In re T.C. CA5 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 10/26/23 In re T.C. CA5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    In re T.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,                                                                              F084799
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Super. Ct. No. 21JL-00068-A)
    v.
    OPINION
    T.C.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT*
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
    Bacciarini, Judge.
    Richard M. Oberto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth N. Sokoler and Sean
    M. McCoy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    -ooOoo-
    *           Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Meehan, J.
    T.C. appeals from the juvenile court’s order of wardship following a true finding
    that T.C. committed misdemeanor sexual battery by restraint (Pen. Code, § 243.4,
    subd. (a))1 and misdemeanor false imprisonment (§ 236). T.C. contends: (1) there is
    insufficient evidence to support a finding that he committed sexual battery by restraint;
    (2) the probation condition requiring submission of his electronic devices to search and
    seizure was unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad; and (3) if objection to the
    probation condition was forfeited for failure to object before the juvenile court, defense
    counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
    The People respond that: (1) there is substantial evidence T.C. touched an
    intimate part of the victim through her clothing to support the finding that he committed
    sexual battery; (2) T.C. forfeited objection to the probation condition regarding his
    electronic devices by failing to object at sentencing; and (3) if challenge to the probation
    condition is not forfeited, the probation condition is reasonable because it serves the
    court’s rehabilitative goals, or, alternatively, if the condition appears facially overbroad,
    it can be narrowly tailored.
    We agree the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of sexual battery by
    restraint, but there was sufficient evidence T.C. committed misdemeanor sexual battery
    (§ 243.4, subd. (e)). We will therefore modify the sexual battery finding on that count.
    We otherwise affirm.
    PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
    On August 9, 2021, the Merced County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship
    petition alleging that T.C. committed: felony sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4,
    subd. (a); count 1); and misdemeanor false imprisonment (§ 236; count 2) against a single
    victim, A.S.
    1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
    2.
    On April 22, 2022, the juvenile court commenced a jurisdictional proceeding.
    After the prosecution rested, T.C.’s counsel moved to dismiss the counts. The court
    denied the motion.
    On May 11, 2022, the juvenile court found true both allegations of the petition but
    found the allegation for count 1 to be true as a misdemeanor.
    On June 17, 2022, T.C. was adjudged a ward of the court and placed under the
    supervision of the probation department. The order included a condition that T.C. must
    submit to a search of all electronic devices.
    T.C. filed a timely notice of appeal.
    FACTUAL SUMMARY
    I. Prosecution Evidence
    A.S. was best friends with T.C.’s sister, G.C. On April 19, 2021, A.S. and G.C.
    walked from school to G.C.’s family’s house. T.C. drove G.C. with A.S. to G.C.’s
    softball game, and then T.C. and A.S. returned to the family’s house. A.S. went to G.C.’s
    bedroom after they returned. There was no one else in the house besides A.S. and T.C.
    T.C. came to G.C.’s room and asked A.S. to kiss him. A.S. told him “ ‘No.’ ”
    A.S. was sitting up against the headboard on G.C.’s bed. T.C. leaned over the bed
    kissing A.S. on her face and neck. A.S. told T.C. “ ‘No.’ ” T.C. said “ ‘Come on. Just
    kiss me.’ ” T.C. left the room.
    T.C. came back to G.C.’s room about an hour later wearing a different shirt. A.S.
    was sitting on G.C.’s bed and T.C. sat on the edge of the bed. T.C. began touching A.S.’s
    stomach and legs. T.C. grabbed both of A.S.’s legs to pull her closer to him and pulled
    his shorts down. T.C. put his penis between A.S.’s legs and started thrusting while A.S.
    was still clothed. T.C.’s penis touched A.S.’s “private area” through her jeans. A.S. said
    “ ‘No’ ” to T.C. A.S. testified that T.C.’s penis touched A.S.’s stomach when he was
    trying to put his penis between her legs. A.S. was pushing T.C. off her and telling him
    3.
    “ ‘No.’ ” T.C. left the room, calling A.S. a “[s]lut and hoe” as he left.
    A.S. used her cell phone to record seven videos of the exchanges with T.C. that
    afternoon. These videos were admitted as evidence.
