Navigators Real Estate v. Chao CA2/3 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/16/24 Navigators Real Estate v. Chao CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
NAVIGATORS REAL ESTATE, B332359
INC. et al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. Nos. 23AHCV00045,
23AHCV00201)
v.
JACK W. CHAO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Margaret L. Oldendorf, Judge. Affirmed.
Jack Wei Chao, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Law Office of Charles Pok and Associates, Charles Pok;
Mascheroni Law and Laura E. Mascheroni for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and appellant Jack W. Chao, a real estate
attorney, appeals from trial court orders denying his special
motions to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 Chao moved to strike causes of
action asserted against him in two complaints, one filed by
Navigators Real Estate, Inc., which does business as Pinnacle
Real Estate Group (Pinnacle), and a second filed by Jing Shao, a
real estate buyer. We affirm the trial court orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2022, Jing Shao and Liping Huang entered
into a real estate purchase agreement whereby Shao agreed to
purchase Huang’s real property in Monrovia, California. The
parties agreed to close escrow by December 26. On December 6,
Huang also signed a contract with Pinnacle in which she agreed
to pay Pinnacle a commission on the sale of her property. Despite
these agreements, and acting at least in part on Chao’s advice,
Huang refused to complete the sale and did not pay the
commission.
On January 6, 2023, Pinnacle filed a complaint against
Chao, Huang, and Lina Ta, Huang’s son’s girlfriend or fiancée.
The complaint alleged a claim for breach of contract against
Huang and a claim for intentional inference with contractual
relations against Chao and Ta.
The complaint alleged that Chao is a real estate broker
who, acting in concert with Ta, “persuaded Defendant Liping
Huang not to close the escrow as required by the [real estate
1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
purchase agreement] and not to pay the service fee as required
per the [commission agreement] to Plaintiff.” According to the
complaint, Chao and Ta persuaded Huang “to cancel this valid
[real estate purchase agreement] so that Jack Wei Chao can
become Defendant Liping Huang’s real estate broker and sell the
property for Defendant Liping Huang and pocket the commission
and Lina Ta can control the proceeds of the sale of The Property
in conjunction with Defendant Jack Wei Chao.” Pinnacle also
alleged that Chao was aware of the “valid contract” between
Pinnacle and Huang, his “conduct prevented” Huang from
“performing” her two contracts, and Chao knew his conduct
would cause Huang to refuse to perform her obligations under the
contracts.
On January 27, 2023, Shao also filed a complaint against
Chao, Huang, and Ta. Shao asserted an intentional inference
with contractual relations claim against Chao and Ta. Shao
alleged that Chao and Ta “persuaded” Huang not to close escrow
and to cancel the real estate purchase agreement. Shao further
asserted that Chao and Ta persuaded Huang to withhold Shao’s
money in escrow. Like Pinnacle, Shao alleged Chao had done so
to become Huang’s real estate broker and to sell the property
himself. Shao asserted Chao was aware of the valid real estate
purchase agreement and his conduct prevented Huang from
closing escrow and performing her contractual obligations.
On June 12, 2023, the trial court issued an order finding
the Pinnacle and Shao cases related.
Chao’s Special Motions to Strike
On June 14, 2023, Chao filed a special motion to strike
Shao’s intentional interference with contractual relations cause
of action, pursuant to section 425.16. On June 26, Chao filed a
3
special motion to strike the same cause of action in Pinnacle’s
complaint. Chao made the same arguments in both motions.
Chao argued the anti-SLAPP statute applies to lawyers
engaged in litigation activity. He asserted he had an attorney-
client relationship with Huang when he persuaded her not to
complete the real estate transaction. He also argued that his
communications with individuals at Pinnacle were protected
“settlement negotiations.” Chao further contended the litigation
privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) barred the
plaintiffs’ claims.
