Stoner v. SCA of CA CA6 ( 2024 )

Filed 9/19/24 Stoner v. SCA of CA CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARCEL STONER, H051566
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CV410973)
v.
SCA OF CA, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant;
WSSH CSS, LLC,
Real Party in Interest.
This appeal is from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Defendant SCA
of CA, LLC (SCA) moved to compel when plaintiff Darcel Stoner, an SCA employee,
filed prevailing wage and unfair competition claims against it. SCA asserted that Stoner
agreed to arbitrate those claims during his onboarding process by clicking an
acknowledgment box on a website screen describing the company’s dispute resolution
policy. The trial court disagreed. It ruled that, by checking the box, Stoner accepted and
acknowledged SCA’s policy concerning dispute resolution, not the agreement to arbitrate
referenced in that policy. For the reasons explained below, we agree with this
interpretation and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. SCA’s Arbitration Agreement
SCA has a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement—California” (Arbitration Agreement)
for its employees. With a few exceptions, this agreement covers, “to the maximum
extent permissible under federal and state law,” claims relating to an employee’s
employment, including “claims for wages and other compensation” and “claims for
violation of any federal, state or other government law.” The Arbitration Agreement
generally requires that arbitrations be administered by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), and it provides for discovery and an award in writing. In addition,
the agreement expressly waives an employee’s right to bring claims “on a multi-plaintiff,
class, collective, or representative basis.”
The Arbitration Agreement repeatedly indicates that employees are to accept the
agreement by signing it. The agreement’s introduction states that that “the undersigned
employee . . . and the Company agree, by signing this Agreement, to use the arbitration
procedures in this Agreement instead of a trial in court before a judge or jury.” (Italics
added.) The agreement also states that an employee may obtain a copy of AAA rules
“before signing this Agreement,” that “[s]igning this Agreement is optional,” and that
“[b]y signing this Agreement” an employee affirms that he or she had sufficient time to
read the agreement and “did not sign under any coercion or duress.” Finally, just above
the signature block for the employee, the Arbitration Agreement states: “BY SIGNING
BELOW, I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED AND READ, OR
HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ, THIS ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT.”
B. Stoner’s Onboarding
Stoner was hired by SCA’s predecessor as a street sweeper operator. When SCA
took control, it retained many employees, including Stoner. As part of its onboarding
process, SCA asked retained employees such as Stoner to “review, acknowledge, read
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and execute necessary documents regarding their employment with SCA” on a website
used by the company. For each document, a separate screen appeared, and at the bottom
each screen stated “I accept and acknowledge the company policy above” next to a box to
be checked by the employee. Although Stoner does not remember checking any boxes,
SCA presented records showing that Stoner electronically acknowledged and accepted
screens with sixteen forms and at least three documents.
1. The Dispute Resolution Screen
One of the screens that SCA contends Stoner checked was entitled “CA – L –
Voluntary Mutual Arbitration Agreement” and addressed dispute resolution (Dispute
Resolution Screen). The Dispute Resolution Screen has three components: a summary
paragraph, a link, and an acknowledgement box.
a. The Summary Paragraph
At the top of the Dispute Resolution Screen is a paragraph summarizing SCA’s
dispute resolution policy. The first two sentences of this summary paragraph express the
belief that most work-related disputes can and should be resolved through informal
conciliation, and the final two describe the arbitration procedure available if conciliation
fails:
“SCA of CA, LLC (‘Company’) believes that most work-related concerns can be
addressed with the employees’ manager or Human Resources. Thus, employees are
encouraged, but not required, to speak with their manager or Human Resources to resolve
any work-related problem before initiating the procedures set forth in this Mutual
Arbitration Agreement (‘Agreement’ or ‘Arbitration Agreement’). Where resolution
cannot be achieved through the Company’s internal resources, the undersigned employee
(including his/her heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns) (collectively,
‘Employee’) and the Company agree, by signing this Agreement, to use the arbitration
procedures in this Agreement instead of a trial in court before a judge or jury. Arbitration
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is the process by which a neutral third party makes a binding decision relating to a
dispute.”
