
    , 231.) To overcome this
    presumption, the People “must prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the
    charged conduct at the time it was committed.” (Id. at p. 232.)
    “In determining whether the minor knows of the
    wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on
    circumstantial evidence such as the minor’s age, experience, and
    understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense,
    including its method of commission and concealment.” (In re
    James B. (2003) 
    109 Cal.App.4th 862
    , 872.) Generally, “‘it is only
    reasonable to expect’” that as children approach the age of 14,
    they are more likely to understand the wrongfulness of their acts.
    (People v. Lewis (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 334
    , 378.)
    “We review the whole record most favorably to the
    judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence—
    that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
    from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the
    requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.” (In re
    Jerry M. (1997) 
    59 Cal.App.4th 289
    , 298.)
    Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
    conclusion that appellant understood his conduct’s wrongfulness.
    3
    Appellant’s mother testified she taught him the difference
    between right and wrong, which he knew. She also stated
    appellant knew better than to take things from others. While the
    court apparently based its decision on the probative testimony of
    appellant’s mother, our review is not limited to the court’s stated
    rationale. (Cf. In re Paul C. (1990) 
    221 Cal.App.3d 43
    , 52-54
    [reviewing implied finding minor knew wrongfulness of conduct].)
    Appellant was also about six months away from turning 14 at the
    time of the carjacking. The circumstances of the offense show
    preparation and coordination. Appellant’s face mask evinces a
    desire to conceal.
    Maximum Term of Confinement
    Appellant claims the minute order of the disposition
    hearing improperly included a maximum term of confinement.
    The People agree, as do we. The court did not establish a
    maximum term of confinement in its oral pronouncement of
    judgment. “‘Where there is a discrepancy between the oral
    pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract
    of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.’” (People v.
    Costella (2017) 
    11 Cal.App.5th 1
    , 10.) Setting a maximum term
    of confinement would be improper where, as here, the court does
    not remove the minor from his parent’s physical custody. (In re
    Matthew A. (2008) 
    165 Cal.App.4th 537
    , 541.) Therefore, we will
    direct the juvenile court to delete references to a maximum term
    of confinement in the minute order of the dispositional hearing.
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court is directed to amend the July 25, 2023
    minute order to delete references to a maximum term of
    confinement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
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    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    CODY, J.
    We concur:
    YEGAN, Acting P. J.
    BALTODANO, J.
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    Sabina A. Helton, Judge
    Superior Court County of Los Angeles
    ______________________________
    Sarah M. Javaheri, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
    Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B330685

Filed Date: 9/16/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2024