In support of both special motions to strike, Chao
submitted a declaration stating that on December 16, 2022,
Huang retained Chao as an attorney to represent her in the real
estate transaction. Lina Ta, who had power of attorney for
Huang because Huang lived in China and had “mental issues,”
had contacted Chao. Chao declared that he performed a legal
analysis and concluded Huang did not understand the terms of
the commission and real estate purchase agreements, did not
approve of the amount of the commission, and did not consent to
some of the real estate purchase agreement terms. Chao also
declared that he discovered a “$1.027 [million] note secured by
the property which benefits the Buyer Jing Shao.” The note was
not documented in either contract and, in Chao’s opinion,
presented a “huge risk” to Huang. Chao therefore “suggested
Liping H[u]ang not complete the transaction.”
Chao described three subsequent communications with
Pinnacle. On December 21, 2022, Chao called real estate broker
Brian H. Chen, Huang’s broker at Pinnacle who represented her
4
in the sale, to “dispute” the agreements.2 Two days later, Chao
called Charles Pok, a real estate attorney representing Pinnacle
and buyer Shao. Chao accused Pinnacle of acting as a “dual
agent” because Pinnacle represented both the buyer and seller in
the transaction. Pok disagreed and “indicated a possible
lawsuit.” Chao told Pok he would represent Huang and Ta “in
the upcoming legal proceedings.”
According to Chao, on January 2, 2023, he e-mailed Pok.
Chao declared that this e-mail was a “settlement offer.” The e-
mail stated, “After my extensive effort on the Seller’s son, who is
the decision maker in this case, I’m presenting the following
terms to resolve the purchase agreement dispute . . . .” The e-
mail proposed: the “purchase price to be paid in full in [U.S.]
dollars through escrow,” a total 4 percent commission for the
sales and listing agents, and furniture would not be included in
the sale.
Chao also supported the special motions to strike with a
declaration from Chen, which Pinnacle had previously filed in
support of a motion for default judgment. Chen declared that
sometime around the scheduled close of escrow on December 26,
2022, Huang told Chen that Chao and Ta advised her to pressure
Shao to pay more by “lock[ing]” Shao’s money in escrow. When
Chen refused to assist Huang, she told him she would not close
escrow or pay the commission.
On July 14, 2023, Pinnacle filed an opposition arguing that
Chao’s special motion to strike was untimely and also that he
failed to show his conduct was protected by the anti-SLAPP
2 According to Ta’s declaration in support of Chao’s motions
to strike, Chao advised Huang to stop the sale before he called
Chen on December 21.
5
statute or the litigation privilege. Pinnacle did not submit any
evidence with the opposition, but referred to evidence Chao had
previously submitted in support of the special motion to strike.
On July 26, 2023, the trial court ruled on the anti-SLAPP
motion to strike as to Pinnacle’s complaint. Although the court
concluded the motion was untimely, it nonetheless exercised its
discretion to consider the merits. The court found Chao had not
met his burden of establishing that Pinnacle’s claim against him
arose from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
On August 2, 2023, Shao filed a two-page opposition to
Chao’s special motion to strike in the Shao action. Shao argued
Chao’s motion was identical to the motion he filed in Pinnacle’s
action, and therefore failed for the same reasons the trial court
gave in denying the first motion.
On August 16, 2023, the trial court denied Chao’s anti-
SLAPP motion to strike Shao’s cause of action against him. The
court again found that Chao had not met his burden of
establishing the claims asserted against him arose from protected
activity. The court explained that Chao allegedly persuaded
Huang not to complete her contractual obligations and then
attempted to negotiate new terms by sending the e-mail to Pok.
There was no evidence this or any other negotiations were in
anticipation of litigation.
On August 21, Chao filed a notice of appeal of the trial
court’s July 26 order. On August 23, he filed a notice of appeal of
the trial court’s August 16 order. We granted the parties’ joint
motion to consolidate the two appeals.