Notably, the summary paragraph initially references the Arbitration Agreement
using its full name, “Mutual Arbitration Agreement,” but then defines two terms to refer
to the agreement: “Agreement” and “Arbitration Agreement.” The paragraph also notes
that employees agree to the Arbitration Agreement “by signing the Agreement.”
b. The Link
Directly below the summary paragraph is a link to the “Voluntary Mutual
Arbitration Agreement,” the same agreement earlier referred to as “Mutual Arbitration
Agreement,” “Arbitration Agreement,” and “Agreement.”
c. The Acknowledgment Box
Beneath the link to the Arbitration Agreement is an acknowledgment box, which
states “I accept and acknowledge the company policy above.”
2. The Acknowledgment Page
SCA’s records list the Dispute Resolution Screen among 16 onboarding screens on
which Stoner “Signed Off.” SCA’s records also contain an “Acknowledgment Page” for
the Dispute Resolution Screen. Stoner’s name and employee number are on the top of
the page. Immediately below that, the Acknowledgement Page states “[p]lease review
the attached agreement.” Further below that, there is a link to the Arbitration Agreement,
and a checked acknowledgment box at the bottom.
C. Proceedings Below
In February 2023, Stoner sued SCA and another entity on behalf of a class of
street sweeping employees, claiming SCA failed to pay prevailing wages under Labor
Code section 1720 et seq. and unfair competition under Business & Professions Code
sections 17200-17209. Stoner subsequently amended his complaint to add a claim for
Labor Code violations pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA)
(Labor Code, § 2698 et seq.).
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SCA moved to compel arbitration of Stoner’s individual claims, strike the class
claims, and stay the representative PAGA claims. SCA argued that Stoner accepted the
Arbitration Agreement by checking the acknowledgment box on the Dispute Resolution
Screen. The trial court denied SCA’s motion. The court assumed “for the sake of
argument” that Stoner had checked the acknowledgment box, but concluded that doing so
did “not establish that he assented to the terms of the Mutual Arbitration Agreement.” It
reasoned that, by checking the acknowledgment box, “Stoner merely accepted and
acknowledged SCA’s policy regarding dispute resolution.” This policy, the court
explained, expressed SCA’s belief that most work-related disputes can be resolved
informally, encouraged employees to seek informal resolution of issues, and provided the
option of arbitration if informal efforts were unsuccessful. However, the policy
recognized that employees agree to arbitration “by signing the Mutual Arbitration
Agreement.” Thus, the court concluded, “the checked box is simply an acknowledgment
that the parties agree to be bound by the Mutual Arbitration Agreement if it is signed by
Stoner. [(Citations omitted.)]”
SCA filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1294, subdivision (a).
II. DISCUSSION
SCA appeals the denial of its motion to compel arbitration, arguing that Stoner
accepted the Arbitration Agreement by checking the acknowledgment box on the Dispute
Resolution Screen. We disagree. The Arbitration Agreement specified a mode of
acceptance—signing the agreement—which Stoner did not employ. Moreover, far from
suggesting that checking its acknowledgment box is an alternative mode of acceptance,
the Dispute Resolution Screen expressly recognized that employees enter into the
Arbitration Agreement by signing it. As the trial court correctly recognized, what Stoner
“accepted and acknowledged” by checking the Dispute Resolution Screen’s
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acknowledgment box was SCA’s dispute resolution policy, not the Arbitration
Agreement.
A. Background Principles
The parties agree that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
applies here. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the FAA declares “ ‘a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ ” (New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira
(2019) 586 U.S. 105, 120.) This policy is “to make ‘arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’ ” (Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596
U.S. 411, 418.) Accordingly, “ ‘a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’ ” (AT&T Technologies v.
Communications Workers (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648.)
In determining whether a party has agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration, courts
apply “general state-law principles of contract interpretation,” albeit with “due regard” to
the federal policy favoring arbitration. (Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 475-476; see also
Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 236 [“In determining the rights of the parties to enforce an arbitration
agreement within the FAA’s scope, courts apply state contract law while giving due
regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.”].) Under California law, to form a
contract, the parties’ assent to the contract must be free, mutual, and communicated by
each party to the other. (Civ. Code, § 1565.) In determining whether there is mutual
assent, courts apply an objective standard. (Patel v. Liebermensch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 344,
352 [“The terms of the contract are determinable by an external, not by an internal
standard—or by what has been termed the objective rather than the subjective test.”].) In
addition, the party moving to enforce an agreement bears “[t]he burden of proving the
agreement.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165-
166.)