    Later that day, A.S. told G.C. and T.C.’s mother, M.C., what happened. A.S. told
    M.C. and G.C. that she had videos of T.C. G.C. and M.C. asked A.S. to delete the videos
    because they could hurt T.C.’s football career. A.S. did not tell her parents until months
    later. A.S. reported the incident with T.C. to law enforcement in June 2021.
    A.S. had previously complained to G.C. via text message in March 2021 that T.C.
    was harassing her, asking A.S. to kiss him and give him oral sex. G.C. responded to
    A.S., “ ‘Just tell him no.’ ”
    II. Defense Evidence
    Former Dos Palos Police Department Deputy Omar Mondragon was the
    investigating officer for the allegations against T.C. Mondragon spoke with A.S. and
    reviewed the videos provided by A.S. He confirmed all the videos were dated April 19,
    2021, with timestamps of 1:19 p.m. on four of the videos and 3:10 p.m. on the other
    three videos.
    T.C.’s mother, M.C., testified that she learned about A.S.’s allegations against
    T.C. on June 3, 2021. She denied that A.S. told her that T.C. “did something
    inappropriate to her” before then.
    T.C. testified that on April 19, 2021, he drove G.C. to her softball game with A.S.
    After T.C. dropped off G.C., T.C. asked A.S. if she wanted to go back to her house but
    she wanted to go back to T.C.’s family’s house. T.C. asked A.S. if she wanted to give
    him “a blow job.” A.S. said yes and performed oral sex on T.C. in his room.
    Later that day, T.C. went to G.C.’s room. He asked A.S. if she wanted to give him
    another “blow job.” T.C. started kissing A.S. He denied that he ever pulled his pants
    down. T.C. also denied that he “w[as] dry-humping her” or put his penis on her stomach.
    4.
    He conceded that he did not stop kissing A.S. immediately when she said “ ‘No.’ ” T.C.
    testified that A.S. had given him oral sex prior to April 19.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    T.C. contends the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he committed
    sexual battery by restraint.
    A.      Additional Background
    After closing arguments, the juvenile court discussed its finding regarding count 1:
    “And all of the evidence that was moved into evidence, with respect to [c]ount 1, the
    [c]ourt does find that the allegation is true beyond a reasonable doubt, that the sexual
    battery by restraint was, in fact, committed on or about June 3rd, by the minor, [T.C.].
    [¶] And the court bases its verdict on the following things: [¶] Number one, the video
    doesn’t lie as to what happened. There was clearly unwanted contact, and it was clearly
    of a sexual nature by [T.C.]’s own testimony. He testified that he went in that room to
    seek a blow job, and therefore, the [c]ourt finds that that battery was committed for the
    purposes of sexual gratification, arousal, or abuse. [¶] With respect to the degree of the
    offense, again, the videotape doesn’t lie. There was no video of [T.C.]’s penis touching
    the victim’s skin in the case. I can’t say beyond a reasonable doubt that that took place.
    It may well have, but based on the evidence before the [c]ourt, I can’t say that it
    happened beyond a reasonable doubt. So, therefore, the [c]ourt finds as to the level of
    offense in [c]ount 1 is a misdemeanor.”
    The court’s minute order for its findings cites section 243.4, subdivision (a). The
    probation officer’s report also cites this statutory subdivision.
    B.      Standard of Review
    In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the same
    standard to juvenile proceedings applicable to adult criminal convictions. (In re V.V.
    5.
    (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 1020
    , 1026.) “In either type of case, we review the whole record in the
    light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
    evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a
    reasonable trier of fact could find the [minor] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re
    Sylvester C. (2006) 
    137 Cal.App.4th 601
    , 605, fn. omitted.) “Conflicts and even
    testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
    judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
    credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
    depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
    look for substantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 342
    , 403.) “A
    reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
    hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the [court’s
    finding].” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 327
    , 357.)
    C.      Applicable Law and Analysis
    “Section 243.4 proscribes various forms of sexual battery, i.e., unlawful touching
    of ‘intimate parts.’ ” (People v. Dayan (1995) 
    34 Cal.App.4th 707
    , 715.) Subdivision (a)
    of the statute provides: “Any person who touches an intimate part of another person
    while that person is unlawfully restrained by the accused or an accomplice, and if the
    touching is against the will of the person touched and is for the purpose of sexual arousal,
    sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, is guilty of sexual battery.” (§ 243.4, subd. (a).)
    Sexual battery under subdivision (a) can be either a misdemeanor or a felony. (People v.