6
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Chao’s
Special Motions to Strike
Chao challenges the trial court orders denying his special
motions to strike. He asserts the trial court erred in finding his
special motion to strike Pinnacle’s complaint was untimely.3 He
also contends the trial court erred in concluding the plaintiffs’
allegations against him did not arise from protected
“prelitigation” activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e).4
A. Anti-SLAPP law and standard of review
“To combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free
speech and petition rights (typically known as strategic lawsuits
against public participation, or SLAPPs), the Legislature has
3 We decline Chao’s request that we disregard the
respondents’ joint brief on appeal because it was untimely.
Although the Respondents’ brief was filed late, this court
exercised its discretion to accept the brief and Chao does not
assert he suffered any prejudice from the late filing.
We also do not consider Chao’s argument that the trial
court erred in finding the special motion to strike Pinnacle’s
complaint was untimely. Despite the finding of untimeliness, the
trial court exercised its discretion to consider the special motion
to strike on its merits. We may affirm the trial court’s order if it
is correct on any theory and we therefore need not consider
Chao’s alternative argument. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical
Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [decision will be affirmed on
appeal if correct on any theory].)
4 At oral argument, Chao raised an additional argument
based on a theory of anticipatory repudiation of the contracts.
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time at oral
argument. (Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California,
Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 997.)
7
authorized a special motion to strike claims that are based on a
defendant’s engagement in such protected activity. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).)” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).)
The resolution of a special motion to strike under
section 425.16 involves two steps. “Initially, the moving
defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged. [Citations.]” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1061.) A claim arises from protected activity “when that
activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Id. at
p. 1062.) If the defendant carries its burden to demonstrate the
plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must
then demonstrate the claims have minimal merit. (Wilson v.
Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884.)
Our review of whether the trial court properly denied the
anti-SLAPP motion on the merits is de novo. (Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “We exercise independent judgment in
determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the
challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Ibid.) We
consider “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
B. Chao has not established that plaintiffs’
allegations arise from protected activity
The first question in the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether
the plaintiffs’ claims or allegations arise from protected activity.
A cause of action arises from protected activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute only “when that activity underlies or forms the
basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) To
8
determine this, we “ ‘consider the elements of the challenged
claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements
and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The
defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim
rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a
statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
Section 425.16, subdivision (e), describes four categories of
conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Rand Resources,
LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) Chao appears
to assert that two of those categories apply here: section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1), “any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law,” and subdivision (e)(2),
“any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body . . . .” He argues that his act of
advising Huang not to complete the real estate transaction
“necessarily relates to [the] prelitigation privilege.”
“Although the [anti-SLAPP] statute refers to ongoing
proceedings,” many courts have held that prelitigation
communications may qualify for section 425.16 protection, so long
as they concern the subject of the dispute and are made in
anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration. (Medallion Film LLC v. Loeb & Loeb LLP
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1272, 1284 (Medallion Film) [collecting
cases]; People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 809, 824 (Anapol).) Similarly, “ ‘[n]umerous cases
have held that the SLAPP statute protects lawyers sued for
litigation-related speech and activity. [Citations.] Put otherwise,
9
legal advice and settlement made in connection with litigation
are within section 425.16, and may protect defendant attorneys
from suits brought by third parties on any legal theory or cause of
action “arising from” those protected activities.’ [Citation.]”
(Clarity Co. Consulting, LLC v. Gabriel (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
454, 464 (Clarity).)
Pinnacle’s and Shao’s complaints each assert a single cause
of action against Chao: intentional interference with contractual
relations. “To prevail on a cause of action for intentional
interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must plead and
prove (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff
and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that contract;
(3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or
disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or
disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting
damage.” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148.)
Both complaints identify similar activity that they allege
constitutes Chao’s intentional inference with the parties’
contractual relationship. Pinnacle’s complaint alleges Chao
persuaded Huang not to close escrow and not to pay the
commission fee, and that Huang breached the contracts based on
Chao’s “persuasion.” Shao’s complaint similarly alleges Chao
persuaded Huang not to close escrow and to withhold Shao’s
money in the escrow account.
This alleged conduct is neither litigation-related protected
activity, nor speech or activity made in anticipation of litigation.
