In re T.J. CA1/2 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/19/24 In re T.J. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re T.J., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168593
v. (Alameda County
T.J., Super. Ct. No. JV03132608)
Defendant and Appellant.
In April 2023, when he was sixteen years old, defendant T.J. entered a
gas station while armed with a gun, struck the attendant in the face with the
gun, and fled the scene after taking money from the register. After T.J.
admitted to assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), the juvenile court committed T.J. to Secure Track,
Alameda County’s secure youth treatment facility. T.J. appeals, arguing the
juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that a less restrictive,
alternative disposition would not be suitable. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Shell Station Incident
On April 22, 2023 at around 2:25 a.m., T.J. and another male entered a
Shell gas station in Oakland, approached the counter, and requested a gas
1
can from the attendant. When the attendant opened the side door to hand
the gas can, T.J. and the other male each pointed a handgun at the attendant
and forced their way into the cashier’s area. They demanded the attendant
open the safe, but the attendant did not know its code. Both T.J. and the
other male then hit the attendant on his face with their handguns. The two
suspects opened the cash register, took $700 in cash, and fled the scene in a
vehicle. The attendant sustained bruising to his face.
T.J. was arrested one month later after police saw him exiting a car
that was used in an armed robbery. A search of the vehicle revealed a semi-
automatic pistol.
The Charges
On May 24, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a juvenile
wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a))1 charging then 17-
year-old T.J. with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211) (count one);
assault with a firearm (id., §§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) (count two); carrying a
concealed loaded firearm within a vehicle (id., § 25400, subd. (a)(1) (count
three); possessing an assault weapon (id., § 30605, subd. (a)) (count 4); and
carrying a loaded and unregistered firearm on his person in a public place
(id., § 25850, subd. (a)) (count 5). The petition also alleged various firearm
use and possession enhancements.
On June 29, T.J. admitted to assault with force likely to produce great
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4))—a lesser included offense of
count two—in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts and
enhancements. The juvenile court (the Honorable Scott B. Jackson) accepted
the admission and set a dispositional hearing for July 17.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
The Dispositional Hearing
On July 13, 2023, the probation officer filed a dispositional report. The
report detailed T.J.’s prior probation history beginning on August 12, 2019,2
when he was declared a ward after admitting to grand theft of another
person (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)). Nearly two years later, on July 7, 2021,
T.J. admitted to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). And on March 28,
2022, he admitted to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). In addition,
T.J. was twice found in violation of probation.
T.J.’s first out-of-home placement was at Boys Republic in September
2021, following the burglary offense. He absconded after three days. T.J.
was then taken into custody at the Juvenile Justice Center where he
remained until November 16, 2021, at which point he returned to Boys
Republic. On December 7, 2021, T.J. again absconded.
On June 2, 2022, following the second degree robbery offense, T.J. was
placed at Rite of Passage (ROP). He initially struggled to adjust to the rules
and norms of the program. But with continued support and treatment from
his treatment team, he “learned to utilize positive social skills and began to
have more positive interactions with others. While in placement he was able
to work on his poor impulse control, poor decision-making, and poor problem-
solving skills. His progress was measured by the completion of his treatment
groups, which were aimed at him learning better conflict resolution, effective
communication, and improved interactions with peers and authority figures.”
On January 31, 2023, T.J. completed the program and returned to the home
of his mother.
On May 22, 2023, T.J. was arrested for the assault in the instant case.
2 The report refers to the year “2029,” which presumably was a
typographical error.
3
The assault was T.J.’s “19th referral” to the probation department. He has
been on probation since 2019.
The dispositional report also documented T.J.’s family history. T.J.’s
parents together raised nine children, including T.J. The family was referred
to Child Protective Services approximately 25 times. Two allegations of
general neglect by T.J.’s mother were substantiated. T.J.’s parents also had a
history of domestic violence in the home. The probation officer observed that
while the family was “close-knit,” T.J.’s parents needed “[t]o be more
available for [him].” T.J. himself has a son, born in September 2022.
In addition, the report noted that T.J. was involved with the “Stubby”
gang. He also suffered traumatic experiences such as being shot in the neck,
and his friends dying due to gun violence. T.J. also used marijuana daily.
T.J. was found to be at medium risk for recidivism within the next year.