    Elam (2001) 
    91 Cal.App.4th 298
    , 309 (Elam).) As used in subdivision (a), “ ‘touches’
    means physical contact with the skin of another person whether accomplished directly or
    through the clothing of the person committing the offense.” (§ 243.4, subd. (f).)
    “ ‘Intimate part’ means the sexual organ, anus, groin, or buttocks of any person, and the
    breast of a female.” (§ 243.4, subd. (g)(1).) Subdivision (e)(1) defines misdemeanor
    sexual battery as where a person “touches an intimate part of another person, if the
    6.
    touching is against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of
    sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.” (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1).)
    Subdivision (e)(1) acts as a “ ‘catchall’ provision” to criminalize unlawful sexual
    touching against the will of the victim. (People v. Smith (2010) 
    191 Cal.App.4th 199
    ,
    207.)
    T.C. contends there is insufficient evidence he touched the bare skin of A.S.’s
    intimate part to support a true finding under section 243.4, subdivision (a). Specifically,
    T.C. argues A.S. testified his penis touched her stomach, but there was no evidence T.C.
    touched A.S.’s intimate parts underneath her clothes or her breasts. To be guilty under
    subdivision (a), “actual direct contact with the skin of the intimate part of another person
    is essential.” (In re Keith T. (1984) 
    156 Cal.App.3d 983
    , 986.) T.C. must have touched
    the skin of A.S.’s sexual organ, anus, groin, buttocks or breast to be guilty of this offense.
    (Elam, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.)
    We agree T.C.’s conduct does not meet the elements of sexual battery by restraint
    as proscribed in section 243.4, subdivision (a). A.S. testified that T.C. kissed her on the
    face and neck. She also testified that T.C. touched her stomach and legs. The face, neck,
    stomach and legs are not an “intimate part” of a person under the statute. (§ 243.4,
    subd. (g)(1).) A.S. was wearing jeans when T.C. was thrusting his penis between her
    legs. T.C. did not touch the skin of A.S.’s intimate parts while doing so because the
    thrusting was against her clothing. A.S. said that T.C.’s penis touched her stomach when
    he was lifting her shirt. Although T.C. purportedly touched his own intimate part to
    A.S.’s skin, specifically, on her stomach, the evidence does not reflect that T.C. ever
    touched the skin of A.S.’s intimate parts.
    The People appear to concede that T.C. did not violate section 243.4,
    subdivision (a) because the contact was through clothing. The People argue however that
    there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of misdemeanor sexual battery under
    7.
    section 243.4, subdivision (e), “[a]lthough the court did not expressly cite” to this
    subdivision.
    The petition alleged that T.C. committed felony sexual battery by restraint under
    section 243.4, subdivision (a). The juvenile court found true the allegation that T.C.
    committed “sexual battery by restraint.” The court further found “the level of offense in
    [c]ount 1 is a misdemeanor.” The court did not specify the statute upon which this
    finding was based, but the minute order cites to section 243.4, subdivision (a).
    We cannot on this record conclude that the juvenile court intended to find T.C.
    committed misdemeanor sexual battery under section 243.4, subdivision (e) rather than
    subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) is a wobbler offense. (Elam, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 309.) The court’s statement that the offense is a misdemeanor may have simply been
    clarifying the level of the offense under subdivision (a) since it was a wobbler. (Welf. &
    Inst. Code, § 702 [when an offense is a wobbler, “the court shall declare the offense to be
    a misdemeanor or felony”].) This is particularly likely considering the court’s finding
    that T.C. committed “sexual battery by restraint,” the offense proscribed by
    subdivision (a). As discussed above, the evidence does not support a finding of sexual
    battery under subdivision (a) because T.C. did not touch the skin of A.S.’s intimate parts.
    “However, where the evidence is insufficient to sustain the offense charged but shows
    that the [minor] is guilty of a lesser included offense, or an attempt to commit the offense,
    or a lesser degree of the offense, the court may reduce the crime rather than reverse
    outright.” (People v. Yonko (1987) 
    196 Cal.App.3d 1005
    , 1010.) We agree with the
    People that the evidence supports a finding that T.C. committed misdemeanor sexual
    battery under section 243.4, subdivision (e).