Both complaints limit the allegations against Chao to his act of
persuading Huang not to complete the real estate transaction.
The evidence Chao submitted in support of the special motion to
strike indicates there was no litigation pending or anticipated at
10
that time. Chao had merely reviewed the relevant contracts and
advised Huang she should not go through with the sale. At that
point, there was not yet a claim to be litigated or settled. There
is no indication that when Chao persuaded Huang not to carry
out her contractual obligations, there was litigation contemplated
in “good faith and under serious consideration . . . .” (Anapol,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) Chao did not indicate in his
declaration that his advice to Huang was in anticipation of
litigation or related to litigation. A defendant arguing challenged
conduct was protected prelitigation activity must “show litigation
[was] more than theoretical . . . .” (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Rubin (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 493, 500 (Rubin).)
Chao asserts that his investigation, negotiation efforts, and
settlement offer were prelitigation activities that related to the
eventual litigation of the parties’ dispute, and are therefore
protected. Yet, the plaintiffs’ complaints do not mention Chao’s
subsequent negotiations or communications with Pinnacle’s
counsel. The claims are not based on Chao’s conduct after he
persuaded Huang not to complete the sale. “[W]here a plaintiff’s
claim attacks only the defendant’s decision to undertake a
particular act,”—here, Chao’s decision and act of convincing
Huang not to carry out her contractual obligations—“and if that
decision is not itself protected activity, that claim falls outside
the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Mission Beverage Co. v.
Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 701 (Mission
Beverage).)
Chao argues that his advice to Huang that she not
complete the sale “necessarily relates” to his subsequent acts of
disputing, negotiating, and making a “settlement” offer to Pok,
which he asserts were protected prelitigation activities. Chao
11
points to his December 23, 2022 call to Pok, when Pok mentioned
a possible lawsuit, and to Chao’s January 2, 2023 e-mail to Pok,
which he characterizes as a “settlement offer.” However, “the
mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took
place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the
anti-SLAPP statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,
89.) Chao advised Huang not to complete her contractual
obligations before his December 21, 2022 call to Chen. The
complaints’ claims against Chao arise from his alleged persuasion
of Huang, not Chao’s subsequent conduct.
Further, in Chao’s first call to Chen, neither party
mentioned litigation. And, according to Chao’s declaration, when
Chao called Pok two days later, Pok—not Chao—raised the
possibility of litigation first. “While eventual litigation was a
remote possibility from the mere fact that [Chao’s calls] alerted
[Chen and Pok] that [Chao] wanted something from [Pinnacle], a
remote possibility is not enough to demonstrate a communication
is actually connected to litigation and is therefore protected.”
(Medallion Film, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287.) Thus,
“[w]hen conduct ‘ “will lead to litigation only if negotiations fail or
contractual commitments are not honored, future litigation is
merely theoretical rather than anticipated and the conduct is
therefore not protected prelitigation activity.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) Even though Pok mentioned litigation, the “ ‘possibility of
litigation in the event of nonperformance is not enough to
conclude’ ” that Chao’s actions were “ ‘made in anticipation of
litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious
consideration.’ [Citation.]” (Rubin, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at
p. 500.)
12
Clarity, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 454, is illustrative. In
Clarity, the parties entered into a contract in which Clarity Co.
Consulting, LLC (Clarity) agreed to provide services to another
company, ONclick Healthcare, Inc. (ONclick). (Id. at pp. 458–
459.) ONclick failed to pay for the services. Clarity sued ONclick
and its general counsel for breach of contract. The complaint
asserted intentional misrepresentation and concealment claims
based on allegations that the company and general counsel had
misrepresented and suppressed evidence of the company’s weak
financial condition. (Id. at pp. 459–460.)
