Arnold v. Medal CA2/7 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/11/24 Arnold v. Medal CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ROLAND ARNOLD, B323743
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. BQ048027)
v.
ERICK JASON MEDAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Christine Byrd, Judge. Affirmed.
Erick Jason Medal, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
Roland Arnold, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Roland Arnold sought a domestic violence restraining order
against Erick Jason Medal, whom Arnold once dated, alleging
that Medal persistently harassed him for a decade. The trial
court issued a restraining order and later renewed the
restraining order. Medal moved to terminate or modify the
restraining order, and the trial court denied Medal’s motion. On
appeal, Medal contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal
standard in denying his motion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2015, Arnold filed a request for a domestic
violence restraining order against Medal. In a declaration in
support of his request, Arnold stated that he and Medal had
dated on and off for several years until 2005. After they broke up
Medal subjected Arnold to 10 years of threats and abuse online
and by telephone, including by making threats against Arnold
and Arnold’s family, and engaging in “constant intimidation and
surveillance.” In 2014, Arnold obtained a restraining order
against Medal. After the first restraining order expired, in
March 2015, Medal again approached Arnold and harassed him
outside his apartment. This caused Arnold to believe he needed a
restraining order to protect himself.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on
March 9, 2015, and on March 30, 2015, it issued a one-year
restraining order pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act, Family Code section 6200 et seq. The March 30 order
required, among other things, that Medal stay at least 100 yards
away from Arnold and Arnold’s home and refrain from harassing,
threatening, following, stalking, keeping under surveillance,
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impersonating, or contacting Arnold. In April 2016, the court
renewed the restraining order for an additional five years.
In March 2021, Arnold filed a request to renew the
restraining order permanently. He alleged that Medal continued
to harass him and that he had violated the restraining order,
including by following Arnold, attempting to contact Arnold
online and by telephone, attempting to hack Arnold’s online
accounts, and having individuals sit outside Arnold’s home to
watch and take photos of him. Arnold stated a criminal case had
been filed against Medal and in 2017, as a result of a guilty plea,
the criminal court had ordered Medal to pay a fine, complete
36 months of probation, perform community service, and
complete a 52-week domestic violence class.
On April 26, 2021, the trial court granted Arnold’s request
and ordered that the restraining order remain in effect
permanently. In August 2021, Medal, represented by counsel,
moved to set aside the renewed restraining order. After hearing
testimony on the issue, the court denied Medal’s motion.
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We augment the record on our own motion to include
Arnold’s March 9, 2015 request for domestic violence restraining
order against Medal; the March 9, 2015 temporary restraining
order against Medal; the March 30, 2015 restraining order
against Medal; the April 2016 order to renew the domestic
violence restraining order; Arnold’s March 11, 2021 request to
renew the restraining order permanently; the court’s April 26,
2021 order to renew the domestic violence restraining order
permanently; Medal’s August 23, 2021 notice of motion and
motion to set aside the permanent restraining order; and Medal’s
June 21, 2022 motion to terminate or modify the permanent
restraining order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
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In June 2022, Medal filed a motion to terminate or modify
the permanent restraining order. Relying on Loeffler v. Medina
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495 (Loeffler), Medal contended that his
motion to terminate was governed by Code of Civil Procedure
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section 533, which provides that a court may terminate an
injunction “upon a showing that there has been a material
change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary
restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the
injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has
changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the
modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary
restraining order.”
Medal argued there had been a material change in facts
and justice would be served by terminating or modifying the
restraining order. Medal supported his argument with a variety
of assertions, including that he had no communication with
Arnold outside of court for five years; he had moved and did not
live near Arnold; there was no allegation of violence or in-person
contact; he had completed 10 days of community service,
52 weeks of domestic violence courses, and 36 months of
probation; his criminal conviction for violating the restraining
order had been set aside and dismissed pursuant to Penal Code
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section 1203.4; and, although he had been a substitute dance
2
Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.
3
Penal Code section 1203.4 provides in part for a court to
allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty and for the court to
dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant
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teacher prior to the restraining order, he could not secure
employment as a teacher because of the restraining order.