The probation officer recommended that T.J. be committed to Secure
Track. She reported: “The youth’s matter was screened for Secure Track; he
was approved for Secure Track. The youth has been to Placement and
completed the program, however, he continues to offend . . . . [He] was armed
and continues to associate with the Stubby gang. [T.J.] has proven he was
not rehabilitated, as this is his third sustained Felony offense.”
In addition to citing T.J.’s history of offenses and probation violations,
the report justified the recommendation for Secure Track based on the
following:
“The youth lacks structure in the home. The violence experienced in
the home coupled with other traumas throughout his life appears to have
played a significant role in his behaviors. He self-medicates daily smoking
marijuana and remains connected to the Stubby gang members and
associates. The youth absconded twice from court-ordered out-of-home
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placements. After being continued in placement for the third time, the youth
successfully completed the program; however, shortly thereafter he was
arrested for the instant offense.
“Despite fathering an eight-month-old son, the youth continues to
engage in negative and risky behaviors. The SOS [(Screening for Out of
Home Placement)] Committee recommends a commitment to the Secure
Track Program which offers several evidence-based therapeutic services,
including Rites of Passage (ROP): Culturally Responsive Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy, Growth Restores Our Worth (G.R.O.W.): Life
Skills/Social — Emotion Development, Raising Leaders: Employment and
Career Pathways, a Fatherhood Program, and TRUE Academy: Gang
Intervention and Anger Management. Secure Track will address his drug
use as well as develop [his] decision-making skills, peer relations, life skills,
and most importantly his parenting skills. Secure Track will enable the
youth to focus on his needs absent the distraction of his peers and the
community.”
At the dispositional hearing on July 17, T.J.’s attorney requested that
he be placed at Camp Sweeney instead of Secure Track. The People joined in
the recommendation of the probation department for Secure Track. The
juvenile court noted that the probation officer did not explain why a referral
to Camp Sweeney would not be appropriate. Therefore, the court continued
the hearing to July 21 to allow probation to provide such an explanation.
On July 20, the probation officer submitted a memorandum, which
reiterated her recommendation for T.J.’s commitment to Secure Track and
included the following:
“On July 6, 2023, the youth’s matter was screened with the [SOS]
committee; Secure Track was deemed the most appropriate for the youth. He
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could receive intensive services in a controlled environment which will
prevent him from absconding and placing himself and the community at
further risk. The least restrictive option of Camp Sweeney was discussed but
given the youth’s AWOL history and the seriousness of his offense, armed
robbery of a business, and striking the victim in the face with a firearm,
Secure Track was recommended. The youth has twice absconded from Court
ordered STRTP [(Short-Term Residential Therapeutic Program)] placements.
After being continued in placement for the third time, the youth successfully
completed the STRTP placement; however, shortly after returning home, he
was arrested for the instant offense. This is the youth’s third sustained
felony offense, which, unfortunately, despite supportive services afforded, the
youth has not been rehabilitated. The youth does not have structure and
support in the home of his parents, and[ ] the domestic violence experienced
in the home, coupled with other traumas throughout his life, appears to have
played a significant role in his current behaviors. Camp Sweeney requires a
parent to be involved and active in the program and historically there has not
been a parent that has been active and supportive in his rehabilitation.
“On July 20, 2023, a further SOS discussion was held concerning the
appropriateness of Camp Sweeney. While similar programming can be
offered to the youth at Camp Sweeney, his AWOL history and present offense
are of great concern to the committee. The youth’s offenses are increasing in
sophistication and would be putting the community at risk if he were in an
open setting such as Camp Sweeney, where he could easily walk away and
return to Oakland.
“Entering and robbing a business at gunpoint and striking the Victim
in the face with a firearm is a bold and egregious offense. The youth needs to
acknowledge the gravity and risk he posed to the Victim and himself
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possessing a firearm. The youth’s behavior has continuously escalated over
the years with 19 referrals to the Probation Department. The youth has
failed to realize the trauma he is causing his victims.
“At this time, it appears the Secure Track Program will assist the
youth with his rehabilitative needs in a secure structured environment to
help him accomplish set goals to become a productive member of the
community. Secure Track will enable the youth to focus on his treatment
goals and needs. It is hoped that the youth maximizes the opportunity while
in Secure Track to be held accountable, begin self-reflection and healing,
work on decision-making skills, and peer relations, obtain life skills and
strengthen his parenting skills, as well as address his substance misuse.”
The continued dispositional hearing came on as scheduled, on July 21.