The general counsel filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike
Clarity’s claims against him. He asserted he was not involved in
negotiations of the relevant contract and that he was only part of
negotiations relating to an unrelated employment contract with a
Clarity employee. The general counsel alleged that after
negotiations regarding the employment contract broke down,
Clarity threatened to sue and demanded immediate payment
under the terms of the services contract. The parties engaged in
settlement negotiations, which failed. The general counsel
contended that his contract and settlement-related negotiations
were thus protected conduct. (Clarity, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 460–461.)
The Clarity court rejected the general counsel’s argument
that the claims against him arose from protected activity.
(Clarity, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.) The court reasoned,
“Appellant’s misrepresentations and acts of concealment were not
made in contemplation or anticipation of future litigation. When
they were made, there was no claim or dispute to be litigated or
settled. [¶] Appellant’s litigation-related activity did not
commence until the employment contract negotiations ‘broke
13
down’ and ONclick refused respondent’s request that it
immediately pay respondent’s invoices. As appellant stated in
his points and authorities filed in the trial court, ‘The parties
then engaged in settlement negotiations’ that ‘failed.’ ” (Id. at
p. 464.) The court reviewed the allegations in the complaint and
concluded the allegations arose solely from the defendants’
failure to pay and misrepresentation and concealment of ability
to pay, not the subsequent negotiations or settlement discussions.
(Id. at pp. 464–465.)
Chao argues that Clarity is distinguishable because the
plaintiffs’ intentional inference with contractual relations claims
here are “directly related” to Chao’s settlement discussions with
plaintiffs and his belief that the underlying agreements were
induced by fraud. He further asserts that in Clarity, the Court of
Appeal denied the anti-SLAPP motion because the causes of
action for intentional misrepresentation and concealment had
“nothing to do with settlement discussions.” (Clarity, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 463.) We disagree. The contractual
interference claims plaintiffs have alleged do not arise from the
settlement discussions between Chao and the plaintiffs. Instead,
they are based on Chao’s act of persuading Huang to abandon the
contracts. That act was not made in contemplation or
anticipation of future litigation. As in Clarity, Chao’s subsequent
communications with Chen communicating this decision, and
with Pok attempting to renegotiate the contracts’ terms, do not
transform his alleged acts of interference into protected
prelitigation conduct. (Mission Beverage, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th
at p. 701 [defendant’s decision to terminate a contractual
agreement was not protected activity; a subsequent
14
communication of that decision did not convert the contract-
related decision into protected speech].)
Moreover, as was apparent in Clarity, that the defendant is
a lawyer does not render all of the defendant’s acts protected
activity. “Not all attorney conduct in connection with litigation,
or in the course of representing clients, is protected by
section 425.16.” (California Back Specialists Medical Group v.
Rand (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037 [rejecting assertion of
protected litigation activity under anti-SLAPP statute where the
appellant attorney argued his conduct concerning liens was
protected activity because he disbursed the funds as an attorney
and was representing his clients in the underlying actions].)
Chao was required to establish that plaintiffs’ allegations against
him challenged conduct made in genuine contemplation of
litigation. He failed to meet that burden. (Medallion Film,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1287–1288 [lawyer’s alleged
misrepresentations in letter regarding the parties’ dispute were
not protected activity because they were not in good faith and
serious contemplation of litigation; lawyer’s acts aiding client’s
alleged fraud preceding the letter had no connection to protected
activity].)
Chao’s reliance on Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss, Hauer, & Feld, LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, is
misplaced. In Optional Capital, the court explained that the
conduct which formed the basis of the claims against the lawyer
defendants arose directly from ongoing litigation in which the
defendants were representing a client involved in the dispute.
The claims at issue challenged one law firm’s work in negotiating
a settlement of a state court action, and another firm’s alleged
failure to disclose that settlement to a federal district court. The
15
plaintiff relied on counsel’s in-court statements as evidence of the
alleged wrongful acts. (Id. at p. 114.) The Court of Appeal
observed that “ ‘conduct is not automatically protected merely
because it is related to pending litigation; the conduct must arise
from the litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) It therefore determined
that the conduct was protected not simply because it involved an
attorney-client relationship, as Chao argues here, but because
the alleged conduct arose from the litigation. (Ibid.) Here, in
contrast, the allegations concerning Chao’s interference with the
parties’ contracts did not arise from any pending litigation.
