People v. Megaw CA2/1 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 10/26/23 P. v. Megaw CA2/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324731
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. KA109392)
    v.
    WESLEY BRYAN MEGAW,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
    Robert A. Werth, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Kathy S. Pomerantz,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ____________________________
    This is an appeal from a new sentence imposed after
    defendant Wesley Bryan Megaw’s prior sentence was recalled at
    the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of
    Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Defendant’s conviction
    was the product of a plea bargain in which he pleaded nolo
    contendere to kidnapping, second degree robbery, identity theft,
    and bringing contraband into jail. Megaw agreed to serve an
    aggregate prison sentence of 32 years 4 months, which included
    the upper term of eight years for the kidnapping, doubled to
    16 years pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law. The trial court
    accepted the plea agreement and imposed the agreed-upon term.1
    Several years later, in 2022, the Secretary of CDCR
    recommended recall of Megaw’s sentence. After recalling
    Megaw’s sentence, the resentencing court struck five 1-year
    enhancements and reimposed the remainder of the original
    sentence, resulting in a new aggregate term of 27 years 4 months.
    On appeal, Megaw argues that amendments to Penal Code2
    section 1170, subdivision (b) precluded the resentencing court
    from reimposing the upper term sentence for the kidnapping
    conviction. He further contends the court erred in not exercising
    its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c) to dismiss a five-
    year enhancement imposed under section 667, subdivision (a) and
    a one-year enhancement imposed under section 12022,
    subdivision (b)(1).
    1 Because the trial judge who accepted Megaw’s plea deal
    was not the same judicial officer who later resentenced Megaw,
    we refer to the court that accepted the plea as the “trial court”
    and the other court as the “resentencing court.”
    2   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
    2
    We hold that the limitations on imposing upper term
    sentences in the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)
    do not apply because the trial court imposed the upper term
    sentence for the kidnapping conviction pursuant to a plea
    agreement. Also, Megaw fails to demonstrate the resentencing
    court erred in not dismissing the enhancements when it found
    such a dismissal would endanger public safety. We thus affirm.
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
    We summarize only those aspects of the procedural history
    relevant to this appeal.
    In October 2015, the People filed an information charging
    Megaw with kidnapping to commit robbery, in violation of
    section 209, subdivision (b)(1) (count 1); second degree robbery, in
    violation of section 211 (count 2); identity theft, in violation of
    section 530.5, subdivision (a) (count 3); possession of a forged
    driver’s license, in violation of section 470, subdivision (b)
    (count 4); and bringing contraband into jail, in violation of
    section 4573, subdivision (a) (count 5). As to counts 1 and 2, the
    People alleged that, for the purpose of section 667,
    subdivision (a), Megaw suffered a prior conviction for a serious
    felony, and that, for the purpose of section 12022,
    3  We derive our Procedural Background in part from
    admissions made by the parties in their appellate briefing. (See
    Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 
    226 Cal.App.2d 666
    , 668, 674
    [“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently
    treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in
    the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
    
    111 Cal.App.4th 273
    , 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
    use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
    against the party.’ ”].)
    3
    subdivision (b)(1), Megaw personally used a deadly and
    dangerous weapon in the commission of those two offenses. The
    People further alleged for the purpose of the Three Strikes law
    that Megaw had a prior serious or violent felony conviction, and
    that, for the purpose of section 667.5, subdivision (b), he had
    served five prior prison terms. Shortly after the People filed the
    information, Megaw pleaded not guilty to all counts and denied
    all special allegations.
    In November 2016, the People and Megaw agreed to a plea
    by which the People would amend the information to include a
    violation of section 207 (kidnapping) as count 6; Megaw agreed to
    plead nolo contendere to counts 2, 3, 5, and 6; the People agreed
    to dismiss counts 1 (kidnapping to commit robbery) and 4
    (possession of a forged driver’s license); and Megaw would serve
    an aggregate prison term of 32 years 4 months, which included
    the upper term sentence of eight years on count 6, doubled to
    16 years pursuant to the Three Strikes law. The trial court
    accepted the parties’ plea agreement and imposed the agreed-
    upon aggregate prison sentence of 32 years 4 months, which
    consisted of: 16 years on count 6; a one-year enhancement
    pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b)(1); a five-year
    enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a); five one-
    year enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b); two
    years on count 2; one year four months on count 3; and two years
    on count 5.