T.J.’s mother appeared telephonically. T.J.’s father also called in
telephonically to inform the court that he was walking to the courthouse and
was “two minutes” away. While on the record, T.J.’s father asked Judge
Jackson, “How you been, man?” Judge Jackson replied, “I’ve been good, man.
. . . I haven’t seen you since pre-COVID,” before a discussion off the record
took place.
When back on the record, T.J.’s attorney again requested that T.J. be
placed at Camp Sweeney. And again, the People joined in probation’s
recommendation for Secure Track. After hearing the arguments of the
parties, the juvenile court made the following comments:
“[T]he problem with [T.J.], when he comes back into the community,
someone ends up getting hurt, and I can’t afford to do that. . . . [¶] He did
succeed at that placement, and I, of all people—you know, this is one thing
about being a juvenile judge, you stay with the families; you stay with these
families forever. I’ve been with [T.J.] since 2019. I really care about this
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family. I know all the boys. I know all the kids. I’ve known the kids that
have been born in front of me, basically. I know what’s happening. I know
what’s happening with the family. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[On April 22, 2023,] [T.J.] commits this offense and someone got hurt.
I can’t afford that; the community can’t afford it. And there’s no one that’s
rooting more for this family or for [T.J.] than me.
“You know, as you heard before we got back on the record, I had a long
conversation with dad. I told him I haven’t seen him in a while. And Mom,
you know, as you know, is sporadically involved. . . . We can sometimes get
in touch with them; sometimes can’t. A lot of times can’t. She’s not here
today because she’s ill, which is fine, so we’re on the phone with her.
“But the reality of it is . . . that it’s just not happening, and the
rehabilitation is just not happening. And for whatever reason, they have a
lot going on in that house. And for whatever reason, Mom and Dad aren’t
really stepping up, and Camp requires that. You know, that’s one of the
things, Camp really requires the family step up and come to the forefront and
be co-partners in all of this. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“And this family, who I care a lot about, they’ve just never been able to
really step up and help their children. And what ends up happening is that
someone in the community ends up getting hurt. . . . I’ve given [T.J.] tons of
chances.
“This is . . . his 19th referral. This is Petition 8—[¶] . . . [¶] with
escalating and escalating and escalating behavior. And it’s just—you know,
it’s sad. It’s one of those situations where the Court doesn’t want to do it but
just feels compelled to do it because nothing seems to stick.
“. . . I was so proud of [T.J.] You know, he did so well at that
placement, and then again, he comes back into the community, and . . .
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someone else is getting hurt. And so we need to take, you know, more
structured, serious intervention at this time.”
The court then stated it had read and considered the probation
department’s disposition report and supplemental memorandum and “any
other relevant, material evidence.” It also took judicial notice of “all prior
findings, orders, and judgments in this proceeding.” The court announced its
dispositional findings:
“[T.J.] is continued to be declared a ward of the Court.
“The most recent adjudicated offense . . . [,] a [Penal Code section]
245(a)(4), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury[,] is a
[section] 707(b) offense.
“The Court has considered a number of factors, including the severity of
the offense, including the youth’s role in the offense, the youth’s behavior,
and the harm done to the victims;
“The youth’s previous delinquent history, including adequacy and
success of previous attempts by the juvenile Court to rehabilitate the youth,
whether the programming, treatment, education offered and provided in a
secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and
secure needs of the youth, whether the goals of rehabilitation, community
safety can be met by assigning the youth to an alternative, less restrictive
disposition available to the Court.
“The Court has also considered the youth’s age, developmental
maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity
and expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting the safety and
suitability of committing the youth to a term of confinement in a secure youth
treatment facility.
“The Court finds that a less, restrictive, alternative disposition isn’t
9
suitable. [¶] The youth is committed to the Secure Youth Treatment
Facility.” The court set the baseline term of commitment as four years.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“[T]he juvenile court has long enjoyed great discretion in the disposition
of juvenile matters . . . .” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 411.) It has “
‘maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the
particular ward before it.’ ” (Ibid.) We review a commitment decision for
abuse of discretion and factual findings for substantial evidence, indulging all
reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court’s decision. (In re Angela
M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396; In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
1, 5 (Carlos J.); In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135
[decision affirmed unless the court “acted beyond the scope of reason”].)
