In re I.P. CA2/8 ( 2024 )

Filed 1/16/24 In re I.P. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re I.P. et al., Persons Coming B326088
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01954A-D
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARIA J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Ashley Price, Commissioner. Appeal dismissed.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
The mother in this dependency case challenges the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings and orders concerning three of her
four children. During the pendency of her appeal, the juvenile
court terminated jurisdiction over the three children, who had
remained placed with mother throughout the proceeding. The
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. We
agree the appeal is moot, and we decline to exercise our
discretion to address mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional
findings and orders.
BACKGROUND
Mother Maria J. has four children: daughter I.P., son D.P.,
son I.R. and daughter A.R. Her daughter I.P. is the oldest, now a
teenager. The father of I.P. and D.P. is A.P.; the two youngest
children have a different father, J.R.M. Neither father is a party
to mother’s appeal.
In May 2022, the Department filed a juvenile dependency
petition, and amended the petition in July 2022. The amended
petition, as sustained on October 20, 2022, alleged that J.R.M.,
father of the two younger children, sexually abused I.P., and that
mother knew of the sexual abuse and failed to protect I.P.,
placing her and her siblings at risk. The allegations of each of
the sustained counts were identical. After describing J.R.M.’s
sexual abuse, the petition alleged mother knew of the abuse and
allowed J.R.M. to reside in the home and have unlimited access
to I.P. “The mother has an inability to protect the child as the
mother has repeatedly stated she does not believe the child was
sexually abused by [J.R.M.]. Such sexual abuse of the child [I.P.]
by [J.R.M.] and the mother’s failure to protect the children
endangers [I.P.’s] physical health, safety and well-being and
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places child and the child’s siblings, [D.P., I.R. and A.R.] at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, danger, sexual abuse and failure
to protect.”
As to I.P. and D.P., the allegations were sustained under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1)
(failure to protect), (d) (failure to protect from sexual abuse), and
(j) (abuse or neglect of sibling). As to I.R. and A.R., the
allegations were sustained under subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).
The court declared all the children dependents of the court;
removed I.P. from mother; and, among other things, placed D.P.
with both parents and I.R. and A.R. with mother, under
supervision of the Department.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
In her opening brief, mother stated she “does not contest
the jurisdiction findings and orders with respect to [I.P.].” But
she contended the findings and orders with respect to the other
three children were not supported by substantial evidence.
Mother contended D.P., I.R. and A.R. did not face any current or
future risk of sexual abuse; the other three children did not
witness any inappropriate conduct; they were “dissimilarly
situated from [I.P.], and faced a significantly lower risk of similar
abuse”; and J.R.M. did not reside in the family home.
The Department filed its respondent’s brief and at the same
time filed a request for judicial notice and a motion to dismiss the
appeal.
We grant judicial notice of minute orders of the juvenile
court and final juvenile custody orders, as requested by the
Department. The minute orders show that on April 20, 2023, the
juvenile court granted a motion to terminate jurisdiction, and on
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April 28, 2023, the court received, signed and filed juvenile
custody orders terminating jurisdiction over each of the children.
The custody orders show mother has sole physical custody of I.R.
and A.R., and joint legal custody with their father. Mother has
joint legal and joint physical custody of I.P. and D.P. with their
father.
We agree with the Department that mother’s appeal of the
October 2022 jurisdictional and dispositional orders is moot, and
we decline to exercise our discretion to decide the appeal. We
have considered mother’s late-filed opposition to the
Department’s motion, but find her opposition to have no merit.
The governing principles are described in In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266 (D.P.). “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a
specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon
reversal, the case is not moot, and merits review is required.
When a parent has not made such a showing, the case is moot,
but the court has discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.”
(Id. at p. 283.)
Here, mother makes no serious contention that her appeal
is not moot. Indeed, she concedes she “cannot identify a ‘specific
legal consequence’ this Court could redress,” and concedes this
court cannot provide “immediate, effective relief which would
presently alter” mother’s legal status. As in D.P., mother “has
not demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that
would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.)
Nor are we persuaded this is an appropriate case to
exercise our discretion to decide a moot appeal. In D.P., the
Supreme Court discussed a nonexhaustive list of factors for
assessing whether a court should exercise discretionary review of
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a moot appeal. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285–287.) These
include whether the challenged jurisdictional finding could be
prejudicial to the appellant in future dependency proceedings (id.
at p. 285); whether the finding is based on particularly pernicious
or stigmatizing conduct (id. at pp. 285–286); and whether the
case became moot due to prompt compliance by parents with
their case plan (id. at p. 286).
Mother recites each of these factors (in less than one page
of argument, most of it consisting of quotations from D.P.), but
does not explain or elaborate on their application in her
particular case. She says the finding she exposed her children to
sexual abuse would prejudice her in a future proceeding but does
not explain how. She quotes the language from D.P. about
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct, but she has not contested the
jurisdictional findings concerning I.P., the child who was the
subject of the abuse. The only factor cited that arguably favors
mother is her apparently prompt compliance that resulted in the
termination of jurisdiction.
D.P. instructs us to consider all relevant factors, the
totality of the evidence, and the overarching goal of the
dependency system to safeguard children, with a focus on
preserving the family and the child’s well-being. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Having done so and having balanced the
pertinent considerations, we decline to exercise our discretion to
consider the merits of mother’s moot appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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