    In February 2022, the Secretary of CDCR sent a letter to
    the resentencing court recommending that it: recall Megaw’s
    sentence and resentence him pursuant to section 1170.03,
    4
    subdivision (a)(1),4 and strike the section 667, subdivision (a)
    enhancement (CDCR letter). Attached to the letter was a
    cumulative case summary and evaluation report, which included
    a summary of the offenses for which Megaw was committed to
    state prison, Megaw’s criminal and parole history, and a
    description of his conduct in prison.
    Megaw filed a “Supplemental Motion In Support Of
    Resentencing,” in which he reported having a traumatic
    childhood, certain mental health conditions, and a history of
    substance abuse.
    In October 2022, the resentencing court held a hearing at
    which it recalled Megaw’s sentence; struck the five one-year
    section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements because of a change
    in the law preventing the court from imposing them;5 and
    reimposed the remainder of Megaw’s prison sentence, resulting in
    an aggregate term of 27 years 4 months. Megaw timely appealed.
    4  “Effective June 30, 2022, ‘[t]he Legislature . . .
    renumbered section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, but made no
    substantive changes. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Braggs
    (2022) 
    85 Cal.App.5th 809
    , 818.) We refer to section 1172.1 when
    addressing the statute governing Megaw’s resentencing.
    5   This ruling is not challenged on appeal.
    5
    DISCUSSION
    A.    Senate Bill No. 567 Does Not Apply to a Sentence
    That Was the Product of a Plea Agreement and Thus
    Provides No Basis for Invalidating Megaw’s Upper
    Term Sentence on Count 66
    1.    Section 1170, subdivision (b) and Senate Bill
    No. 567’s amendments thereto
    When the trial court had initially sentenced Megaw in
    November 2016, section 1170, subdivision (b) provided in
    relevant part: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be
    imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice
    of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of
    the court. . . . The court shall select the term which, in the court’s
    discretion, best serves the interests of justice. The court shall set
    forth on the record the reasons for imposing the term
    selected . . . .” (Stats. 2015, ch. 378, § 1 [filed with the Sec’y of
    State on Sept. 30, 2015]; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(2)
    [providing that this version of § 1170 became effective on Jan. 1,
    2016].)
    Years later, and pursuant to section 1172.1, the Secretary
    of CDCR recommended recall of Megaw’s sentence.
    Section 1172.1 provides in pertinent part: “The court, in recalling
    and resentencing [a defendant upon the recommendation of the
    Secretary of CDCR], shall apply the sentencing rules of the
    Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce
    sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
    6 Megaw acknowledges that count 6 was the only offense
    for which an upper term sentence was imposed.
    6
    disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
    (See § 1172.1, subds. (a)(1)–(a)(2).)
    Prior to the October 2022 resentencing hearing, Senate Bill
    No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567) amended
    section 1170 effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
    § 1.3 [filed with the Sec’y of State on Oct. 8, 2021]; Cal. Const.,
    art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(2) [providing that this version of § 1170
    became effective on Jan. 1, 2022].) As amended by Senate Bill
    No. 567, section 1170, subdivision (b) now circumscribes a trial
    court’s choice among three potential sentencing terms: “When a
    judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute
    specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
    discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
    middle term, except as otherwise provided in [subdivision (b)(2)].”
    (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3 [§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)].) As relevant
    here, newly-added subdivision (b)(2) in turn provides: “The court
    may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when
    there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
    the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
    term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
    stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
    reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
    trial.”7 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3 [§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)].)
    7  The statute applies a different rule to prior convictions:
    “Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2) [of subdivision (b)], the
    court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in
    determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction
    without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (Stats. 2021,
    ch. 731, § 1.3 [§ 1170, subd. (b)(3)].)
    7
    Finally, newly-added subdivision (b)(5) of section 1170
    requires the trial court to “set forth on the record the facts and
    reasons for choosing the sentence imposed,” and “[t]he court
    may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any
    enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any
    provision of law.” (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3 [§ 1170,
    subd. (b)(5)].)
    2.    Senate Bill No. 567 does not apply to stipulated
    sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements
    Courts of Appeal are split on whether Senate Bill No. 567’s
    amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) apply to stipulated
    sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements. Division Five of
    the First District and the Fifth District have held these
    amendments do not apply to a stipulated sentence imposed
    pursuant to a plea agreement. (See People v. Mitchell (2022)
    
    83 Cal.App.5th 1051
    , 1057–1059 (Mitchell), review granted
    Dec. 14, 2022, S277314; People v. Sallee (2023) 
    88 Cal.App.5th 330
    , 333–334 (Sallee), review granted Apr. 26, 2023, S278690).
    Division One of the First District and the Sixth District disagree.