    Misdemeanor sexual battery under section 243.4, subdivision (e) requires: (1) a
    touching, (2) of another person’s intimate part, (3) against the person’s will, and (4) for
    the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse. (§ 243.4,
    subd. (e)(1).) As used in subdivision (e), “ ‘touches’ means physical contact with another
    8.
    person, whether accomplished directly, through the clothing of the person committing the
    offense, or through the clothing of the victim.” (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(2), italics added.)
    Unlike in section 243.4, subdivision (a), “contact with the victim’s skin is not required
    but may occur through clothing” for misdemeanor sexual battery. (People v. Ortega
    (2015) 
    240 Cal.App.4th 956
    , 966; People v. Dayan, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 716
    [misdemeanor sexual battery “does not expressly require actual contact with the skin, and
    it applies to touching through the clothes of the victim”].) Misdemeanor sexual battery is
    a lesser included offense of sexual battery under subdivision (a) because “[m]isdemeanor
    sexual battery contains the same elements [as subdivision (a)] except that unlawful
    restraint is not required.” (Ortega, at p. 966.)2
    A.S. testified that T.C. thrust his penis between her legs. A.S. told Mondragon
    that T.C.’s penis “was touching [her] private area” while she was wearing jeans. A.S.
    repeatedly said “ ‘No’ ” to T.C. As the juvenile court stated, this “was clearly unwanted
    contact, and it was clearly of a sexual nature by the [minor]’s own testimony.” T.C.’s
    unwanted touching of A.S.’s intimate parts through her clothing for purposes of sexual
    arousal or gratification suffices to make a finding that he committed misdemeanor sexual
    battery. We therefore modify the disposition to reflect a finding that T.C. committed
    misdemeanor sexual battery under section 243.4, subdivision (e) on count 1.
    II. Challenge to Electronic Devices Search Condition
    T.C. contends the probation condition requiring submission of his electronic
    devices to search and seizure was unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad. The
    People respond that T.C. forfeited objection to the condition regarding his electronic
    devices by failing to object before the juvenile court. We agree with the People that
    2     T.C. acknowledges that misdemeanor sexual battery under section 243.4,
    subdivision (e) is a lesser included offense of subdivision (a) and that a “touching under
    subdivision (e)(1) can be entirely through the clothes.”
    9.
    T.C.’s challenge on both grounds is forfeited. We also reject T.C.’s argument that the
    condition is facially overbroad.
    A.      Probation Conditions
    At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court followed the probation officer’s
    recommendation and ordered T.C. a ward of the court. The order imposed several
    conditions on T.C. as recommended by probation including the following in pertinent
    part: “Submit to search of all electronic devices, including cell phones and computers at
    any time of the day or night by any Probation Officer or Peace Officer with or without a
    warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion over which the minor has control over or
    access to for electronic communication. Minor must provide access/passwords to any
    electronic devices, computers, cell phones, accounts and applications to any Probation
    Officer or Peace Officer. Minor waives the specific consent and warrant requirements set
    forth in [sections] 1546 and 1546.1 .…” There was no discussion by the court of the
    order’s conditions. Minor did not object to any of the conditions.
    B.      Forfeiture
    “ ‘The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat and
    rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from criminal conduct.’
    [Citation.] To those ends, a juvenile court may order a ward under its jurisdiction to
    probation. [Citation.] … [T]he court ‘may impose and require any and all reasonable
    conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done
    and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019)
    
    7 Cal.5th 1113
    , 1118 (Ricardo P.); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) “The juvenile
    court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions .…” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 875
    , 889 (Sheena K.).) A probation condition is invalid if it “ ‘(1) has no
    relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
    which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
    10.
    related to future criminality[.]’ ” (People v. Lent (1975) 
    15 Cal.3d 481
    , 486.) “[T]he
    Lent test governs in juvenile and adult probation cases alike.” (Ricardo P., at p. 1119.)
    Failure to challenge the reasonableness of a probation condition on Lent grounds
    forfeits the issue on appeal. (Sheena K., 
    supra,
     40 Cal.4th at p. 889; People v. Welch
    (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 228
    , 237.) Because T.C. failed to object before the juvenile court to the
    electronic devices search condition as unreasonable, the issue was not preserved for
    appeal, and we decline to address it. (In re L.O. (2018) 
    27 Cal.App.5th 706
    , 711–712.)