The purpose of juvenile law guides our examination of the record. (In
re Calvin S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 522, 528.) The law provides that removal
may be necessary for a minor’s “welfare or for the safety and protection of the
public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) Delinquent minors “shall, in conformity with the
interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and
guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them
accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their
circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent
with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.” (Id., subd. (b); see In re
Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507 [court may choose custodial confinement
“to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public”].)
Until recently, the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) was “the state’s
most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders . . . .” (In re
Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902.) “The DJJ is also known as the
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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Facilities (DJF). [Citation.] DJJ and DJF are used interchangeably in case
law.” (In re J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410, 413, fn. 1.) “The DJJ was
previously known as the California Youth Authority.” (In re Miguel C.,
supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 906, fn. 4.)
In 2020 the Legislature enacted “juvenile justice realignment” by
passing Senate Bill No. 823 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2020, ch. 337.)
Implementing the Legislature’s juvenile justice realignment program
required the eventual closure of the DJJ and the devolution of its
responsibilities onto California’s counties. (§ 736.5, subd. (a).) This
development in juvenile justice realignment added section 875 et seq., which
provides that beginning on July 1, 2021, in addition to other types of
treatment, the court may order a ward to be committed to a secure youth
treatment facility, the county level equivalent of the DJJ and also known as
“Secure Track.” (§ 875, subd. (a); In re J.B., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 427,
fn. 12.) The Legislature closed the DJJ effective June 30, 2023. (§ 736.5,
subd. (e); Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 10.)
In the context of Secure Track commitments, section 875, subdivision
(a)(3) (section 875(a)(3)) requires the juvenile court to make “a finding on the
record that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is
unsuitable. In determining this, the court shall consider all relevant and
material evidence, including the recommendations of counsel, the probation
department, and any other agency or individual designated by the court to
advise on the appropriate disposition of the case. The court shall additionally
make its determination based on all of the following criteria: [¶] (A) The
severity of the offense or offenses, including the ward’s role in the offense, the
ward’s behavior, and harm done to victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous
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delinquent history, including the adequacy and success of previous attempts
by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the
programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure
youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and security
needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community
safety can be met by assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive
disposition that is available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age,
developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting
the safety or suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a
secure youth treatment facility.” (§ 875(a)(3).)
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Here, the record reflects that the juvenile court considered all the
relevant evidence and the criteria set forth in section 875(a)(3) in finding that
a less restrictive, alternative disposition would be unsuitable for T.J.
Substantial evidence supports that determination.
The evidence shows that T.J.’s present offense of assault by force likely
to produce great bodily injury was a serious offense; he pistol-whipped the
victim on his face, injuring him. The record also reflects a prior delinquent
history since 2019, a series of failed efforts to rehabilitate T.J. in multiple
placements, a history of absconding from less restrictive placements, and a
pattern of criminal behavior over the course of the wardship that was
escalating in severity.
In addition, T.J. experienced violence and lacked structure in his home.
He suffered from other traumatic experiences such as being shot in the neck
and losing friends to gun violence. He was involved in a gang. And he used
marijuana daily to self-medicate. T.J. was also raising a young son, but
continued to engage in negative and risky behaviors. As reported by the
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probation officer, Secure Track provided therapy and specific programs that
would address T.J.’s needs concerning his substance misuse, decision-making
skills, gang affiliation, anger management, parenting skills, and employment.
Although the less restrictive alternative of Camp Sweeney had similar
programs, Camp Sweeney also required active family involvement and
support. Unfortunately, in the probation officer’s view, it was unlikely that
T.J.’s parents would provide him with the proper support given they had not
previously shown up for him in that regard. Beyond that, considering T.B.’s
history of absconding from past placements and the seriousness of his present
offense, the probation officer determined the community would be at risk if
T.J. were placed in an open setting such as Camp Sweeney where he could
easily walk away.
All of this supplies substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
conclusion “that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is
unsuitable.” (§ 875(a)(3).) Thus, the court was well within its discretion in
committing T.J. to Secure Track.
T.J.’s counterarguments do not convince us otherwise. First, T.J.
argues the juvenile court improperly relied on facts outside the record
relevant to the criterion in section 875(a)(3)(D) of whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by an alternative, less
restrictive placement. Second, he argues “the record . . . is fatally short of
evidence relevant to” the criterion in section 875(a)(3)(C) of whether the
programs and treatment provided at Secure Track would meet his needs.
