Aguilar v. Dept. of Corrections CA1/4 ( 2023 )

Filed 9/15/23 Aguilar v. Dept. of Corrections CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
ALEXIS AGUILAR,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A165629
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF (Del Norte County
CORRECTIONS AND Super. Ct. No. CVPT2021-1052)
REHABILITATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Alexis Aguilar, an inmate at Pelican Bay Prison appearing in
propria persona, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandate,
which sought an order compelling the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (Department) to expunge from his prison file a 2013
disciplinary violation for participating in a hunger strike. While the appeal
was pending, the Department placed a memorandum in Aguilar’s prison file
stating that the rules violation at issue has been determined not to be a
violation under the reasoning of In re Gomez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1082(Gomez) and that Aguilar is not guilty of the violation. Because Aguilar has
now obtained the relief he sought on appeal, we dismiss his appeal as moot.
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Background
On July 22, 2013, Aguilar was found guilty of a disciplinary violation
after participating in a mass hunger strike and assessed a 90-day loss of
custody credits against his sentence. Aguilar exhausted his inmate appeal
challenging the disciplinary violation in January 2014.
In March 2016, Division Two of this court addressed a habeas petition
filed by another inmate who was found guilty of participating in the same
mass hunger strike as Aguilar. (Gomez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086.)
The court held that Gomez’s participation in the hunger strike, which
consisted of skipping nine consecutive meals to protest the conditions of
solitary confinement at the prison, was not factually sufficient to support the
Department’s finding that Gomez had engaged in behavior that “ ‘might
lead’ ” to “ ‘disorder’ ” that “ ‘endangers facility, outside community or another
person.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1098–1100.) The court ordered prison officials to restore
Gomez’s lost credits and expunge the disciplinary violation from his prison
file. (Id. at p. 1100.)
In December 2016, Aguilar filed an administrative grievance
challenging the July 2013 disciplinary violation based on the Gomez decision.
His grievance explained, “I was found guilty of the exact same rule violation
for exactly the same circumstances” as Gomez. He requested that he be
afforded the same treatment as Gomez following his appeal. After exhausting
the administrative proceedings, Aguilar filed the present petition seeking a
writ of mandate compelling the department to expunge his 2013 disciplinary
violation on the ground that under Gomez the violation was not supported by
sufficient evidence. The Department demurred on grounds that: (1) Aguilar
could pursue his claim by filing a habeas petition; (2) the petition was barred
by the statute of limitations and (3) Aguilar failed to show the Department
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has a ministerial duty to expunge the disciplinary violation. The trial court
sustained the Department’s demurrer without leave to amend but advised
Aguilar that his claim could be pursued by petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Aguilar filed a notice of appeal.1
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of Aguilar’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus, filed in this court on January 31, 2023, under Case
No. A167085. Aguilar’s petition challenged the same rules violation at issue
in the present appeal. On July 25, this court denied the petition after being
notified by the Attorney General that the Department has placed a
memorandum in petitioner’s prison file stating that the rules violation at
issue has been determined not to be a violation under the reasoning of
Gomez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1082 and that petitioner is not guilty of the
violation.
On August 14, 2023, we gave the parties an opportunity to submit
supplemental briefing as to whether the appeal is now moot. The Attorney
General submitted a letter brief confirming the placement of the
memorandum in Aguilar’s prison file and arguing that the appeal should be
dismissed as moot. Aguilar submitted an untimely letter brief arguing that
the appeal is not moot because (1) the memorandum placed in his file is
insufficient, (2) his petition sought relief on behalf of all inmates who suffered
the same disciplinary violation, (3) the complaint “stated a cause of action as
a matter of law” and (4) the petition presents an important question of law.
1 Although Aguilar’s notice of appeal refers to a judgment of dismissal,
the appellate record contains no judgment. This appeal thus appears to have
been taken from the order sustaining defendant’s demurrer without leave to
amend, which is not an appealable order under Code of Civil Procedure
section 904.1. The absence of an appealable order provides an alternative
basis on which this court dismisses the appeal.
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Discussion
Aguilar has obtained the relief he sought on appeal, and thus, his
appeal is moot. (People v. J.S. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 163, 170 [“[A]s a
general matter, an issue is moot if ‘any ruling by [the] court can have no
practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.’ ”].) Aguilar’s
arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Aguilar suggests the memorandum placed in his file is insufficient
because the court, rather than the warden, should make the determination
that the disciplinary violation is not supported by some evidence. The result,
however, is the same. He is no longer subject to any penalty as a result of the
violation.
Aguilar argues his appeal is not moot because his petition sought relief
on behalf of all inmates who suffered the same violation. Aguilar misstates
the allegations of his petition. Aguilar’s petition contains no allegations
purporting to represent unnamed inmates. His prayer for relief seeks a
“peremptory writ commanding [the department] to reverse the [rules
violation report], and expunge all references to this disciplinary charge from
petitioner’s file” or “[i]n the alternative, show cause why it should not do so,
and thereafter issue a peremptory writ commanding [the department] to
expunge all references to this disciplinary for all inmates affected by the
identical charge.” Given that Aguilar has obtained the primary relief
requested, any alternative request for relief is immaterial.
Aguilar’s argument that the complaint “stated a cause of action as a
matter of law” is irrelevant. The sufficiency of the complaint does not affect
the mootness of the appeal.
Finally, Aguilar argues the petition presents the following important
question of law: Can a writ of mandate be used to challenge a due process
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claim when no time credits are at stake? A court may make an exception to
the mootness rule where the appeal “involves an important matter of public
interest that is likely to recur, yet evade review.” (People v. Pipkin (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1150.) Aguilar, however, has made no showing that this
issue is likely to evade review. This issue is directly tied to whether Aguilar
had an adequate legal remedy in habeas proceedings, which several cases
have already addressed. (Compare In re Johnson (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 290,
297 [declining to review prison disciplinary violation that did not result in the
loss of good time credits] with In re Marti (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 561, 566-567
[reviewing a habeas claim challenging a prison disciplinary violation that did
not result in the loss of good time credits because it could affect future
classification and parole suitability decisions].) Accordingly, we decline
Aguilar’s request to exercise our discretion to address this issue.
Disposition
The appeal is dismissed.
HIRAMOTO, J.*
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P.J.
STREETER, J.
Aguilar v. CA Dept. of Corrections (A165629)
*Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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