    We next turn to T.C.’s claim that the search condition is unconstitutionally
    overbroad. Constitutional challenges to a probation condition may also be forfeited for
    failure to object before the juvenile court. (Sheena K., 
    supra,
     40 Cal.4th at p. 887; People
    v. Patton (2019) 
    41 Cal.App.5th 934
    , 946 (Patton) [“An as-applied constitutional
    challenge is forfeited unless previously raised.”].) The forfeiture rule however does not
    apply “where a party raises a facial challenge to a condition of probation as
    constitutionally vague or overbroad that can be resolved without reference to the
    sentencing record in a particular case.” (In re L.O., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 711;
    Sheena K., at p. 887.) Our Supreme Court has held that this exception “does not apply in
    every case in which a probation condition is challenged on a constitutional ground. …
    ‘[T]here may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions of law that can be
    resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial
    court.” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection and waiver principles
    encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the trial
    court.” [Citation.]’ ” (Sheena K., at p. 889.)
    T.C.’s failure to object to the condition as unconstitutionally overbroad before the
    juvenile court forfeited the issue on appeal. Although T.C. argues the condition was
    “facially overbroad,” this is not a true facial challenge to the search condition. Rather
    than presenting a pure question of law, T.C.’s overbreadth challenge may not be
    11.
    addressed without reference to the record before the juvenile court. (Sheena K., supra, 40
    Cal.4th at p. 887.)
    “A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights
    must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being
    invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Sheena K., 
    supra,
     40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
    “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the
    legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the [minor]’s
    constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is
    impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O.
    (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 1149
    , 1153.) Whether a probation condition is
    unconstitutionally overbroad is subject to de novo review. (Patton, supra, 41
    Cal.App.5th at p. 946.)
    The purpose of the search condition may only be ascertained by reference to the
    record. We therefore may not address whether the search condition is tailored to its
    purpose without examination of the record. Moreover, T.C. relies on the record to
    challenge the condition as overbroad because he argues there “was never any suggestion
    that T.C. used an electronic device to commit any offense in this case or engage in any
    illegal activity.” This is “a classic as-applied claim.” (Patton, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 947.) T.C.’s contentions are premised on evidence, or rather, a lack of evidence, in the
    record, not on the condition’s language as facially overbroad.
    T.C. suggests the search condition is facially overbroad “[a]s in Sheena K.” In
    Sheena K., the minor was ordered as a condition of probation that she “ ‘not associate
    with anyone disapproved of by probation.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 878.)
    The condition’s constitutional infirmity was obvious without reference to the record and
    was easily remedied by adding a requirement that the minor have knowledge of who was
    disapproved of by probation. (Id. at p. 892.) Here, unlike in Sheena K., whether the
    search condition is overbroad and, if so, whether it could be tailored to its purpose
    12.
    necessitates reference to the record before the juvenile court. Because this is not a facial
    challenge to the condition, T.C. forfeited his constitutional challenge by failing to object.
    For all these reasons, minor’s challenge to the electronic devices search condition
    is forfeited.
    C.      Facial Overbreadth Challenge
    Because T.C. forfeited an as-applied challenge to the condition by failing to object
    at the disposition hearing, we consider his contentions as facial challenges. “A facial
    challenge ‘does not require scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead
    requires the review of abstract and generalized legal concepts.’ [Citation.] The claim is
    that a condition cannot have any valid application, without relying on any facts in the
    sentencing record.” (Patton, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 946.)
    In Ricardo P., our Supreme Court found that a probation condition requiring the
    minor to submit to warrantless search of his electronic devices including passwords was
    not reasonably related to the minor’s future criminality and was thus unreasonable under
    Lent. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) The court emphasized that its “holding
    does not categorically invalidate electronics search conditions. In certain cases, the
    probationer’s offense or personal history may provide the juvenile court with a sufficient
    factual basis from which it can determine that an electronics search condition is a
    proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality.” (Id. at
    pp. 1128–1129.)
    Ricardo P. does not categorically render the search condition here facially
    overbroad. The court in Ricardo P. determined the condition was unreasonable pursuant
    to Lent—the court did not grant review or address the constitutional questions. The court
    acknowledged that “[t]he warrantless search of a juvenile’s electronic devices by a
    probation officer, a government official, plainly raises privacy concerns .…” (Ricardo
    P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1123.) However, the court further concluded that “[t]he fact that
    an electronics search condition may burden a juvenile probationer’s constitutional rights
    13.
    does not necessarily render it invalid.” (Id. at p. 1126.) An electronics search condition
    may be constitutionally imposed under appropriate circumstances. (Patton, supra, 41
    Cal.App.5th at pp. 946–947; In re Malik J. (2015) 
    240 Cal.App.4th 896
    , 902 (Malik J.).)