We address T.J.’s second contention first. T.J. maintains that the
probation reports did not contain enough information about the programs at
Secure Track. Relying on Carlos J., he argues the probation officer “should
have explained the activities that these programs entail, the number of hours
13
of therapy that these programs would provide to T.J., and how the programs
would meet T.J.’s needs.” Additionally, T.J. argues that a commitment to
Secure Track could expose him to “peer contagion” from other youth with
more serious offenses, and that in light of that circumstance, the juvenile
court should have taken evidence on whether placing him “at Secure Track
would make him worse. . . .”
In Carlos J., the probation officer recommended commitment to DJF
based on the minor’s underlying offense (assault with a firearm) and gang
association. (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 4, 7.) The probation
department recommended the DJF, citing the gravity of the offense and
indicating gang intervention services were warranted, but not mentioning
any specific programs at the DJF that could provide such services. (Id. at pp.
7–9.) Moreover, a psychologist opined the minor needed treatment for PTSD
and discouraged a commitment to the DJF. (Id. at p. 8.) The juvenile court
committed the minor to the DJF, concluding “ ‘the youth will benefit from the
reformatory, discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJF].’ ” (Id. at p.
9.) Division Five of this court reversed, finding no substantial evidence of
probable benefit under section 7343 and remarking, “there must be some
specific evidence in the record of the programs at the DJF expected to benefit
a minor.” (Id. at p. 10.) Without such evidence, the appellate court held, it
could not “review the adequacy of the evidence supporting the finding” of
probable benefit. (Ibid.)
3 Section 734, which applies to DJJ commitments, provides that “[n]o
ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless
the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition
and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will
be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment
provided by the Youth Authority.”
14
Though the court declined to create any bright line rule about how
much evidence was enough for commitment, it explained that with regard to
the initial showing required to support a DJF commitment, “it is reasonable
and appropriate to expect the probation department, in its report or
testimony, to identify those programs at the DJF likely to be of benefit to the
minor under consideration.” (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)
“Where a minor has particular needs, the probation department should also
include brief descriptions of the relevant programs to address those needs.”
(Ibid.)
Nevertheless, the Carlos J. court made clear that “the probation
department is not required in its report and initial testimony to provide in[-
]depth information about the DJF’s programs or to preemptively respond to
even predictable criticisms of the DJF. Under Evidence Code section 664,
where the probation officer has identified programs of benefit to a minor and
provided brief information about the most important programs, it may be
presumed the probation officer’s recommendation is based on an assessment
the programs are available and appropriate. If a minor wishes to dispute the
availability or efficacy of particular programs, or to suggest that other
conditions at the DJF undermine the programs, the minor must present
sufficient evidence to reasonably bring into question the benefit he or she will
receive from the adoption of the probation department’s recommendation.”
(Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.)
In stark contrast to Carlos J., where there was “no specific information
in the record regarding the programs at the DJF” (Carlos J., supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at p. 4, italics added), here, the probation officer’s dispositional
report identified the programs at Secure Track expected to address T.J.’s
needs. Specifically, the report states: “The SOS committee is recommending
15
a commitment to the Secure Track Program which offers several evidence-
based therapeutic services, including Rites of Passage (ROP): Culturally
Responsive Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Growth Restores Our Worth
(G.R.O.W.): Life Skills/Social – Emotion Development, Raising Leaders:
Employment and Career Pathways, a Fatherhood Program, and TRUE
Academy: Gang Intervention and Anger Management. Secure Track will
address his drug use as well as develop the youth’s decision-making skills,
peer relations, life skills, and most importantly his parenting skills. Secure
Track will enable the youth to focus on his needs absent the distraction of his
peers and the community.” These descriptions of the relevant programs to
address T.J.’s needs, though brief, satisfy the standard set forth in Carlos J.
for the People’s burden of showing the appropriateness of a proposed
placement. (Carlos J., at p. 12.)
T.J. nonetheless argues the probation officer should have provided
additional information such as the specific activities and number of hours
involved in the identified programs at Secure Track. But Carlos J. forecloses
such an assertion. Where, as here, the probation department has identified
and provided brief information about the relevant programs, “it is not
required . . . to provide in[-]depth information about [Secure Track’s]
programs or to preemptively respond to even predictable criticisms of [Secure
Track].” (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13, italics added.)