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B. The Arbitration Agreement
The Arbitration Agreement specifies a mode of acceptance: signing the agreement.
This mode of acceptance is recognized in the Arbitration Agreement’s introduction,
which states that “the undersigned employee . . . and the Company agree, by signing this
Agreement, to use the arbitration procedures in this Agreement instead of a trial in court
before a judge or jury.” (Italics added.) Elsewhere, the agreement repeatedly references
the employee signing the agreement: (1) “Employee may obtain a copy of the AAA rules
before signing this Agreement . . . ,” (2) “[s]igning this Agreement is optional and not a
condition of employment or employment related benefits,” (3) “[b]y signing this
Agreement, Employee affirms that Employee has been provided sufficient time to read,
consider, and ask questions about this Agreement,” and (4) the “Employee did not sign
under any coercion or duress.” (Italics added.) And in the last paragraph, just above the
signature block for the employee, in all capital and bold letters the Arbitration Agreement
states: “BY SIGNING BELOW, I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED
AND READ, OR HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ, THIS
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.” (Italics added.) Thus, it could not be clearer that the
specified mode for accepting the Arbitration Agreement is to sign it.
Stoner did not employ this mode of acceptance. As the trial court recognized,
Stoner’s signature is not on the copy of the Arbitration Agreement that SCA contends
Stoner accepted. Accordingly, in its reply brief, SCA expressly conceded that the
“Agreement document was not signed by Stoner.”
C. The Dispute Resolution Screen
Rather than asserting that Stoner signed the Arbitration Agreement, SCA contends
that he “electronically accepted/executed” the agreement by checking the
acknowledgment box on the Dispute Resolution Screen. It is unclear whether the
Arbitration Agreement even permits this alternative mode of acceptance: The
agreement’s express and repeated references to employees signing the agreement suggest
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that a signature is the exclusive mode of acceptance. (See, e.g., Hofer v. Young (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 52, 56; see also Rest. 2d Contracts, § 60 [“If an offer prescribes the place,
time or manner of acceptance[,] its terms in this respect must be complied with in order
to create a contract.”].) However, we need not decide this issue because nothing in the
Dispute Resolution Screen suggests that Stoner intended checking the screen’s
acknowledgment box to be an alternative mode of accepting the Arbitration Agreement.
By checking the box, Stoner merely accepted and acknowledged the dispute resolution
policy described in the summary paragraph earlier on the screen.
1. The Dispute Resolution Screen
The acknowledgment box on the Dispute Resolution Screen states that “I accept
and acknowledge the company policy above.” The “company policy above” is naturally
understood to refer to the summary paragraph that appears higher up on the Dispute
Resolution Screen. That paragraph begins by expressing the belief that most “work-
related concerns” and “work-related problem[s]” can be addressed by an employee’s
manager or SCA’s human resources department. It then encourages employees to speak
with their managers or human resources to resolve work-related problems. Finally, it
states that, “[w]here resolution cannot be achieved” by informal conciliation and
cooperation, employees should use arbitration “instead of a trial in court before a judge or
jury.” Thus, when Stoner checked the acknowledgment box stating that “I accept and
acknowledge the company policy above,” he was accepting and acknowledging the
dispute resolution policy described earlier on the Dispute Resolution Screen.
Although the Arbitration Agreement is part of the dispute resolution policy
described by the summary paragraph, the acknowledgment box cannot be reasonably
interpreted as an acceptance of that agreement. In the first place, the acknowledgment
box does not refer to the Arbitration Agreement. The Dispute Resolution Screen uses
several terms for the Arbitration Agreement. The title of screen refers to “CA-L-
Voluntary Mutual Arbitration Agreement.” The summary paragraph refers to the
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“Mutual Arbitration Agreement” and defines two additional terms to refer to the
agreement: “ ‘Agreement’ or ‘Arbitration Agreement.’ ” And, much like the title, the
link below the summary paragraph refers to the “Voluntary Mutual Arbitration
Agreement.” The acknowledgment box does not use any of these terms. Indeed, the box
does not even use the word “arbitration” or the word “agreement.” Instead, the box uses
a new and entirely different term: “company policy above.” The use of this new and
different term creates a clear inference: The acknowledgment box does not refer to the
Arbitration Agreement.