    “Such a condition allows warrantless searches of a probationer’s property so long as they
    are not arbitrary, capricious or harassing. [Citation.] While a search condition
    diminishes a juvenile probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it does not entirely
    preclude it.” (Malik J., at p. 902.)
    Similar probation conditions allowing warrantless search of electronic devices
    have been found permissible and survived facial overbreadth challenges. (Malik J.,
    supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 902–904; People v. Ebertowski (2014) 
    228 Cal.App.4th 1170
    , 1175–1176.) The condition here is not facially overbroad and we reject T.C.’s
    contention to the contrary.3
    D.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    T.C. briefly argues that if the issue was forfeited for failure to object to the
    condition before the juvenile court, defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
    counsel. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, T.C. must prove:
    (1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
    prejudiced him. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687.) To show
    prejudice, “[the minor] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
    A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
    outcome.” (Id. at p. 694.)
    3      T.C. does not specifically argue the condition is unconstitutionally vague, but a
    vagueness challenge would also fail. “A probation condition ‘must be sufficiently
    precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to
    determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the
    ground of vagueness.” (Sheena K., 
    supra,
     40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) The language of the
    condition here sufficiently apprises T.C. of what is required of him.
    14.
    “It is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
    assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only
    if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
    challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
    or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013)
    
    57 Cal.4th 986
    , 1009.) “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
    effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
    circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
    counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
    evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
    the wide range of reasonable professional assistance .…” (Strickland v. Washington,
    
    supra,
     466 U.S. at p. 689.)
    T.C. argues defense counsel had no reasonable tactical reason for failing to object
    to the electronic devices search condition. In viewing T.C.’s claim through an ineffective
    assistance of counsel lens, the question is not whether the condition is overly broad but
    rather whether no satisfactory explanation can be given for counsel’s failure to object.
    (People v. Hart (1999) 
    20 Cal.4th 546
    , 624.)
    The record is silent as to why the condition was imposed and why defense counsel
    did not object to it. As discussed above, the condition was not facially overbroad and
    similar electronic devices search conditions have been found permissible in appropriate
    circumstances. (Patton, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946–947; Malik J., supra, 240
    Cal.App.4th at p. 902; People v. Ebertowski, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1175–1176.)
    T.C.’s counsel may have reasoned that a facial overbreadth objection would have been
    fruitless. Counsel may have believed T.C. was adequately protected from the condition’s
    terms by the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits warrantless searches that are arbitrary,
    capricious or harassing. (Malik J., at p. 902; People v. Reyes (1998) 
    19 Cal.4th 743
    ,
    752.) Counsel may have also concluded the condition was a reasonable method to
    15.
    monitor T.C.’s future conduct due to T.C.’s pending relocation to another state to attend
    college. (See People v. Olguin (2008) 
    45 Cal.4th 375
    , 380–381 [a probation condition
    that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is reasonably
    related to future criminality].) The record does not rule out a tactical reason for counsel’s
    failure to object and the possibility that the electronic devices search condition is
    appropriately tailored to T.C.’s circumstances preclude a finding that no reasonable
    attorney would have failed to do so. (See People v. Hart, 
    supra,
     20 Cal.4th at pp. 623–
    624 [“ ‘To the extent the record on appeal fails to disclose why counsel acted or failed to
    act in the manner challenged, we will affirm the judgment “unless counsel was asked for
    an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory
    explanation .…” ’ ”]; see also People v. Lopez (2008) 
    42 Cal.4th 960
    , 972 [“ ‘[D]eciding
    whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish
    ineffective assistance.’ ”].)
    On this record, we cannot conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient for
    failing to object to the electronic devices search condition. We thus reject minor’s
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s finding on count 1 is modified to reflect that T.C. committed
    misdemeanor sexual battery in violation of section 243.4, subdivision (e). In all other
    respects, the disposition is affirmed.
    16.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: F084799

Filed Date: 10/26/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2023