Next, T.J. notes that “ ‘[n]umerous studies . . . indicate that exposure to
deviant peers leads to increased deviant behavior and is a consistent
predictor of juvenile delinquency.’ ” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460,
472, fn. 5.) He then argues that because a commitment to Secure “can
undoubtedly cause ‘peer contagion,’ ” the juvenile court should have taken
more evidence on whether such a commitment “would make him worse.” We
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are unpersuaded.
In Carlos J., the minor on appeal relied on articles and reports
describing similar studies and argued that “it was critical for the record to
contain some specific information about the DJF’s gang intervention
programming in light of the risk that juveniles confined in institutions such
as the DJF may become more entrenched in criminality.” (Carlos J., supra,22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.) The Carlos J. court declined to consider such
materials, as they were not presented to the juvenile court and, in any event,
were unnecessary to its decision. (Id. at p. 13, fn. 8.) The appellate court,
however, noted: “Those sorts of materials, or testimony along similar lines, if
properly presented to the juvenile court at the time of disposition, would then
obligate the People to present more in-depth information about the DJF in
order to show probable benefit.” (Id. at pp. 13–14, italics added.) “The
bottom-line is that, where a minor has concerns about a particular aspect of
the DJF and presents evidence supporting those concerns, it may be necessary
for the People to provide additional information to the juvenile court in order
for the court to make a properly supported finding of probable benefit.” (Id.
at p. 14, italics added.)
Here, at the dispositional hearing, while T.J.’s counsel expressed a
concern that a Secure Track commitment would subject T.J. to other youth
with more serious charges and cause him to “be further institutionalized” ,
she did not present any evidence supporting those concerns. Thus, contrary
to T.J.’s suggestion, the People were not obligated to provide additional
information on Secure Track’s programs beyond what was already presented
in the probation officer’s reports. (See Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp.
13–14.)
Accordingly, Carlos J. does not provide a basis for reversing the order
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committing T.J. to Secure Track.4
Nor are we persuaded by T.J.’s criticism that the names of the relevant
Secure Track programs identified in the probation reports “sound more like
woke jargon than like real programs.” Although T.J.’s counsel expressed
concerns about the overall setting of Secure Track, she did not question the
legitimacy of the particular programs it offered. In fact, it appears counsel
held the opposite view. One of counsel’s arguments in favor of placement at
Camp Sweeney was the fact that it had some of the same or similar programs
as Secure Track—an implied acknowledgment that the programs were
appropriate and that T.J. would benefit from them. Thus, any suggestion on
4 T.J. also cites In re C.H. (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94 and In re Aline D. (1975)
14 Cal.3d 557 to argue that “the California Supreme Court has likewise
repeatedly recognized that less criminally oriented youths are permanently
damaged by exposure to youths who have become hardened criminals.” T.J.
overstates the holdings of those cases, which are in any event inapposite. In
In re Aline D., the court did not make the sweeping proposition that T.J. says
it did. Instead, there was specific evidence from a psychologist’s report that
the minor in that case was “not truly delinquent and that involvement with
more delinquent and criminally oriented youths may adversely influence
her.” (In re Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 561.) Similar evidence was not
presented in this case. In In re C.H., the high court held that a juvenile court
lacked authority to commit a ward to the DJF under section 731, subdivision
(a)(4) where the ward was never adjudged to have committed an offense
described in section 707, subdivision (b), even if the ward’s most recent
offense was a sex offense as referenced in section 733, subdivision (c). (In re
C.H., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 97–98, 108.) In interpreting sections 731,
subdivision (a)(4) and 733, subdivision (c), the court considered the legislative
history, which indicated that the “Legislature’s choice to restrict the class of
juvenile offenders eligible for commitment to the DJF serves to protect less
serious youthful offenders (those who have not committed § 707(b) offenses)
by ensuring they are not housed with and exposed to the more serious
juvenile offenders committed to the DJF.” (In re C.H., at p. 107.) In re C.H.
has no bearing here, as the application of section 731, subdivision (a)(4) or
section 733, subdivision (c) is not at issue.
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appeal that the Secure Track programs are not “real programs” is entirely
misplaced.
We now turn to T.J.’s other contention that the juvenile court assumed
facts in evidence relevant to the criterion in section 875(a)(3)(D)—“[w]hether
the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the
ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is available to the
court.”