The acknowledgment box also does not use the method for agreeing to the
Arbitration Agreement identified on the Dispute Resolution Screen. The summary
paragraph states that employees “agree . . . to use the arbitration procedures” in the
Arbitration Agreement “by signing this Agreement.” (Italics added.) The
acknowledgment box does not use this method. The box does not allow employees to
physically sign the Arbitration Agreement. Nor does it allow them to affix an electronic
signature. Indeed, the box does not even state that, by clicking it, employees will be
deemed to have signed the Arbitration Agreement. The box merely allows employees to
click the statement that “I accept and acknowledge,” and it is the “company policy
above”—not the Agreement, Arbitration Agreement, Mutual Arbitration Agreement, or
Voluntary Mutual Arbitration Agreement—that is accepted and acknowledged.
Checking the acknowledgment box cannot be reasonably interpreted to be assent to the
Arbitration Agreement when it neither refers to that agreement nor uses the specified
method for entering into it.
SCA asserts that the “company policy above” referenced in the acknowledgment
box cannot be the dispute resolution process described by the summary paragraph, and
therefore must refer to the Arbitration Agreement, because the process described in that
paragraph is “not a policy at all.” SCA’s own authorities show otherwise. One case cited
by SCA defines “ ‘policy’ ” to mean “ ‘a definite course or method of action selected
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from among various alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine
present and future decisions.’ ” (City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle (1985) 471 U.S. 808, 823,
fn. 6 [citing Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary’s definition of “ ‘policy’ ”].)
The dispute resolution policy described in the summary paragraph easily satisfies this
definition. That policy describes a course of conduct selected from among various
alternatives: The policy chooses informal conciliation and cooperation with employees
rather than hostility and confrontation between management and labor and, where such
cooperation fails and the employee agrees to arbitrate, arbitration rather than litigation
and trials in a court before a judge or jury. Another case cited by SCA defines
“ ‘policy’ ” to mean “ ‘general principles which guide a corporation, or rules intended to
be followed consistently over time in corporate operations.’ ” (Cruz v. HomeBase (2000)
83 CalApp.4th 160, 167 [defining “corporate policy”].) The summary paragraph’s
dispute resolution process satisfies this definition as well: It adopts general principles—
conciliation and arbitration—to guide SCA’s approach to dispute resolution.
SCA also argues that an employee may not “accept” a policy unless a binding,
enforceable contract results. That is incorrect. In ordinary usage the word “accept” can
mean, among other things, “to receive with consent” or even “to take without protest.”
(Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 10, col. 3.) Thus, when Stoner clicked the
acknowledgment box and stated “I accept” SCA’s dispute resolution policy, he could
have been saying simply that he had received the policy. Moreover, this interpretation is
supported by the fact that the acknowledgment box states that “I accept and
acknowledge” the dispute resolution policy. (Italics added.) If, as SCA asserts, the
acknowledgment box had used the word “accept” in a technical sense to refer to a
contractual acceptance, there would have been no need to add the word “acknowledge.”
In addition, it is not reasonable to interpret the acknowledgment box to use the word
“accept” in such a technical legal sense when it is coupled with the word “acknowledge”
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and the term “company policy,” neither of which has any technical legal meaning. In
short, SCA has failed to offer a plausible interpretation of the Dispute Resolution Screen.
2. Context
SCA tries to draw support from the context in which the acknowledgment box
appears. In particular, SCA points out that, on the day that Stoner clicked the Dispute
Resolution Screen’s box, he also electronically acknowledged 15 other policies and forms
containing identically worded boxes. However, SCA fails to present any evidence that
all these policies and forms—which include a “Welcome Letter and Checklist”—contain
any enforceable agreements that might be accepted. As a consequence, the other policies
and forms presented to Stoner lend no support to SCA’s assertion that the
acknowledgment box on the Dispute Resolution Screen must create an enforceable
agreement.
SCA also points to the Acknowledgment Page generated after Stoner checked the
acknowledgment box on the Dispute Resolution Page, asserting that it “recorded Stoner’s
acceptance of the Agreement.” There is, however, no evidence that this page was ever
viewed by Stoner. Moreover, the page merely reproduces the acknowledgment box’s
statement that “I accept and acknowledge the company policy above” with a now
checked box. The page does omit the summary paragraph. However, in its place, the
page states “[p]lease review the attached agreement,” not the company policy, which
suggests not only that the company policy refers to something besides the Arbitration
Agreement but also that Stoner did not review the Agreement.
