Haile v. Haile CA1/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 10/26/23 Haile v. Haile CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
EDEN HAILE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167562
v.
TSEGAI HAILE, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SFL-090902)
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Tsegai Haile purports to appeal from several orders entered
in the dissolution proceedings initiated by his wife, respondent Eden Haile.1
Most of those orders were not appealable. And to the extent one of them was,
Tsegai offers no reasoned argument why it should be reversed. We therefore
reject Tsegai’s arguments.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Tsegai and Eden were married in January 1996. Tsegai in April 2022
filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against Eden, and
the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). That same
month, Eden filed a divorce petition. For the date of separation, she listed
1 We refer to the parties by their first names in the interest of clarity.
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April 8, 2022, the date she left the marital home because Tsegai had sought a
TRO.
Following a hearing, the trial court in August 2022 denied the request
for a restraining order and awarded Eden her attorney fees. Tsegai did not
appeal from the order.
Tsegai’s legal representation has changed several times. He was at
first self-represented. As of late 2022 he had changed legal representation
three times. He is self-represented in this appeal.
A dispute arose about discovery into the community interest in the
family residence and, in September 2022, Eden filed a motion to compel the
production of documents, which Tsegai opposed. By order filed in
November 2022, the trial court granted the motion in part and ordered
Tsegai to pay Eden $1,060 in sanctions.
Following the order, Eden’s attorney contacted Tsegai’s attorney and
requested compliance by mid-December 2022. Before the requested deadline,
Eden’s counsel received a substitution of attorney replacing Tsegai as a self-
represented party. Tsegai provided an amended discovery response by the
end of December but provided no further information. Eden then issued
subpoenas to three financial institutions for production of business records.
Also in December 2022, Tsegai filed a motion to bifurcate “the issue of
the parties’ date of separation for a separate and early trial,” and requested
sanctions. The motion requested a determination that the parties’ separation
date was March 1, 2002 (sic). Eden opposed the bifurcation request, which
the trial court denied.
In January 2023, Tsegai filed a motion to quash the subpoenas for
business records. He also sought sanctions against Eden and her attorney.
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Eden opposed the motion to quash and request for sanctions, and she
requested her attorney fees and costs in connection with her opposition.
By order filed on March 30, 2023, the trial court denied the motion to
quash since Eden had demonstrated a substantial basis for issuing the
subpoenas. The court denied Tsegai’s request for sanctions and granted
Eden’s request for her attorney fees and costs.
Also in March 2023, the trial court entered an earnings assignment
order for attorney fees. The order directs Tsegai to pay $500 each month for
Eden’s attorney fees, plus $1,000 each month for attorney fees that were in
arrears.
Tsegai filed a notice of appeal on April 4, 2023.
II.
DISCUSSION
Tsegai has filed a 39-page opening brief that recounts the history of his
marriage, and he attacks nearly every aspect of the proceedings below. He
declares that “every decision of the lower court is illegal, Null, and Void,” and
he asks this court to “reverse [them]; vacate [them], and order the case
venued [sic] to a superior court of a different county,” relief he did not request
below. His arguments fail.
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(10), authorizes an
appeal to be taken from an order made appealable by the Family Code. But
Tsegai does not identify any Family Code provision that applies here.
Tsegai’s notice of appeal identified four dates of orders from which he
purportedly appealed. The first date was January 11, 2023, the date of an
order consolidating the proceedings on Tsegai’s original request for a
restraining order with the dissolution proceedings. Even putting aside the
issue of timeliness, such a consolidation order was an interim order and thus
not appealable since “further judicial action is essential to a final
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determination of the parties’ rights.” (In re Marriage of Griffin (1993)
15 Cal.App.4th 685, 689; see also In re Marriage of Olson (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1462 [order not appealable where it is preparatory to a
later proceeding].)
The second date identified in the notice of appeal was February 17,
2023. That was the date of the hearing on Tsegai’s request to bifurcate the
proceedings, though apparently no order was entered on that date. Whatever
the date of the order entered denying the request, it was not appealable since
it was an interim order. (Griffin, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.)
Tsegai also listed in his notice appeal March 30, 2023, the date of the
order denying his motion to quash. This is likewise the only order Tsegai
identified in his civil case information statement filed in this court. An order
denying a motion to quash is not appealable and may be challenged only by
petition for writ of mandate, which Tsegai did not seek. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 418.10, subd. (c); American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 383, 387.)
Finally, the notice of appeal listed March 1, 2023, the date of the
earnings assignment order directing payment of Eden’s attorney fees.
Assuming this order was a pendente lite order for the payment of attorney
fees, it was appealable. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368;
In re Marriage of Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 468.) But the
record contains only the order and lacks information that would provide
context about its entry. And Tsegai offers no reasoned argument why the
trial court erred in issuing it. He states in his opening brief that the order
“den[ied] [him] due process and the equal protection of the DVPA, forging
judicial council forms, FL-430, and FL-435, is final [sic].” This scant
argument appears to be the only mention in Tsegai’s opening brief of the
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order. As this argument lacks coherence, we deem it to be abandoned.
(Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 524–525.)
In his opening brief, Tsegai also criticizes the trial judge for striking a
statement of disqualification against him that Tsegai filed but did not serve.
But as the trial court’s April 3, 2023 order stated, a determination of
disqualification is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a
writ of mandate, which Tsegai did not seek. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3,
subd. (d).)
Tsegai further challenges at least one order that was entered after he
filed his notice of appeal and thus is not before us.
III.
DISPOSITION
Appellant Tsegai Haile’s August 3, 2023 request for judicial notice is
denied.
To the extent Tsegai has appealed from an appealable order, the order
is affirmed. Respondent Eden Haile is awarded her costs, if any, as she did
not file a respondent’s brief.
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_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Margulies, J.
_________________________
Banke, J.
Haile v. Haile A167562
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