T.J. takes issue with the following comments made by Judge Jackson at
the dispositional hearing: “[F]or whatever reason, Mom and Dad aren’t really
stepping up, and Camp [Sweeney] requires that. You know, that’s one of the
things, Camp [Sweeney] really requires the family step up and come to the
forefront and be copartners in all this. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And this family, who I
care a lot about, they’ve just never been able to really step up and help their
children.”
According to T.J., “[t]he juvenile court judge, while expressing an
exceptional level of warmth and concern for [his] large family, also thought
that he knew the parents and their capacities, from a series of cases.” By
“series of cases,” T.J. apparently means “earlier cases involving other
siblings,” as he states in his reply brief. T.J. also states, “Strangely, the judge
had a lengthy conversation with T.J.’s father, before going on the record.”
Thus, in T.J.’s view, the court “assumed facts outside the record[ ] concerning:
(1) the family participation that an effective program at Camp Sweeney
requires, and (2) [his] family’s inability to engage in the required
participation.” In turn, T.J. argues the court assumed facts not in evidence
relevant to section 875(a)(3)(D) of whether the goals of rehabilitation and
community safety could be met at a less restrictive, alternative placement.
Preliminarily, T.J. did not object to the juvenile court’s purported
19
reliance on facts outside the record on any grounds. By failing to do so, he
has forfeited his claims on appeal. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929,
966; accord, id. at p. 1007, fn. 1 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [“I agree with the
majority . . . that . . . by failing to object to the trial judge’s reliance on facts
outside the record, the defense did not preserve the question for review.”];
Guadalupe A. v. Superior Court (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 100, 108.) Thus, we
may disregard the contention. (See People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p.
966 [declining to consider defendant’s claim that trial judge improperly
considered outside evidence due to his failure to object].)5
But even if T.J. preserved the issue for appeal, it fails on the merits.
T.J. fails to establish that the juvenile court assumed facts not in the record.
T.J. suggests that Judge Jackson based his findings on an off-the-
record conversation he had with T.J.’s father during the dispositional
hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, and while on the record, T.J.’s
father asked Judge Jackson how he was doing, and Judge Jackson replied,
“I’ve been good” and that he had not seen T.J.’s father in a while. There was
then a discussion off the record. Later during the hearing, Judge Jackson
explained to the parties, “as you heard before we got back on the record, I had
a long conversation with dad. I told him I haven’t seen him in awhile.” Thus,
as Judge Jackson explained, the off-the-record discussion essentially
5 We reach the same conclusion as to T.J.’s contention raised for the
first in his reply brief that the consideration of evidence outside the record
deprived him of due process. T.J. never raised this claim in the trial court,
and so it is forfeited. (See D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625, 632
[“California courts recognize that claims alleging violations of due process
rights can be forfeited by failing to raise them in the trial court”], citing
People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436; People v. Cardona (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 516, 523.) The due process challenge is doubly forfeited because
T.J. failed to raise it in his opening brief. (People v. Taylor (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 628, 642–643.)
20
consisted of an exchange of pleasantries between himself and T.J.’s father
during the announcement of the party appearances. Further, Judge Jackson
did not state or suggest he relied on that discussion in making his findings.
T.J. also fails to establish that the juvenile court assumed facts based
on other cases involving T.J.’s siblings, assuming such cases exist. Before
commenting on his familiarity with T.J.’s family, Judge Jackson expressed:
“this is one thing about being a juvenile judge, you stay with the families; you
stay with these families forever. I’ve been with [T.J.] since 2019. I really
care about this family. I know all the boys. I know all the kids. I‘ve known
the kids that have been born in front of me, basically. . . . I know what’s
happening with the family.” Judge Jackson did not state what information
he was relying upon when he made these comments. But later during the
hearing, immediately before announcing the dispositional findings, Judge
Jackson indicated he had read and considered the probation officer’s reports
and all relevant evidence in this case, and took judicial notice of all prior
orders and findings in this case. Thus, at best, there is ambiguity as to
whether Judge Jackson’s finding regarding T.J.’s parents’ inability to provide
the support required at Camp Sweeney was based on information he
gathered from these proceedings or, as T.J. contends, from other proceedings
involving his siblings.