SCA argues as well that the Dispute Resolution Screen’s acknowledgment box
would be rendered superfluous if clicking it is not interpreted as agreeing to the
Arbitration Agreement. We disagree. Even if it does not accept the Arbitration
Agreement, the acknowledgment box documents whether the employee checking it
received notice of the information on the Dispute Resolution Screen. In any event, the
principle that terms should not be interpreted to be superfluous applies to contracts. The
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question here is whether a contract was formed, and SCA provides no authority extending
that principle to this situation.
3. Case Law
Citing several cases, SCA also points out that an arbitration agreement may be
accepted through a standalone acknowledgement referencing the agreement. While that
is true as an abstract matter, the cases cited by SCA finding such acceptances are easily
distinguished.
SCA relies heavily on B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
931. The plaintiff in that case sued a video game company, and the company moved to
compel arbitration under a license agreement that expressly incorporated a separate
dispute resolution policy containing an arbitration provision. (Id. at pp. 937-940.) The
first page of the license agreement stated, in bold and all capital letters, that it contained a
dispute resolution provision with an arbitration agreement: “ ‘PLEASE NOTE THAT
THE SECTION BELOW TITLED “DISPUTE RESOLUTION” CONTAINS A
BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND CLASS ACTION WAIVER. THEY
AFFECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS. PLEASE READ THEM.’ ” (Id. at p. 939.) Based
on this provision, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff received “sufficiently
conspicuous notice” that he would be agreeing to arbitrate claims if he accepted the
license agreement. (Id. at pp. 954.)
The opposite is true here. The Dispute Resolution Screen did not notify Stoner
that he would be agreeing to arbitrate claims if he clicked the screen’s acknowledgment
box. To the contrary, as noted above, the screen informed Stoner that employees agree to
arbitrate “by signing the [Arbitration] Agreement.” In addition, far from notifying Stoner
that by clicking on the acknowledgment box he would be entering into the Arbitration
Agreement, which the Dispute Resolution Screen repeatedly referenced earlier, the box
said that he would accept and acknowledge “the company policy above,” which as shown
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above is naturally understood to be described in the summary paragraph earlier on the
screen.
Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373 (Harris) is equally
inapposite. In Harris, the Court of Appeal concluded that an employee had entered into
an arbitration agreement because a handbook acknowledged by the employee expressly
notified employees that they “ ‘will be deemed to have consented to the Agreement to
Arbitrate by virtue of receipt of this Handbook.’ ” (Id. at p. 383.) The Dispute Resolution
Screen does not tell Stoner that he will be deemed to have consented to the Arbitration
Agreement by clicking the acknowledgment box. Indeed, as just noted, the Dispute
Resolution Screen says just the opposite: It characterizes arbitration as “voluntary” and
states that employees agree to arbitrate “by signing the [Arbitration] Agreement.”
The other decisions cited by SCA are inapposite as well. In one, a surety’s
construction bond explicitly incorporated by reference a construction contract containing
an arbitration clause. (Boys Club of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1271.) In another, a signed application for membership in a
board of realtors stated that, by applying, members agreed to abide by bylaws imposing
on members a duty to arbitrate certain disputes. (King v. Larsen Realty, Inc. (1981) 121
Cal.App.3d 349, 355.) Neither decision suggests that Stoner intended to accept the
Arbitration Agreement by clicking a box referring to the “company policy above.”
In sum, the Dispute Resolution Screen did not notify Stoner that he would be
agreeing to the Arbitration Agreement by clicking the screen’s acknowledgment box,
especially as the screen expressly recognized elsewhere that the way to agree to arbitrate
was by signing the Arbitration Agreement. Instead, as indicated above, the box’s
statement that “I accept and acknowledge the company policy above” is naturally
understood merely to confirm that Stoner received the dispute resolution policy described
in the summary paragraph earlier on the screen. We therefore conclude that Stoner did
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not accept the Arbitration Agreement by clicking on the acknowledgment box and that
SCA’s motion to compel arbitration was correctly denied.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Stoner is entitled
to his reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
DANNER, J.
Stoner v. SCA of CA, LLC
H051566
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