Chao has not carried his burden of establishing that the
plaintiffs’ claims against him arise from protected activity under
section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1073.) Accordingly, we need not reach the second step of the
special motion to strike inquiry. We therefore do not consider
Chao’s argument that plaintiffs cannot show a probability of
prevailing because his conduct was protected by the litigation
privilege. We also do not consider the arguments Chao makes in
his reply brief that the underlying contracts were induced by
fraud and were not enforceable, or that he is likely to prevail on
the merits. We reject Chao’s argument that the trial court erred
in denying his anti-SLAPP motions based solely on the
allegations in the complaints. As explained above, the first step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis required Chao to demonstrate that
the allegations he was moving to strike arose from protected
activity under section 425.16. It is of no consequence that, in
opposition to the special motion to strike, plaintiffs relied on
Chao’s evidence and did not provide independent evidentiary
support for the allegations in the complaint.
16
II. Chao Lacks Standing to Raise an Issue Affecting
Only Huang
On August 21, 2023, Chao filed a notice of appeal to
challenge the trial court order denying his special motion to
strike Pinnacle’s complaint. On August 22, 2023, the trial court
sustained Pinnacle’s demurrer to Huang’s cross-complaint. Chao
argues that order must be vacated because his act of filing a
notice of appeal effected an automatic stay.5
Chao has no standing to raise issues that affect only a non-
party to the appeal. Huang is not a party to this appeal. Chao is
not aggrieved by an order sustaining a demurrer to Huang’s
cross-complaint. (Estate of Kempton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 189,
202 (Kempton).) Standing is a jurisdictional requirement and we
therefore do not consider Chao’s contention. (Conservatorship of
Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.)
III. Chao Fails to Establish Reversible Error Based on
Judicial Bias
Under the heading “The Trial Court Ruled in Pinnacle’s
Favor Without Evidentiary Support Casting Doubt on
Impartiality,” Chao appears to argue that the trial court has
demonstrated a lack of impartiality by: incorrectly overruling his
demurrer to Pinnacle’s complaint; denying his motion for
sanctions against Pinnacle without considering relevant
evidence; speaking with one of plaintiffs’ attorneys alone;
5 We note that while an appeal from the denial of an anti-
SLAPP motion automatically stays further trial court
proceedings on the merits, this is true only with respect to causes
of action affected by the motion. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v.
Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 195, fn. 8.) Chao’s special motion
to strike did not challenge any cause of action asserted against
Huang.
17
suggesting arbitration; indicating it “respectively [sic]
disagree[d]” with Shao’s counsel’s argument; denying the motions
to strike; and granting Pinnacle’s demurrer to Huang’s cross-
complaint.
These arguments lack merit. Chao has provided a laundry
list of complaints about the trial court’s substantive rulings
without any legal analysis or cogent argument. This is
insufficient to present a cognizable issue for appellate review.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson); Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 480, 497–498.) To the extent that Chao seeks to
challenge non-appealable orders, orders that are not the subject
of his notices of appeal, or orders for which he is not the
aggrieved party, we lack jurisdiction to consider his claims.
(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696;
Kempton, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 202; Faunce v. Cate (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170.) Further, Chao has failed to provide
an adequate record for us to review any claims of judicial
misconduct based on the trial court’s statements in open court, as
he did not include a reporter’s transcript or other substitute in
the record on appeal. (Jameson, at pp. 608–609; In re Marriage
of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.) Chao’s unsupported
representations about what the trial court said are insufficient.
Finally, that the trial court ruled against Chao, even if
those rulings were erroneous, does not establish judicial bias or
lack of impartiality. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053,
1110.) Chao has not demonstrated any judicial bias or
misconduct that would mandate reversal.
18
DISPOSITION
The trial court orders denying Chao’s special motions to
strike are affirmed. Respondents to recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
19