    (See People v. Todd (2023) 
    88 Cal.App.5th 373
    , 377–381, review
    granted Apr. 26, 2023, S279154; People v. Fox (2023)
    
    90 Cal.App.5th 826
    , 830.) This issue is pending before our high
    court.
    Until we receive guidance from our high court, we conclude
    that Mitchell and Sallee are better reasoned. Megaw thus fails to
    demonstrate the resentencing court erred in imposing the high
    term as to Megaw’s kidnapping conviction.
    Megaw argues Mitchell and Sallee are “inapposite” because
    in those cases, “the original sentence was imposed before [Senate
    Bill No.] 567 became effective, but the opinion[s in those cases
    8
    were] issued after [Senate Bill No.] 567 was effective.” Yet,
    Mitchell cited “well-established principles of statutory
    interpretation” to determine whether amended section 1170,
    subdivision (b) applies to “sentences imposed pursuant to
    stipulated plea agreements” (see Mitchell, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
    at pp. 1057–1059, review granted), an analysis that would have
    been unnecessary if the date of the defendant’s sentencing
    hearing (i.e., prior to Senate Bill No. 567’s effective date) were
    determinative. Further, upon noting that the parties had not
    disputed that “Senate Bill No. 567 is retroactive to cases not yet
    final on appeal,” the Sallee court remarked, “Accordingly, the
    issue before us is not whether Senate Bill No. 567 applies
    retroactively, but rather whether it applies at all in the context of
    a stipulated plea.” (See Sallee, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 335,
    fn. 3, review granted.) We thus reject Megaw’s effort to
    distinguish Mitchell and Sallee based on when the resentencing
    hearing occurred.
    B.    Megaw Fails to Demonstrate the Resentencing Court
    Erred In Declining To Dismiss the One-Year and
    Five-Year Enhancements Pursuant to Section 1385,
    Subd. (c)
    1.    The trial court’s authority to dismiss enhancements
    under section 1385, subdivision (c) and our standard
    of review
    Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides for dismissal of
    enhancements in the interests of justice: “Notwithstanding any
    other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
    furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
    9
    enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385,
    subd. (c)(1).)
    Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides guidance to the
    trial court in considering whether to dismiss an enhancement:
    “In exercising its discretion under . . . subdivision [(c)], the court
    shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
    defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
    subparagraphs (A) to (I) [of subdivision (c)(2)] are present. Proof
    of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
    greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
    finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
    safety.” (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) The statute also provides
    “ ‘[e]ndanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
    dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
    other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
    The mitigating circumstances listed in section 1385,
    subdivision (c)(2) include: “Multiple enhancements are alleged in
    a single case”; “[t]he application of an enhancement could result
    in a sentence of over 20 years”; “[t]he current offense is connected
    to prior victimization or childhood trauma”; and “[t]he
    enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years
    old.” (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2)(B), (c)(2)(C), (c)(2)(E), & (c)(2)(H).)
    Under section 1385, subdivision (c), “if the court finds that
    dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ then
    the court need not consider the . . . mitigating circumstances
    [listed in subdivision (c)(2)].” (See People v. Mendoza (2023)
    
    88 Cal.App.5th 287
    , 296 (Mendoza).)
    Section 1385, subdivision (c)(3) sets forth when a trial court
    may exercise its discretion to dismiss an enhancement: “While
    the court may exercise its discretion at sentencing, this
    10
    subdivision does not prevent a court from exercising its discretion
    before, during, or after trial or entry of plea.” (§ 1385,
    subd. (c)(3).) The Legislature has declared that subdivision (c)
    applies to “all sentencings occurring after January 1, 2022.” (See
    id., subd. (c)(7).)
    We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s refusal to
    dismiss an enhancement because dismissal would endanger
    public safety. (See Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
    Under that standard of review, “ ‘An exercise of discretion is
    subject to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the
    action is shown. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Perez (2015)
    
    233 Cal.App.4th 736
    , 742.) Furthermore, “a trial court’s factual
    findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its
    conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” (In re White (2020)
    
    9 Cal.5th 455
    , 470.) Substantial evidence exists if, reviewing the
    “ ‘record in the light most favorable to the judgment[,]’ ” we
    conclude “ ‘ “ ‘the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
    fact’s findings . . . .’ ” ’ ” (See People v. Alvarez (2014)
    
    229 Cal.App.4th 761
    , 774 (Alvarez).)
    Additionally, we are bound by the following “fundamental
    principles of appellate review: (1) a judgment is presumed
    correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
    favor of correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of
    providing an adequate record affirmatively proving error.”