This ambiguity, however, must be construed against T.J., not the other
way around. (See In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1069, citing
Johndrow v. Thomas (1947) 31 Cal.2d 202, 208–209 [“ ‘It is an established
rule of law that the findings of fact are to receive such a construction as will
uphold rather than defeat the judgment thereon. For this purpose they are to
be liberally construed, and any ambiguity or inconsistency therein is to be
resolved in favor of sustaining the judgment.’ ”]; Winograd v. American
21
Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631 [“[a] ruling by a trial court
is presumed correct, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance”];
California School Employees Association v. King City Union Elementary
School Dist. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 695, 702 [appellate court must resolve any
uncertainty in trial court findings “ ‘ “so as to support the judgment rather
than to defeat it” ’ ”].) Only “[w]hen the record clearly demonstrates what the
trial court did” will the reviewing court “not presume it did something
different.” (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39
Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384.) Here, the record does not clearly demonstrate the
court relied on information from other cases. Accordingly, we must construe
the court’s comments in a manner that supports the commitment order—that
is, as an order based on facts presented in the record in this case. In short,
T.J.’s claim that the court relied on facts outside the record fails.
But even assuming the juvenile court improperly considered outside
information, any such error was harmless under any standard. (See People v.
Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 387 [trial error, as opposed to a structural
defect, subject to harmless error analysis]; see also People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836 [errors of state law are harmless unless it is “reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to [the defendant] would have been
reached in the absence of the error”]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24 [federal constitutional error must be shown to be harmless beyond
reasonable doubt].) Even if we disregard the information the juvenile court
purportedly learned from other cases, the record contains substantial
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s decision that Camp Sweeney would
be unsuitable, which evidence the court did consider.
The record in this case includes the probation officer’s dispositional
report and supplemental memorandum. As mentioned, the memorandum
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states, “Camp Sweeney requires a parent to be involved and active in the
program and historically there has not been a parent that has been active
and support in rehabilitation.” As explained in the dispositional report, T.J.’s
family history consisted of domestic violence in the home, two substantiated
allegations of general neglect by T.J.’s mother, and a lack of structure in the
home. Based on this, the probation officer observed that the family, though
“close-knit,” needed “[t]o be more available for [T.J.]” in his rehabilitation.
T.J. does not argue that the probation officer lacked sufficient knowledge of
the programs at Camp Sweeney. Indeed, we may presume the probation
officer had such knowledge. (See Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 10
[probation department’s “report can fairly be read as asserting that the DJF
is the best placement to address appellant’s needs and it can be presumed
that assertion was based on some knowledge of the DJF”].) Nor does he
dispute the foundation or accuracy of the probation officer’s reports regarding
his probation history, specific needs, and family background.
Thus, the record contains ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that T.J.’s family would likely be unable to provide the level of
support that a placement at Camp Sweeney required. This evidence—when
combined with other undisputed evidence in the record such as T.J.’s history
of absconding from past placements, failure to reform despite a high level of
court and probation intervention, escalating delinquent conduct, and the
seriousness of his current offense—constitutes overwhelming evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s determination that Camp Sweeney would not
be suitable. Therefore, assuming that the juvenile court erred in relying on
outside information, any such error was harmless under any standard.
Lastly, we address an argument T.J. makes in passing: “There is
something fundamentally unfair about the scenario of a youth who finds
23
himself in the juvenile justice system due to his parents’ inability to provide
structure in the home, and then is locked up rather than sent to Camp
because his parents are sometimes overwhelmed and disorganized. (See
generally Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, re [sic]
fundamental fairness as requirement of due process.)” This argument is
unavailing. First, Judith P., a juvenile dependency case, is inapposite.
There, the court held it was “fundamentally unfair to terminate either a
parent’s or a child’s familial relationship if the parent and/or child has not
had an adequate opportunity to prepare and present the best possible case for
continuation of reunification services and/or reunification.” (Judith P., supra,at pp. 557–558.) These concerns regarding notice and opportunity are not
implicated in this case.
Second, T.J.’s argument gives the incorrect impression that the juvenile
court committed him to Secure Track solely because of his family situation.
But that was only one factor that the juvenile court in this case considered.
And T.J. does not argue or provide any authority establishing that a juvenile
court may not consider a ward’s family circumstances in determining
whether a proposed placement would be suitable. Further, T.J.’s argument
ignores that the juvenile court made its determinations on evidence of T.J.’s
own conduct. As already explained, that evidence includes T.J.’s lack of
success on probation, history of absconding from less restrictive settings,
escalating delinquent history, and the severity of his present offense.
For all these reasons, T.J. provides no basis for us to reverse the
juvenile court’s order committing him to Secure Track.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
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_________________________
Richman, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
In re T.J. (A168593)
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