Medal’s motion was called for hearing on August 31, 2022,
with Medal, Medal’s attorney, and Arnold present. After hearing
the testimony of Arnold and the arguments presented by Arnold
and Medal’s counsel, the trial court denied the motion. The court
stated that there was no material change of facts or law and it
would not be in the interest of justice to grant the relief Medal
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requested. Medal filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Medal contends that the trial court applied an incorrect
standard in ruling on his motion to terminate the restraining
order. Although Medal argued in the trial court that Loeffler,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 1495 compelled the court to apply the
section 533 standard to his motion to terminate the domestic
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violence restraining order, Medal argues the opposite on appeal.
Specifically, he contends that the court erred by applying the
section 533 standard, that Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 1495is wrongly decided to the extent that it limits the court’s
discretion to consider only the section 533 factors, and that the
when, among other grounds, the defendant “has fulfilled the
conditions of probation for the entire period of probation.”
4
On November 14, 2023, Arnold filed a California Rules of
Court, rule 8.224 application for transmittal of exhibits. Because
Arnold’s application refers to exhibits not necessary for
disposition of this appeal, we deny it.
5
A domestic violence restraining order is “‘a type of
injunction.’” (In re Marriage of Carlisle (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
244, 255; accord, Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 511.)
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court should instead have applied the standard articulated in
Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509 (Yost), which permits
a court examining a motion to terminate a civil harassment
restraining order to consider factors beyond those set forth in
section 533.
Any error in the standard applied by the trial court was
invited by Medal, and Medal forfeited his contention that a
different standard applies by failing to raise that argument in the
trial court. (See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th
383, 403 [“‘[w]here a party by his conduct induces the commission
of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal’
on appeal”]; Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 70
[same]; see also, e.g., Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 908, 944 [“‘[a] party may not for the first time on
appeal change its theory of relief’”]; Kaufman & Broad
Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2006)
136 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [“CalFarm failed to raise this argument
in the trial court and thus forfeits that argument here”].)
Even if Medal had not forfeited the argument, and even if
he is correct that Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at page 527
requires a court to consider grounds outside the section 533
criteria “on a case-by-case basis,” he fails to show that the trial
court applied a standard that is contrary to Yost.
Medal argues that under Yost the court’s discretion
whether to terminate a restraining order “includes, but is not
limited to, the three grounds articulated in . . . section [533].”
True, but in Yost, the appellant had “argued below that a trial
court’s discretion to modify a civil harassment restraining order
is not limited to the grounds set forth in section 533,” and the
trial court had rejected that contention and refused to consider
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the additional grounds for termination proposed by the appellant.
(Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 524, 528-529.) The court of
appeal reversed, holding that the trial court inappropriately
limited its consideration of arguments that bear on the
appropriateness of the continued restraining order. (Id. at
pp. 528-529.) Here, in contrast, Medal did not argue to the trial
court that it must consider factors outside of section 533 (he
argued precisely the contrary), and the court did not refuse to
consider any contention raised by Medal. The court affirmed that
it had read the papers and heard Medal’s argument, and it
addressed each such argument, finding that “there is no material
change of facts or the law, and that it would not be in the interest
of justice to terminate or to shorten the length of the restraining
order.” Medal argues that it was error for the court to refuse to
consider other factors. But Medal has not shown that the trial
court refused to consider any factor.
Medal asserts that the trial court’s decision “reflects an
unawareness or misunderstanding of the full scope of its
discretion.” He contends the trial court demonstrated this lack of
awareness when, after his counsel requested clarity about the
meaning of the term “permanent” as it pertains to the restraining
order, the court stated that “permanent” means “lifetime.” Medal
cites no authority and makes no argument explaining why this is
error, or how it affected the outcome. Family Code section 6345,
subdivision (a), provides that domestic violence restraining
orders may be renewed “permanently.” Even permanently
renewed domestic violence restraining orders are subject to
termination or modification under Family Code section 6345.
There is no indication in the record that the trial court believed it
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lacked discretion to modify or terminate the permanent
restraining order when it denied Medal’s motion.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s August 31, 2022, order is affirmed. Arnold
is to recover his costs on appeal.

EVENSON, J.
We concur:
FEUER, Acting P. J.
MARTINEZ, J.

Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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