    (People v. Arter (2017) 
    19 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1
    , 6.) “[A] natural
    and logical corollary to” these principles is “[t]he doctrine of
    implied findings[, which] requires the appellate court to infer the
    trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the
    judgment.” (Ibid.)
    11
    2.    Megaw fails to show the resentencing court abused its
    discretion in not dismissing the enhancements
    because dismissal would endanger public safety
    Megaw argues the resentencing court erred in failing to
    exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c) to
    dismiss the five-year enhancement imposed pursuant to
    section 667, subdivision (a) and one-year enhancement imposed
    pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). Megaw claims the
    court “failed to take into consideration” the following mitigating
    factors in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2): “(1) multiple
    enhancements were alleged”; “(2) the application of the
    enhancement[s] . . . . result[ed] in a sentence of over 20 years”;
    “(3) the current offense is connected to prior victimization or
    childhood trauma”; and (4) one of “the enhancement[s] is based
    on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (Citing § 1385,
    subds. (c)(2)(B), (c)(2)(C), (c)(2)(E), & (c)(2)(H).) Megaw also
    appears to challenge whether substantial evidence supported the
    resentencing court’s finding that dismissal of the enhancements
    would endanger public safety.8
    At the October 2022 hearing, the resentencing court agreed
    with the People that there existed “an unreasonable risk” Megaw
    would commit an offense—a super strike—referenced in
    subdivision (c) of section 1170.18 because he perpetrated a
    kidnapping to commit robbery in violation of section 209,
    8 As we explain later in this part, the resentencing court
    found that shortening Megaw’s sentence would endanger public
    safety because there was an unreasonable risk he would commit
    an offense identified in section 1170.18, subdivision (c).
    12
    subdivision (b)(1).9 In particular, the court remarked that the
    kidnapping victim “was moved about”; regardless of whether
    Megaw’s accomplice was in fact “the leader,”10 Megaw
    “participated” and “aided and abetted” in the offense and “was
    present during the entire time”; and the victim “was tied and . . .
    terrorized . . . .” The court also stated that its finding of an
    unreasonable risk that Megaw would commit such an offense was
    “buttressed by the fact that, for a period of time . . . until [Megaw]
    picked up this last case, he didn’t stay out of state prison for very
    long.” According to the court, Megaw “continued to go back to
    state prison on serious offenses[, a]nd that history is certainly a
    great predictor of future conduct.”
    By agreeing with the People that there was an
    unreasonable risk that Megaw would commit an offense
    identified in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), the resentencing
    court tacitly found there was a likelihood that shortening
    Megaw’s sentence would result in physical injury or other serious
    danger to others, specifically, that dismissal of the enhancements
    9  (See § 1170.18, subd. (c) [defining “ ‘unreasonable risk of
    danger to public safety’ ” as “an unreasonable risk that the
    petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of
    clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e)
    of Section 667”]; § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII) [“Any serious or
    violent felony offense punishable in California by life
    imprisonment or death.”]; § 209, subd. (b)(1) [“A person who
    kidnaps or carries away an individual to commit robbery . . . shall
    be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the
    possibility of parole.”].) We reiterate that as part of the plea
    bargain, the People dismissed the count alleging kidnapping to
    commit robbery. (Procedural Background, ante.)
    10   Megaw’s accomplice is not a party to this appeal.
    13
    would “endanger public safety” for the purpose of section 1385,
    subdivision (c), thereby obviating the need to assess the
    mitigating factors listed in that provision. (See § 1385,
    subd. (c)(2); see also Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 297–
    298 [holding that “consideration of the mitigating factors in
    section 1385(c)(2) is not required if the court finds that dismissal
    of the enhancement would endanger public safety,” and observing
    that “determination of whether dismissal would endanger public
    safety . . . under section 1385(c)(2) is similar (though not
    identical) to the determination of whether ‘resentencing the
    petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
    safety’ ” for the purpose of § 1170.18].)
    We conclude that Megaw fails to rebut the presumption of
    correctness accorded to this ruling.
    Regarding the circumstances of the kidnapping, Megaw
    argues, “The only information in the record is found in the CDCR
    letter which mirrors the information in the probation report
    which apparently was taken from police reports.” Megaw
    does not assert that the court’s observations concerning this
    offense are not substantiated by these documents. Indeed,
    Megaw acknowledges the probation report indicates that in
    March 2015: (1) Megaw and an accomplice, each armed with an
    air soft pistol, ordered a clerk at a motel to give them all the
    money from a cash register; (2) after obtaining approximately
    $270 from the cash register, Megaw and the accomplice “escorted
    the victim to [an] office”; (3) the accomplice “bound the victim’s
    hands and feet with duct tape”; and (4) “[t]he two men then
    ransacked the office.”
    Megaw complains, “These facts were not found true beyond
    a reasonable doubt after a trial or admitted by Megaw,” meaning
    14
    that newly-amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) barred the
    court from relying upon them at sentencing. As explained earlier
    in our Discussion, we have concluded that section 1170,
    subdivision (b) does not apply to stipulated sentences imposed
    pursuant to plea bargains. (See Discussion, part A.2, ante.) In
    addition, at Megaw’s initial sentencing hearing, his counsel
    “stipulate[d] to a factual basis based on the information and
    attached reports and transcripts.” Megaw does not address this
    stipulation, let alone argue that it has no import as to the
    resentencing court’s reliance on facts set forth in the police
    reports and probation report. We thus reject Megaw’s assertion
    that the court erred in relying on these documents. (See People v.
    Evans (2011) 
    200 Cal.App.4th 735
    , 756, fn. 12 [declining to
    address an argument that a party failed to support adequately].)
    Megaw further complains that the resentencing court
    erroneously “refus[ed] to hear from the victim of the crime who
    was present at the hearing and willing to testify.” We review this
    claim of error for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Thomas
    (2021) 
    63 Cal.App.5th 612
    , 626 [indicating that the “decision to
    admit or exclude evidence” is typically committed to the trial
    court’s discretion].) Megaw correctly observes that his counsel
    had represented at the resentencing hearing that if called to the
    stand, the victim would testify: “Megaw’s accomplice, . . . was the
    leader of what was supposed to be a robbery,” the accomplice
    “ordered Megaw around during the crime”; Megaw “appeared to
    be under the influence of alcohol or drugs”; and he “was panicked
    and wanted to leave once the robbery was complete.” Megaw
    argues, “The court’s refusal to hear this evidence . . . directly
    contradicts the assertion that there was an unreasonable risk
    that Megaw would commit a crime which carried a life sentence.”
    15
    He claims his counsel’s representations regarding the victim’s
    testimony “[i]nstead . . . suggest[ ] Megaw was surprised by [his
    accomplice’s] escalation of a robbery into a kidnapping.”
    The resentencing court, however, found an unreasonable
    risk that Megaw would commit an offense referenced in
    section 1170.18 because, regardless of whether “he was the leader
    or he was a follower[,] . . . he was there[, h]e participated[, and
    h]e aided and abetted.” The court’s statements indicate that even
    if the victim had provided testimony consistent with the
    representations of Megaw’s counsel, the court would still have
    concluded that Megaw had perpetrated a violation of section 209,
    subdivision (b)(1). Under these circumstances, we conclude the
    resentencing court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
    allow the victim to testify at the hearing. (See People v. Ledbetter
    (2014) 
    222 Cal.App.4th 896
    , 904 [“ ‘The law neither does nor
    requires idle acts.’ ”].)
    Lastly, Megaw argues that the resentencing court erred in
    characterizing his performance on parole as “terrible.” At his
    initial sentencing hearing, Megaw admitted he suffered several
    prior convictions for which he served terms in prison, including a
    1998 conviction for robbery in violation of section 211; a 2008
    conviction for burglary in violation of section 459; and a 2012
    conviction for another burglary in violation of section 459. He
    pleaded nolo contendere to five offenses in the instant action,
    including a kidnapping and a second degree robbery. Thus,
    regardless of whether Megaw’s performance on parole could be
    fairly characterized as terrible, the record substantiates the
    resentencing court’s finding that Megaw had “continued to go
    back to state prison on serious offenses,” which finding supports
    the court’s conclusion there was an unreasonable risk that
    16
    Megaw would commit a serious offense in the future. (See
    Alvarez, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 [holding that an
    appellate court should review the “ ‘record in the light most
    favorable to the judgment’ ” in assessing the trial court’s factual
    findings].)
    In sum, Megaw fails to show that the resentencing court
    erred in finding that reducing Megaw’s prison term would
    endanger public safety. For the same reason, Megaw does not
    establish the resentencing court abused its discretion in declining
    to dismiss the one-year enhancement imposed under
    section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and the five-year enhancement
    imposed under section 667, subdivision (a).
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    BENDIX, J.
    We concur:
    ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
    WEINGART, J.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B324731

Filed Date: 10/26/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2023